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Abstract
This thesis examines the organisational transformation of the British Labour 
Party since 1983. The main intellectual contributions are: (1) the development of a 
rational choice model of party organisation; (2) an explanation Labour’s 
organisational reforms, a subject that has attracted little academic attention.
An exchange model of party organisation is developed, focusing on leader- 
follower relations inside parties. It builds on previous exchange models and extends 
the approach to the issue of party change, on which some general propositions are 
offered. The model is used to examine changes in leader-follower relations in the 
Labour Party. It is shown that Labour’s historic form of intraparty exchange 
consisted of that between the parliamentary elite and the leaders of the major trade 
unions affiliated to the party, institutionalised in the ‘block vote’. Labour’s problems 
with the unions in the 1970s and its subsequent electoral wilderness years persuaded 
party leaders to reduce union influence to broaden the party’s electoral appeal.
The strategy was to enfranchise individual members at the expense of activist 
cliques and unions. Three areas of decision-making are examined -  policymaking, 
parliamentary candidate selection, and leadership contests -  and two trends are 
evident: (1) the erosion of Labour’s federal structure, based on union affiliation and 
its replacement by a unitary (individual membership) structure; (2) the centralisation 
of power with party elites. A new form of exchange, between party leaders and 
individual members, has increasingly replaced that between party and union leaders. 
This has given Labour’s organisation a greater degree of electoral legitimacy by 
reducing its reliance on the unions (who might extract policy concessions from 
Labour governments). However, centralisation has gone so far that it is questionable 
whether party activists and unions have sufficient incentives to remain inside the 
party, supplying it with labour and finance. To this extent, the exchange model alerts 
us to the possibility that Labour may no longer possess ‘equilibrium institutions’.
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1 Introduction
1.1 INTRODUCTION
In July 2001, the Labour Movements Specialists Group of the UK Political 
Studies Association convened a conference on interpretations of the Labour Party. 
The organisers’ aim was to ‘revisit and re-evaluate the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of key interpretative approaches’ to the study of the party and thereby 
‘better understand Labour’s past, present, and possible future’. Conference papers 
covered the ideology and history of labourism, reflections on the Marxian analyses of 
Ralph Miliband, Tom Naim and Perry Anderson, an application of cultural theory to 
the party, and an explanation of the Labour Party-trade union link in terms of social 
norms. Rational choice theory was not represented at the conference. Indeed, one 
participant asserted: ‘the rational choice model, taken alone, affords little 
illumination on the operations and dynamics of the Labour Party’ (Shaw, 2001b).
The present thesis disagrees fundamentally with this last remark and shows 
that rational choice can in fact shed considerable light on the Labour Party. It 
explains the functioning of Labour’s internal institutions and offers an account of 
why party leaders felt compelled to reform them after 1983. This was the beginning 
of Labour’s ‘modernisation’ and is a contentious period in the party’s history. This 
opening chapter establishes the remit of the thesis. In section 1.2,1 briefly overview 
existing work on Labour’s modernisation. In section 1.3 I state the aims of this thesis 
and justify its focus before outlining the subsequent chapters in section 1.4.
1.2 EXISTING WORK ON THE LABOUR PARTY
Existing work on the Labour Party since 1983 covers most of the changes in 
policy, organisation and strategy the party has undertaken with the emphasis on
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policy changes. The present thesis is concerned solely with organisational changes 
but argues that the latter were motivated by a desire to make the party more electable 
by easing internal constraints on policy. Labour’s modernisation involved 
abandoning leftwing policies in a range of areas, including defence, European 
integration and the economy. All were important but Labour’s changes to its 
economic policies were perhaps the most significant and have elicited the most 
attention by academic commentators. Much of the debate has been normative, 
discussing Labour’s relationship to social democracy or whether it made too many 
concessions to Thatcherism. Labour’s policy shifts are not the focus of this thesis but 
they have some related importance to the extent that they were motivated by electoral 
considerations. These competing accounts can be categorised by whether or not they 
regard Labour’s changes as necessary and/or desirable. Leftist critics such as Hay 
(1999) and Heffeman (2001) find the changes undesirable and unnecessary. They 
suggest Labour could have won with radical policies if it had tried persuading voters 
of its case. Marxisant followers of Ralph Miliband find the changes undesirable but 
an inevitable response to the economic and electoral constraints on reformist social 
democratic parties (Panitch and Leys, 1997; Coates, 2001; Coates and Panitch, 
2001). These writers hold a normative commitment to the manual working class and 
find Labour an extremely limited vehicle for change. More sympathetic observers 
such as Martin Smith and Mark Wickham-Jones find the changes, to varying 
degrees, both necessary and desirable though more recent changes are criticised.
In an exchange with Hay and in other articles, Smith has defended the cause 
of Labour’s modernisers (Smith, 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 2000; see also Smith and 
Spear, 1992). He suggests the left’s programme and strategy were discredited by the 
election defeat of 1983 and that Labour had to transform its electoral, party and 
governing strategies. This entailed appealing to middle class voters, centralising 
power in the party and adopting economic policies that fit with the realities of 
globalisation (Smith, 2000: 144-50). Economic policy has been at the centre of 
debates about Labour, with observers such as Wickham-Jones (1995a, 1995b, 1996, 
1997) arguing that economic circumstances made the abandonment of radical 
policies inevitable. This view is based on the ‘structural constraints’ theory of social 
democracy (Przeworski, 1985) whereby social democratic governments are 
constrained by the need to maintain corporate profitability. Failure to do this can
12
precipitate capital flight, unemployment and a fiscal crisis of the state. The thesis has 
been attacked by Hay who claims that it implies a ‘logic of no alternative’ for social 
democratic governments and leads them to accept the new right’s neo-liberal agenda 
(1999: 149, 175). However, structural constraints are precisely that -  constraints -  
whereas the ‘logic of no alternative’ is implied only by structural determinism, which 
neither Przeworski nor Wickham-Jones advocates. A constraint involves a restriction 
on freedom but rarely a total negation of it (e.g. a dog is constrained by its leash). 
That much is obvious from Przeworski’s original discussion, in which he argued that 
socialist parties went along with the strictures of neo-classical economics until the 
1930s but then discovered Keynesian techniques of demand-management, enabling 
them to secure material improvements for workers under capitalism. Hay’s argument 
illustrates the entangling of normative and analytical debates evident in much work 
on the Labour Party. The present thesis eschews normative arguments, focusing 
instead on what did happen and why rather than whether it should have happened.
In contrast to Labour’s policy changes, its organisational transformation has 
received less attention. An older literature exists on the distribution of power in the 
party, centred round the famous ‘McKenzie thesis’ of domination by the 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) (McKenzie, 1964, 1982; see also Minkin, 1980; 
Kavanagh, 1985, 1998; Brand, 1989; Beer, 1982). This thesis is examined in Chapter 
5. The major source of contention was over whether PLP leaders were free of control 
by the Labour Party conference. After 1983, this debate was overtaken by new 
organisational developments, examined in a series of books and papers by Eric Shaw 
(1988; 1994: 108-23; 1996; 2000b; 2001a). Shaw’s basic claim is that since 1983 
Labour’s leaders have increasingly centralised power. He offers normative 
arguments against this development and complains that the ‘one member -  one vote’ 
(OMOV) reforms amount to centralisation through the back door. Shaw also 
documents how party leaders have acquired increasing control over the policymaking 
process. In this he is joined by Gerald Taylor (1997: 42-67; 1999: 9-25), who 
complains that party members have been sidelined in policymaking.
A more sympathetic voice to the organisational changes is Patrick Seyd 
(1993: 85-92), who claims they were a necessary part of making Labour electable. 
However, Seyd also claims that recent reforms have ‘de-energised’ Labour members 
and reduced the party’s campaigning capabilities (Seyd, 1999). Seyd, in
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collaboration with Paul Whiteley has also written a book and numerous articles on 
Labour’s membership, based on large-scale surveys (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; 
Whiteley and Seyd, 1998a). These data are referred to in the present thesis. Labour’s 
organisational structure has also been compared to other British parties by Paul 
Webb (1994, 2000), who too points to the reality of centralisation-through- 
democratisation though Webb’s account is largely non-normative.
One of the major areas of interest in this thesis is the reform of Labour’s 
institutional links with the trade unions. The major account of the party-union link is 
Lewis Minkin’s The Contentious Alliance (1992). Minkin is a staunch defender of 
the link though he has accepted the need for reform. Minkin was a member of the 
NEC’s trade union links review group in 1992-3 and aligned himself with the 
‘traditionalists’ seeking limited rather than extensive changes. Minkin’s arguments 
have been assessed by Steve Ludlam (1998, 2001a), who at first concluded a 
‘divorce’ was likely but changed his mind after the first term of the Blair government 
and the subsequent (temporary?) reduction in party-union tensions. Repeated 
reference is made to Minkin’s work throughout the present thesis and its analytical 
framework (based on norms and values) is critically assessed in Chapter 9.
In summary, a principal aim of this thesis is to fill a gap in the literature on 
the contemporary Labour Party. Most existing work focuses on policy changes while 
discussion of organisational reform is scarcer. There has been no book-length 
analysis of Labour’s organisational transformation. The present thesis examines all 
the major reforms and explains them within the framework of analytical models, 
which together comprises a significant part of the ‘value-added’ of the thesis.
1.3 AIMS OF THE THESIS
This thesis utilises many of the arguments deployed in the accounts listed 
above but it goes beyond them, integrating their insights into a coherent whole 
structured round a rational choice model of party organisation. The aim is to explain 
why Labour’s organisational structure changed so dramatically in the two decades 
after its catastrophic general election defeat of 1983.1 explore the external pressures 
and intraparty forces that were instrumental in shaping the party. I do not employ a 
great deal of primary sources, other than some published Labour Party documents.
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The primary contribution of this thesis is towards the development o f theoretical 
models that help us understand the processes of institutional design and change in 
parties. Existing rational choice work on party organisation is utilised to fashion a 
fuller model that sheds light on the competing pressures on intraparty actors. A major 
aim of this thesis is to open up the black box of party organisation and connect it to 
existing models of party competition, which have received more attention.
It might be objected that developing a model on the basis of one case is risky. 
However, I believe this approach can be justified. First, there are precedents in the 
party organisation literature, the most celebrated being Roberto Michels’ (1962) 
account of the German Social Democratic Party, on the basis of which the author 
formulated his famous ‘iron law of oligarchy’. Second, although this thesis develops 
theoretical tools that can be used to analyse any party, other aspects of it have a 
narrower empirical reach. The model of party competition I utilise assumes a two- 
party system. In practice, such systems tend to be the exception rather than the norm 
(though this does not detract from their importance -  many insights have been gained 
by work on spatial models of two-party competition). This means there is a much 
narrower range of cases available for comparison and besides, party organisations 
and political systems vary considerably across states. Thus, the USA has a two-party 
system but its parties have loose organisational structures in which the entire notion 
of party membership is problematical. Alternatively, the Australian Labor Party is 
similar in some respects to its British cousin but Australia is a federal state and uses a 
preferential electoral system. The federal structure -  replicated in the Australian 
Labor Party, which is divided along state lines -  complicates comparisons, not least 
because the federal Labor Party is less developed than the state parties (Manning, 
1996; Albanese and Robinson, 1996; Maddox, 1978; Overacker, 1968).
One of the advantages of using the British example is that given its electoral 
system and unitary structure, the UK’s political and party system most closely 
resembles the simple system used by Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory o f 
Democracy (1957), a text that provides the model of party competition used in this 
thesis. To this, it might be objected that the UK is not really a two-party system 
because the Liberal Democrats (or their forerunners) consistently achieve about one- 
sixth of the votes in general elections. However, when we look at the allocation of 
seats in the House of Commons, we do indeed find a largely two-party system: even
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in 2001, when the Liberal Democrats achieved the best result by a third party since 
the 1920s, their 52 seats amounted to only 8 percent of the total, while the 
Conservatives and Labour combined accounted for 88 percent of the legislative seats. 
The assumption of two-party competition is thus a simplification but a justifiable 
one, not least because two-party systems often exhibit strong centripetal tendencies, 
an observation confirmed by the experience of the period under review. In Britain, 
only Labour has undertaken comprehensive organisational change since the early 
1980s, largely because it was electorally uncompetitive. The Conservative Party 
could postpone change because it kept winning elections, though its landslide defeat 
in 1997 prompted some organisational change with the possibility of more to come.
In short, the British Labour Party offers a unique study in comprehensive 
organisational change in the context of a two-party system. However, this does not 
mean that the lessons drawn from it are inapplicable to other parties. On the contrary, 
many of its reforms have been replicated elsewhere and identified as contemporary 
trends in party organisational development, ranging from the empowerment of 
individual members in candidate selection, to new developments in policymaking 
(Scarrow, et al., 2000; LeDuc, 2001). By focusing on the Labour Party, it is possible 
to test the model’s explanatory power over a wide range of institutional reforms. One 
caveat, however, is that even after the reforms, Labour did not correspond to some 
ideal-typical party structure, which was somehow the endpoint of party reformers. I 
argue that institutional change is a contested and negotiated process, whereby 
outcomes reflect actors’ preferences, existing institutional opportunities and electoral 
considerations. Rather than being an evolutionary process, party change also reflects 
power struggles. The method of enquiry employed in this thesis is to examine 
institutions before and after change and account for the motives of reformers. I 
pursue the usual rational choice approach of analysing the range of outcomes 
permitted by institutional constraints but I endogenise institutional design. 
Institutional stability and institutional change are twin areas of concern in this work.
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This thesis focuses on the main areas of institutionalised decision-making in 
parties, namely candidate selection, leadership election and policymaking. In the
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Labour Party this means looking at the principal reforms to the national and local 
structures. The unitary nature of the UK state ensures that the national decision­
making institutions of the Labour Party are pre-eminent though local bodies are 
important in the selection of parliamentary candidates. Changes to Labour’s regional 
structure are not considered because it has traditionally been of lesser importance. 
Recently, regional bodies have been given a boost, first through UK devolution and 
second through their representation in Labour’s new national policy forum.1 They 
may become the focus of future research in to the party’s organisational structure.
Before discussing the Labour Party, some theoretical issues are addressed. In 
Chapter 2 ,1 provide a brief account and justification of the rational choice approach. 
Major rational choice concepts are introduced and key notions such as office-seeking 
politicians and imperfect information are explored. Critiques of both the approach in 
general and its previous application to the Labour Party are evaluated.
Chapter 3 turns to the theory of party organisation, beginning with an 
assessment of older theories. ‘Evolutionary’ models are rejected for the present study 
because their focus is on long term transformations rather than the sort of 
incremental changes that are of interest here. Ware (1996) distinguishes between 
electoral, institutional and ‘sociological’ accounts of party organisation, and while 
each has some strengths, none can explain all the important aspects of parties. 
However, these approaches inform the rational choice ‘exchange’ model that is 
developed in the remainder of the chapter. The exchange in question is between 
politicians and activists: politicians need activists to campaign for them and in return 
for labour and finance, they offer policy promises. However, this exchange is non- 
simultaneous and politicians face commitment problems over their willingness to 
deliver activists’ preferred policies. Moreover, activists have different preferences so 
they cannot all exchange resources for promises. To solve these problems, 
institutions substitute for explicit market exchange. However, these institutional 
solutions are not perfect because politicians promise policies for citizens’ votes. 
Voters’ preferences are usually more ‘moderate’ than those of activists so politicians 
require autonomy within parties in order to chart a course between the two. Tensions 
between activists and politicians are never fully resolved and the latter may seek to 
reduce their reliance on activists. Some propositions on party change are derived 
from the analysis and are deployed in the thesis. Three propositions are of particular
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relevance to the Labour Party: (1) in two-party systems, electoral failure is a major 
precipitant of change; (2) politicians prefer more autonomy from members and seek 
change that achieves this goal; and (3) parties founded by or accountable to external 
organisations such as trade unions, may suffer electorally if  voters suspect their 
policy promises lack credibility due to their external links.
I am not claiming that a new ‘theory’ is being offered here. No overarching 
meta-theory of party change is advocated in this thesis. Instead, the explanatory 
thrust is more short- and middle-range, developing and applying a set of analytical 
tools, embedded in models, and which can in principle be used to study other parties. 
The propositions I offer on party change are probabilistic rather than deterministic in 
nature. An important reason for this is that party members have different preferences 
over policies and institutions. Thus, parties do not simply follow an evolutionary 
logic (though there will be evolutionary tendencies) because organisational change is 
also shaped by internal power struggles. Since the balance of forces varies both 
between and within parties over time, it is hazardous attempting to offer general 
predictions for all parties. Institutional change may be precipitated by electoral 
failure but rival intraparty actors will still negotiate over change. For this reason, it is 
better for us to have analytical tools for exploring political mechanisms rather than 
seeking a general theory of party development.
Chapter 4 begins the analysis of the Labour Party by applying the exchange 
model to Labour’s pre-modemised organisational structure. Some historical details 
are provided about the party’s emergence and growth and there are also accounts of 
the coalitions for change that formed in the 1980s when Labour’s electoral fortunes 
were at their nadir. The centrepiece of the chapter is an analysis of the trade union 
block vote, a key internal institution in Labour’s decision-making bodies. The block 
vote is normally regarded as an institution that facilitated oligarchic control of the 
Labour Party, a claim largely accepted here. Less attention has been given to its 
efficiency in safeguarding the supply of trade union resources to the party by linking 
financial donations to voting power. This institutional arrangement with the unions 
was a rational response by a party that needed union money and could not wait to 
build up slowly an individual membership.
Chapters 5-7 examine the institutional reforms in the Labour Party since 
1983. Each chapter begins with a rational choice account of the status quo ante,
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setting out the types of behaviour and outcomes that the institutions produced. 
Explanations are offered of why party reformers wanted to change these institutions 
and then I describe the new institutions and why various actors were persuaded to 
support change. One question the analytical tools developed in Chapter 3 are 
deployed to address is: Why did the unions that bankrolled the Labour Party permit it 
to change so fundamentally that their own material and organisational interests came 
under attack? I return to this question in Chapter 9.
Chapter 5 examines Labour’s policymaking bodies. An account is given of 
the policymaking structure in 1983, focusing on the annual conference and the 
national executive committee (NEC). The relationship of this extraparliamentary 
nexus to the PLP has been the traditional focus of debate about power in the Labour 
Party. Shortcomings in this debate are highlighted and I argue that the absence of 
direct enforcement mechanisms has been responsible for the PLP’s independence of 
the annual conference. The new policymaking structure of the 1990s organised round 
the national policy forum is analysed and shown to facilitate elite control of the 
party, though not to the extent some critics have alleged. The guiding principles 
surrounding reform have been to centralise decision-making power with the 
parliamentary leadership and to give the policymaking process greater legitimacy by 
directly reducing union input or undermining union-dominated bodies, such as the 
annual conference. I show that the institutions were in need of reform but the new 
structures risk depriving party members of any real influence over policymaking.
Chapter 6 analyses the selection of parliamentary candidates -  the most 
contested reforms of the period. Candidate selection is presented as a series of 
intraparty screens enabling various actors to select or veto candidates. Many screens 
have been reformed in the Labour Party since 1983 including not only voting rules 
but also nomination rules and the powers of the centre. The major reform was the 
adoption of OMOV and two stages in its progress are identified. First, party leaders 
sought to reduce the influence of the activist left by enfranchising inactive (and 
‘moderate’) members. The collective action problems faced by the latter effectively 
meant that OMOV entailed centralisation-through-democratisation. However, it is 
shown that the granting of voting rights carries dangers for a centralising leadership 
unless the centre’s veto powers are strengthened. Second, OMOV signalled the launch 
of an assault on the party-union link. Its achievement in 1993 marked a significant
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step away from Labour’s federal structure towards an individual membership 
structure, which was deemed to possess greater legitimacy in the eyes of voters.
Chapter 7 examines Labour’s electoral college for leadership contests. I 
sketch a principal-agent framework for understanding the constraints on political 
leadership and apply it to Labour. In its original form, the electoral college was 
dominated by the trade unions, even though they controlled only 40 percent of its 
votes, because block voting enabled four or five large unions to sew up leadership 
contests early on. The abolition of block voting and the introduction of OMOV 
curtailed the power of union leaders in leadership contests. However, party members 
did not really benefit at their expense. Instead, MPs and the media have assumed the 
‘kingmaking’ role formerly played by union leaders. Once again, the changes 
represented a big step away from Labour’s federal structure, as individual union 
levypayers were enfranchised at the expense of their union leaders. The electoral 
college has never really enabled party members to hold their leaders to account but is 
instead a way of bestowing legitimacy on elected leaders. An appendix offers 
reflections on the reformed structure of the NEC.
Chapter 8 addresses the issue of Labour’s organisational resources. The first 
part of the chapter looks at trends in funding and membership levels. Labour’s 
financial dependence on the unions decreased significantly during the 1990s but 
individual membership remains fairly low despite a brief period of fast growth. I 
argue that relying on wealthy donors is no substitute for union finance and that only 
state-funding of political parties would enable the party to abandon the unions. The 
second part of the chapter assesses Labour’s use of its resources in campaigns. 
Labour made a deliberate attempt to switch to capital-intensive communication 
technologies, thereby reducing its dependence on policy-seeking activists. I develop 
a theoretical framework for understanding the place of communications in political 
exchange and provide a brief account of the new techniques. Labour’s renewed 
interest in constituency campaigning during general elections requires a core of 
activists so party leaders cannot completely ignore the wishes of activists.
Chapter 9 concludes by reflecting on Labour’s organisational transformation 
and the theoretical tools deployed in the work. I argue that two main stages are 
apparent in Labour’s organisational overhaul. First, there were moves to centralise 
power and undermine the leftwing activists in the 1980s. Second, the 1990s saw the
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erosion of the party-union link in many areas (accompanied by further 
centralisation). The result is that Labour, from being a largely federal party with 
some unitary features is now a mainly unitary party with some federal features. 
However, it resembles Kirchheimer’s catch-all party rather than Duverger’s ‘bottom- 
up’ mass party. The motivation for organisational reform was Labour’s parlous 
electoral position, with successive election defeats eroding opposition to change. 
This is why the unions went along with many of the changes: modernisers claimed 
that voters distrusted Labour because the unions had dominated the party and only 
reform would allow trust to be rebuilt. Since the unions had an interest in the return 
of a Labour government, they accepted through gritted teeth the reform agenda. Now 
that office has been achieved, the exchange model directs our attention to the unions, 
who are starting to question their value-for-money from the link. This raises 
questions about whether Labour’s institutions any longer provide individuals and 
unions with incentives to remain members. The thesis ends with reflections on the 
advantages of the exchange approach over other explanations of the Labour Party.
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2 The Rational Choice Approach
2.1 RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS
I do not intend to engage in an exhaustive discussion of rational choice theory 
not least because the widespread and increasing use of rational choice models is a 
testament to the utility of the approach. Nevertheless, it is necessary to remind 
ourselves of the key assumptions employed in rational choice analyses.1
Rational choice models are based on the interaction of individuals, who are 
generally seen as the bearers of preferences but who are confronted by a range of 
economic, institutional and informational constraints. ‘Rationality’ in rational choice 
refers to individuals’ means rather than ends, though certain conditions are laid down 
about preferences. First, preferences must be complete in that all options can be 
ranked better than or equal to each other. Second, individual preferences must be 
transitive, or, logically consistent -  if I prefer x  to y  andy to z, I should also logically 
prefer x  to z. Third, preferences must be translatable into action, so that if I prefer x 
to y, then given a choice between x  and y  I will undertake action to bring about x 
(Dowding and Hindmoor, 1997: 455; see also Downs, 1957: 6).
An individual’s preferences are usually assumed to be fixed (see below) and 
the interest for the analyst concerns whether the individual chooses from the 
available courses of action that which secures her highest attainable preferred end. 
Rational individuals do this because they are assumed to engage in maximising 
behaviour. Specifically, individuals seek to maximise their utility, which is seen as an 
analytic rather than a substantive concept, referring to von Neumann-Morgenstem 
utiles (not happiness, satisfaction, desire, etc.) -  a means by which numerical values 
can be attached to preferences. Each individual possesses a utility function that 
captures her choice behaviour under institutional, informational, etc. constraints
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(Dowding, forthcoming). A rational actor will not choose a course o f action that 
leads to a lower payoff than she could obtain by acting differently. Moreover, actions 
are chosen purely to achieve certain goals (instrumentalism) rather than being 
pursued for their own sake -  only the attainment of the actor’s goals will enable her 
to accrue utility. Actions themselves involve the expenditure of scarce resources and 
thus involve costs. Some rational choice theorists have sought to relax the 
assumption of instrumentalism by allowing a greater role for expressive motives, 
whereby individuals can undertake actions because the actions themselves are 
pleasurable (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993; Chong, 2000; Schuessler, 2000). In their 
surveys of party members in the UK, Seyd and Whiteley (1992; Whiteley et al., 
1994) suggest expressive benefits are an important motive to join parties. However, 
many rational choice theorists are uneasy about the role of expressive motives in 
models because there is the danger that they can be invoked to ‘explain’ any 
discrepancy between a model’s predicted outcome and observed empirical outcomes. 
In the model of party organisation I develop, expressive benefits are absent.
Strictly speaking, utility maximisation is not the same as self-interest. An 
altruist could maximise her utility by performing generous acts for others but this 
could entail costs for herself and not be in her selfish interest (Margolis, 1982; see 
also Bergstrom and Stark, 1993; Eshel et al., 1999). However, most rational choice 
models do assume self-interest, which is usually introduced via what Kavka (1991: 
373) calls ‘auxiliary assumptions’, which often supersede utility maximisation. For 
example, an entrepreneur seeks to maximise profits, a politician seeks to maximise 
votes, a bureaucrat seeks to maximise budgets, etc. In the present work, utility 
maximisation and self-interest are, unless otherwise specified, assumed to be 
congruent. The reason is that this work deals principally with institutional actors 
rather than actual individuals. This corresponds to the type/token distinction, in 
which a type is a general class of object, actor, etc. while a token is a specific 
example of a given type (see Dowding, 1991: 11). Thus, I talk about general types -  
‘party leaders’, ‘activists’, ‘trade union leaders’, ‘voters’, and even ‘leftwingers’ and 
‘rightwingers’. Such actors are defined by their institutional or structural position or 
role rather than by any peculiar personal tastes that may enter into their utility 
functions. Even when I talk about token individuals such as Neil Kinnock, I do so 
largely in his (former) capacity as the leader of a vote-seeking party and not as an
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individual with a personal history and idiosyncratic quirks. Proper names generally 
do not enter into rational choice models (Dowding, 1994: 109).
The type/token distinction is relevant to another feature of rational choice 
theory -  methodological individualism. This is the doctrine that all outcomes and 
events are to be explained in terms of individuals’ actions. Sociological critics of 
rational choice have long complained about its focus on individuals at the expense, 
as they see it, of social structures and institutions. However, much of this critique is 
misplaced. The emphasis on type rather than token actors ensures that certain 
institutional and structural elements are directly incorporated into rational choice 
models via actors’ preference schedules and constraints (see Dowding, 1991: 10-16; 
1996: Ch.2). Assuming a politician to be an office-seeker means importing structural 
features of the competitive party system into our explanation of individual actions. 
Far from being anti-structuralist, most rational choice models are in fact quite 
structuralist (Dowding and Hindmoor, 1997: 453).
The other main point about individualism in models is that it does not have to 
be methodologically so (Dowding, 1991: 10). Rational choice theorists contend that 
while events can be explained in terms of individuals often it is otiose to do so 
because macro-level (e.g. institutional-level) explanations may suffice. Thus, it is 
possible to discuss the actions of ‘parties’ or ‘interest groups’ without referring to 
individuals because even though such collective bodies never have their own 
preferences (only individuals have desires), we can often refer to them as a shorthand 
for aggregates of individual decisions that take place within such bodies. In principle, 
we could explain a party’s electoral strategy by detailing the countless individual 
decisions taken but usually this is not necessary. All that matters for the individualist 
is that we could so explain if we desired.
The critic of rational choice may respond that this framework of analysis and 
the narrow characteristics of homo economicus offer an extremely pared-down 
concept of individuals and demand in its place a more ‘realistic’ view of human 
behaviour. However, rational choice theorists do not believe that all people are 
necessarily like that in every sphere of their lives; nor do they dispute the validity of 
non-rationalist approaches. Instead, they claim the simplifying assumptions of 
rational choice enable us to model scenarios, in which extraneous factors are filtered 
out and the explanatory work is done by a few concepts (Dowding, 1991, 1996;
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Dowding and Hindmoor, 1997). It is not inherently objectionable to simplify matters 
in this way -  all science is reductionist, explaining the complex in terms of the 
simple. This inevitably means that some things will be left out of our models (if this 
were not so they would be descriptions rather than models) and no model can explain 
100 percent of the variance. Nevertheless, good models and assumptions help 
illuminate key patterns, processes and mechanisms. For example, in his model of 
party competition, Anthony Downs (1957: 30) assumed unapologetically that 
‘[politicians in our model are motivated by the desire for power, prestige, and 
income ... their primary objective is to be elected.’ This provides politicians with an 
instrumental attitude to policy and ideology, which, as we shall see shortly gives the 
model a lot of analytical purchase. This assumption is a simplification -  real 
politicians are as likely as anyone else to have their own intrinsic preferences (more 
so since they have found their way into a political career). According to Downs, 
office-seeking politicians ‘choose an ideology which will win votes, not one they 
believe in, since their objective is the acquisition of office, not the creation of a better 
society’ (Downs, 1957: 111). This rather blunt and perhaps even cynical statement 
not only posits the primacy of office-seeking motives but also acknowledges that 
politicians may have private views that differ from the electorally optimal policy. 
Politicians may have their own private (perhaps radical) preferences but the success 
of their careers depends on their party’s policy programme. A party leader who 
sticks dogmatically to his own private preferences may find himself forever out of 
office or being removed by his colleagues. Often, the logic of party competition 
asserts itself so that such politicians either abandon their private preferences or do 
not publicise them and stick to the party line.4 This thesis employs the general 
assumption of politicians as office-seekers. This does not preclude politicians 
expressing support for radical policies to an intraparty audience in leadership 
contests, candidate selection, etc. What it does is to provide a useful approximate 
guide to the incentive structure of politicians in the British parliamentary system 
during the period under review, which was largely a two-party affair, at least in the 
House of Commons where it is legislative seats that count. Moreover, the 
‘Westminster model’ of executive-legislative fusion, strong party discipline, single 
party majority governments and a unitary state ensures that the only way of wielding 
real power is to win a national election (Lijphart, 1999).5
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The assumption of office-seeking indicates the types of situations in which 
rational choice is most fruitful -  when it is applied to types rather than tokens, which 
generally involves specific institutional settings where actors’ goals are clear and 
rules of interaction are precise (Tsebelis, 1990: 32-3). Political institutions, such as 
parties, provide such interactional settings with clearly-defined rules and a set of 
actors in clearly-defined roles. Many political scientists have, in recent years, turned 
their attention to the functioning of institutions, with rational choice theorists playing 
a leading role.6 Institutionalism and rational choice are well-suited. Institutions are 
formal or informal sets of rules, which provide ‘structure’ and establish the rules of 
the game. They constrain human action, helping define the choice set of individuals. 
Rational individuals pursue their interests subject to institutional limitations. This 
conception informs, for example, Williamson’s transactions cost analysis of 
organisation (1985), where individuals are assumed to be opportunistic ( ‘self-interest 
seeking with guile’) and ‘boundedly rational’, i.e. they are instrumentally rational 
subject to information constraints. As Alt and Shepsle (1990: 2) explain:
[PJositive political economy is the study o f  rational decisions in a 
context o f political and economic institutions. It deals with two 
characteristic questions: How do observed differences among 
institutions affect political and economic outcomes in various 
social, economic, and political systems, and how are institutions 
themselves affected by individual and collective beliefs, 
preferences, and strategies? In effect, these are questions about 
equilibrium in institutions and about institutions in equilibrium. In 
providing answers to these questions, positive political economy 
seeks both to furnish an understanding of optimal choices in 
various institutional settings and to endogenize those institutional 
settings... [T]he distinguishing characteristic of positive political 
economy is that it always considers these two questions to be 
related. (Emphasis in original).
What this implies, inter alia, is that ‘those seeking to change an institution have 
some result in mind when they try to do so’ (Alt and Shepsle, 1990: 2). Just as 
political actors have preferences over policy, they also have preferences over 
institutions because the latter present alternative utility streams: an actor may have 
more chance of achieving her goals in institution A than she would in institution B.
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This is merely a basic description of the fundamentals of the rational choice 
approach. The present thesis fleshes out this approach to institutions to explain why 
different actors in the Labour Party had divergent preferences over its structure. 
Indeed, I argue that the existence of party organisations per se reflects the mutual 
interdependence but conflicting preferences of elected politicians and volunteer 
activists. The argument is built around simple assumptions about how different types 
of actors interact with each other in a common institutional setting. An important 
component of my approach is one of the most famous models in the rational choice 
canon, the spatial, or ‘Downsian’ model of party competition. Given the importance 
of this model for the present thesis, and its recent criticised invocation in relation to 
the British Labour Party it is worthwhile examining it briefly.
2.2 THE DOWNSIAN MODEL AND THE STUDY OF THE LABOUR PARTY
The main theoretical work of this thesis consists of the exchange model of 
party organisation developed in Chapter 3. This model is partly founded on the 
Downsian model of two-party competition, which provides dynamism to the model 
of party organisation. That being so, some justification is needed for using the 
Downsian model. The analysis throughout this thesis is positive, with the emphasis 
on explaining what is rather than describing what ought (not) to be. Advocates of 
rational choice argue that it is ideal for explaining and analysing rather than merely 
describing and judging (Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997: 5-35). In the literature on the 
Labour Party, much work is informed by strong normative commitments. This is 
most obviously true of the various Marxist analyses of Labour, which bemoan its 
failure to be a vehicle for socialism and condemn its conservatism vis-a-vis the 
existing political and social order (Cliff and Gluckstein, 1988; Elliott, 1993; 
Miliband, 1972; Naim, 1964). Labour’s recent ‘modernisation’ has spurred a fresh 
wave of academic assaults from the left on the party’s leadership (e.g. Hay, 1994, 
1999; Taylor, 1997; Allender, 2001). Even Robert McKenzie’s (1964, 1982) famous 
analysis of the distribution of power in the Labour Party was informed by the 
normative belief that parties’ policy programmes should not be determined by extra- 
parliamentary bodies, such as Labour’s annual conference.
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The present work is not informed by normative commitments and offers no 
normative recommendations. Instead, it explains why certain actors in the Labour 
Party felt compelled to undertake organisational changes and why other actors 
supported them. The emphasis is on the ‘how, what and why’ of party change rather 
than on the ‘should or should not’. Yet many opponents of rational choice claim it is 
irredeemably tainted by its association with the new right (Self, 1993; see also King, 
1987: Ch.6) while in the UK, where rational choice is a minority pursuit, it is widely 
believed to predict pessimistic outcomes. However, rational choice is a method, not 
an ideology, and it can be used by political scientists of both left and right (Dowding 
and Hindmoor, 1997). Nevertheless, suspicion of rational choice has been expressed 
in the Labour Party literature, particularly in relation to the Downsian model, which 
is widely seen as informing Labour’s electoral strategy throughout the 1990s. As Hay 
(1999: 76) observes, ‘A quite startling range of authors have ... been impressed by 
the similarities of Labour’s “politics of catch-up”, with its studious targeting of the 
“median voter”, and the Downsian logic of electoral rationality and/or expediency’.7 
However, this recognition of the model’s importance is usually filled with dismay 
and regret. More often than not, the Downsian label is applied disapprovingly, as the 
Labour Party is condemned for an electoral strategy that is deemed pusillanimous or 
even treacherous. Far from being a positive model, the Downsian model is seen as 
largely normative and part of a conservative project, a siren song to seduce the 
leaders of socialist and radical parties into abandoning their progressive policies. 
How sympathetic should we be to these fears?
The Downsian two-party model is an informal statement of Duncan Black’s 
(1958) more rigorous median voter theorem (MVT). The latter states that if the 
members of a group have single peaked preferences and there is a unidimensional 
ideological/policy scale, then the ideal point of the median voter has an empty 
winset.8 This can be illustrated by considering a three-member voting body (say, a 
committee), with each member (X, Y and Z) ranking three alternative policy options 
(a, b and c) differently (Figure 2.1).
In Figure 2.1, Uj measures the utility accruing to individual i from a given 
policy position. Individual X’s preference ranking is a > b > c; Y’s ranking is b > a = 
c; and Z ’s ranking is c > b > a. If the options were put to pair-wise votes, b would 
defeat a by two votes (Y and Z) to one (X), and b would defeat c by two votes (X
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and Y) to one (Z). Option b is thus a Condorcet winner and as we can see, it is the 
preferred alternative of the median voter, Y. This result holds for a group of any size.
Figure 2.1 Median Voter Theorem
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b ca
Now one of Downs’ (1957) contributions was to relate (rather informally) 
this idea of the importance of the median voter to two-party electoral competition. 
The Downsian model consists of two types of actors, voters and parties (the latter 
being coterminous with politicians), with parties offering policy promises in 
exchange for citizens’ votes. Voters have single-peaked policy preference schedules, 
which are mapped along a unidimensional scale of ideology, based on attitudes 
towards government control of the economy (leftwing -  in favour of nationalisation; 
rightwing -  in favour of free markets9). Downs assumed voters are normally 
distributed along this scale, so that most voters are situated in the political 
centreground (though there is nothing to rule out the possibility of voter distributions 
skewed to the left or right, or of bimodal distributions). Meanwhile, parties are 
concerned solely with the aim of winning governmental office, regarding policies as 
means to an end: ‘[p]arties formulate policies in order to win elections rather than 
win elections in order to formulate policies’ (Downs, 1957: 28). Downs viewed 
politicians as vote-maximisers because this is the most effective way by which 
parties can win office. However, it is better to assume politicians are office-seekers, 
so that they seek only as many votes as they need to win an election (50 percent plus 
one).10 This is particularly apposite if we assume, as I do, that vote-gathering is 
costly (see Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1978: 76). Figure 2.2 depicts two parties (A
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and B), each seeking to win a majority of votes. Each voter supports the party that is 
nearest to her in ideological space. Parties try to steal a competitive advantage on 
each other by moving closer to each other and the limit of this convergence occurs 
when both parties position themselves at the median voter point (M).
Figure 2.2 Downsian Model o f Party Competition
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Aggregate Distribution of 
Voters’ Preferences
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Party convergence in this model reflects the fact that the median voter’s bliss 
point has an empty winset so each party aims to capture the support of the median 
voter. It is possible for a party to win the election even if it does not occupy point M 
-  provided that the other party is even further away from M. Furthermore, parties 
may converge even if they are not aware of MVT, e.g. through trial and error (see 
Dowding, 2000: 75-7). However, most discussions of the ‘pure’ Downsian model 
assume that the parties converge at M. It is this equilibrium result that has worried, 
among others, many critics of the British Labour Party’s electoral strategy in the 
1990s. Since this process of party convergence seems to capture precisely what has 
occurred in British politics over the last decade, Labour’s leftist academic critics, 
who generally prefer a more radical set of policies than those pursued by Labour’s 
leaders, have called into question the analytical value of the Downsian model.
I believe that such fears and hostility are misplaced. It is of course possible 
that a theory might be used as intellectual cover for a political programme but that 
fact alone is not sufficient to damn the theory. Moreover, it is unfair to claim that 
Downs advised that parties should adopt centrist policies. In fact, the model (when
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formalised) is purely axiomatic, stating that if a given set of axioms is satisfied (two 
parties, unidimensional scale, single-peaked preferences, proximity voting, etc.), 
parties will converge on the median voter position (Bariy, 1991: 218; see also 
Downs, 1959). The model does not offer predictions for real countries’ political 
systems -  not least because its assumptions are so pared-down11 -  and it does not 
provide normative advice on electoral strategy. Likewise, in this thesis the Downsian 
model is used as an analytical device that helps us understand why Labour’s 
parliamentary leaders have usually pursued moderate policies. At no point do I 
condemn or applaud Labour for pursuing given policies.
This confusion of positive and normative elements pervades the whole of 
Hay’s critique of the model and its impact on Labour. His caution about what he 
rather revealingly calls ‘the dangers of Downsianism’ (Hay, 1999: 102) throws into 
relief the essentially normative content of the term -  a debased strategy of selling out 
socialist principles in the search for votes.12 Hay discusses Downs’ book as if it were 
entitled, ‘How to Win Elections: A User’s Manual’. It is not. The apparent belief that 
Downs is offering prescriptive advice to politicians seems to underlie Hay’s assertion 
that while the Downsian model provides a useful description of Labour electoral 
strategy in the 1990s, it utterly fails to explain that strategy. This seems to be saying 
that, while it may look like a duck, waddle like a duck and quack like a duck, it is in 
fact not a duck at all... but an ostrich! Like many hostile critics of rational choice 
before him, Hay associates the method with a particular political prescription. From 
this perspective, to concede that the Downsian model explains Labour’s shift to the 
centreground is tantamount to endorsing that shift.
The critique of the Downsian model by Labour Party specialists entails a 
number of points, two of which I consider briefly. One criticism is that it is far too 
simplistic to assume that politicians are office-seekers. Many radical critics would 
perhaps agree wholeheartedly that specific leaders such as Neil Kinnock and Tony 
Blair were ‘motivated by the desire for power, prestige, and income’, as Downs puts 
it, but their objection would be that leaders of socialist parties should not be like this. 
Instead, they should shape public opinion and win support for socialist policies. They 
should be policy-seekers prepared to argue their case.
However, assuming politicians to be policy-seekers makes little impact on the 
two-party Downsian model because even here parties will experience a centripetal
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pull (Barry, 1978: 149-50; Calvert, 1985). Let us assume that the party leaders 
positioned their respective parties at their ideal policy points towards the left and 
right extremes of the policy continuum. The leader of the leftist party would have an 
incentive to shift marginally towards the median voter because although it is a small 
distance from his preferred position it is enough to defeat the rightist party, whose 
policies are detested by leftists. Similarly, the leader of the rightist party would shift 
closer towards the median voter and at the limit the two parties would be in 
equilibrium at the median voter position. Thus, whether as office-seekers or policy- 
seekers, the competitive dynamics in a two-party system are the same.
A second response of critics of the Downsian model is to attack the 
assumption of fixed preferences. Most rational choice theorists assume fixed 
preferences to give their models predictive power. If preferences were not fixed, any 
change from the status quo could be ‘explained’ by a change in preferences (Becker, 
1986: 110). For example, if a party in a two-party system were unexpectedly to win 
an election with an ‘extremist’ policy platform (confounding the centripetal logic of 
spatial models of voting), it might simply be explained on the basis of a (largely 
unobservable and unmeasurable) change in voter preferences. That is unsatisfactory. 
Assuming fixed preferences helps stabilise models yet there are few rational choice 
theorists who believe preferences are fixed for eternity. Indeed, there has been a push 
to endogenise the process of preference formation (e.g. Dunleavy and Ward, 1991; 
Grafstein, 2000; Ward, 2000; Young, 1991).13
The fixity of preferences is a prime target of Hay and illustrates his confusion 
of axioms and normative prescriptions. Hay does not explain the utility of the fixed 
preferences assumption but instead disparages what he sees as its normative 
substance, viz. that parties should pander to the prejudices of voters -  a process he 
terms, following Dunleavy and Ward (1991), ‘preference-accommodation’. Instead, 
Hay wants parties to lead rather than follow public opinion. Such a ‘preference- 
shaping’ strategy would entail winning over voters with the force of argument and 
would liberate Labour from the tyranny of ‘preference-accommodation’.
At this point, a few words should be said about these latter two terms for the 
purpose of clarification. In a hostile assessment of the Downsian model and its 
relation to British politics, Heffeman (2001: 101-27) reaches a similar conclusion to 
Hay’s, viz. that parties have the ability to shape voters’ preferences, which implies
32
that parties need not converge on the median voter position.14 Heffeman seeks to 
make a ‘clear distinction’ between preferences and choices’, ‘an elector casts a vote 
for one party rather than another not necessarily because that party meets his or her 
preference but because that is the choice made available to them’. He adds, 
seemingly in the belief that this contradicts Downs, ‘always a preference is 
constrained by the choices that can be made’ (2001: 104-5). Quite so, but that is part 
of all rational choice models. Rational choice theorists, including Downs, assume not 
that an actor always chooses her first preference but simply that she chooses from  
among the available options the one she ranks highest in her preference schedule. 
This is clearly the case in Downs’ spatial model since there are innumerable voters 
but only two parties, each adopting one point on the ideological continuum. Clearly, 
those voters whose ideal policies are not offered by either party (which means the 
vast majority of voters) must choose between the more preferred of two points 
neither of which represent their ideal points.
Heffeman’s confusion may stem from the misleading term ‘preference- 
accommodation’. The latter is seen as the conventional Downsian approach to 
parties’ behaviour vis-a-vis voters with fixed preferences. By contrast, preference- 
shaping refers to parties’ active alteration of voters’ preferences. Preference-shaping 
involves re-shaping the aggregate distribution of voters’ preferences but preference- 
accommodation is the process whereby parties seek to satisfy the preference of the 
median voter only. ‘Preference accommodation’ is an unhappy choice of term, not 
least because all parties accommodate preferences -  those of the voters whose 
position they happen to share (which might not be the median voter).
Much of the ‘preference-shaping versus preference-accommodating’ debate is 
normative. From the perspective of individuals with radical (i.e. non-centrist) policy 
preferences, a strategy that involves ‘accommodating’ the preferences of centrist 
voters will involve a ‘sell-out’, ‘betrayal’, etc. Only a strategy that ‘shapes’, i.e. 
changes preferences will persuade voters to support radical policies. Interestingly, in 
their survey and analysis of the opinions of Labour Party members in the 1990s, 
Seyd and Whiteley (1992) suggested that those members on the most radical wing of 
the party, the so-called ‘hard’ left, were those most set against electoral compromise. 
The authors compared the attitudes of the ‘hard’ left to all other members (‘soft’ left, 
centrists, ‘soft’ right and ‘hard’ right) (see Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1 Perceptions o f Electoral Strategy by ‘Hard’ Left and Other Factions (%)
ongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly
1. ‘The Labour Party should adjust its policies to capture the middle ground o f  politics. ’
Hard left 10 20 7 28 36
All others 21 42 10 21 6
2. ‘The Labour Party should always stand by its principles even if this should lose an election.'
Hard left 52 29 7 9 3
All others 19 37 13 23 8
3. 'The central question o f  British politics is the class struggle between labour and capital. ’
Hard left 61 28 6 5 1
All others 21 40 16 19 4
4. ‘The Labour Party should only adopt policies supported by a majority o f working class people. ’
Hard left 31 24 14 22 10
All others 13 27 18 37 6
5. ‘Coalition governments are the best form o f government for Britain. ’
Hard left 1 3 8 31 57
All others 1 5 14 49 31
Source: Seyd and Whiteley (1992: 167, Tab. 7.12).
The essence of so-called ‘Downsianism’ is in item 1 about capturing the 
middle ground of politics, and here ‘hard’ left members are six times more likely 
than other party members to disagree strongly. They are also much more likely to 
demand that the party stick to its principles and believe coalition government is 
undesirable. For Seyd and Whiteley, the reason for these differences is that 
‘members of the hard left have their own distinctive analysis of Labour Party 
electoral strategy’ (1992: 166). This strategy involves viewing politics as being about 
class struggle (item 3 in the table) so Labour should adopt policies favourable to 
workers (item 4). Manual workers are a minority of the electorate in Britain as 
elsewhere, creating problems for electoral strategies based on class mobilisation
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(Przeworski and Sprague, 1986). In response, many socialists have argued that 
white-collar workers should also be classified as working class. Given the 
considerable differences between blue- and white-collar workers, it would seem only 
an aggressive ‘preference-shaping’ electoral strategy, perhaps involving industrial 
mobilisation and white-collar union membership drives, would persuade a majority 
of voters to identify themselves as working class and supporters of the radical left.
This is not the place to discuss the feasibility of such a project (though it 
would probably require mobilisation on an enormous scale, involving increased 
unionisation or widespread fear of job losses). The point is that within the constraints 
of two-party electoral competition, radicals on both the left and the right face an 
uphill task. ‘Preference-shaping’ offers the hope of overcoming these problems 
though even then it is easier for governments than oppositions to achieve because the 
former have access to the resources of the state (see Dunleavy and Ward, 1991). 
Shifting policies towards the centreground involves fewer political costs and 
promises speedier electoral rewards, even if those promises are not always 
immediately delivered. This is what the Downsian model recognises, rather than 
opposing radical policies on normative grounds.
Neither Hay nor Heffeman fully define what they mean by ‘preference- 
shaping’ and each fails to distinguish the latter from ‘persuasion’.15 In Dunleavy and 
Ward’s initial discussion of preference-shaping, it was clear that the term generally 
referred to the systematic transformation of individuals’ material interests and the 
very structure of society (e.g. through the Conservative government’s decision to sell 
off council houses in the 1980s). However, both Hay and Heffeman often seem to be 
referring to persuasion, which involves furnishing voters with information rather than 
material incentives. Thus, Hay describes preference-shaping as ‘the politics of 
advocacy’ (1999: 60) and elsewhere commends to the Labour Party a strategy that 
would entail a ‘narration ’ of the crisis of Thatcherism and a ‘new alternative vision ’ 
of a post-Thatcherite settlement (1994: 701; emphasis added).16 This focus on 
persuasion reflects Hay’s more general tendency to assume that ideas rather than 
social structures play the major explanatory role in political science (see Coates, 
2001:297).
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2.3 INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND THE DOWNSIAN MODEL
The version of the Downsian model usually presented both by critics and in 
textbooks is one of complete information. However, Downs went into great depth on 
the implications of uncertainty and regarded it as the major contribution of his book 
(Downs, 1993: 199; see also Hindmoor, 2000). Once we admit parties may not fully 
know what voters want, or that voters have only sketchy ideas about parties’ policies 
(as Downs himself noted), we may sometimes have breaks on party convergence. 
Furthermore, when information is costly and incomplete, issues such as trust become 
very important, so much so that if a party abandons its policies to win votes, it may 
lose credibility and gain a reputation for being untrustworthy, costing it votes. Policy 
change can entail costs as well as benefits (Laver, 1997: 115-6). In Chapter 3 ,1 argue 
that the concept of party organisation makes sense only in conditions of imperfect 
information since finance, activists, spin doctors, pollsters etc. are needed precisely 
because neither politicians nor voters are fully informed.
Some extensions of the spatial model have assumed uncertainty and have 
generated equilibria in which parties diverge (Berger et al., 2000; Hinich and 
Munger, 1997: 117-35; cf. Calvert, 1985; see also Grofman and Withers, 1993; 
Enelow and Hinich, 1984: 115-30). Affording a proper role to uncertainty entails 
recognising that the collection, evaluation and dissemination of information is costly. 
Voters rely on free information in the media because the minuscule probability any 
voter has of determining an election result cannot justify incurring the costs of 
collecting and evaluating information. Voters may rely on information shortcuts 
(Popkin, 1993) such as perception of politicians’ competence, credibility and 
trustworthiness. Politicians’ attempts to project credibility and endear trust may 
constrain their policy manoeuvrability, thus imposing costs on policy changes.
Uncertainty can impact on electoral dynamics, as Downs understood. A 
feature of the basic Downsian model is that parties and policy positions are 
indistinguishable -  voting for a given party means voting for its given policy 
position. In reality, voters realise that the policies parties say they will deliver are not 
always the ones they later implement in government. Voters may attach different 
levels of uncertainty to different politicians. Some may be regarded as completely 
trustworthy whereas others are only moderately so. Some may be completely 
untrustworthy so that their policy pronouncements lack any credibility whatsoever.
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Rational voters discount by a suitable factor the promises of politicians they deem to 
be moderately or completely untrustworthy. Incorporating this risk factor into the 
Downsian model can produce divergence between parties. It can even produce 
situations where trusted and credible extremists can defeat untrusted moderates 
(Hinich and Munger, 1997: 122-7), or where less trusted candidates can harm their 
prospects by shifting from extreme to moderate positions (Berger et al, 2000).
These considerations weigh on the minds of politicians. In a world where 
information is costly, reputations can be extremely valuable for politicians but they 
also impose constraints on politicians’ actions. Reputations can take years to 
establish but they are fragile: like shattered glass, ruined reputations are extremely 
difficult to put back together. Politicians who change their minds on important issues 
-  particularly if they are perceived to be doing so simply to win votes -  risk 
becoming distrusted. This can be a significant cost of vote-seeking behaviour. Neil 
Kinnock was never able to play down the jibe that in his effort to make Labour re­
electable by abandoning unpopular policies, he had changed his mind on every major 
political issue. Another credibility problem for Labour in the early 1990s stemmed 
from its organisational and financial links to the trade union movement. The 
Conservatives claimed that if Labour entered government it would abandon its 
moderate economic and industrial policies in the face of union pressure. The 
‘moderate’ faction that ‘modernised’ Labour in the 1990s loosened the party’s links 
with the unions so as to alleviate this credibility problem (Gould, 1999).
Related to the issue of credibility is that of competence -  politicians’ ability 
to manage the country and its economy, and to deal with unanticipated events 
(Popkin, 1993: 29-32). Incumbency can provide parties with greater credibility than 
challengers because voters can use the incumbent’s record as a guide to how closely 
policy outcomes match ex ante promises (Hinich and Munger, 1996). If a party’s 
competence is questioned, voters may deem it a risky proposition and therefore 
discount its promises by a risk factor reflecting the possibility that economic 
mismanagement could harm the welfare of voters. General matters of politicians’ 
competence may be more important to many voters than detailed policies (Popkin, 
1993: 29). Tony Blair’s first three years as party leader were characterised by a 
determined effort to portray Labour as a ‘business-friendly’ party rather than one 
dominated by unions. There are many more trade unionists than there are business
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leaders but Blair wanted to signal his party’s economic competence, which cannot be 
achieved through policy implementation when Labour is in opposition. All 
governments are dependent on firms to invest in order to promote growth and 
employment (Przeworski, 1985). Policies that threaten investment and 
macroeconomic stability evoke fierce criticism from business leaders. John Eatwell, 
a former economics adviser to the Labour Party, has written:
Credibility has become the keystone of policy-making in the 
nineties. A credible government is a government that pursues a 
policy that is ‘market friendly’; this is a policy that is in accordance 
with what the markets believe to be sound (cited in Wickham- 
Jones, n.d.: 6).
To demonstrate Labour’s competence, Blair sought endorsements of his party’s 
policies from business leaders. Popkin (1993: 19-22) argues that parties can acquire 
voter credibility by mobilising public support (on television) from elites. Relying on 
elite interpretations provides voters with free shortcuts to obtaining and evaluating 
information when it is not rational to expend resources on such actions. Blair learnt 
from Labour’s failure to mobilise sufficient elite support prior to the 1992 general 
election, when the publication of the ‘shadow budget’ was condemned by many 
business leaders (see Wickham-Jones, n.d.).
Relaxing the assumption of perfect information not only makes models more 
realistic but also opens up avenues for exploration. Informational problems are a key 
issue in the design of institutions, as recognised by Williamson (1985) in his 
assumption that individuals are boundedly rational, unable to know everything or 
compute all eventualities. They are a recurrent theme in this thesis and I argue that an 
imperfect understanding among Labour’s current leaders about the incentives needed 
to attract and maintain activists is one reason for current membership discontent.
2.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has set out some of the theoretical building blocks of the present 
thesis. The defence offered for the rational choice approach was that it generates 
interesting questions and equips us with the tools to answer them. Of the concepts
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introduced, those of office-seeking elites and incomplete information are particularly 
important and the next chapter employs them to generate a model of party 
organisation. The test of that model and of the utility of the rational choice approach 
will be whether they offer convincing explanations of the changing structure of the 
Labour Party, the analysis of which begins in Chapter 4.
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3 An Exchange Model of Party 
Organisation and Party Change
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Political parties are one of the most important organisational forms in modem 
societies -  indeed, modem democracy is effectively coterminous with party 
democracy. Even in an age when their alleged demise has been charted (Lawson and 
Merkl, 1988), parties are the mainstays of Western democracies. Yet the rational 
choice literature on party organisation is relatively underdeveloped. There is a classic 
literature on party organisation dating from a century ago when Ostrogorski (1962) 
and Michels (1962) offered brilliant early analyses, to which would later be added 
Duverger (1964). In the last few decades, interest has grown in the nature of party 
organisational change with an ‘evolutionary’ view making a considerable impact (see 
below).1 Yet significant as these works are, there is still a dearth of work on the 
microfoundations of parties. This chapter sketches such microfoundations. The 
model developed follows the ‘exchange’ approach in which politicians are assumed 
to offer policy promises to activists in exchange for campaign resources.
Parties as organisations have changed enormously over the past century so 
our models must be able to account for party change. In this respect exchange models 
are particularly useful. Some accounts of party change take a long-term perspective, 
looking at differences between party ideal-types at various points in time. Thus, 
evolutionary models look at the rise and fall of the cadre, mass, catch-all and cartel 
party structures over the course of the past century. However, the present work looks 
at one party over a period of twenty years so long-term theories do not adequately 
capture the nature and extent of party change.
The present chapter is set out as follows. Section 3.2 pinpoints strengths and 
weaknesses of existing approaches to party organisation and change. Section 3.3 
derives the need for party organisation in rational choice models from imperfect
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information in political markets, 3.4 describes the basic exchange between activists 
and politicians while 3.5 shows how transaction costs create the need for formal 
organisations. Section 3.6 shows how politicians need autonomy from activists if 
they are to win elections but too much autonomy causes conflicts. Section 3.7 
outlines an exchange model of party change and 3.8 concludes.
3.2 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF PARTY ORGANISATION AND 
PARTY CHANGE
An important insight of the literature on party organisation is that efficient 
forms of party organisation correspond to historical phases of democratic 
development. These are usually regarded as the cadre, mass, catch-all, and cartel 
party structures (Duverger, 1964; Kirchheimer, 1966; Katz and Mair, 1995, 1996). 
Each party structure is associated with a particular period in the development of 
democracy, with the cadre party prevalent in the restricted suffrage era, the mass 
party during the extension of the suffrage in the early twentieth century, and the 
catch-all and cartel parties in the post-war period of class dealignment. These forms 
are ideal types and in reality, considerable organisational variety exists because 
parties are prone to internal power struggles. Katz and Mair argue that the motor of 
long-term changes in party organisational structure is transformations in the nature of 
democracy itself. The stages of metamorphosis of the evolutionary model provide 
too great a time-scale for my analysis of the Labour Party. Labour’s changes were 
directly connected with its electoral failings. Nevertheless, the evolutionary model 
does provide us with a useful set of party organisational templates.
The mass party was devised by European socialists at the turn of the 
twentieth century in response to the enfranchisement of the working class. Their aim 
was to capture the working class vote even though workers did not comprise a 
majority of the electorate (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Przeworski, 1985) and 
required a party structure that would enable this. The mass party was the answer, 
with the emphasis on recruiting members who would finance the party through 
subscriptions and campaign for it in the community. Membership recruitment was 
facilitated by a branch structure, local branches being the lowest-level organisational 
unit in the party -  what Duverger (1964: 17-40) called ‘the basic element’. The 
national party consisted of many branches at the grassroots level and each branch
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typically came under considerable control from the centre. The branch structure 
broke the membership down into smaller, more manageable units and eased 
socialists’ collective action problem. These organs were small enough for the active 
members to get to know each other and coordinate their action. Olson (1971: 60) 
observed that social selective incentives, like the desire for friendship and status, are 
likely to work best in small groups. Such incentives would help to retain activists 
since many of these are likely to know each other in small units like branches. A 
centralised command structure combined with a decentralised branch structure of 
mass membership could efficiently promote collective action. Vertical links between 
branches and higher bodies were strong. These links defined the means of 
coordinating party activity, significantly reducing coordination costs. Many mass 
parties provided social incentives in the form of cultural and social clubs (e.g. sports, 
literary societies), which were used to attract a wider audience (see Geary, 1987). 
These too encouraged people to join the party.
By the 1950s, a new organisational form appeared in response to changes 
taking place in industrialised societies. The ‘catch-all’ party reflected the weakening 
of class ties that followed greater prosperity. It was a structure intended to capture 
ideologically footloose voters. Kirchheimer identified five features of the shift from 
the mass to the catch-all party:
(a) Drastic reduction of the party’s ideological baggage... (b)
Further strengthening of top leadership groups... (c) Downgrading 
of the role of the individual party member... (d) De-emphasis of 
the classe gardee, specific social-class or denominational clientele, 
in favour of recruiting voters among the population at large, (e)
Securing access to a variety of interest groups... The chief reason 
is to secure electoral support via interest-group intercession 
(Kirchheimer, 1966: 190).
Kirchheimer is not as clear as Duverger on parties’ ‘basic elements’, but the 
emphasis is on leadership autonomy vis-a-vis members. The catch-all party is 
necessarily centralised because the party elite requires flexibility in determining 
policy. This era also saw a shift to more capital-intensive forms of campaigning, 
further obviating the need for an active membership (Katz and Mair, 1995: 20). 
Panebianco (1988: 262-7) argues that whereas mass parties were bureaucratic, parties
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nowadays are professional. This ‘electoral-professional’ party encompasses the 
catch-all party while acknowledging the shift towards the employment of experts and 
technicians (Webb, 2000: 249, n.6). The catch-all party is also an ideal type and in 
reality, hybrid parties existed, combining mass and catch-all features.
According to Katz and Mair (1995), a new form of party began to emerge in 
Western Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, which corresponded to changes in the 
nature of party democracy. Katz and Mair claim that class dealignment continued to 
weaken the link between parties and social segments and parties have now ceased to 
offer even programmes of social amelioration. Instead, the basis of party competition 
has become more technocratic, with parties offering similar policies and competing 
on managerial expertise. The further development of political communications 
means that campaigning has become even more capital-intensive and party members 
are less important. However, a mass membership is a useful legitimising device for 
the party leadership, and membership may turn over rapidly. State funding of parties 
leaves them financially secure. Most parties will find themselves in government 
before long and will thus get the chance to reward their supporters until another party 
wins an election and gets its chance. Politics becomes simply another profession 
rather than a means of pursuing social reform or amelioration. Parties thus ‘collude’ 
in dividing up the spoils of office and become a ‘cartel’ (Katz and Mair, 1995: lb- 
23). Katz and Mair do not suggest that these tendencies are anywhere fully 
developed or that they are uniformly applicable -  in fact, they argue that 
‘cartelisation’ is least advanced in the UK.2
A synthesis of these party types provides an historical account of general 
party organisational ‘evolution’ (Maor, 1997: 100). However, this historical account 
covers a broad time-span and is of limited use for analysing the minutiae of changes 
that took place in a single party in a given twenty-year period, which is the task 
before us. A more fine-grained approach to the study of party organisation and party 
change is required. Alan Ware has recently asked why party organisations share 
certain similarities and exhibit various differences, and he identified three main 
approaches to the examination of this question (Ware, 1996: 94-108). First, there are 
electoral competition models in which party competition compels different parties to 
copy their successful rivals and adopt ‘efficient’ organisational structures. Secondly, 
there are institutional models, which emphasise intraparty relations in accounting for
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organisational variation. Finally, there is what Ware describes as a sociological 
approach, which emphasises the way in which party organisation reflects the supply 
of resources to parties (as well as changes in that supply).
(i) Electoral Competition Approaches
The major exponents of this approach are Duverger (1964), Epstein (1980) 
and Kirchheimer (1966). As we have seen, Duverger explained the rise of mass 
parties in terms of their greater mobilisational efficiency in an age of mass 
enfranchisement. This efficiency stems from its branch structure, which enables the 
mass party to embed itself in local communities and mobilise people into the party. 
Successful mass parties recruit a large proportion of their potential voters into party 
membership. In the face of this competition, the old cadre parties were compelled to 
adopt features of the mass party, in particular the branch structure, which enabled 
them better to mobilise their supporters. This is what Duverger meant when he spoke 
of ‘contagion from the left’, since the original mass parties were the working class- 
based socialist parties, while the cadre parties being infected by this contagion were 
mainly older conservative parties. The propelling force of this contagion was 
electoral competition since the branch structure was a superior means of recruiting 
members and procuring other resources in the age of mass democracy.
Epstein (1980) used the same logic of electoral competition to argue the 
contrary, that there would be ‘contagion from the right’. As older ‘non-electoraT 
parties faced greater electoral competition, they would be forced to shed those 
functions that did not promote vote-seeking. Since party members often wanted 
policies inconsistent with the preferences of voters, politicians had incentives to 
reduce their reliance on those members. A cadre organisation would suffice if 
sufficient funds could be garnered from interest groups and individual donors. 
Epstein predicted that West European parties would become more like American 
parties, weak membership organisations with hazily defined policy programmes, elite 
flexibility and running candidate-centred campaigns. Kirchheimer followed in a 
similar vein, claiming that the erosion of traditional social class cleavages created a 
bigger market for available votes and this compelled parties to centralise and broaden 
their funding base.
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The weakness with the arguments of Duverger and Epstein is that neither the 
mass party nor Epstein’s ‘electoral party’ became the dominant template for party 
organisations throughout liberal democracies. Epstein later acknowledged he had 
overstated his case that European parties would move towards the American ideal- 
type (see Epstein, 1980: 359-83). Yet electoral approaches are valuable because they 
emphasise the importance of party competition in being an underlying cause of party 
change. Any party that is in the business of winning votes faces pressure to reform its 
organisation if doing so offers the prospect of electoral gain. This is particularly true 
of two-party systems where competition is zero-sum and in the model developed 
later, electoral ‘shocks’ are important in explaining party change.
(ii) Institutional Approaches
In contrast to electoral approaches to party organisation, which focus on 
external factors, institutional approaches emphasise the importance of intraparty 
relations. The main exponent of this approach, Panebianco (1988: 50), claims that 
‘[a] party’s organizational characteristics depend more upon its history, i.e. on how 
the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor... 
Every organization bears the mark of its formation...’ Panebianco proposes a 
theoretical structure for analysing parties, consisting of two components: a party’s 
‘genetic model’ -  i.e. how it came to be formed -  and its degree of 
‘institutionalisation’ -  the extent to which it ceases to be simply an instrumental tool 
and becomes ‘valuable in and of itself (1988: 53).
Three factors define a party’s genetic model. First, an organisation develops 
through either territorial penetration (centrally-directed development of local party 
units) or territorial diffusion (autonomous development of local units, nationally 
integrated later). Second, parties’ formations take place either in the presence or 
absence of an external sponsoring institution. Those with an external sponsor, such 
as the old West European communist parties and the Comintern, or labour parties 
formed by trade unions, have leaderships that are externally legitimated. In those 
parties without an external sponsor, the leadership’s authority is internally 
legitimated. Third, some parties are created as vehicles for a charismatic politician, 
while others are not (Panebianco, 1988: 50-2).
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Panebianco’s second component, institutionalisation, occurs in a party’s early 
years, and he offers two dimensions along which to measure it. First is the 
organisation’s degree of autonomy vis-a-vis its environment, including its relations 
with members, external sponsors and ordinary voters. Second is a party’s degree of 
systernness (the level of interdependence of its internal organs and the party’s overall 
structural cohesion). When systemness is low, sub-units control party resources 
independently of the centre, which makes for a heterogeneous organisation and 
retards the centre’s ability to make the party autonomous vis-a-vis its environment. 
This can be done only if the centre controls resources and coordinates the sub-units. 
Strong institutions are autonomous with high levels of systemness whereas weak 
institutions have low levels of autonomy and systemness (Panebianco, 1988: 53-7).
Panebianco claims parties that emerge from territorial diffusion are usually 
weak institutions because the local units retain considerable autonomy, whereas 
those that form through territorial penetration are strong institutions, as the centre 
possesses coordinating power. Internally legitimated parties often become strong 
organisations because there is no external sponsor to retard such development. 
Externally legitimated parties with extra-national sponsors, such as the old Western 
communist parties, are strong institutions because the external sponsor prefers to 
shield them from other influences in that society. By contrast, externally legitimated 
parties with ‘national’ sponsors are weak institutions -  the most common examples 
are labour parties, which rely on trade unions -  and remain so because the sponsor 
fears institutionalisation would weaken its own control (Panebianco, 1988: 63-7).
Panebianco regards the development of party organisation as path-dependent, 
placing great emphasis on an organisation’s formative years. Differences between 
parties are thus explained by reference to internal party relations, and although he 
acknowledges that parties can change (see below), change is greatly constrained by 
the existing structure. It does, however, tend to underplay the significance of 
exogenous factors such as electoral competition in explaining party change. Ware 
remarks that ‘Panebianco’s approach is correct in emphasizing how a particular 
genetic history and a particular pattern of institutionalization constrains the potential 
for any reform, but it does no more than that’ (Ware, 1996: 104). In fact, 
Panebianco’s model seems to perform better at explaining organisational stasis than 
it does organisational change. Nevertheless, the message of this approach is that the
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existing organisational structure of a party is a crucial factor in empowering 
supporters and/or entrenching opponents of party change.
(iii) ‘Sociological’ Approaches
‘Sociological’ approaches focus attention on the supply and demand of party 
resources. All parties require resources if they are to function, first as organisations 
in their own right and then as electoral machines. The most important resources are 
money and labour, though Ware suggests there are others, such as personal charisma 
of individual politicians -  an individual’s charisma might be very important in 
helping the party to attract votes. Labour is provided by party activists, who are 
usually unpaid volunteers but money can be provided by a range of sources, 
including members but also interest groups, firms and, increasingly the state. There 
are limits to the substitutability of resources, e.g. even parties running media-based 
campaigns need activists to operate telephones and computers. ‘Consequently, how a 
party responds to the challenge of developing its organization in a way that enables it 
to maintain (or improve) its electoral competitiveness depends on where it perceives 
its potential new resources residing’ (Ware, 1996: 106).
A variation of this resources-based approach, centred on the cartel party 
thesis turns the traditional relationship between resource acquisition and electoral 
competitiveness on its head. The cartel thesis claims that the integration of parties 
with the state has created a cartel among the main parties, in which the substance of 
party competition is greatly reduced. One of the most important aspects of this 
integration is state-funding of parties. As Ware (1996: 108) observes, ‘[t]o the extent 
that the state can provide for resources that are substitutable for those resources 
provided by members and activists it provides a disincentive for individual parties to 
expand and develop a membership base’. Ware claims the main problem with the 
‘sociological’ approach is that various organisational structures may be compatible 
with a given pattern of resources but the approach does not enable us to predict 
which one will emerge. However, the more general idea that the supply and demand 
of resources is an important element towards an understanding of party organisation 
is one that is incorporated in the model set out shortly.
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In the remainder of this chapter, I synthesise existing work on exchange 
models of party organisation. The model I develop combines elements from the three 
approaches to the study of party organisation identified by Ware. The resultant model 
emphasises the importance of electoral shocks, as well as internal distributive 
conflicts. It also places great emphasis on the supply and demand of party resources.
3.3 THE INFORMATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES
A major argument of this thesis is that the internal organisation of parties, and 
their relationships with ordinary voters, is most fruitfully comprehended in terms of 
political exchange, i.e. the exchange of votes and/or resources for policy promises. 
Political exchange is necessarily subject to much higher transaction costs than 
economic exchange. Economic exchange is conducted through the medium of 
money, making exchange simultaneous and precise. Measurement costs in basic 
market exchange are usually low, as each trader knows what s/he is getting (and 
giving) and how much of it s/he receives (and gives). Enforcement costs in market 
exchange are reduced by the existence of a disinterested third party (the state), which 
can legally enforce contracts. As we shall see, certain kinds of exchange involving 
highly specific assets face more serious enforcement problems and may require 
additional institutions (Williamson, 1985), but generally economic exchange is much 
easier to measure, monitor and enforce than political exchange, ceteris paribus. 
Political exchange is usually non-simultaneous (Weingast and Marshall, 1988) as 
votes, favours, donations, labour, etc. are supplied now in exchange for promises of 
future benefits. However, there is no common medium of exchange, such as money, 
in which promises can be stored and cashed in. Conventional IOUs are inefficient 
because in politics there is generally no neutral arbitrator that can enforce 
agreements. Furthermore, politics usually concerns the supply of public goods, which 
because they are indivisible and non-excludable involve problems of measurement 
and enforcement. Determining who supplies what and how much can be difficult. 
Thus, political exchange cannot be analysed as precisely as economic exchange.
Nevertheless, exchange models can shed light on the microfoundations of 
political organisations and help explain why certain institutions arise. Political 
exchange is a feature of rational choice models of party competition. The Downsian 
model consists of voters and parties engaging in electoral exchange, in which policy
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promises are traded for votes. However, Downs did not examine the exchange that 
occurs inside parties between intraparty actors. His intention was to explore the 
dynamics of party competition in a simplified setting so he assumed away internal 
divisions in parties, regarding the latter as unified actors:
[A] political party is a team of men seeking to control the 
governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted 
election. By team, we mean a coalition whose members agree on 
all their goals instead of just part of them (Downs, 1957: 25) 
[Emphasis in original].
Textbook presentations of the Downsian model normally assume perfect 
information. Downs himself discussed the role of uncertainty in party competition 
but he did not fully explore its consequences for parties as organisations. Parties 
appear as ‘black boxes’ in his model, being cohesive teams of office-seekers rather 
than organisational complexes. In fact, the concept of parties as organisations makes 
sense only in conditions of incomplete and costly information, as we can see by 
considering the counterfactual situation of perfect information, which in a two-party 
system entails the following:
1. Each voter knows her own policy preferences.
2. Each voter knows the aggregate distribution of all voters’ preferences.
3. Each voter knows the policy positions of both parties.
4. Each party knows its own policy position.
5. Each party knows the aggregate distribution of all voters’ preferences.
6. Each party knows the policy position of the other party.
From these assumptions, inter alia, parties know the policies they must adopt to win 
elections. However, at least four implications for party organisations follow:
1.1 If voters are completely informed, there is no persuading role for political 
communications, such as leaflets, advertising, broadcasts etc. or for ‘spin 
doctors’. Propaganda consists of partial information (supportive of one’s own 
party, critical of opponents), and is effective only in conditions of incomplete 
information.
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1.2 If parties are completely informed about voters’ preferences, they need not 
expend resources on collecting such information, making polling and focus 
groups superfluous.
1.3 Since all actors are perfectly informed of each other’s preferences and 
positions, electoral campaigning is otiose. Therefore, politicians do not need 
donations of money or labour because these resources are required only for 
campaigning.
1.4 Policymaking committees and conventions are unnecessary because in the 
absence of activists and interest groups, politicians simply choose policies that 
can win elections.
These propositions imply that party organisation is redundant in conditions o f 
perfect information. Once the need to campaign is removed, so is the need for 
organisation, which is why they appear as ‘black boxes’ in perfect information 
models, an assumption that still characterises much rational choice modelling of 
party competition.4
In reality, information is incomplete and costly, and it is in such conditions 
that party organisation is needed. Political exchange between voters and parties 
incurs costs covering information collection and transmission, organisation and 
mobilisation. Politicians must expend resources discovering voters’ preferences, as 
well as testing the popularity of different policies. Meanwhile, voters have only a 
basic idea of party programmes, relying on free information from the mass media 
and using ideologies as information-economising devices because they have little 
incentive to expend resources on acquiring information (Downs, 1957; Ware, 1979: 
35-7). Parties have incentives to transmit information favourable to themselves or 
disparaging of their opponents. In short, parties must campaign to persuade 
imperfectly informed voters to support them. Leaflets must be printed; advertising 
space must be purchased; opinion polls must be commissioned; spin doctors and 
advertising professionals must be employed; party functionaries need transportation; 
rent must be paid for hired buildings, and so on. To cover these costs, politicians 
need financial contributions and labour from supporters. Individual politicians will 
need to pool their resources in parties in order to surmount these costs, which would 
otherwise present considerable barriers to entry. Politicians have incentives to band
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together in parties because campaigning is costly but can exhibit economies of scale 
and it may be easier to raise funds as a group because greater numbers lend greater 
credibility (Laver, 1997: 85). Politicians may have reputational incentives to join 
existing parties because a party label is a low-cost way of conferring information to 
voters about a politician’s credibility and preferences (Aldrich, 1995: 50, 55). Hence, 
‘parties’ in the loose sense of ‘bundles’ of politicians, activists and campaign 
resources, stem from information costs facing ambitious politicians. The premise of 
incomplete information establishes the need for politicians to attract activists in order 
to campaign for votes -  and in the process creates a new set of exchange relations.
3.4 POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS AND POLITICAL EXCHANGE5 
Intraparty Incentive Structures
Since Downs’ definition of a party is inadequate for this thesis, we need an 
alternative one. Ware (1996: 5) offers the following:
A political party is an institution that (a) seeks influence in a state, 
often by attempting to occupy positions in government, and (b) 
usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so 
to some degree attempts to ‘aggregate interests’.
This definition avoids assuming party members are united in their beliefs and goals. 
It also enables a distinction to be drawn between parties and pressure groups. It does 
not, however, mention participation in elections because it is intended to cover 
parties in one-party states as well as liberal democracies. For present purposes, 
participation in competitive elections and the pursuit of government are essential 
attributes of parties. Combining these points permits a conception of parties as 
politicians and activists interacting within an institutional setting.
Now we have seen that politicians require finance and labour in order to 
campaign for and win votes. It is the contention of this thesis that a valuable way of 
conceiving of this relationship is in terms of political exchange between the two sets 
of actors. Exchange models of party organisation focus on exchange between 
politicians and activists, whereby activists agree to campaign for politicians to help 
them get elected in return for policy concessions or other benefits. Though there have
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been a number of important contributions,6 the main exchange models are those of 
Sehlesinger (1984) and Strom (1990; see also Strom and Muller, 1999), both of 
which strongly inform the model developed here. In this section, I assess 
Sehlesinger’s model, which looks at incentives within parties while in section 3 .5 ,1 
turn to Strom, who focuses on institutions.
Sehlesinger presents an incentive structure for a party organisation embedded 
in a two-party system in which politicians are assumed to be office-seekers. His 
account is based on a distinction between parties and other kinds of organisation,
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such as firms, interest groups and bureaux. He compares them in terms of three 
variables: (1) how they obtain key resources; (2) the nature of the organisation’s 
principal output; (3) the mode of compensation of the organisation’s participants. 
Parties and firms are similar on only the first of these counts, in that they both obtain 
their key resources through market exchange. Like firms, parties must measure their 
success by market criteria, i.e. whether they secure enough votes to win an election. 
By contrast, interest groups have much greater freedom to define their own goals and 
standards of success. Thus, if they put up candidates in an election, they define their 
own measure of success or failure, e.g. targeting certain incumbents, winning a given 
number of seats, etc. But winning elections is not the be-all and end-all for an interest 
group. In short, where parties are office-seekers, interest groups are policy-seekers. 
Similarly, bureaux obtain resources from governments and can maintain their 
existence if they can convince governments to continue funding them.
Thus, parties and firms both need to be competitive. In two other key respects 
though, parties differ from firms. On the nature of their respective output, firms 
produce private goods but parties, like interest groups and bureaux, seek to supply 
collective goods. Private goods are divisible, easy to measure, and those who refuse 
to pay for them can be excluded from consuming them. Revenues generated from 
sales can be used to compensate directly those producing the goods -  the firm’s 
workers -  who can be recruited directly via the labour market. The material 
incentives that firms provide to their workers means that the latter can happily 
produce the firm’s output without having any desire to consume it. By contrast, 
parties produce collective goods -  policies -  which cannot be divided up among 
individuals, which are not readily observable, and which cannot be restricted to those 
who pay for them or help to produce them. Inter alia, this means that collective
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goods generate no revenue (Olson, 1971), which in turn implies that parties must 
recruit labour (and financial donations) by offering non-financial incentives.8 While 
politicians receive social and material benefits from attaining office, activists receive 
solidary and purposive incentives in return for their voluntary labour (Clarke and 
Wilson, 1961).9 Solidary (social selective) incentives refer to such factors as 
friendship and status -  in general the enjoyment one derives from participating in a 
group, though they may also be negative, e.g. avoiding ridicule and ostracism. 
Purposive benefits are payoffs an individual receives from seeing certain policies 
implemented or ideological goals achieved.10 As Sehlesinger observes, these benefits 
are collective and thus run up against Olson’s free-rider problem. Those attracted to 
parties by purposive incentives tend to be the young and inexperienced, who lack 
sufficient information to be able to calculate the relative costs and benefits of joining 
groups. Such incentives lack staying power and there is likely to be a high rate of 
membership turnover as those who gain experience realise their marginal influence 
and quit the party, being replaced by new recruits. Those who remain in the party 
have probably become attracted to the social benefits of membership. Nevertheless, 
the existence of purposive incentives means that party members, unlike employees in 
a business firm, have preferences over the kind of output that their organisation 
produces (Demsetz, 1990) and thereby have an interest in the configuration of power 
in the party because this may determine which policies are adopted.
This leads to the third variable identified by Sehlesinger, the mode of 
compensation offered by the organisation. Firms pay their workers monetary rewards 
but parties generally do not pay their members and activists. On the contrary, they 
look to their members to supply the party with finance. Direct payment allows firms 
to recruit workers from the full-time labour market and exercise control over them 
once they are hired, making sure that they turn up on time, fulfil certain levels of 
productivity, etc. Moreover, it allows the firm to rationalise its workforce, producing 
the most efficient division of labour. By contrast, parties recruit members from the 
leisure market and there is thus the constant risk that they may be diverted to other 
pursuits. The lack of financial remuneration prevents parties from controlling their 
members in the same way as firms. The members’ contributions are voluntary so 
they cannot be ordered around under the threat of dismissal. Many members -  in 
fact, most -  are likely to make no active contribution at all other than paying their
53
annual subscriptions. Inter alia, this prevents party leaders from rationalising their 
organisations as efficiently as firms can. Perhaps most importantly, parties must offer 
their members other rewards -  policies and candidates. Since this is a party’s 
principal output, its competitiveness in the electoral market may be damaged if the 
members’ preferences are not aligned with those of the median voter.
Table 3.1 Reasons for Joining the Labour Party
Motives (important examples in italics) %
Altruistic concerns 42.3
A belief in socialism 14.2
To help the working class 10.5
To create a more equal/compassionate society 9.6
Collective positive incentives 7.5
Collective negative incentives 17.4
To get rid o f Thatcher/Conservatives 16.9
Selective outcome incentives 0.3
Selective process incentives 23.9
To be politically active 11.5
Social norms 7.2
Unclassified 1.4
Source: Seyd and Whiteley (1992: 74, Tab. 4.5).
Sehlesinger’s account of incentive structures in parties is useful and forms a 
central part of the exchange model deployed in this thesis. A recent empirical study 
of British Labour Party members found that incentives of a broadly purposive nature 
were the most important reason members gave for joining. Seyd and Whiteley (1992) 
devised a general incentives model of party membership fairly similar to that 
described above. They identified three classes of reasons for joining a party: rational 
(collective and selective incentives, whether process- or outcome-oriented), altruistic 
and social norms (Table 3.1 above). Inter alia, they claim 42.3 percent of Labour 
members joined for altruistic reasons and 24.9 percent joined for collective
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incentives (positive and negative). However, the distinction between the two is rather 
hazy. Collective incentives referred to support for certain policies or a desire to 
defeat the Conservatives. The most important altruistic motives for joining were a 
belief in socialism, to help the working class and to create an equal society (1992: 
74). Both categories relate to ideology and policy, and can be subsumed under the 
heading of purposive incentives, in which case, two-thirds of Labour’s members had 
purposive motives for joining.
Sehlesinger tends to discount the long-term significance of purposive 
incentives because they are collective and from this he invariably assumes office- 
seeking politicians face few serious impediments from activists (e.g. pp. 387-8). As 
such, it would appear there is very little ‘exchange’ taking place inside parties, 
certainly over policies. Yet this sits uneasily with their important recruiting role and 
the ubiquity of ideological struggles inside real-life parties. In fact, purposive 
incentives can be accorded an important role even in rational choice models once we 
realise the impact they may have in combination with social incentives. The latter 
conform to Olson’s broad definition of selective incentives -  private benefits that 
accrue only to joiners -  because only by participating in a party’s activities can 
individuals secure friendship, status and the opportunity to meet like-minded people, 
etc. (see Chong, 1991: 31-72; 2000). In his critique of exchange models, Ware (1992: 
81-3) complains that they sideline social incentives yet there is no reason why they 
should not be integrated into the model.11 Social incentives buttress purposive 
incentives. Theoretically, people may join a party just for social incentives while 
having no sympathy for its policy goals but they are unlikely to find friends in a 
party whose members are hostile to their own views (Chong, 1991: 34). Social 
incentives are important when a party is out of government and unable to implement 
its policy package, though their relative importance has diminished over the years. In 
the era of the old mass parties, many people joined parties for access to their cultural 
and social functions (the German SPD was archetypal in this regard). Access to other 
sources of leisure, particularly through the mass media, has reduced the importance 
of these kinds of clubs yet party activists still benefit in the narrower sense of 
meeting like-minded people. Empirical studies provide support for the importance of 
these incentives: in the Seyd and Whiteley study above, 23.9 percent of members 
joined for selective process incentives, mainly of a social nature.
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Social incentives are particularly important for activist retention. Negative 
social incentives may persuade activists to continue working hard for a party. Since 
activists are volunteers, they cannot be ‘sacked’ if they shirk, as employees can. 
Whereas employment contracts set out workloads and penalties concerning 
unfulfilled obligations, party constitutions do not detail the responsibilities of 
activists other than specifying an annual membership fee. There are never provisions 
setting out activist workloads. This lacuna is due to the collective goods output of 
parties, the voluntary nature of party membership and the lack of financial incentives 
for recruitment. There seems to be nothing to stop activists from shirking on their 
labour contributions. However, negative social incentives in the form of ridicule or 
ostracism from colleagues may help control shirking. Those seeking to occupy 
elected positions in local parties will not want reputations for shirking. Social 
benefits are more likely to accrue in small groups, where individuals’ efforts are 
noticed by others, so it is not surprising that much activism is organised locally. A 
branch structure breaks up a national collective action problem into thousands of 
small collective action problems, which can be overcome as social incentives and 
conditional cooperation flourish (Bendor and Mookheijee, 1987). Nevertheless, 
social incentives are most useful for existing activists. They do not accrue to inactive 
members, who are often fleeting members but who normally comprise the majority 
of a party’s membership. The activists form a self-selected core that dominates a 
party’s intermediate-level structures.
Indeed, the relatively small numbers of individuals joining parties and the 
even smaller number who become active has led many political scientists to suggest 
that activists are different from most voters -  and here we can see the true 
significance of purposive incentives. The most famous expression of this is John 
May’s Taw of curvilinear disparity’ (1973), which predicts that activists will be 
politically more radical than voters. May’s law is based on two assumptions: first, 
that party members can be horizontally divided along organisational fractures, and 
second, members within these different subgroups face different incentives and 
receive different types of payoffs. The subdivision of the members is along a 
continuum ranging from low to high ‘organisational status’, whereby leaders occupy 
high positions, activists occupy intermediate positions and the party’s supporters 
occupy low positions. May claims there is a ‘curvilinear disparity’ of incentives and
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preferences between high, intermediate and low status levels. Politicians strive for 
material and social incentives, such as the financial rewards and status of holding 
office and power, whereas activists are attracted mainly by purposive incentives. 
Only the most zealous people will undertake the tedious administrative chores of 
local party organisations. In order to gain office, party leaders prefer ‘moderate’ 
policies aligned with ordinary party supporters’ preferences, whereas activists are 
more likely to have radical preferences, producing leftwing extremists in socialist 
parties and rightwing extremists in conservative parties (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Curvilinear Disparity (based on May, 1973: 139, Fig. 5)
Leftist party Rightist partyl i
Leaders
Activists
Voters
Left Centre Right
May’s law has been criticised on theoretical and empirical grounds but some 
of its weaknesses stem from the model of party competition on which it is based. It is 
often said that May’s law is founded on the Downsian model (e.g. Iversen, 1994: 
158), but this is not true -  May assumes most voters are pre-committed to one or 
other party (1973: 139, esp. n.l). Hence, two recent tests of May’s law (Iversen, 
1994; Norris, 1995b) followed May in focusing on the preferences of the mean 
partisan supporter of each party and purported to show the lack of any great 
differential between these voters and party activists. However, reformulating May’s 
schema on the Downsian model draws our attention away from partisan supporters 
and towards the median voter overall, since it is the latter that parties must capture. If 
a party attracts all its activists from one side of the median voter divide, the median 
activist will always be more radical than the median voter, regardless of whether the 
activist body is dominated by extremists. This obviates making strong psychological 
assumptions about ‘zealous’ activists (which Kitschelt (1989) claims is a feature of 
exchange models) in order to show that activists are more radical than voters.12 This
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reformulation of May’s law is less contentious than the original version but also
1 <a
more relevant and is the first of five propositions I offer on party organisation:
P .l In two-party systems, a party’s median member and the overall median voter
have different policy preferences (modified law of curvilinear disparity).
Thus, a genuine exchange model of parties requires us to recognise that there 
are two parallel spheres of political exchange: an internal sphere of exchange 
between politicians and activists; and an external realm of exchange between 
politicians and voters. Pace Sehlesinger, the exchange of policy promises for 
labour/finance inside parties is important and we cannot simply assume that such 
internal exchange will always be trumped by politician-voter exchange. (Neither, as I 
argue shortly, can we follow early exchange models in assuming politicians are 
completely constrained by the preferences of activists.)
However, at this point, two problems arise. First, the simple exchange model 
suggests politicians offer the same policy promises to all activists. Yet if  an activist is 
not happy with these policies, she has little incentive to engage in the exchange. 
Thus, the simplified model might appear to assume all activists share the same policy 
preferences, which in turn implies politicians are forced to forgo recruiting large 
numbers of activists because they cannot offer them satisfactory policies. Yet it is 
unrealistic to assume even broadly homogenous preferences among activists. Second, 
even if activists unite behind a policy, politicians face a choice in accommodating 
their preferences or those of the median voter (P.l). Politicians might persuade 
activists that moderation is needed to win an election but in government radical 
policies can be implemented. Yet the risk remains that the politicians will renege on 
their promises. These problems are discussed next.
3.5 PARTY ORGANISATIONS AS GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES14 
Exchange and Institutions
The black box status of parties in rational choice models of party competition 
mirrors the way in which the firm was regarded as a production function in neo-
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classical economics. Indeed, organisational economists’ attacks on this conception of 
the firm point the way forward for reconceptualising parties.15 Williamson (1985) 
argues that firms are governance structures in which some transactions are organised 
more efficiently than they would be in markets.16 The key elements for Williamson 
are imperfect information, since not everything can be known in advance; 
opportunism, which is ‘self-interest seeking with guile’; and asset specificity, or, the 
degree to which investments made during the course of a trading relationship are 
dependent on the continuation of that particular relationship (Williamson, 1985: 30- 
2). Some exchanges can take place via the market and without the need for 
institutions because the goods/services being traded can easily be put to alternative 
uses if an agreed exchange breaks down. Such exchanges involve fairly unspecific 
assets. By contrast, highly specific assets are vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour in 
market exchange (e.g. ex post attempts to renegotiate contracts) so they are more 
efficiently organised in firms through a process of ‘vertical integration’. Williamson 
(1985: 114-5) gives the example of General Motors buying out the car body 
manufacturer, Fisher Body in 1926. From 1919, Fisher had a ten-year contract to 
supply GM with car bodies, but a technological shift from wooden to metal car 
bodies required increasingly specific investments geared to the particularities of 
GM’s cars. GM became dissatisfied with the contract and wanted to renegotiate more 
favourable terms. Fisher resisted this as well as demands to situate its plants adjacent 
to GM’s. However, Fisher could not hold out indefinitely because its investments 
were tied up in supplying GM and it would be costly to switch to other companies. 
Fisher and GM integrated under a unified governance structure, thereby enabling the 
realisation of economies of scale without fear of opportunistic behaviour.
Now, political parties are similar to the Williamsonian conception of firms. 
Given the nature of the transaction costs attending ‘trade’ between politicians and 
activists, such trade is best organised within an institutional framework whereas 
politician-voter ‘trade’ can be accommodated in ‘market’ (i.e. electoral) exchange. 
Internal rules and party organs institutionalise politician-activist exchange, providing 
it with durability.
When politicians offer policy promises in return for a tangible resource such 
as a vote or a donation, the exchange is normally non-simultaneous. This insight 
(following Weingast and Marshall, 1988) forms the centrepiece of Strom’s exchange
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model of party organisation (1990). Strom argues that when activists campaign for 
politicians, they are usually supplying their labour in the months and years before an 
election, after which they hope to obtain favourable policies from the newly-elected 
politicians (the same applies to financial donors). We may add that the same non­
simultaneity characterises politician-voter exchange because when voters offer their 
votes, they do so hoping policy promises will be enacted in the future. In each case, 
politicians may face a commitment problem because once voters or activists have 
supplied votes or finance/labour, the politicians could decide to renege on their 
promises. Thus, politicians could promise radical policies to activists in order to 
secure their campaigning efforts but once in office they may renege. However, if 
activists anticipate this problem, they may undersupply campaign resources (Strom, 
1990: 576). This is a prisoner’s dilemma in which politicians’ incentive to break their 
promises imposes costs on them as activists shirk.
Commitment problems in non-simultaneous political exchange are similar to 
the problems caused by high asset specificity in economics (e.g. donated labour or 
finance cannot be retrieved and reinvested elsewhere), and in the case of politician- 
activist exchange, the solution is similar: to institutionalise exchange in a rules-based 
governance structure, i.e. a party. Strom (1990: 577-9) lists three institutional means 
to promote credible commitments in parties: (1) intraparty democracy; (2) internal 
recruitment policies that favour existing activists; and (3) personnel accountability of 
leaders to members. The first enables decentralised policymaking, the second permits 
activists to pursue careers and the third gives activists the power to replace shirking 
politicians. Each of these is a means, whether direct or indirect, by which activists 
can influence party policy and limit politicians’ autonomy. To this we may add that 
there are two principal mechanisms available to institutional designers for affecting 
outcomes: screens (or filters) and sanctions (Pettit, 1998: 57-9). Sanctions, which 
can be positive (rewards) or negative (punishments), impact on the desirability that 
agents attach to each option within their set of options, while the set itself is assumed 
constant. While sanctions concern agents’ incentives, screens are about excluding (or 
including) certain options. Alternatively, they may involve excluding (or including) 
certain actors from the decision-making process. Throughout this thesis, it is shown 
that screens are an important institutional mechanism in party organisations, e.g. in 
candidate and leader selection procedures.
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Thus, Strom’s insight is to see that institutionalising exchange in 
organisational structures assigns enforcement powers to activists and reduces their 
fears about elite shirking. Institutions are efficient because they permit exchanges 
that otherwise might not take place due to the transaction costs that attend them. 
Therefore, my second proposition on party organisation is:
P.2 Party institutions are efficient in that they reduce party members’ policy 
enforcement costs and ease the commitment problems of members and 
leaders.
Strom also observes that the severity of any commitment problems for 
politicians can vary according to the technology of campaigning that is deployed 
(1990: 575-6). Labour-intensive mass parties that depend on activists will be most 
affected whereas capital-intensive parties that rely on mass media campaigns can 
comfortably afford shirking by activists. Other things equal, office-seeking 
politicians may thus prefer capital-intensive technologies because it eases their 
reliance on policy-seeking activists. This creates a dynamic element in the exchange 
model and I return to it in section 3.6
Institutions also mediate exchange between politicians and voters (e.g. 
electoral systems, voter registration, term limits). However, formal organisations, 
whose functions and activities occur much more regularly than quadrennial election 
days are generally not required despite the non-simultaneity of politician-voter 
exchange. The frequency of exchange is an important dimension of asset specificity, 
with infrequent exchange less needful of costly governance structures (Williamson, 
1985: 72-3). An individual voter has little incentive to form extra-electoral 
institutions to reduce the costs of exchange because her vote is but one among 
millions and is cast just once every four years. By contrast, activists make much 
higher political investments of labour and donations. These are wasted if politicians 
shirk so institutional guarantees of control are required.
Strom’s model fits well with the incentives approach set out earlier and it 
forms another important part of the exchange approach adopted here. However, there 
would appear to be a slightly problematical feature with the story thus far. The
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unstated assumption has been that activists seek a single set of policies from the 
politicians -  after all, in the Downsian model a party can occupy only a single point 
on the policy continuum at any one point in time -  and use intraparty institutions to 
enforce their preferences. In reality, activists’ preferences range along the ideological 
spectrum even if the distribution is usually skewed towards the radical end. In which 
case, why is one set of policies chosen rather than another? Furthermore, will those 
activists who do not receive their most favoured policies from politicians decide to 
exit? An exchange model must be able to address these problems.
Activist Preference Heterogeneity
Simple exchange approaches focus on the ‘horizontal’ division within parties 
between the elite at the top and the activists at the bottom. This dichotomy has often 
been identified by critics as too simple to capture all the important elements in 
parties (e.g. Kitschelt, 1989). However, recognising that preference heterogeneity 
exists among the activist body allows us to go beyond simple exchange models 
because a role is opened up for vertical (i.e. factional) fractures running through 
parties. While retaining the assumption from May’s law that activists on average will 
be more radical while politicians on average are more moderate, we can accept that 
both sets of actors will display a range of policy preferences. Moreover, elites and 
followers with similar preferences can band together in their own factions. Figure 3.2 
presents a simple illustration of this in a social-democratic party, with the horizontal 
division between leaders and followers crosscut by a factional division between 
moderates and radicals. The moderate faction (shaded light grey) is a ‘top-heavy’ 
coalition consisting of the bulk of the political leaders supplemented by a minority of 
party members. The radical faction is a ‘bottom-heavy’ coalition of mainly ordinary 
members together with a minority of the politicians. This is a simplification but 
according to May’s law it represents something like the normal configuration in 
major parties. ‘Moderate’ coalitions tend to be ‘top-heavy’ while ‘radical’ coalitions 
tend to be ‘bottom-heavy’ though all coalitions exhibit tensions between leaders and 
followers, especially if the former are shirking.
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Figure 3.2 Horizontal (Organisational) and Vertical (Factional) Cleavages
Many authors use the concept of the dominant coalition as that subset of 
actors that controls a party (e.g. Panebianco, 1988; Harmel and Janda, 1994).17 Rival 
factions may challenge the dominant coalition or be coopted into it. Vertical and 
horizontal (leader-follower) cleavages may crosscut because each faction includes 
politicians and activists. Subgroups of activists can attempt to install a subgroup of 
politicians in order to control party policy. The excluded activists may in turn 
promote another subgroup of politicians. Likewise, politicians outside the dominant 
coalition may compete against it or be coopted into it. A constraint on incumbent 
party leaders straying too far from the preferences of most activists is that they could 
be replaced by an alternative set of politicians. The parliamentary body contains 
many politicians seeking to pursue their own self-interest and the most effective way 
of doing this is by holding key leadership positions in the party. Rival politicians 
may have incentives to monitor the leaders and expose shirking in the hope of being 
called upon to replace the incumbents (see Laver, 1997: 68-88). Vertical cleavages 
are thus very important though ultimately in an exchange model horizontal cleavages 
retain primary (but not sole) explanatory priority, particularly as far as institutional 
change is concerned. Major intraparty organs are usually divided from each other by 
horizontal fractures, i.e. they are in a hierarchical relationship. It is rare to find 
institutions purposefully divided by factional fractures, i.e. a body set aside for the 
left, another for the right, etc. This latter configuration should be distinguished from 
horizontally divided bodies that happen to be dominated by one or other faction, e.g. 
local party branches dominated by radical activists. The assumption of horizontal
Radicals: ‘bottom-heavy’ 
coalition (dark grey)
Moderates: ‘top-heavy’ 
coalition (light grey)
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cleavages inside party organisations together with May’s law suggests there is a 
systematic tendency for party organs at given organisational levels to have certain 
distributions of preferences, e.g. parliamentary bodies dominated by moderates and 
local branches dominated by radicals. I return to this in section 3.7.
These points raise questions about the institutionalisation of politician-activist 
exchange. Since a party’s leadership can set party policy at only one point on the 
policy continuum, and given activist preference heterogeneity, leaders cannot recruit 
activists by offering all of them their most preferred policies. Why then would 
activists remain in a party if their preferred policies are not adopted, given then- 
considerable investments of money and labour? Answering this helps us identify 
another general function of party organisation:
P.3 Party institutions aggregate members’ preferences and permit enduring
preference heterogeneity among members and politicians.18
Through their procedural and voting rules, as well as with rules on voter eligibility, 
institutions aggregate activists’ preferences so as to prioritise a single policy position. 
For example, policymaking conferences allow activists to choose policies they 
collectively want party leaders to pursue. This necessarily means that not all activists 
are exchanging resources for promises of their preferred policies -  only some 
activists will be in this position. Thus, rather than being directly offered policy 
promises per se, activists are instead offered institutions as a means of influencing 
policy. That is, intraparty institutions serve as a substitute for the explicit exchange 
of policy promises for resources. This cmcial point is absent from Strom’s exchange 
model. It is crucial because even if a subset of activists fail to secure their most 
preferred policies, they can use the institutions to try to change policies, ensuring that 
they have incentives to remain in the party because they can fight again, building 
new coalitions and forcing new votes. Institutions also provide the means for 
activists or their representatives to bargain with politicians, e.g. through elected 
members of committees. Thus, institutions and the distribution of preferences co- 
determine party policy. Finally, party constitutions usually set out means by which 
the institutions themselves can be changed so that even if a subset of activists is 
disadvantaged under current mles, they may have further incentives to stay if they
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believe they could introduce more favourable institutions. Just as actors have 
different preferences over policies, they also have different preferences over 
institutions. I return to this in section 3.7.
In summary, Strom’s exchange model provided insights into how party 
organisation helps reduce commitment problems between politicians and activists. 
However, we identified a second function of institutions -  to aggregate members’ 
preferences -  which forces us to reconceptualise the exchange approach to parties. In 
the same way, according to Weingast and Marshall (1988) that the committee system 
in the US congress serves as a substitute for the explicit exchange of votes for 
promises, so intraparty institutions over policymaking and candidate selection 
substitute for the explicit exchange of activist resources for policy promises. 
However, the degree to which institutions can enforce deals is itself a variable. A 
problem facing intraparty actors is that parties also engage in electoral exchange with 
voters. This requires politicians to have some autonomy in order to speak to two 
different constituencies but it ensures that commitment costs are never fully 
eradicated. It is to that and related problems that I now turn.
3.6 THE POLICY-VOTES TRADE-OFF AND POLITICIANS’ AUTONOMY
Politicians must offer popular policy promises to voters to win elections and 
thereby satisfy their own office-seeking desires. Politicians also require activists if 
they are to win votes and in return activists require institutions through which they 
can pursue their own interests and exert influence over politicians. However, the 
median activist and the median voter have different preferences (P .l), presenting 
politicians with a strategic dilemma. Activists too face tough choices since they 
know their favoured policies can be implemented only if their party captures the 
median voter. If they burden it with extreme policies, they may hand victory to the 
opposing party, to whose policies they are more vehemently opposed. It is, therefore, 
too simplistic to regard them as pure policy-seekers who have no interest in electoral 
considerations, though this is how they are normally regarded in the rational choice 
literature (e.g. Robertson, 1976; cf. Kitschelt, 1989). Activists face a trade-off 
between doctrinal purity and electability so it is more realistic to regard them as 
constrained policy-seekers, i.e. there is a minimum probability of electoral success 
that they demand of any given policy package (which in reality is an empirical
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question). Activists may voluntarily dilute their demands if their preferred policies 
fail to offer a high enough chance of electoral success. Intraparty institutions are 
important, being sites of bargaining between politicians and activists. Whether in 
delegate conferences or committee meetings, politicians and activist representatives 
can agree a policy package that will win votes but which also contains some policies 
favoured by the activists. This may not be impossible given the reality of imperfect 
information among voters. Politicians may attempt to ‘becloud their policies in a fog 
of ambiguity’ (Downs, 1957: 136; see also Alesina and Cukierman, 1990; Shepsle, 
1972) in order to capture centrists while retaining extremist support. Such strategies 
are more likely to sway voters than better-informed activists.
To do this, politicians need some autonomy from activists, with freedom to 
expound and interpret policies. Since electoral politics is characterised by constant 
flux, with new issues and events arising, politicians generally do require some -  and 
prefer more -  discretion over policy and its presentation. Institutional accountability 
and control mechanisms provide safeguards for activists and may encourage them to 
permit autonomy. However, granting discretion carries risks for activists because 
opportunistic politicians may exploit it to tweak policies through presentation. This 
could be a problem if the party gains office because governments can use the 
resources of the state and are more independent of activists. Activists will be more 
willing to allow discretion if politicians’ preferences are close to their own because 
agency loss will be lower (so moderate activists are likely to permit discretion to 
office-seeking politicians), but less likely if there is a big difference in preferences.
P.4 Party leaders tend to prefer institutions that give them more autonomy from 
members but members tend to prefer institutions that give them more control 
over politicians.
Many intraparty tensions can be traced back to elites’ exercise of their autonomy. 
This autonomy is greatest when politicians are in government, and we often find that 
activists attempt to impose stricter controls on politicians after their ejection from 
office, especially if there is a perception that the government reneged on promises to 
activists. It is costly for politicians to shift policy in the face of activist opposition 
because it can cause ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ (Hirschman, 1970). Activist voice can range
66
from public disquiet to attempts to implement new policies or enforce institutional 
reforms. If a subgroup of activists realises it has no hope of affecting party policy, its 
members may decide to exit. Activist voice and exit are more likely to occur when 
politicians have considerable autonomy. If politicians could be completely controlled 
by activists, the latter would bear full responsibility for the party’s performance. This 
would still leave room for voice and exit but it would be among activists themselves. 
However, if politicians have discretion to shift policy, activists are more likely to 
believe they are being ignored when policy does not reflect their own preferences. 
Politicians must weigh up the electoral costs of activist voice and exit. Voice is 
costly because voters are often repelled by divided parties, though closing down 
channels of ‘voice’ such as embarrassing conferences may encourage membership 
exit. Exit is costly if it leaves politicians with insufficient activists for campaigning. 
Politicians may then feel compelled to offer policy compromises or institutional 
reforms to stem the outflow of activists or attract new ones (see below).
Some degree of leadership autonomy is a reality in most parties. This reminds 
us that political institutions have distributive as well as efficient consequences. Party 
organisation is efficient if it provides politicians and activists with payoffs higher 
than they could achieve in non-institutionalised exchange. This is shown in Figure 
3.3, where politicians and activists begin at the non-party status quo ante point a. 
Politicians’ utility increases with votes and resources whereas activists’ utility 
derives from policy and social benefits. Party organisation offers activists some 
protection from the threat of shirking by politicians and institutionalises the supply of 
resources to politicians. Thus, there is a Pareto improvement whereby politicians and 
activists move to a point north-east of point a. However, numerous institutional 
configurations are Pareto-superior to a -  e.g. b and e are on the Pareto frontier and 
are thus Pareto optimal. However, a move to the Pareto frontier need not imply a 
Pareto improvement, e.g. a move from a to f  reduces politicians’ utility. Moreover, a 
Pareto improvement need not reach the Pareto frontier (e.g. a move from a to d). 
Thus, b, c, d and e are just four examples of Pareto improvements on the status quo 
ante. Each represents a different institutional settlement, but which will be chosen? 
This cannot be determined a priori as it depends on the relative bargaining power of 
politicians and activists. Disputes over which Pareto improvement to choose are 
distributional conflicts as politicians and activists seek to maximise their payoffs.
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Figure 3.3 Efficient and Redistributive Institutions
Politicians’
Utility
dm
Activists’ Utility
Since politicians and activists often prefer different policies, they may also 
disagree over institutions. Conflicts over institutions can be even more intense than 
conflicts over policies because institutions have a longer time-span than policies and 
represent investments by actors (Tsebelis, 1990: 92-118). Party institutional change 
is an ever-present possibility. For example, in Figure 3.3 assume that the formation 
of party institutions results in a new status quo at b. Politicians seeking more 
autonomy might want to move to e. By contrast, activists prefer a move to c so as to 
reduce leaders’ autonomy, though if they move to f  politicians would be worse off 
than they were at the non-party stage (point a) and such points are not viable in the 
long term. Any point that makes activists worse off than they were at a would cause 
membership exit and party decline, so it too would not be viable in the long term.
It is easy to think of examples of institutions with different distributive 
consequences. Policymaking conventions have differing abilities to enforce their 
decisions. Party leaders often have more autonomy if parliamentarians rather than 
activists elect them. Leaders facing mandatory annual re-election have less autonomy 
than those who remain in charge until challenged. Nomination rules make it easier or 
harder to mobilise support for challengers. Parliamentarians may face reselection 
panels run by activists. If a party’s executive has no veto power over local selection 
contests, the activists can exert more control over their MP. Generally, institutions 
provide greater or lesser amounts of discretion for politicians. The more discretion 
politicians enjoy, the greater the potential commitment costs will be because activists 
may suspect that promises could be broken and so undersupply resources. Party 
organisation reduces commitment problems but does not eradicate them.
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Campaign Technologies
The inevitability of leader-aetivist disparities over policy gives politicians 
incentives to develop ways of campaigning that permit a reduction in demand for 
activists’ services, introducing a dynamic element into the exchange model. The 
post-war period has seen a strong shift in liberal democracies towards capital- 
intensive means of campaigning based on the electronic media and lately involving 
computerisation (see Scammell, 1995; McNair, 1999; Farrell and Webb, 2000; 
Wring, 1996). Intraparty conflicts are not the only motivation to develop new 
technologies but they are an important one. The old mass parties of the pre-war era 
were based on labour-intensive techniques, relying on activists to ascertain voters’ 
desires and communicate the party’s policies. The activists were in a powerful 
position as conveyers and collectors of information, which would be filtered through 
their own policy preferences. The growth of media campaigning via television 
interviews and political marketing enabled politicians to communicate directly with 
voters. This, together with the rise of modem opinion polling helped reduce the 
significance of labour-intensive methods. By reducing their demand for activists, 
politicians can alleviate policy-vote trade-offs -  capital makes no policy demands. 
Politicians still require finance to pay for polling, marketing, etc. but observers of the 
shift from the mass party structure to the catch-all (Kirchheimer, 1966), electoral- 
professional (Panebianco, 1988) and cartel party structures (Katz and Mair, 1995) 
have noted a corresponding shift to different sources of funding -  interest groups, 
firms and the state. State funding alleviates parties’ reliance on the financial 
donations of activists and interest groups and can reduce constraints on elites.
P.5 Party leaders may have incentives to reduce their dependence on party 
members by seeking alternative sources of funding and by adopting capital- 
intensive communications technologies.
However, capital can only partly substitute for labour (Ware, 1992), and 
some technology requires activists to operate it, e.g. PCs and telephone canvassing. 
The renaissance in constituency campaigning in the UK (Denver and Hands, 1998)
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points towards a continued role for activists and with it the need for intraparty 
channels of accountability and control. Yet the undoubted importance of spin 
doctors, pollsters and other professionals has consequences for the internal 
organisation of parties. Media-based campaign techniques require centralised 
command structures so that decisions can be taken quickly and actors can respond to 
a fast-changing environment. As Kavanagh (1995: 108) notes, ‘[s]peedy decision­
making and short lines of communication (by-passing committees) are important to 
communicators’. Such centralisation has distributive consequences, facilitating 
leadership autonomy, not least because informal communications groups often 
operate outside of parties’ formal constitutional structures, making it difficult for 
them to be controlled ‘from below’. In contrast to the old mass parties, it is now the 
strategists and spin doctors, accountable directly to party leaders, who control flows 
of information to and from the party, undertaking polling and interpreting the data -  
a powerful resource during arguments about the direction of party policy -  and 
spinning the party’s message to the voters.
3.7 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN VOTE-SEEKING PARTIES
Some institutions allow more discretion than others, sometimes leading 
politicians and activists to conflict over institutions. A satisfactory model of parties 
must explain how and why they change. We saw earlier that evolutionary models 
look specifically at change but their scope is long term, particularly those variants 
that point to socio-political change as the motor of party change. The purpose of 
devising an exchange model was to provide parties with microfoundations. An 
exchange model of party change must be based on such microfoundations. Therefore, 
we need to develop tools for understanding short and medium term changes based on 
the two key exchange relationships in which politicians engage. Also important is the 
existing distribution of intraparty resources because a party’s prior development 
creates organisational opportunities and resources, which can be utilised by opposing 
actors or indeed become the focus of reformers’ attempts to institute change.
I do not propose to examine in great detail all other theories of party change. 
However, I do examine one recent model, which offers an advance on earlier models 
and which informs the model I sketch below. Going beyond sociological models of 
long-term change and studies of individual parties that invariably point to
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incremental alterations, Harmel and Janda (henceforth, HJ) have developed ‘a theory 
of party change that uses party goals as a major concept in explaining changes in 
individual parties’ (1994: 259). This is the approach adopted in this thesis. The HJ 
model essentially critiques and extends a notion of party change sketched by 
Panebianco (1988: 239-61).
Panebianco poses three questions about party change (1988: 239-42). First, is 
it ‘evolutionary’19 or politically ‘developmental’? Evolutionary accounts, such as that 
of Michels, claim that party organisations pass through stages of development that 
follow laws determinable a priori (e.g. growth in size, greater bureaucratisation, 
etc.). By contrast, theories of political development view change as the 
indeterminable result of power struggles in parties, an approach that Panebianco 
himself prefers. Secondly, he asks whether change is intentional or non-intentional. 
Management theories typify the former (‘the effect of deliberate and conscious 
choices’), whereas non-intentional models (such as natural systems models of 
organisations) view change as less planned and often the result of reactions to long- 
brewing organisational crises. Panebianco suggests both views have strengths so a 
hybrid approach is most useful. Thirdly, change can have either exogenous or 
endogenous origins. The former relates to external shocks that induce organisational 
adaptation, while the latter reflects changes in an organisation’s internal distribution 
of power. Again, Panebianco suggests most change is a combination of the two.
HJ concur with Panebianco on the first two questions, as does the present 
work. A model of parties based on microfoundations cannot simply view change as 
evolutionary and inevitable. Further, despite Panebianco’s use o f the terms 
‘intentional’ and non-intentional’ change, actors in this work are regarded as 
boundedly rational and capable of miscalculating, and they also face internal 
resistance from other actors. However, HJ differ with Panebianco slightly on the 
third question. First, they suggest some change can be explained by internal factors 
alone. Second, they claim the role of external stimuli should be comprehensively 
developed: more specifically, ‘the most potent external stimuli are those which cause 
a party to reevaluate its effectiveness in meeting its primary goal, whether that be 
electoral success or something else’ (Harmel and Janda, 1994: 265).
On the basis of this distinction between internal and external precipitants of 
change, HJ suggest party change can be of two main types. First, there is goal-
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motivated change, which usually follows an exogenous shock, and is intended to 
address the party’s pursuit of its primary goal (1994: 278-9). These goals relate to 
whether the party is a vote-seeker (referring mainly to parties in two-party systems), 
an office-seeker (in a multiparty system), a policy-seeker, or what the authors call 
‘intraparty democracy seekers’ (such as some ecology parties). Parties are judged by 
how well they achieve their primary goals, and if they are failing in this respect, 
change becomes more likely. In this thesis, my concern is with the British Labour 
Party, which I take to be a vote-seeking party and it is to such parties that I restrict 
my focus here. The most important exogenous shock for vote-seeking parties is 
electoral failure because it directly harms the pursuit of their main goal, that of 
winning elections. Secondly, HJ say parties may undertake power-motivated change, 
which involves reinforcement of, or challenges to, the party’s dominant coalition. 
The key variables here are leadership change and changes in the dominant coalition. 
Leadership change often follows other changes such as electoral defeats but it can 
also occur for ‘personal’ reasons, such as ill health, age or even death. This did 
indeed happen in the Labour Party in the period under review, when John Smith’s 
death spurred a transformation in Labour’s strategy. Changes in the dominant 
coalition can entail either the addition of new personnel to the existing coalition or 
the displacement of one coalition by another (1994: 266-7).
HJ offer a number of propositions on party change. On goal-motivated 
change, they suggest the poorer a party’s performance in achieving its goals, the 
greater the likelihood of change. For vote-seeking parties, ‘the more pronounced 
their electoral failures, the more likely they are to change’ (1994: 281). On power- 
motivated change, they claim changes in leadership, the composition (personnel) of 
the dominant coalition or the conformation of the dominant coalition (i.e. 
replacement of the previous dominant coalition by a new one) each make change 
more likely (1994: 280). HJ also offer propositions that distinguish the effects of goal 
motivations and power motivations on party change but I ignore these as my main 
concern is with the very notions of goal- and power motivations. In the following 
paragraphs, I restrict my comments to vote-seeking parties.
Now, it is not always clear that goal- and power-motivated changes are so 
easily distinguishable. Power is not desired for its own sake but for what it can 
achieve -  in this case, control of policy. The latter also has consequences for the
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party’s ability to capture votes, so goal and power motivations overlap considerably. 
For example, goal-motivated change could entail making the party more competitive 
through institutions that favour the adoption of vote-winning policies. To the extent 
that this favours one faction over another or involves increasing leadership 
discretion, such change has power consequences. Besides, while it is true that 
politicians want to improve their party’s performance, this is mainly achieved 
through policy and personnel changes rather than institutional reform.
This blurring of goal and power motivations flows from a problematic feature 
of HJ’s model. Although they distinguish five different types of actors (top leaders, 
middle leaders, activists, passive members and ordinary voters), HJ appear to assume 
each type of intrapaity actor behaves in much the same way in the pursuit of the 
party’s primary goal. Thus, in a vote-seeking party, top leaders, middle leaders, 
activists and passive members are all vote-seekers. This means horizontal cleavages 
play little explanatory role in the HJ model, with vertical cleavages explanatorily 
more important. Thus, HJ use the concept of dominant coalition to describe the 
people that control the party, and these coalitions are largely factions that cut across 
horizontal divisions. As we have seen, they argue party change often occurs after the 
displacement of the dominant coalition by a new one, and the attempt by the latter to 
entrench itself through institutional change.
I earlier acknowledged the utility of the concept of ‘dominant coalition’. 
However, HJ’s use of it blurs the distinction between horizontal and vertical 
cleavages. While factional (vertical) cleavages are important, we generally find that 
horizontal cleavages between politicians and activists explain most intraparty 
institutional change. If factions were uniformly distributed in each party organ, it 
would be difficult for the dominant coalition to augment its position through 
specifically institutional reforms. Institutional change for distributive reasons is 
effective only if different factions are concentrated in different organs because the 
rival coalition can be easily targeted with an attack on their powerbase. May’s law 
suggests factions are indeed differentially distributed in party organs, with moderates 
controlling top leadership positions and radicals dominating intermediate and local 
organs. Thus, a leadership attack on radicals could target local parties. Therefore, I 
prefer to give explanatory priority to the tensions arising from parties’ horizontal 
cleavages, which are activated by the clash of vote-seeking (politicians) and policy-
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seeking (activists) motives. Horizontal cleavages provided the microfoundations of 
the exchange model above. As we shall see, activated horizontal cleavages often 
precipitate reforms that either tighten or relax activist control of politicians.
The concepts of ‘power-motivated change’ and a purely factional notion of 
‘dominant coalition’ are closely linked, in that the dominant coalition implements 
changes to augment its own power, and changes in its conformation often produce 
power-motivated change. This does not distinguish sharply enough between reforms 
that consolidate the old dominant coalition and those that empower a new one. I 
prefer the term redistributive institutional change to power-motivated change 
because it focuses on institutions rather than factions. Redistributive institutions can 
be of a consolidating or ‘new deal ’ nature, whereby the former consolidate the old 
dominant coalition and the latter entrench a new coalition (Tsebelis, 1990). 
Consolidating change is normally instigated ‘from above’ by party leaders and 
usually involves increasing leadership autonomy. This often involves centralisation 
(particularly with ‘top-heavy’ coalitions) but consolidating change may be subtler 
than that, e.g. by reforming preference aggregation mechanisms. An increasingly 
common real-life example of this is the decentralisation of candidate selection 
procedures from activists to inactive (and politically moderate) ordinary members 
(Katz, 2001). New deal change typically emanates ‘from below’ as activist 
disenchantment with the leadership empowers a set of politicians willing to listen to 
the activists. The new institutions usually impose tighter controls on politicians and 
strengthen activist organs. However, new deal institutional change is sometimes 
instigated by party leaders, e.g. if a part of the dominant coalition decides it would be 
better off abandoning another part of that coalition and replacing it with some other 
group. Precisely this happened in the Labour Party in the early 1990s.
Political Exchange and Party Change
This section outlines an exchange model of party change building on the 
strengths of the HJ model. In an exchange model, it follows that party change will 
relate to one or both spheres of political exchange, i.e. politician-voter or politician- 
activist. It would seem that vote-seeking politicians are more likely than policy- 
seeking activists to seek changes that directly or indirectly make the party electorally 
more competitive. My claim is that much party change usually centres round the
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opportunities that institutions offer for elite autonomy from party members and that 
the major precipitant of change is poor electoral performance.
There is a consensus that the principal conditions prompting organisational 
change in a vote-seeking party are likely to be shocks that affect its electoral 
performance or sharpen tensions between politicians and activists (e.g. Harmel and 
Janda, 1994; Koelble, 1996; Panebianco, 1988: 243). When a vote-seeking party 
loses an election it is generally because it has offered the median voter unfavourable 
terms of political exchange compared to the winning party, i.e. its policies are 
‘extreme’ (or, alternatively, its policies in government were unsuccessful). In order 
to be more competitive it must change its policies. However, there may be costs, and 
not only benefits, in moderating policy. Some of these costs are external, e.g. 
credibility costs as voters lose trust in the party. Significant policy shifts will often 
need to be accompanied by major changes in personnel at the top of the party, with 
the adoption of new leaders without a history of political extremism or failure. Other 
costs are internal, stemming from intraparty impediments to policy change. Radical 
activists may control important decision-making organs and use them to block policy 
change (a problem according to P.l). Thus, my first proposition on party change is:
C .l Electoral failure creates pressure for organisational change that promotes
policy flexibility and/or makes vote-gathering less costly.
Electoral failure is bad for all intraparty actors since only governments can 
implement policies. Even activists may accept the need for party change to improve 
electoral performance but if, as often, this involves reducing their own power, they 
may resist it at first. This resistance will diminish with each successive election 
defeat. The corollary of C .l is that change is less likely when electoral performance 
is good. Change is not undertaken lightly because it involves exit, voice and 
opportunity costs, e.g. missed opportunities to campaign or attack the opposing party 
because time and energy is invested in party change.21 HJ suggest parties are 
conservative organisations that change only under pressure (1994: 278). However, 
parties are likely to undergo organisational reform more frequently than firms or 
bureaux because unlike the latter, intraparty actors have conflicting preferences over 
their party’s ‘output’ whereas paid employees receive material rather than purposive
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incentives. Party change is generally about controlling policy and decision-making 
whereas in firms and bureaux it usually concerns ‘X-efficiency’ (internal efficiency). 
Interest groups also offer purposive incentives but they do not compete in the 
electoral market so leaders have greater incentives to pursue their members’ 
preferences, reducing the likelihood of frequent institutional change.
Electoral failure can prompt different types of change but the most common 
is overtly redistributive reform as politicians attempt to increase their own power in 
order to pursue moderate policies free of internal constraints (see P .l and P.4). Such 
reforms typically centre on institutional sites of contact between politicians and 
members, such as candidate selection, leadership election and policymaking 
procedures, as well as control over rule-making and disciplinary procedures. Thus:
C.2 Redistributive change instigated ‘from above’ by party leaders is usually 
intended to increase their autonomy from party members.
This tends to characterise not only ‘top-heavy’ dominant coalitions but also ‘bottom- 
heavy’ (activist-dominated) coalitions. Even party leaders who are supported by a 
minority of MPs and a majority of (largely radical) activists will be tempted to dilute 
radical policies if this is the only realistic way of winning office. Any such ‘shirking’ 
risks splitting the dominant coalition and could end in the leadership forming a new 
coalition, perhaps buttressed by centralising reforms. This happened in the Labour 
Party when the centre-leftist Neil Kinnock was elected as leader in 1983 with little 
support from shadow cabinet members but with overwhelming backing from 
activists and trade unions.22 Yet in the following years, Kinnock successfully shifted 
the party towards the centreground, forming a new coalition with the Labour right as 
the party sought electoral respectability. As in this case, change will be more widely 
accepted by activists if it is deemed necessary for electoral success. Similar 
centralising changes occurred in the German SPD in the 1990s after consecutive 
election defeats and this process of change has also recently begun in the British 
Conservative Party, with moves to assert greater central control over candidate 
selection. However, politicians must not increase their own power so much that 
commitment costs are too high. Institutions must remain Pareto-improvements on 
non-party ‘market’ exchange between politicians and activists otherwise the latter
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will undersupply resources. A further recent lesson from Labour is that although 
redistributive change from above normally consolidates the dominant coalition it is 
sometimes ‘new deal’ in nature. I show throughout this thesis that Labour’s 
traditional dominant coalition of parliamentary and trade union leaders was partly 
dismantled by Tony Blair because the unions were seen as an electoral liability.
The flip side of the elite’s preference for autonomy is activists’ desire for 
control (see P.4). The lower the degree of elite discretion, the harder it becomes for 
politicians to renege on deals with activists. However, activists too must be careful 
not to bind politicians too tightly otherwise the party may end up with policies that 
reflect activists’ preferences but which harm its electoral chances. Nevertheless:
C.3 Redistributive change instigated ‘from below’ by party members is usually 
intended to reduce politicians’ opportunities to shirk by shrinking their 
autonomy from members.
The most obvious way of achieving such change is through decentralisation of 
decision-making to activists or the strengthening of enforcement mechanisms. For 
example, Labour activists in the 1970s fought for the mandatory reselection of MPs 
in order to reduce the latter’s security of tenure by increasing activist leverage over 
them. However, redistributive change can be subtler than this. Parties’ preference 
aggregation methods are often the subject of fierce battles (see P.3). There is no 
perfect way of democratically aggregating the preferences of a group of individuals 
(Arrow, 1951) so institutions affect outcomes. Electoral rules can be majoritarian or 
proportional. Votes can be cast as blocks by affiliated organs or on an individual 
basis. Electoral colleges can weight votes in favour of one group or another. In 1980- 
1, the Labour Party was split by an argument over the weighting of votes in its new 
electoral college for leadership contests (Kogan and Kogan, 1982) and in later years 
controversy surrounded moves away from block voting to individual voting.
Redistributive change from below can involve activists who are part of a 
‘bottom-heavy’ dominant coalition reasserting control over leaders but more often it 
is ‘new deal’ in nature and reflects a challenge to the dominant coalition. As with
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change ‘from above’, redistributive change ‘from below’ normally follows electoral 
failure but this time it is likely to follow an unsuccessful spell in office:
C.4 A perceived government ‘betrayal’ of party members, followed by electoral 
defeat, increases the likelihood of attempts ‘from below’ to introduce ‘new 
deal’ institutions and/or reduce leadership autonomy.
In these circumstances, the first instinct of the activists is to bring the politicians to 
heel by implementing changes that reduce their autonomy in the expectation this will 
make them listen to the activists. Labour’s activists did this after the defeat of James 
Callaghan’s Labour government in 1979. The watchword of such reforms is usually 
‘accountability’. (Another example would be the leftist-inspired reforms in the 
German SPD after its ejection from office in 1982 -  see Koelble, 1987, 1996.) 
However, reforms can go too far, replacing elite independence with stifling controls 
that prevent any flexibility and result in the adoption of ‘extremist’ platforms. This is 
what happened in the Labour Party after its reforms of 1979-81, leading to the 
election defeat of 1983. If such reforms fail to turn the party around after one 
election, strong pressure emerges for greater elite autonomy, as there was in the 
Labour Party after 1983 and the SPD in the 1990s (Koelble, 1996: 256).
Redistributive reform -  changing the distribution of power between 
institutions -  is the major type of change undertaken in parties, reflecting attempts by 
coalitions to secure control of policymaking and candidate selection. However, there 
are other forms of party change, which have distributional consequences but which 
cannot simply be subsumed under this heading. I offer propositions on three such 
kinds of change (C.5-7) as well as a proposition adopted from the HJ model (C.8):
C.5 Institutional change can be introduced to increase the supply of resources to 
the party.
C.6 Institutional change can be introduced to facilitate new communication 
technologies.
C .l Institutional change can be introduced if voters are repelled by a party’s 
existing institutional structure.
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C.8 Leadership change can be a spur for party change.
First, an aim of party change that is often overlooked in exchange models, is 
the need to attract campaign resources (C.5, which together with C.6 is related to 
P.5). If a party does not have sufficient funds or activists to undertake campaigning, 
it will fare badly regardless of its policies. Institutional change can provide incentives 
for people to join the party or for interest groups to affiliate to it. For example, party 
‘democratisation’ might encourage individuals to join, knowing they can receive the 
selective benefit of participation rights in decision-making (Pennings and Hazan, 
2001: 268). Affiliated membership may encourage interest groups to institutionalise 
their relationship with the party and thereby provide a firmer commitment. Party 
change intended to attract activists may inevitably erode politicians’ autonomy. 
Similarly, if politicians wish to change their sources of funding, party change may 
precede or follow it. For example, the Labour Party began life purely as a party of 
affiliated members but in 1918, prompted by the extension of the franchise and the 
need to win many more millions of votes, it permitted individual membership. This 
broadened its source of funding but required the formation of a national network of 
constituency parties, with powers for the new class of members. Alternatively, the 
extension of state-funding for parties could result in greater control by politicians as 
they are less dependent on activists. It might precipitate activist exit but with less of 
an impact on the party’s campaigning capabilities.
A second neglected form of party change is that which accompanies the 
adoption of capital-intensive techniques based on the electronic media (C.6). Capital- 
intensive techniques reduce politicians’ reliance on activists and thus cut the costs of 
activist exit following a centralisation of power (though alternative sources of 
funding may be needed). Moreover, such techniques require centralised command 
structures, further undermining activists and their committee representatives.
Finally, parties may occasionally undergo change because voters do not like 
or trust the existing institutions -  a previously unidentified form of party change 
(C.7).23 This type of change is rare but I later argue that it was an important 
dimension of Labour’s transformation in the 1990s. In his taxonomy of parties, 
Panebianco (1988) distinguishes between internally and externally legitimated 
parties. The former are parties in which the leadership’s legitimacy is based within
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the party, for example on a mass individual membership whereas externally 
legitimated parties are formed by or organisationally responsible to an external body. 
There are two main types of externally legitmated parties: West European communist 
parties, which were responsible to the Comintern in Moscow, and labour parties, 
which were formed by, and remained connected to sponsoring trade unions. A 
problem arises for such parties if their external sponsors undergo legitimacy crises. 
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe rocked Western communist parties in 
the early 1990s and most underwent significant reform, including name changes. By 
contrast, the world’s labour parties do not share a common extra-national source of 
legitimacy but are instead connected to national trade union movements. Hence, 
there is no reason why they should all simultaneously undergo legitimacy crises. 
Only those parties whose trade union movements undergo legitimacy crises should 
be affected and in this instance the British Labour Party is exemplary. British trade 
unions fell into public disrepute throughout the 1970s as industrial relations soured 
and strikes proliferated. The defining moment was the ‘winter of discontent’ in 1978- 
9 when a spate of public sector strikes mortally damaged the Labour government and 
fatally undermined the electoral and policy credibility of the Labour Party for over a 
decade. The unions’ preponderant position in the Labour Party was put under the 
spotlight and the sight of demonised trade union leaders wielding block votes at 
Labour’s annual conference gave the impression of a party under the thumb of its 
union paymasters. Even as public attitudes towards the unions mellowed, there 
remained unease with their role in the party. Labour’s organisation lacked legitimacy 
and engendered distrust. Thus, even when Labour moderated its economic policies, a 
credibility gap remained because many voters suspected that the moderate policies 
would be abandoned in government as the unions moved to cash in their investments. 
The only way it could effectively counter these fears was to reduce the party’s 
dependence on the unions, thereby demonstrating to the public that Labour could be 
trusted. However, it is difficult to persuade external sponsors to continue contributing 
funds while giving up power -  consecutive election defeats were needed to secure 
union acquiescence to change.
These then are the major aims and precipitants of change in vote-seeking 
parties. Electoral considerations are at the forefront of explanations of change, even 
those that are ostensibly about internal power struggles. The major disagreement here
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with the HJ model is on just how separate the various internal precipitants of change 
really are. Operationalising horizontal cleavages between office-seeking politicians 
and policy-seeking activists sheds a different light on redistributive party change. 
Sometimes, the catalyst is truly independent of such considerations but the resulting 
change can still be informed by electoral imperatives. For example, HJ rightly note 
the possibility of change following the accession of a new leader, who could have 
emerged due to the ill-health or death of the previous incumbent (C.8). The death of 
John Smith in 1994 was the catalyst that sparked a major transformation of the 
Labour Party but the explanation of the direction of that transformation lies mainly 
in the widespread recognition within the party of its parlous electoral situation and 
the resulting consensus that an electorally attractive leader was sorely needed.
This approach to party change is operationalised in the remainder of this 
thesis. Changes in institutions are examined in terms of their precipitant causes -  
usually electoral -  and their distributive aims. It complies with the recommendation 
of HJ that explanations of party change be connected to party goals. It also complies 
with HJ and Panebianco’s suggestion that ‘political developmental’ models are 
preferable to evolutionary ones. An evolutionary approach might be justified if all 
that mattered in vote-seeking parties was their ability to win votes; however, 
distributive issues and power struggles are also of the utmost importance. Finally, it 
is important to refer back to Panebianco and emphasise that the aims of party change 
may not necessarily be fulfilled; that change may often evoke strong resistance; and 
that unintended consequences may occur. Labour’s transformation since 1983 is 
replete with instances of each.
3.8 CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to integrate some existing rational choice arguments 
about party organisation and extend them. The model developed is informed by the 
‘new institutional economics’ approach to organisation. Political parties represent a 
response to the problems inherent in politician-activist exchange, with institutions 
substituting for explicit ‘market’ exchange. This is not only due to the commitment 
problem that politicians face (emphasised by Strom) but also follows from preference 
heterogeneity among activists. Nevertheless, parties also engage in exchange with 
voters, and this mediates politician-activist exchange. Politicians require discretion if
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they are to satisfy activists and win votes, and institutions provide greater or lesser 
amounts of autonomy. However, this means that questions of organisational 
efficiency co-exist with distributional conflicts, as politicians prefer more autonomy 
while activists prefer less. Consequently, parties tend to be more prone to 
organisational change than other types of organisation.
The model of party change outlined above is based on an intentional rather 
than an evolutionary approach. As Harmel and Janda (1994: 261) argue, ‘party 
change does not “just happen’” . Specific changes are undertaken for reasons, and the 
actors that implement them are motivated by self-interest. In the long run, parties 
may approximate to the ideal-types derived by evolutionary models but changes 
often reflect the need to win votes and yet maintain activists. Any given institutional 
configuration allocates resources to politicians and activists, and they will use these 
resources to bring about change. The bargaining power of actors also depends on the 
electoral success or otherwise of the party. Individual real-life parties will differ in 
all these respects so individual parties will always diverge from the ideal-types. Party 
change is path dependent.
The exchange approach helps to provide microfoundations for parties and 
enables us to move beyond the usual rational choice treatment of them as unitary 
actors. The simple dichotomy between politicians and activists proved useful for it 
allowed the exploration of institutional solutions to the tension arising from having 
office-seeking and policy-seeking actors in the same party. This is a more realistic 
way to conceive of parties than the normal rational choice approach, which is to see 
them solely as office-seekers or policy-seekers. The more fine-grained approach to 
parties developed here has provided underpinnings for a notion of parties as 
organisations and as such, has sought to enable rational choice accounts of parties to 
be connected to the largely non-rational choice literature on party organisation.
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4 Political Exchange in the Labour 
Party (pre-1990)
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 3 , 1 argued that intraparty institutions serve two main functions: 
providing intraparty actors with means of alleviating their commitment problems and 
aggregating members’ preferences. This chapter shows how a famous institutional 
device in the Labour Party tackled both these problems. That device is the ‘block 
vote’, an institutional means by which trade unions have been able to dominate the 
decision-making bodies of the party and one of the most controversial aspects of the 
organisational link between Labour and the unions. Block voting has been used, to 
greater or lesser degrees in all areas of decision-making in the Labour Party.
Block voting is so important that it is examined before the analysis moves on 
to policymaking, candidate selection and leadership elections (chapters 5-7). This 
chapter uncovers the efficient qualities of block voting, which helped hold the 
Labour Party together. Also analysed are the distributional features of block voting 
(section 4.2). In section 4.3, attention turns to why, despite the block vote, trade 
unions have rarely been able to control completely the actions of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party (PLP). I distinguish between the office-seeking motives of Labour 
politicians and the policy-seeking instincts of interest groups, such as trade unions. 
Understanding the logic behind the block vote and its limitations as a means of 
overcoming union-PLP commitment problems enables us later to recognise just how 
far-reaching recent reforms in the Labour Party have been. Block voting embodied a 
specific kind of relationship between the party and the unions, so before turning to an 
analysis of the block vote and PLP-union tensions it is necessary to understand 
something about the history of the party-union link.
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4.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL EXCHANGE IN THE LABOUR 
PARTY
The idea behind the exchange approach is that office-seeking politicians 
recruit activists to their cause in order to campaign for office, and in return they offer 
policy concessions and other benefits. However, this is not accurate, in a descriptive 
sense at least, of the British Labour Party. First, unlike the other main British parties, 
Labour was formed as an extraparliamentary party, which only later acquired a 
significant presence in parliament. By contrast, the Conservative Party was initially a 
parliamentary cadre party that developed an extraparliamentary structure in response 
to the extension of the franchise (McKenzie, 1964). Secondly, the major form of 
exchange in the Labour Party is between politicians and trade unions rather than 
individual activists. It is worth briefly examining Labour’s formative years in order 
to understand the nature of its internal exchange relations.
Labour was formed in 1900 by a coalition of trade unions and socialists, 
mainly from the small Independent Labour Party (ILP) and the Fabian Society.1 The 
unions had different interests from those of the socialist groups, and the new party 
represented a compromise of means and ends by all involved. As Pelling and Reid 
(1996: 4) observe, its foundation ‘was therefore not so much a birth as a marriage’. 
The motives to coalesce for both unions and socialist groups were to be found in late- 
nineteenth century British political life.
Britain was unusual by continental standards in that its union movement 
achieved a position of considerable organisational development and membership 
growth before the formation of a major socialist political party, a consequence of the 
country’s early industrialisation. However, the unions faced serious legal obstacles 
and since law was made in parliament it was inevitable they would seek to influence 
that body. It is a common feature of sectional interests that they seek to secure 
valuable legislation from governments through lobbying and political donations.2 
The unions did this but went a step further. The limited extension of the franchise to 
working men in 1867 (followed by a further extension in 1884) created a potential 
constituency for pro-union parliamentary candidates and so many unions sought to 
put up for election their own candidates in areas of working class strength. Rather 
than form a separate party, the unions sought to work through the existing parties, 
which effectively meant the Liberal Party since the Conservatives were largely
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hostile to union aims. This was not surprising given the high costs of establishing a 
separate party and the lack of certainty of electoral success for any political 
newcomer, particularly in elections conducted under the plurality electoral system. 
Individual unions struck deals with local Liberal associations to put up union 
candidates, often in double-member constituencies (a number of which continued to 
exist until 1918) and in solidly working class areas, though not in middle class areas, 
where business interests often dominated local Liberal associations. The miners’ 
federation was foremost among these unions, putting up candidates in mining 
communities. The first such union candidate was elected to the House of Commons 
in 1874 and several more were elected in the 1880s and 1890s. These MPs were 
known as ‘Lib-Labs’ and often aligned themselves with the radical wing of the 
parliamentary Liberal Party. They functioned as a small pressure group inside the 
House of Commons, seeking to influence trade union legislation and protect union 
rights in the industrial sphere, including picketing and free collective bargaining.
This strategy began to be questioned by some in the unions in the late 1890s. 
Employers formed their own federal organisations with links to parliament and went 
on the offensive against unions in the workplace through strike-breaking bodies, 
leaving union leaders worried about possible attacks on the very legitimacy of their 
organisations (Taylor, 2000a: 17). Unions also found themselves increasingly on the 
wrong end of judicial decisions, including threats to their right to picket (Pelling and 
Reid, 1996: 6). These were times when the unions needed strength in parliament yet 
by 1899 the number of Lib-Lab MPs had reached only eleven. This was largely due 
to the unwillingness of local Liberal associations, strongly influenced by business 
interests, to pick union-sponsored candidates (Lovell, 1991: 39). The strategy of Lib- 
Labism might be generally satisfactory for unions such as the miners’ federation or 
the cotton workers, where large workplaces and regional concentration enabled such 
unions to dominate Liberal associations. However, the 1890s saw the growth of large 
general unions such as the transport workers and municipal workers, which sought to 
recruit semi-skilled workers across a range of industries and over a wider 
geographical territory. These unions tended to be more interested in issues of interest 
to workers everywhere, such as workplace and labour market conditions, rather than 
issues related to specific industries (Reid, 2000: 223). Such unions did not have the 
concentrated territorial strength of the miners, making Lib-Labism a less attractive
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strategy. For the union movement as a whole, Lib-Labism proved to be a cheaper, 
but temporary alternative to forming a new party. There were moves by some of the 
general unions (with strong links to socialist groups) to secure a firmer basis for 
labour representation in the House of Commons. Finally, a resolution was passed at 
the 1899 Trades Union Congress calling for unions and socialist groups to devise 
ways of increasing labour parliamentary representation.
In February 1900, trade unionists and members of socialist societies met in 
London to agree the formation of the Labour Representation Committee (LRC). The 
aims of the LRC were unclear aside from providing for greater labour representation. 
No programme was agreed and no decision was made as to whether it would work 
alongside existing parties or form its own. The financial basis of the LRC would 
consist of affiliated organisations paying just ten shillings per thousand members and 
the committee could not appoint paid officials or finance its own candidates (Pelling 
and Reid, 1996: 7-8). At the time the events of the meeting were seen in rather 
limited terms, as a further step on the path towards better labour representation. Only 
retrospectively did it come to be seen as the founding moment of the Labour Party.
A question arises as to why the unions felt it would be in their interests to ally 
themselves with the socialist groups. After all, the LRC was dominated financially 
and organisationally by the unions so why did they not simply go it alone, without 
the hindrance of the socialists, of whom many union leaders remained deeply 
suspicious? The answer lies in the crucial role played in the newer unions by 
socialists, particularly those connected to the ILP. Most of the new general unions of 
1889 were founded or rapidly taken over by socialists (Lovell, 1991: 30). Even if 
many union members remained instrumental in their attitudes to union membership, 
the socialists often organised them and provided the core of committed activists. The 
growth of socialism in the new unions even led to attempts to restrict their influence 
within the TUC through a series of constitutional reforms in that body in 1895 
(including the advent of block voting). It was the formation of the ILP in 1893 that 
provided an attempt by some socialists to link these disparate groups of radical 
activists in the unions and local trades councils. The ILP put up candidates in general 
elections in the 1890s though it made little impact. Its leading figure, Keir Hardie, 
had harboured hopes of building an individual mass membership along the lines of 
the German SPD but realised that the best hope for a strong socialist party in Britain
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lay in winning over union support in order to boost the growth of the party and 
quicken its electoral development. As G.D.H. Cole observed:
They [the ILP] speedily realized that ... they must either 
induce the trade unions to throw in their lot with them or be 
content to build up very slowly a party based on individual 
membership on the Continental socialist model. As they were 
not prepared to wait, most of them preferred the shorter cut of 
a Labour Party based mainly on trade union affiliations, even 
though they realized that they could get such a party only by 
a considerable dilution of their socialist objectives (Cole,
1948: 152).
Vote-seeking required a well-resourced organisation to campaign on the ground but 
attracting members and funds could not be achieved overnight. The ILP therefore 
chose an organisational alliance with the unions: large-scale collective action is 
easier to organise by drawing together existing groups than by starting from scratch 
because it dramatically lowers mobilisation costs (Chong, 1991: 36).
The socialist and trade union bodies that founded the LRC each had strong 
purposive incentives to do so but they disagreed over policies, with the socialists 
wanting to ameliorate the injustices of capitalism while the unions took a narrower 
perspective, seeking the repeal of, and a defence against legislation inimical to their 
interests. Given the financial dominance of the unions, it was their preferences that 
took priority. Political exchange consisted of a commitment by the socialist groups to 
pursue policies of benefit to the unions in return for the right to piggyback on the 
unions’ organisational and financial resources. The parliamentary leadership was 
provided by the ILP and the Fabians, the latter of whose personnel tended to be more 
middle class, better educated and better versed in administrative tasks than working 
class trade unionists. For these reasons, and others including the high opportunity 
costs facing busy union leaders participating in parliamentary politics, politicians 
from the socialist societies would dominate the leadership of the new Parliamentary 
Labour Party (PLP). To ensure that they retained control, the unions would dominate 
the party’s annual policymaking conference and its national executive committee 
(NEC), as well as furnishing the ranks of much of the PLP with their own nominees.
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For its first twenty years of existence, the Labour Party (as the LRC called 
itself from 1906) was a policy-seeking party for union interests, with its MPs seeking 
to pressure Liberal governments for legislative concessions (Miliband, 1972). It 
enjoyed some early success, both in the electoral arena, where it had 42 seats by 
1910, and in terms of policy concessions, especially the repeal of the Taff Vale 
judgement of 1901, when the House of Lords had ruled that unions could be sued for 
damages for loss of earnings resulting from strike action. A blow came in 1909 with 
the ‘Osbome judgement’, another House of Lords ruling, which prohibited unions 
from spending money on political activities. This could have proved catastrophic for 
the party since it was heavily indebted to the unions and faced being bankrupted. The 
judgement was reversed -  with strings attached (see note 5 to this chapter) -  by the 
Trade Union Act 1913, confirming the necessity of a parliamentary presence.
Labour made its electoral breakthrough in the 1920s when, in the aftermath of 
the First World War and another extension of the franchise, it supplanted a divided 
Liberal Party as the second great party of state. In 1923, just 23 years after its 
formation, Labour formed its first government, a minority administration that lasted a 
year, and by 1929 it was the largest party in the House of Commons. From this time 
on, however, there was a permanent tension in the party between the office-seeking 
instincts of the PLP leadership and the policy-seeking motives of the unions (and 
individual members). This was revealed during the general strike of 1926 and the 
severe economic crisis of 1931 that brought the Labour government and the unions to 
loggerheads over the government’s attempt to cut unemployment insurance at a time 
when the rate of unemployment had soared above two million. This conflict split the 
party, leading to the expulsion of some of its leaders and a slump in its electoral 
fortunes that would last until the outbreak of the Second World War.
The form of political exchange in the Labour Party changed between 1900 
and 1918. Once Labour became a credible contender for government, its politicians 
became imbued with clearer office-seeking incentives. This exchange with the 
unions replicated some features of the earlier exchange between the unions and the 
socialist societies, in that the unions wanted the PLP to pursue legislation favourable 
to their interests. However, the unions themselves now had to consider modifying 
their policy demands because the party was set on winning elections and found its 
incentives structured by the competitive two-party system and the plurality electoral
system. I return to this in section 4.3. Before that, it is necessary to explore the nature 
of intraparty political exchange when the principals are organisations.
Federalism and Block Voting in the Labour Party
The dominant form of political exchange in the Labour Party differs from that 
sketched in Chapter 3 because it is organisations rather than individual activists that 
trade with politicians. Labour was an example of an ‘indirect’ membership party 
(Duverger, 1964), in which the party’s ‘members’ were organisations rather than 
individuals. An individual who wished to join the party had to join it indirectly via an 
affiliated trade union or socialist society. In 1918, a system of constituency Labour 
parties (CLPs) was established in order to aid Labour’s campaigning abilities after 
the extension of the franchise that year (until then, the party had relied mainly on 
local union branches to mobilise supporters). The new system permitted individuals 
to join the party independently of affiliated bodies though their membership was, and 
remained, dwarfed by that of the unions (see Table 4.1). This provision for individual 
membership diluted the indirect nature of Labour’s membership structure but not 
considerably so because the unions continued to provide most of the party’s funds 
and hold most of the power. Party leaders had considered restructuring the party on 
the basis of a direct individual membership as part of Labour’s broader electoral 
appeal but they decided that it could not survive financially without the unions. Thus, 
the indirect structure was entrenched and, with a couple of important exceptions, 
remained largely unchanged until the 1980s (see Appendix 1).
Analysing a party in which intraparty exchange is between politicians and 
interest groups entails modifying the exchange model sketched earlier. One obvious 
difference is that purposive incentives are extremely important for unions while 
social incentives are not. A union may reasonably believe that the substantial 
resources it donates to a party will have a much more noticeable impact than the 
efforts of an individual activist. Perhaps the most important difference is that a union, 
being an organisation in its own right, is controlled by a dominant coalition, ranging 
from elected elites and their supporters lower down the organisation. Control of the 
union enables this coalition to engage in exchange with Labour politicians, supplying 
funds in return for policies. However, unions have their own internal decision­
making and leadership selection structures. Thus, a union can potentially be captured
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by a new coalition, which then demands different policies from the party. Inter alia, 
this can potentially destabilise a party based on union affiliates (see below).
Table 4.1 Labour Party Membership
Year Individual 
members a members b coop, societies m i
j.. u ia i
jmbershipc
1900 0 353,000 23,000 376,000
1910 0 1,394,000 31,000 1,431,000
1920 n/a 4,318,000 42,000 4,360,000
1930 277,000 2,011,000 58,000 2,347,000
1940 304,000 2,227,000 40,000 2,571,000
1950 908,000 4,972,000 40,000 5,920,000
1960 790,000 5,513,000 25,000 6,328,000
1970 680,000 5,519,000 24,000 6,223,000
1980 348,000d 6,407,000 56,000 6,811,000
1990 311,000d 4,922,000 54,000 5,287,000
2000 311,000d n/ae n/a n/a
Source: 1900-90 -  Tanner et al. (2000: 394-7); 2000 -  Wintour (2002a).
a. No individual members until 1918. From 1918-1927 no count was made o f  individual 
members.
b. ‘Contracting-in’ between 1928 and 1946. ‘Contracting-out’ before and after that period.
c. Total membership figures for 1900 and 1910 include members o f  Co-operative and 
Women’s Labour League.
d. New basis for calculation (changed in 1980) but each CLP still allowed a minimum 1,000 
votes at the annual conference (until reweighting o f votes in 1993 and 1996). For individual 
membership figures for all years between 1980 and 2002, see Figure 8.3 in Chapter 8.
e. According to Labour’s submission to the Neill committee’s investigation into party funding, 
by 1998 affiliated union membership stood at 3.5 million (Neill, 1998: 229).
Thus, there are differences in political exchange in indirect parties yet the 
most important elements are similar. In particular, mutual commitment problems 
attend the trade between politicians and unions, stemming from the nonsimultaneous 
exchange of union resources for policies. Resources are constantly needed but 
policies may not be delivered until years later. By then, the politicians may have 
incentives to supply different policies. The risk of shirking by the PLP could 
encourage unions to undersupply resources, to the detriment of both the party and the 
unions themselves since Labour would be less able to fight for the unions’ preferred 
policies. Party institutions are needed to enable politicians and unions to make 
credible commitments to each other and reduce the scope for shirking by the PLP.
However, rather than just one union funding the Labour Party, there was a 
multiplicity of unions, each with different preferences and priorities. This was
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beneficial because it increased the supply of funds and spread the burden over many 
contributors but it also produced problems by creating the possibility o f inter-union 
opportunism. Individual unions might have commitment problems because there 
would be a temptation to free-ride on the financial contributions of other unions. If a 
number of unions decided to undersupply donations in the hope that other unions 
would compensate, the party’s finances could be damaged, hindering its ability to 
campaign. What was needed was a means of preference aggregation that protected 
the party’s funds from inter-union opportunism.
The solution was to construct internal party institutions that linked financial 
contributions to decision-making power. The year 1918 saw the publication of 
Labour’s first constitution, setting out the rules of the party. The constitution 
formalised the federal structure that had been in operation before the First World 
War. An annual conference would aggregate and channel the affiliates’ policy 
preferences. It would be dominated by union delegates and as well as deciding policy 
it would serve as the party’s supreme decision-making body. When resolutions were 
passed at the conference, it would be the responsibility of MPs to introduce the 
appropriate legislative Bills. Union placemen would be guaranteed places in the PLP 
and work for pro-union policies. The NEC would run the party between conferences 
and it too would be dominated by the unions.3 Meanwhile, the unions themselves 
would have complete autonomy in their own internal decision-making procedures -  
another reflection of the federal principle.
To give unions an incentive to maintain the supply of funds, they were 
allocated votes at the conference in direct proportion to the money they donated to 
the party. The mechanism by which this was achieved was the political levy, a small 
sum that trade union members pay to their unions in addition to their normal union 
fees. Each union affiliated to the party its own members who paid this levy, even 
though not all these members were usually aware that they were financing the party 
in this way. A system of ‘contracting out’ ensured that unless levypayers specifically 
stated that they did not wish to pay the levy, it would be automatically deducted from 
their wages.4 Inertia and ignorance ensured that most uncommitted members failed to 
‘contract out’.5 For each trade unionist whose political levy went to the party, his 
union received one vote at the party’s annual conference. Big unions affiliated more 
members and thus obtained more votes.6
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However, although this was a necessary condition for the unions to maintain 
their commitments to continue supplying funds, it was not sufficient because the 
temptation to free-ride remained. A union might affiliate 150,000 levypayers but the 
latter would have widely differing policy preferences, as would the delegates that 
represented them at the party conference. If the union’s 150,000 votes were divided 
among its delegates, under a system of ‘one delegate -  one vote’ (ODOV),7 it would 
be the delegates, rather than the individual unions qua organisations, that would hold 
power. Preference heterogeneity among delegates would mean that delegates from 
the same union could cancel out each other’s votes on the conference floor. For 
example, if three-fifths of these delegates supported policy resolution X while the 
other two-fifths voted against it, the union’s 150,000 votes would be split 90,000 to
60,000 in favour of X, leaving only (90,000 -  60,000) = 30,000 ‘effective votes’. 
Thus, although the union has paid affiliation fees for 150,000 members, only one 
fifth of these have any net effect on the outcome of the vote. Certainly, the same 
could happen in other unions, but the greater the differential between those in favour 
and against a policy, the higher a union’s effective vote would be. A smaller union 
could have more effective votes if there were a greater consensus among its 
delegates. Thus, a union that affiliated only 60,000 levypayers would have 40,000 
effective votes if its delegates were five-to-one against policy X. By contrast, big 
general unions with a vocationally heterogeneous membership might be prone to 
greater opinion diversity and thus a small effective vote.
A system of ODOV or any other form of vote splitting within unions could 
give big unions incentives to reduce their affiliation levels and thereby their supply 
of funds to the party. A union with a finely split delegation or membership could 
substantially reduce its affiliation level with only a marginal impact on its effective 
votes since all factions would be equally affected. Alternatively, internal ‘decision 
costs’ (Horn, 1997) could rise as union leaders expended resources on reducing the 
strength of rival factions in order to increase the union’s effective votes. This would 
mean time and effort taken away from other activities and might necessitate costly 
offers of patronage to pull individual delegates into line. To minimise these problems 
and thus increase efficiency, Labour adopted an ‘indirect’ federal structure whereby 
the unions qua organisations would be regarded as the party’s members. Each 
affiliate would speak with a single voice, which in turn would facilitate the
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dominance of the big unions and safeguard their commitment to continued funding. 
This system was institutionalised through block voting at the party conference.
Block voting involves each organisation casting all its allotted votes as a 
single unit. Each organisation arrived at a decision and cast its votes unanimously in 
favour of that decision while minority opinion was not represented. Thus, in the 
previous example of a union with 150,000 affiliated levypayers, the union would cast 
a single block of 150,000 effective votes at the party conference, whether they were 
cast in favour of a policy or against it. Although it was never specified in Labour’s 
constitution block voting was a consistent feature of the party since its formation in 
1900 (it was first used by the large unions at the TUC in 1895). Until 1953 there were 
provisions for unions to split their block votes at the conference but they were rarely 
used, and even then mainly by federal unions with distinct regional divisions such as 
the miners’ union (Minkin, 1992: 283). Before 1953, block votes were printed on 
cards, which were held up by union leaders at each vote. But with the televising of 
the conference party leaders were anxious about audiences’ response to this practice 
so ‘secret’ balloting was adopted. Where unions previously required just one voting 
card, they now needed eighty (forty ‘for’ and forty ‘against’) and it was deemed 
impractical to multiply this further by giving each delegate a book of voting cards 
(see Minkin, 1992: 283-6). Secret card voting entrenched block voting but the latter 
had existed since the party’s formation because it institutionalised the link between 
financial contributions and voting power. This secured the party’s supply of funds by 
reducing the risk that the big unions might resent their financial burden.
Since block voting compels each union to adopt a single position on each 
policy issue rather than allowing individual delegates to cast equal votes at the party 
conference, the policies adopted by the conference are not a simple reflection of the 
preferences of individual conference delegates. This can be illustrated by looking at a 
simplified conference consisting of two unions (Figure 4.1). Union A is leftwing and 
has 400,000 votes while Union B is rightwing and has 500,000 votes. Assuming that 
each union takes up its full entitlement of one delegate per 5,000 votes, Union A will 
have 80 delegates while Union B has 100. Under a system of ODOV, the overall 
distribution of opinion would be more important than that within each union, so the 
median delegate at the conference would be at point M  in the upper panel and this is 
where conference policies would be positioned. However, block voting ensures that
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the preferred position of each union’s median delegate is the preferred position of 
that union as a whole: point a in the case of Union A, and point b for Union B. 
However, since Union B has more votes that Union A, it can unilaterally decide 
policy, which it sets at b. As we can see, there is a significant distance between b and 
M. In this example, the rightwing union wins. From its earliest days until the 1970s, 
most union leaders were from the centre-right of the party (reflecting their concern 
with its electability) so the left was often disadvantaged by block voting.
Figure 4.1 Distributional Consequences o f Block Voting
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The left was also disadvantaged by intra-union distributional consequences of 
block voting. At the turn of the twentieth century when liberals dominated the unions 
but socialists were growing in influence, block voting stopped the socialists in the 
unions voting with the leftwing socialist societies and later, the CLPs, at the party 
conference. The latter also wielded block votes, though they were much smaller than 
those of the unions (typically 1,000 votes per CLP) and all the CLPs together rarely 
comprised more than 15 percent of the total votes. If it were ever to capture the party, 
the left would need concentrated support in the big unions. Block voting enabled 
centre-right union leaders to control the left by imposing upon it high mobilisation 
costs. Factional conflict had to be waged within organisations as well as between 
them, so minority factions would first need to win majorities inside individual unions 
-  a significant undertaking, though if achieved it could invigorate factions by 
providing them with an organisational shell and access to that organisation’s 
resources (Panebianco, 1988: 94).
Under an ODOV system, factional conflict would be mainly extra- 
organisational, with majority and minority factions within each union affecting the 
conference’s factional balance. A mandating system or some way of ‘whipping’ 
delegates would be needed to bind all delegates to union policy but it might not be 
sufficient. In fact, mandating does exist in the Labour Party, with union executives or 
conferences laying down the policies of their unions, which then form mandates for 
union delegates to the party conference. However, the sheer volume of policy 
resolutions submitted to the conference means that a union’s ‘official’ attitude to a 
given resolution may be difficult to discern. Union conferences (often held months 
before the party conference) and/or union executives would have to anticipate all of 
the issues to be discussed, and determine policies which would then have to be 
formalised into mandates. It is costly trying to write complete contracts or mandates 
because the future is uncertain. Block voting reduced these measurement costs by 
providing a means of voting the preferences of the unions’ dominant coalitions. As a 
safeguard mandates could continue to exist on all the major issues but beyond that 
they were not always necessary. Trade unions at the Labour Party conference are 
usually directly mandated on about a third of issues, partly mandated on another 
third, and not mandated at all on the final third (Harrison 1960: 167; Minkin, 1992: 
294). Minkin observes that ‘[wjhether Left wing or Right wing, the senior union
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official could occasionally obtain the backing of the delegation (or in some cases the 
Executive Committee) for interpreting the mandate in ways which approached the 
point of breaking its spirit’ (Minkin, 1980: 324). For example, in 1961 the 
railwaymen and the engineering unions broke their mandates on public ownership in 
order to help out the embattled leader Hugh Gaitskell (Minkin, 1980: 240).
Measurement costs were further raised by compositing resolutions at the 
conference, i.e. merging together different resolutions to reduce the number of issues 
debated. This increased the discretionary power of delegates with regard to 
mandates, as Minkin explains:
So often [composite] resolutions emerged which combined a range 
of disparate elements that delegation meetings were in the position 
of assessing a resolution, part of which conflicted with union policy 
and part of which was compatible with it. A shrewd opponent of a 
composited resolution could make much of its inadequacy. A 
supporter could find ‘basic’ elements in it which were deserving of 
support (Minkin, 1980: 164).
Composites that linked together separate issues in this way gave the delegations 
more latitude over interpreting mandates. This made it easier for union leaders 
saddled with hostile mandates to be able nonetheless to help out the party leadership. 
The costs to the delegates of defying hostile mandates could thus be reduced.
Breaking mandates carries costs but there was room for manoeuvre, and 
delegates’ discretion increased when mandates were absent. Block voting made the 
institution of mandating more efficient by reducing enforcement costs. The dominant 
coalition in the union faces higher enforcement costs when delegates can cast 
individual votes at the Labour Party conference under a system of ODOV.8 These 
costs are especially high when its preferences are not mandated. Enforcement costs 
are lowest when block votes are used to implement a mandate. When block votes are 
used to implement non-mandated preferences, enforcement costs may be higher if 
the median delegate needs to be convinced of the policy. This can run parallel with 
higher measurement costs as delegates try to reach an agreement.
Block voting reduced the costs of exchange between unions on the floor of 
the party conference by facilitating vote trading. The latter is ubiquitous in voting
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bodies but it consumes time and resources that could be more profitably employed in 
other ways. By concentrating voting resources in a small number of organisations, 
block voting enabled union delegations and parliamentary leaders to organise deals 
quickly. Three or four big unions could collude to ensure their preferred resolutions 
were passed. Vote trading was particularly prevalent during elections to the NEC, 
where the big unions normally voted for each other’s candidates. Moreover, despite 
secret voting since 1953, it was usually easy to monitor the voting record of the 
major unions because each controlled such a large proportion of the votes. Deals 
were thus more likely to stick because if a union reneged on promises to vote for 
another union’s resolution it could face retaliation in later votes. By contrast, vote 
trading under ODOV would be laborious, consuming precious resources and entailing 
high opportunity costs (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Hundreds of individual 
delegates would have to be canvassed yet each would have only a small chance of 
being pivotal to the result of a vote. Furthermore, even if they did promise their votes 
it would be impossible to determine how they actually voted in the secret ballot.
Nevertheless, the block voting system could become unstable once the 
factions were more evenly balanced, as they were from the 1960s onwards. For 
example, the amalgamation of unions -  a steady feature of the post-war years -  could 
impact on conference votes. If a small rightwing union merged with a larger leftwing 
union, the left would take the combined block vote of the new union, increasing its 
share of the conference vote without a single delegate’s opinion having been changed 
(Crouch, 1982: 180). Similarly, small shifts within a single delegation could alter the 
stance of its union and that of the party conference. This happened in 1979 when the 
conference was balanced between left and right and the AUEW, with 928,000 votes, 
was the pivotal union. Its delegation was split and on the whim of one floating 
AUEW delegate, the conference passed mandatory reselection contests for MPs but 
rejected a wider franchise in leadership elections (McSmith, 1996: 118-21, 139-40).9
The thrust of the argument has been that big block votes translate into an 
ability to bring about outcomes yet an objection is that voting resources and outcome 
power are not synonymous (Banzhaf, 1965; Shapley and Shubik, 1954). If the 
conference is factionally divided among unions, each coalition as a whole might have 
an incentive to buy more votes and gain a majority. However, each union within the 
coalition could free-ride, letting its allies buy the extra votes from which they would
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all benefit. By the same reasoning, some unions might be tempted to reduce their 
affiliation fees and thereby harm the financial position of the party. We should 
therefore be wary of viewing unions as votQ-maximisers. Nevertheless, there are 
good reasons for supposing that such free-rider problems might not be overly serious. 
The large and medium sized unions probably comprise a privileged group in the 
Olsonian sense of a group whose members have incentives to contribute towards the 
supply of their desired collective good -  in this case, a solvent party (Olson, 1971). 
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests concentrated voting power at the conference 
was positively correlated with outcome power. A power index analysis of the Labour 
conference in the mid-1980s showed that the ‘power’ of the TGWU, then the biggest 
union, was considerably greater than that of medium and small voting bodies. Each
1,000 votes cast by the TGWU was worth 23 percent more on the Shapley-Shubik 
power index than 1,000 votes cast by a CLP (Leech, 1992: 250).10
Unions thus had incentives to maintain their affiliation levels because their 
voting power was roughly related to their ability to bring about outcomes. Block 
voting ensured that unions considering cutting their contributions would be reducing 
their own voting power at the conference, making them less able to ensure that their 
preferences were prioritised by the party. Block voting thus helped insulate the party 
from financial threats by its affiliates. Intuition suggests that unions unhappy with 
party policy would have an incentive to cut their funding. In fact, if the opposing 
faction’s majority were not too great, it might be rational for a dissatisfied union to 
increase its affiliation level, and thereby increase funds to the party. (The incentive 
would be weaker if either faction had a large majority.) In the 1970s, NUPE, a 
leftwing union angered by the public spending cuts of the Labour government, 
increased its affiliated membership from 100,000 in 1974 to 600,000 by 1980. These 
votes were instrumental in narrowly passing a leftwing package of reforms to the 
party constitution. Some rightwing unions considered choking off funds to the 
leftwing NEC, but pulled back because a reduction in funds would reduce their 
voting power at the conference, further entrenching the left (Minkin, 1992: 518).11
In conclusion, block voting alleviated some of the transaction costs, including 
commitment, measurement and bargaining costs that might have distorted political 
exchange between the politicians and the unions. It weakened incentives for unions 
to free-ride on the contributions of other unions and gave them a considerable degree
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of control over the extraparliamentary party. Block voting was thus an important 
means of institutionalising political exchange in the Labour Party and reflected the 
specific nature of that exchange. The focus above was mainly on the use of block 
voting at the party conference though it was also an important feature of NEC 
elections and the electoral college from 1981 to 1993 (see Chapter 7). Block voting 
was formally precluded in parliamentary candidate selection by a rule against 
mandating delegates to selection meetings but in reality union delegates invariably 
voted as blocks. Since votes at the local level were also allocated on the basis of 
affiliated membership, and thereby, financial contributions, all the pressures to 
maximise ‘effective votes’ examined above came into play (see Chapter 6).
Students of the Labour Party will at this point have noticed that the question 
of relations between the parliamentary and extraparliamentary parties has been 
glossed over. Yet this relationship has spawned a long-running debate about the 
distribution of power in the Labour Party. The unions’ commitment to supply funds 
is dependent on the politicians’ commitment to supply policies but we saw in 
Chapter 3 that office-seeking politicians generally prefer autonomy so that they can 
offer electorally attractive policies to the voters. As we shall see, enforcement 
problems have often plagued the supply of policies from the politicians to the unions.
4.3 THE AUTONOMY OF THE PLP AND PARTY-UNION ‘PATHOLOGIES’
Labour’s institutions were intended to solve two sets of commitment 
problems: that among the unions not to free-ride on each other’s financial donations, 
and that of the politicians to supply the unions’ preferred policies. Historically, the 
institutions have been more successful in solving the first of these problems. Of the 
five Labour governments that held office before 1997, three ended in disaster on the 
rock of govemment-union conflicts. Although policy preferences are fundamental in 
party politics, policymaking bodies within parties are paradoxically often of limited 
use in securing the preferred policies of the coalition controlling them. This is 
because the people who must ultimately implement policies are the parliamentarians. 
MPs as a group can rarely be controlled by extraparliamentary policymaking bodies 
because they do not owe their positions to such bodies. MPs are chosen not as a 
group but individually as candidates by their local parties. Executive bodies have 
greater or lesser control over the selection process but typically local parties possess
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autonomy (see Chapter 6). There is considerable scope for agency loss as politicians 
are, at best, only weakly bound to the demands of intraparty policymaking bodies. 
Even with block voting, the Labour conference’s lack of direct elective control over 
MPs deprived it of enforcement powers and was a reason why the unions could not 
instruct MPs to implement policies in parliament. Block voting has not stopped 
Labour governments from shirking (from the perspective of the unions) in office.
Indeed, an enduring debate about the Labour Party concerns whether it is the 
party conference or the PLP that has ultimate authority over policy. Labour’s 
constitution situates decision-making sovereignty in the conference: ‘[t]he work of 
the Party shall be under the direction and control of the Party Conference...’ (Labour 
Party, 1992a: Clause VII. 1). More specifically, ‘the Party Conference shall decide 
from time to time what specific proposals of legislature, financial and administrative 
reform shall be included in the Party Programme’ (Clause V.l). This appears to be 
unequivocal in proclaiming the primacy of the conference and thus enabling the 
unions, which controlled 90 percent of the votes, to determine policy. The role of the 
PLP is not mentioned but these clauses seem to imply that it should implement 
conference policies. This was spelt out (albeit ambivalently) in a resolution passed at 
the 1907 annual conference, and which became, as McKenzie writes, ‘the standard 
definition of the relationship between the party organizations inside and outside 
Parliament’ (McKenzie, 1964: 396):
That resolutions instructing the Parliamentary Party as to their action 
in the House of Commons be taken as the opinions of the Conference, 
on the understanding that the time and method of giving effect to 
these instructions be left to the Party in the House, in conjunction with 
the National Executive (Labour Party, 1907: 49).
The contingencies of politics demand that the PLP must indeed decide the ‘time and 
method’ of implementing policies. Yet on the question of what happens if the PLP 
refuses to implement conference policies, the constitution is silent, with no 
enforcement mechanisms specified. It may be true, as Rose (1956: 130) has argued, 
that ‘no other organ of the Party claims the authority to override Conference.’ Yet 
nowhere does the constitution state that the PLP is under the control of the 
conference, let alone give the latter any means with which to enforce such authority.
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There are no sanctions available to the conference if the PLP rejects its policies 
because the PLP as a body is not under the direct control of any extraparliamentary 
body. This has resulted in disagreements over who makes party policy and spawned 
a long-running debate centred on a famous thesis suggested by Robert McKenzie.
The McKenzie thesis states that the distribution of power in the Conservative 
and Labour Parties is similar, i.e. the parliamentary party is in the ascendancy. In the 
Labour Party, the PLP is the principal source of power. McKenzie acknowledged that 
the PLP often pays lip-service to the conference in order to retain party unity and he 
noted that problems can arise when the PLP and the NEC find themselves out of step. 
Indeed, he even claimed that the PLP leaders ‘exercise their authority only with the 
consent o f their followers' (McKenzie, 1964: 506 -  italics in original). By this, 
McKenzie was referring to the union leaders whose block votes dominate the 
conference, and he wrote, ‘it is this bond of mutual confidence between the 
parliamentary leaders and a preponderant part of the trade union leadership which is 
an essential key to the understanding of the functioning of the Labour Party’ 
(McKenzie, 1964: 505). Typically though, McKenzie assumed union acquiescence 
would be forthcoming (e.g. 1964: 423-5).
McKenzie claimed that extraparliamentary control of the PLP is impossible 
because Labour submits to the British constitution (McKenzie, 1964: 456, 635, 
passim). By convention, it is inappropriate for parliamentarians to be accountable to 
any body outside parliament save the electorate. To make the PLP accountable to the 
Labour Party conference would violate parliamentary sovereignty; as such, 
McKenzie disparaged intraparty democracy per se, advocating intraparty oligarchy 
as the only means of upholding the British constitution (McKenzie, 1982: 195-6).14
The strength of the McKenzie thesis is that it appears to fit with much of the 
evidence regarding previous Labour leaderships, particularly Labour governments, 
which have often ignored conference decisions with impunity. Even in opposition, 
deprived of the trappings of power, the PLP leadership has rarely come under any 
real degree of control by the conference though critics suggest it does (Kavanagh, 
1985). However, there is a major problem with the thesis. McKenzie acknowledged 
that Labour’s constitution gives significant power to the unions (McKenzie, 1964: 
480) but he assumed this must necessarily be to the benefit of the party leadership. 
This is because most trade union leaders are loyalists of the leadership, linked by a
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‘bond of confidence’ and concerned to minimise conflict between Labour’s political 
and industrial wings. Ultimately, power resides with the PLP and the unions serve as 
ballast against the left. The conference is not decisive but it must be ‘managed’. With 
hindsight the ‘bond of confidence’ between the PLP and the major union leaders was, 
as Minkin asserts, ‘a contingent and not an endemic feature of the pattern of power 
within the Party’ (Minkin, 1980: 321). The ‘Praetorian Guard’ of rightwing unions 
crumbled in the 1960s and 1970s as the TGWU and the AUEW shifted to the left. 
Moreover, although MPs continued to dominate the NEC they came predominantly 
from the PLP’s minority left faction whereas the right dominated the cabinet, leading 
to conflict. In short, McKenzie underestimated the extent to which Labour was run 
by a dominant coalition rather than by a PLP oligarchy attracting automatic union 
support. The PLP was strong in the 1950s because it was in a coalition with a 
rightwing cabal of union leaders, tying up conference votes and magnifying its own 
power. When this coalition broke down, party leaders had to fight harder.
McKenzie wrote his book before the battles of the 1960s and 1970s between 
Labour governments and trade unions. These conclusively demonstrated that union 
acquiescence to the PLP is not inevitable but neither could the unions simply impose 
their own wishes on the government. The political exchange model offers a way of 
understanding relations between Labour and the unions. Ever since Labour overtook 
the Liberal Party in the 1920s to become one of the two great parties of state, unions 
would inevitably face difficulties enforcing certain policies on the PLP. We have 
seen how parties in two-party systems have incentives to become vote-seekers, 
accommodating ‘floating’ voters. Since the 1920s, in order to maintain its electoral 
competitiveness Labour has had to change from being a trade union policy-seeking 
party into being primarily a vote-seeking union-funded party. If their preferences 
were dissimilar to those of union leaders, parliamentary leaders would find 
themselves facing a choice between keeping the unions happy but losing votes or 
winning elections with policies opposed by the unions and thereby creating a union 
backlash. Yet if the policies offered by the Conservative Party are anti-union, the 
unions may have no alternative but to accept centrist policies from Labour. This 
helps answer a question first posed by Wertheimer (1929) in the 1920s as to why the 
policies of the TUC and the Labour Party could diverge when the two organisations 
were bound by common union affiliates and personalities, or, as Lewis Minkin asks:
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If so many features of the Labour Party implied and 
facilitated the initiative of the unions and their leadership, 
why did they not control Labour Party policymaking on a 
permanent basis? ... In casting block votes in [the TUC and 
the Labour Party] why did union leaders not command 
similar policies and strategies in both? Paying both pipers 
why did they not call identical tunes? (Minkin, 1992: 7).
Minkin’s explanation is in terms of labour movement norms of ‘restraint’ and 
‘freedom’, which allow union leaders to wear different hats in the two bodies and 
permit autonomy to the politicians (see Chapter 9). However, there is a rational 
explanation based on the distinction between parties and interest groups. The two are 
alike in being voluntary organisations that seek collective goods, but they differ in 
how they pursue these goods. Parties measure their success by ‘market’ criteria, i.e. 
elections, which, in a two-party system compels them to be vote-seekers. By 
contrast, interest groups are policy-seekers, which lobby governments but do not 
measure their success in electoral terms (Schlesinger, 1984). Trade unions are 
interest groups seeking to promote the interests of their members but in Britain, the 
unions are also the main sponsors of a competitive political party. If the party is to be 
successful, the unions must allow it to adopt a vote-seeking electoral strategy, which 
means they may not always get the policies they want. For example, many unions in 
the early 1980s were committed to British withdrawal from the EEC but they 
permitted the party leadership to adopt discretely a less hostile stance because 
withdrawal was seen as electorally unfeasible (Minkin, 1992: 455-6). This explains 
Wertheimer’s puzzle of policy discrepancy between the TUC and the Labour Party. 
The TUC is an umbrella organisation for policy-seeking unions, willing to bargain 
with governments of any political complexion. The Labour Party is a vote-seeking 
organisation trying to win a parliamentary majority. As Brenda Dean, the former 
leader of the printers’ union, SOGAT said in 1985:
I don’t necessarily think it’s good for the Labour Party to be run by 
the trades unions. In fact, I think it’s counterproductive... I’m a 
member of the Labour Party, I ’ll never vote any other way: but the 
people who put the party in are the five per cent don’t knows. If the 
don’t knows see that the party is dominated by any one group that’s 
going to hurt its election chances. Politics is about power, about
103
being in government -  and we’ve got to make sure we provide the 
means for the Labour Party to get elected (cited in Taylor, 1987:
293).
This is the dilemma facing the unions. Within the party, this need to go 
beyond the unions in its electoral appeal has frequently led politicians to proclaim 
Labour as a ‘national’ rather than a class party. In the 1920s, the number of people 
voting for Labour was more than twice the affiliated membership of the TUC (which 
in turn was twice the size of Labour’s affiliated membership). From then on, 
Labour’s vote was always greater than TUC affiliated membership, except in 1979, 
when TUC numbers were at a peak, and 1983, when Labour suffered a catastrophic 
election defeat. By the 1990s, the situation of the 1920s was restored (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2 Labour Vote and TUC Membership
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Source: Butler and Butler (2000: 233-9, 387-8).
Even these figures do not tell the whole story because a large minority of 
trade unionists consistently fails to vote Labour. Labour’s electoral support among 
union members fluctuated around the 50 percent mark in the 1960s but fell in the
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1970s. In 1983, only 33 percent of union members voted Labour, though the figure 
rose thereafter.15 This far from strong propensity of union members to support 
Labour has decreased the attractiveness of a purely class-based electoral appeal and 
to the extent that union leaders could see this too it inhibited them further from 
seeking to impose such a strategy on the party leadership. Equally, it should be noted 
that the unions retained some autonomy from the party through the TUC, which has 
never affiliated to Labour. The TUC had a parliamentary committee and in the post- 
1945 period was concerned to maintain some ‘distance’ between itself and the 
Labour Party because with the rise of corporatism, it wanted to be able to negotiate 
with governments of all political colours.
A purely union-based programme for Labour was thus unfeasible yet there 
must be some payback for the unions otherwise they are wasting their money. The 
history of the party-union relationship in Britain is the history of attempts to resolve 
this tension (see also Taylor, 1987: 288-93; Reid, 2000: 235-6). In practice, the party 
has often been prepared to compromise on policies that were ‘popular enough’ to be 
electorally competitive, while still providing some rewards for the unions. In turn, 
the unions have historically been willing to permit autonomy to the politicians, 
provided key union interests were protected. The latter included progressive 
industrial relations legislation and the preservation of free collective bargaining -  the 
system of market-based employer-union bargaining through which British workers 
had historically secured significant material improvements. Once these interests were 
safeguarded, the party conference could be the public arena where the unions and the 
politicians struck policy agreements. Since neither side had an incentive to be 
embarrassed by public disagreements, they were usually willing to ‘fix’ votes in 
advance so that both sides could save face (see Chapter 5). The concentration of 
voting resources in a small number of units facilitated such bargaining. This ‘deal’ at 
the heart of the Labour Party meant that union leaders often left ‘politics’ and 
policymaking to the PLP while unions used their block votes for managerial purposes 
at the conference, such as keeping the left in check. Panebianco (1988: 94) described 
this system as one of ‘crossed oligarchies’, capturing the interdependence and mutual 
support of the political and industrial elites.
However, changes in the post-war economy eventually presented problems 
for the party-union relationship that the party’s institutional structure could not solve.
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Labour’s landslide victory in 1945 confirmed its arrival as a major electoral force 
and thereby increased the incentive for politicians to adopt a vote-seeking electoral 
strategy, and once in government, to implement policies that ensured economic 
stability. The growth in numbers and importance of the unions ensured that they 
assumed a greater role in the nation’s political economy, a process that began during 
the war years and which continued through to the 1960s. Full employment created 
the possibility of spiralling wage costs and inflation unless capital and labour could 
agree on how to distribute the national income. The result was the growth of tripartite 
corporatist arrangements between the TUC, the CBI and the government, regardless 
of whether the latter was Conservative or Labour. All distributional claims by 
interest groups are dependent on a growing economy, including those of trade 
unionists. If the economy were growing strongly, this need not present problems but 
in times of recession, all governments are compelled to take measures that restore 
economic growth, even if they create short-term hardship for their own supporters. 
The British economy started to experience a significant slowdown in the 1960s, 
which would last through to the 1980s (Caimcross, 1992; Baston, 2000). As in other 
corporatist systems, governments of all political colours looked to the unions for 
‘wage restraint’, with varying degrees of success (Scharpf, 1991). This is never easy 
for any governing party but for Labour, with its institutional links to the unions, it 
meant economic crises could have traumatic effects on intraparty politics.
Labour’s attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to impose wage restraint violated 
the longstanding ‘agreement’ that the party would not intervene in industrial relations 
without the agreement of the unions (see Ludlam, 2000). Moreover, incomes policies 
met with limited success in Britain because the unusual extent of decentralisation in 
British trade unions compared with continental unions reinforced the attractiveness 
of free collective bargaining. In countries such as Sweden and Norway, corporatist 
measures and incomes policies were viable because governments could bargain with 
centralised union movements whose leaders could make deals stick. By contrast, 
British union leaders had less control over their members since considerable power 
lay with the shop stewards, whose parochial concern for local wage rises had no 
discernible individual effect on inflation but all such claims in aggregate had a major 
impact.16 Shop steward resistance bedevilled British incomes policies.
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With rising worker discontent, the left finally achieved a critical mass within 
the unions in the 1970s, capturing the huge block votes of the TGWU and the AUEW. 
For the first time in Labour’s history, union block votes at the party conference were 
cast consistently against the preferences of the party leadership. However, rather than 
bow to the conference’s demands, the Wilson and Callaghan governments simply 
ignored the defeats being handed out to them on the conference floor, pushing 
through deflationary policies and demanding wage restraint. But the unions did not 
want to be controlled. They fund the Labour Party in order to secure the election of 
Labour governments that can help them. The unions are ultimately policy-seeking 
interest groups so if the party does not ‘deliver’ when it is in government, there is 
less of an incentive for the unions to be loyal. If the unions do not defend their 
members’ interests, even under a Labour government, they risk losing those 
members, or the union leaders may lose control. As Frank Cousins, then the leader of 
the TGWU, said in 1963: ‘If we do not fulfil the purposes for which members join 
unions, to protect and raise their real standard of living, then the unions will whither 
and die. We can give leadership, we can persuade but basically we must serve trade 
union purposes’ (cited in Taylor, 1991: 182). When union leaders wear their interest 
group hats, it is rational for them to take on Labour governments that implement 
hostile policies. The Callaghan government’s incomes policy caused tensions within 
the Labour Party as the government faced a dire economic crisis. Unofficial strikes 
proliferated and many union leaders sensed they were losing control of their 
organisations to rank-and-file militants. The result was a serious rupture in the party- 
union link culminating in the ‘winter of discontent’, a wave of strikes that sealed the 
fate of the government (Coates, 1980; Wickham-Jones, 1996).
However, although electoral considerations diminished for the unions, they 
did not disappear entirely. Even during the Callaghan administration, the leftwing 
leaders of the two biggest unions, Jack Jones (TGWU) and Hugh Scanlon (AUEW), 
were wary of being the hammers of the government. Minkin (1992: 179) argues that, 
after 1975, ‘solidarity with the Government dominated the considerations of Jones 
and Scanlon’, and that they sought dialogue rather than confrontation. However, they 
could not stop the ‘winter of discontent’. Thus, the unions were both willing and able 
to harm a Labour government in order to defend their members’ interests. Union 
anger with the government was signalled by hostile votes at the party conference, but
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the real battle occurred on the picketline. This is the dilemma facing interest group- 
backed parties. If politicians fail to deliver policies favourable to the unions, conflict 
spills out of internal party institutions. Institutions are attempts to ease commitment 
problems but they can never eradicate them. This is the lesson of Labour’s history.
The conflict between Labour and the unions in the 1960s and 1970s, and the 
ultimate explosion of that conflict in 1978-9 reverberated through the party for years. 
This conflict damaged Labour’s reputation among voters and contributed to a 
widespread (if not universal) perception that voters’ fears of future party-union 
conflicts was a major cause of Labour’s wilderness years in the 1980s and 1990s. It 
would also inform the reforming agenda of party ‘modernisers’ who identified the 
union link as an electoral incubus. However, the initial response to the demise of the 
Callaghan government was a concerted two-year long leftwing assault on the 
autonomy of the PLP. As noted in Chapter 3, grassroots attempts to redistribute 
power away from the politicians often occurs after the ejection from office of an 
unsuccessful party. That was the feeling among Labour’s activists and many trade 
unionists in 1979-81. A number of reforms, inspired by the activist left but backed by 
many unions, sought to tighten control over the parliamentarians. Henceforth, all 
Labour MPs would undergo mandatory reselection contests once every parliament in 
which they would need to mobilise the support of their CLPs if they were to survive. 
Moreover, the party leader would now be elected by an electoral college representing 
all sections of the party and not just the MPs (see chapters 6 and 7).17
These reforms were a reflection of and response to the enforcement and 
commitment problems that characterised the party in government. Yet their effect 
was to empower the left and shift Labour’s policies significantly to the left. An even 
more catastrophic election defeat in 1983 was enough to begin the reversal of the 
process, marking the start of a new period of autonomy for the PLP. This is the start 
of the period reviewed in this thesis. The traumas of the 1970s created a negative 
public image for the unions in the 1980s and 1990s, and the Labour leadership 
subsequently sought to distance itself from them. Neil Kinnock’s leadership of the 
party from 1983 to 1992 saw an attempt to transform Labour’s policies and 
organisational structure. The process was given impetus after the defeat of the year­
long miners’ strike in 1985 and the pace of reform picked up considerably after 
Labour’s third consecutive election defeat in 1987, which emphasised the urgency in
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making the party more electable. This was facilitated by the forging of a factional 
coalition on the NEC between the centre-left and the right, which dominated the PLP. 
They were agreed on the need to make Labour more electable. The early targets of 
the reformers were the far-left activists in the CLPs. However, after the historic 
fourth consecutive general election defeat in 1992, the reformers’ focus shifted to the 
unions. Qualitative research by Philip Gould, a key Labour election strategist, 
suggested that voters distrusted Labour and believed it to be a Trojan horse for the 
unions (Gould, 1999). The party reformed union participation in the selection of 
parliamentary candidates and reduced their voting strength at the party conference. 
Furthermore, block voting was abolished in leadership elections, allowing instead 
individual union levypayers to vote by postal ballot (Alderman and Carter, 1994). 
The period saw an increasing emphasis on individual levypayers and stemmed in part 
from a change in the law, which stipulated that union members must vote every ten 
years to decide whether their organisations should have political funds, which 
finance the Labour Party. All the ballots held in the 1985-6 period produced 
comfortable ‘yes’ votes, though this was partly because the unions’ links with 
Labour were downplayed (see Minkin, 1992: 562-82; Taylor, 1987: 205-34; Webb, 
1992a: 24-30). This increased levypayer involvement had the effect of diluting 
Labour’s federal structure.
The pace of reform picked up after each consecutive election defeat, 
conforming to the arguments set out in Chapter 3 that uncompetitive parties often 
undertake organisational reform. Indeed, after the election of Tony Blair as leader in 
1994, Labour seemed to be undergoing more than simply ‘reform’ but a rebirth. Not 
only were policies ruthlessly changed and opposition over-ridden, a new ethos and 
even a new historical narrative for the party were developed. The newly modernised 
party was christened ‘new Labour’, a ‘brand name’ that was deployed in speeches 
and in party literature, though Labour’s official name in its constitution was not 
changed.18 The label was intended to provide a favourable contrast with ‘old Labour’ 
from the party’s discredited past. The reality was more complex (see Smith, 2000; 
Fielding, 2000) and the current Labour government has come up against some ‘old’ 
Labour-style opposition from the unions over its plan to reform public services.
This then sets the scene for the present thesis. It was the problems that 
emerged between the party and the unions when Labour was in government that
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provide the background to understanding Labour’s organisational transformation 
since 1983. Such conflicts robbed the party of credibility and severely damaged its 
hopes of winning the trust of voters. Party leaders won the upper hand and decided 
that the best way to restore credibility was to undertake root-and-branch reform of 
the party’s structure. This may not have been the only path available but it was the 
one that was chosen and presents itself for analysis. That positive (rather than 
normative) analysis forms the remit of this thesis.
4.4 COALITIONS FOR CHANGE
One final task before examining Labour’s reforms is to establish the 
composition of the coalitions for change that assembled in the 1980s and 1990s. Not 
everyone supported change and many of those who did previously had not. It is 
worth examining the forces that supported organisational change, since reference is 
made to them throughout this thesis. However, as is argued in the following chapters, 
the reforms took place in two distinct stages with two different aims. The first, in the 
mid-1980s was to undermine the power of the far-left, which was achieved through a 
‘realignment of the left’. The second aim, in the late-1980s and 1990s was to reduce 
the power of the unions in the party and created a new cleavage between 
‘modernisers’ and ‘traditionalists’. These two stages are examined consecutively.
The Realignment of the Left
The start of the 1980s was a period of leftwing ascendancy. The 
parliamentary right had been discredited by the failures of the Callaghan government 
and the subsequent election defeat in 1979 while the left was strengthened. The new 
leftist coalition included not only activist groups in the CLPs but also a strong bank 
of support within many left-leaning unions, such as the TGWU and NUPE. It was this 
coalition that managed to pass the reforms to Labour’s constitution during 1979-81. 
However, by 1981 there was evidence that the left’s power had reached its peak after 
Tony Benn narrowly failed to win the deputy leadership of the party from Denis 
Healey. Labour’s poor showing in the polls after the formation of the SDP 
encouraged union leaders to agree an end to the left’s constitutional reforms in the 
so-called ‘peace of Bishop’s Stortford’ (Taylor, 1987: 142-5). Left unity was dealt a
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devastating blow by the landslide election defeat of 1983. Labour went into that 
election with a leftwing manifesto that was described by Gerald Kaufman as ‘the 
longest suicide note in history’. Labour’s worst result since 1935 exploded the left’s 
credibility and widened the split that had emerged since 1981. A group of leftist MPs 
led by Kinnock refused to vote for Benn and deprived him of victory.
The period between 1983 and 1985 witnessed a decisive fracturing of the 
leftist factions. The balance between left and right in the party was very delicate, as 
evidenced by the NEC, which remained evenly split despite the right’s rollback of 
leftwingers in 1981 and 1982. The leadership and deputy leadership elections of 
1983 resulted in landslide victories for the centre-left candidate Kinnock and the 
centre-right candidate, Roy Hattersley. The far-left performed poorly in the contest 
as the fissure widened between the moderate ‘soft left’ (centre-left) and the more 
radical ‘hard’ left. It also demonstrated a desire for unity among left and right. Table 
4.2 offers a simple depiction of the strategic choices of the left and the right.
The soft left has the option of allying with either the hard left or the right, 
while the right must decide whether or not to seek compromise with the soft left. 
Combinations of these choices produce leftist domination of the party, rightist 
domination, a centrist compromise or outright factional conflict. In 1980 at the height 
of the left’s assault on Labour’s constitution, the soft left preferred an alliance with 
the hard left. At this time, the Labour right was in disarray, discredited by the failures 
of the Callaghan government and with rumours of defections in the air (ultimately 
arriving in the form of the SDP). The left as a whole gained strength throughout the 
1970s, both at the annual conference and on the NEC. With continued anger at the 
‘betrayals’ of the Labour government, the left unified around the issue of 
constitutional reform designed to reduce the autonomy of the PLP. Some centrist 
unions such as the GMWU sought compromise to save the party from a civil war, and 
large leftist unions such as the TGWU showed some interest, e.g. during the union’s 
commission of inquiiy into the party’s organisational structure in 1980. However, the 
right fought against all the reforms and the left preferred a fight rather than continued 
rightwing control. Thus, the soft left’s preference ordering at the time was Tl > Rl > 
Pl > Sl- The right wanted nothing to change but would have preferred compromise 
with the soft left while excluding the hard left. Hence, its preference ordering was 
also Tr > Rr > Pr > Sr. Together, these preference-rankings created a prisoner’s
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dilemma between the soft left and the right: the soft left would have preferred 
compromise with the right than civil war ( R l  > P l )  but felt it could hold in check the 
hard left and did not trust the right. With both sides having non-cooperative 
dominant strategies, the result was the civil war that engulfed Labour during 1980-2.
Table 4.2 Strategic Options fo r  Labour Factions (mid-1980s)
RIGHT
Compromise with 
Soft Left
Don’t compromise
with Soft Left
___________________
1 WKmn
SOFT LEFT
Ally with Right
Centrist compromise
R l, R r
Leftist domination
t L) s r
Rightist domination
s l , t r
Overt factional conflict
Pl, P r
0l » jiO payoffs to soft left and right.
However, this game was ‘nested’ (Tsebelis, 1990) in the wider game of 
electoral competition. Fluctuations in the latter modify the payoffs from intraparty 
outcomes. This was particularly apparent for the soft left during the period 1983-6. 
Not only had the constitutional reforms and the resulting civil war contributed to 
Labour’s catastrophic defeat of 1983; the miners’ strike in 1984-5 and the fiasco 
surrounding the activities of the Militant Tendency in Liverpool had severely eroded 
the credibility of the hard left in particular and a leftist stance in general. In terms of 
the game matrix, the value of TL fell considerably such that Rl > TL. The 1983 defeat 
strengthened the right while the election of Kinnock as leader probably increased the 
value of compromise with the soft left, providing that the hard left was shunned. Yet 
even if the right’s preference ranking remained Tr > R r > PR > Sr, compromise with 
the soft left was still likely. Such combinations of preference-rankings would again 
result in non-cooperation (Pl, Pr) but crucially there would be much greater scope 
for a cooperative move to mutual compromise between the right and the soft left 
since the latter had turned decisively against the hard left and would have no 
incentive to renege on a deal. Thus was bom the ‘realignment of the left’ in 1985, by
112
which soft leftists reasoned they could secure more by supporting Kinnock and 
restricting any rightward drift than by joining the hard left on the road to electoral 
oblivion. This manifested itself in a solid soft left-right coalition on the NEC 
(resulting in regular 25-2 victories for Kinnock in crucial votes) and a steady base of 
support among the big unions at the annual conference. The principal price that the 
soft left extracted was a commitment to retain Labour’s non-nuclear defence policy, 
the abandonment of which might have re-ignited the party’s civil war.
Leftist critics of the soft left would later complain that far from constraining 
Labour’s shift to the right, they facilitated and supported it (Heffeman and Marqusee, 
1992: 62-70). There was a degree of inevitability about this because once the hard 
left had been reduced to a rump, the soft left no longer held a such a pivotal position 
in the party (see also Shaw, 2000a: 132-3). The hard left attempted to reassemble the 
left coalition in 1988 when Benn challenged Kinnock for the party leadership but his 
11 percent poll demonstrated that the hard left was a broken reed. The election defeat 
of 1987 created a consensus about the need to make Labour more electable, bearing 
expression in the policy review of 1987-9. From then on for the remainder of the 
period under review, the Labour leadership would never face a challenge from a 
strong left, and the increased desire for electability in the 1990s encouraged a greater 
but easier shift to the centreground of British politics.
Modernisers and Traditionalists
The final vanquishing of the hard left coincided with the emergence of a new 
fissure in the Labour Party in the late-1980s. Attention among Kinnock’s allies had 
already started to turn towards the party’s relationship with the trade unions, in terms 
of their constitutional standing and Labour’s industrial policies. Immediately, many 
union leaders became defensive about their role in the party but the election defeat of 
1992 put their power under the spotlight as never before. In place of ‘left versus 
right’ came ‘modernisers versus traditionalists’, the former wanting to reduce union 
influence or even abandon the union link altogether, the latter seeking to defend it. 
The modernisers wanted to push Labour in the direction of a ‘direct’ unitary 
membership structure while the traditionalists, who included much of the union 
movement, wished to retain the existing federal structure. Not everyone slotted easily 
into these two polar opposites, many occupying an intermediate position seeking
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compromise, including the new leader, John Smith and perhaps John Prescott, who 
both made the case for the party-union link while also backing OMOV.
The modernisers emerged in the late-1980s as key Labour figures sensed that 
the party-union link might be damaging the party’s electoral prospects.19 Each year 
during Labour’s annual conference, Conservative ministers and the rightwing press 
drew attention to and exploited the sight of union leaders casting enormous block 
votes. It became a common refrain among ministers that ‘Ron Todd (the leader of the 
TGWU) is the leader of the Labour Party’, particularly when the votes of the TGWU 
prevented key policy changes such as the vote to retain unilateralism in 1988. 
According to Shaw (2000a: 125-7), the shadow communications agency (SCA) 
played a key role in propagating the view that the union link was harming Labour. 
The SCA conducted research into Labour’s image among voters, with agency 
members controlling access to research and monopolising interpretation of the data 
collected (see Chapter 8). Leading SCA figures were modernisers who struck 
alliances with younger, ambitious MPs such as Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, who 
later became the leading lights of the modernisers.
The modernisers were largely a group concentrated near the top of the Labour 
Party, politicians who believed Labour would never win office unless it changed. 
Each successive election defeat strengthened their case and enlarged the size of the 
coalition for reform of the union link, even if the new converts did not go as far as 
the arch-modernisers. Support for reform was growing in the CLPs by the late-1980s, 
bodies that might benefit from any redistribution of power. Seyd and Whiteley 
(1992) collected data on party members’ attitudes to the modernisation strategy, the 
two main indicators of which were a willingness to let the leader initiate change and 
the conflict between principles and electoral pragmatism. We saw in Chapter 1 that 
many Labour members accept the necessity of capturing the political centreground. 
Seyd and Whiteley also found members were willing to permit autonomy to the 
leadership and sensed problems with the party-union link (Table 4.3).
This data was collected in the early 1990s and indicated a desire to cede 
autonomy to the leader to make Labour more electable (the first and second 
indicators). There was widespread agreement with the view that union block votes 
brought the party into disrepute and intriguingly, a slim plurality of members 
believed that the unions wielded too much power in the party. Four-fifths believed
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the party leader should be elected under OMOV (though it is debatable what they 
understood by this, e.g. should union levypayers be entitled to vote?). Thus, there 
was a constituency of support for reform among Labour members, though this was 
particularly pronounced among centrist, rightwing and inactive members, with little 
support among hard left activists (Table 4.4).
Table 4.3 Labour Party Members ’ Attitudes to Modernisation (percentages)
Indicator Agree TV
‘A problem with the Labour Party today is that the 
leader is too powerful ’ 15 71
‘The party leadership doesn’t pay a lot o f attention 
to the views o f ordinary party members ’ 39 44
‘The Labour Party leader should be elected by a 
system o f one party-member, one-vote ’ 80 12
‘The Trade Union block vote at conference brings 
the party into disrepute ’ 72 17
'The Trade Union movement has too much power 
over the Labour Party ’ 43 42
Source: Seyd and Whiteley (1992: 239-40,243). The figures above are compound figures from the 
original source, aggregating ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’, and ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’. 
Figures for ‘neither’ have not been included.
Table 4.4 Attitudes to Modernisation by Activism and Ideology (percentages)
Traditionalists Intermediates
All respondents 18 43 38
Ideology in party
Hard left 51 36 13
Soft left 18 49 34
Centre 5 44 51
Soft right 3 35 62
Hard right 8 43 49
Activism
Inactive 15 44 41
Occasionally active 15 47 38
Fairly active 18 43 39
Very active 24 39 36
Source: Seyd and Whiteley (1992: 164, Tab. 7.11).
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Given these distributions of opinion, the modernisers could expect some 
support from members in OMOV ballots (e.g. in NEC elections) but it was unlikely 
they could rely on much active support. A wider base of members, including 
conference delegates, might be expected to support a redistribution of conference 
voting power from unions to CLPs. Divisions between modernisers, traditionalists 
and intermediates cut across left-right divisions, though the left in general preferred 
more control ‘from below’ while the right in general wanted greater central direction. 
Figure 4.3 provides a schematic map of the groupings.
Figure 4.3 Institutional Preferences o f Labour Factions
Thus, there was the potential for a coalition in support of ‘new deal’ 
institutional reform encompassing key NEC and parliamentary figures together with 
an important section of the individual membership. However, control of Labour’s 
constitution resides in the annual conference and that continued to be dominated by 
union block votes. Therefore, any attempt to reduce union power in the party would 
require the support of the unions themselves, or at least from enough of them to 
achieve a majority. The desperation of the unions to remove the incumbent 
Conservative government provided the modernisers with some leverage but it would
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be a slow process. As we shall see, Kinnock’s attempts to erode the unions’ power 
achieved very limited success. It took the shock of the election defeat of 1992 to 
change the balance of opinion on reform of the union link. The NEC set up a review 
group to examine ways of reforming the party-union link but the group was 
dominated by traditionalists from the big unions and its initial ideas for change were 
extremely limited (see Chapter 7). The new leader, John Smith had just been elected 
by union block votes. Smith was in the intermediate camp, accepting that some 
reform would be necessary but wanting above all else intraparty unity. Smith 
compromised with the unions over certain reforms in order to achieve their support 
for other changes though it took a knife-edge vote at the 1993 annual conference to 
secure the passage of OMOV. A substantial union ‘no’ was narrowly defeated by a 
minority union ‘yes’ together with a considerable ‘yes’ vote from the CLPs. The 
agreed reforms fell short of what the modernisers wanted but they would have their 
chance after Smith’s death a year later in 1994. Blair’s accession to the leadership 
gave an enormous boost to the modernisers and his period in charge has seen 
considerable change though most of the 1993 settlement remains. For a period before 
the 1997 election modernisers encouraged talk of a party-union divorce in order to 
emphasise that Labour was not run by union barons though these calls have since 
fallen quiet. Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 9, calls for divorce nowadays tend to 
come from disgruntled union officials, angered by what they perceive to be the poor 
return on their ‘investment’ in the Labour government.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Labour’s historic problem since the 1920s has been its frequent inability to 
overcome the commitment problems inherent in a trade union-funded vote-seeking 
party. Moreover, before the election victory of 1997, it has been the party’s 
misfortune normally to find itself in office in times of economic crisis, when these 
problems are at their worst. No internal party institution can solve such difficulties. 
Yet given these unpropitious circumstances, we can acknowledge that Labour’s 
internal institutions did alleviate other problems. The block vote was an efficient 
institution that kept the unions in the party and preserved the supply of union finance 
for a century. It reduced but never eradicated commitment problems.
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The political significance of the block vote altered once the unions shifted to 
the left in the 1970s, eventually ending in the organisational reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s. The next three chapters examine crucial reforms in the areas of policymaking, 
candidate selection and electing the party leader, followed by an examination of what 
resources Labour has and what it needs in order to campaign. The political exchange 
approach is deployed throughout in the study of institutional reforms and it is shown 
that Labour’s membership structure has increasingly shifted from an ‘indirect’ 
federal structure to a ‘direct’ unitary one, if not completely then significantly. The 
block vote-based institutionalisation of political exchange examined above was 
dismantled and a party geared towards individual membership and donations 
emerged in its place. However, it is shown that this process was never completed and 
that serious, perhaps insuperable barriers remain to making Labour a purely unitary 
party. It is to the first of these areas of reform, party policymaking that I now turn.
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5 Policymaking
5.1 INTRODUCTION
A fundamental way in which parties institutionalise political exchange is by 
allowing party members a role in policymaking. This process includes the research 
that is conducted to assess the impact of policies, the forums in which decisions are 
made over which policies to adopt, and the interpretation of those policies. These 
stages require different institutions and control of them constitute resources in 
intraparty politics. Policymaking institutions have distributional consequences, 
giving party members greater or lesser control over politicians. In this chapter, I 
explore the nature of Labour’s policymaking structure and the changes to it since 
1983. According to the party’s constitution, the annual conference was, and remains, 
the sovereign policymaking body. This body was long dominated by the block votes 
of the trade unions but recent changes have increased the voting power of the CLPs. 
Moreover, the conference has been increasingly sidelined, with the formation of a 
National Policy Forum and the use of membership referendums. The main effects of 
changes to the policymaking process have been to increase the autonomy of the 
parliamentary leadership and to reduce the role of the unions.
The chapter is set out as follows. Section 5.2 considers Labour’s policy­
making structure before 1983, describing the key institutions. Section 5.3 assesses 
the traditional relationship between the PLP and the annual conference, and later 
changes in this relationship are discussed in 5.4. Section 5.5 discusses the reduced 
role of the unions in policymaking, with the downgrading of the conference while 
power was further centralised with the establishment of the national policy forum in 
the 1990s (section 5.6). Finally, section 5.7 concludes.
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5.2 POLICYMAKING IN THE LABOUR PARTY BEFORE 1983
The first thing we need is a simple way of modelling the policymaking 
process as it existed up to 1983. The aim is not to provide a detailed description of all 
features of the policy process1 but an outline of the basic elements. The unions’ block 
votes gave them collective control of all the major policymaking organs of the extra- 
parliamentary party, including the annual conference, the NEC and the Conference 
Arrangements Committee (CAC). The positions of the unions and the CLPs at the 
conference were addressed in Chapter 4. The pattern of union domination of the 
conference was replicated on the other two bodies.
The NEC is the party’s governing body between conferences and was 
previously the major site of policy formulation. The NEC’s members are largely 
elected by different sections of the party, though the precise format has changed over 
the years (see Appendix 2 to Chapter 7). After the annual conference, the NEC was 
the most powerful body in the extraparliamentary party. According to Labour’s 
constitution, the NEC is formally subject to control by the conference (Labour Party, 
1992a: Clause IX. 1), its major decisions requiring conference approval. Furthermore, 
the NEC is responsible for implementing conference decisions. Yet the relationship 
between the NEC and the conference is far from one of NEC subservience. Indeed, 
the NEC has normally been able to direct the conference. Many of the policies that 
the conference votes on have been drawn up by the NEC, which has the constitutional 
right ‘to submit to the annual party conference ... such resolutions and declarations 
affecting the programme, principles and policy of the party as in its view may be 
necessitated by political circumstances’ (Clause IX.2 (1)). Its policy documents, 
statements and emergency resolutions did not face the same hurdles that confronted 
ordinary resolutions sent into the conference by CLPs and affiliated organisations 
(see below). Moreover, the NEC enjoyed an array of resources that facilitated 
detailed policymaking, including control of the party’s research department and a 
range of policy study groups and subcommittees. Through its policy committees and 
committee-mode of operation, the NEC was the major policy-initiating body in the 
extraparliamentary party and in the party as a whole when Labour was in opposition.
The CAC’s role in the party was to organise the conference agenda. Together 
with the NEC, it comprised ‘the platform’ at the party conference, seated at the front 
of the conference hall facing the delegates (‘the floor’). The CAC had five members
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and was elected by the entire conference. This ensured that the major unions 
determined the result, with most voting for the same candidates -  mainly union 
placemen. Like NEC seats in the trade union section, CAC seats were virtually sitting 
tenancies, with little competition for places and inter-union deals determining the 
result in advance. CAC members have tended to be senior officials (but not leaders) 
of the big unions and predominantly rightwing (Minkin, 1980: 70).
The procedural advantages enjoyed by the ‘platform’ over the ‘floor’ of the 
conference enabled it to shape the course of policymaking. The constitutional duties 
of the CAC were ‘to arrange the order of the Party Conference Agenda’ and ‘to act as 
the Standing Order Committee’ (Clause XI (1)). The CAC could not determine the 
content of the resolutions submitted to it but it could direct the agenda through its 
gate-keeping powers, the most notable of which was the process of ‘compositing’.2 
There were strict controls over the supply of policy resolutions to the party 
conference. Each voting body (unions, CLPs and socialist societies) could send only 
one resolution and one amendment to the conference, all of which had to be 
submitted in advance of the conference and filtered through the CAC (conference 
delegates could not submit resolutions from the ‘floor’). Each year, hundreds of 
policy proposals were submitted over a range of issues but not all could be discussed 
in the course of a five-day conference. It was the task of the CAC to reduce the 
number of resolutions to manageable proportions by combining some resolutions in 
‘composite’ resolutions, which could cover a number of different yet connected 
issues.3 For each policy area, two or three resolutions or composites might go 
forward for debate at the conference, providing delegates with clear choices. The 
CAC was constrained in that any composite resolutions it produced had to retain the 
wording of the original resolutions, often resulting in bloated and incoherent 
composites. However, it could use this to its advantage when dealing with 
resolutions hostile to the ‘platform’. Similarly, it could ‘tidy up’ resolutions that the 
NEC broadly supported (see Minkin, 1980: 138-46).
Figure 5.1 depicts a two-dimensional policy space along with the bliss points 
of the NEC and the annual conference (AC), though in each case, the points are more 
accurately seen as the bliss positions of a stable dominant coalition on each body. 
The point SQA represents the status quo ante and the intersecting circles are the 
indifference curves of the NEC and the conference (the circular indifference curves
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represent lower levels of utility the further away they are from the bliss point). For 
simplicity, I assume the CAC’s preferences are identical to those of the NEC so the 
latter’s indifference curves represent the dominant coalition of the entire ‘platform’.
Figure 5.1 Policy Determination at the Labour Party Conference
•  NEC
SQA• AC
The conference prefers any position inside the large circle to SQA because the 
latter is on the circle boundary. Likewise, the NEC prefers any position inside the 
small circle to SQA. But since the conference is sovereign over policy, it would seem 
that it could vote for its bliss point, AC. However, this ignores the agenda-control 
powers of the CAC. The compositing process may produce clumsy and unwieldy 
resolutions and the CAC may act strategically to ensure resolutions close to the point 
AC are joined in a composite resolution by more extreme resolutions, in particular, 
those lying outside the conference winset of SQA, i.e. outside the large circle. As an 
illustrative example of what is probably a widespread activity, Minkin (1980: 142) 
mentions the debate over German rearmament in 1954, when the NEC presented a 
carefully-worded resolution characterised by ‘masterly ambiguity’ while the senior 
party manager, Herbert Morrison, ensured that so as to provide the conference with a 
‘clear choice’ the NEC resolution faced, in Michael Foot’s words, ‘a resolution of the 
most extreme character’. Furthermore, the NEC member given the task of winding up 
the debate could draw out the most extreme elements of the resolution and urge that 
it be voted down (Minkin, 1980: 227). To be sure of securing the support of the 
dominant coalition at the conference, the CAC would choose a resolution 
representing a position that both it and the conference prefer to SQA, i.e. any point 
within the shaded area of intersection of the indifference curves of the conference
122
and the NEC. Sometimes, this elicited a response from delegates: a widely employed 
tactic of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy in the late-1970s and early- 
1980s was to circulate ‘model resolutions’ among CLPs and encourage their mass 
submission to the CAC. When seventy CLPs submitted an identically worded 
resolution -  as happened during the constitutional upheaval of the late-1970s (Seyd, 
1987: 110) -  it was harder for the CAC to justify unwieldy (and extreme) composites.
Nevertheless, platform manipulation was a common feature of Labour 
conferences and could often be planned because the big unions came to the 
conference with mandates covering the most important issues. Composites could be 
tailored to fit with union mandates or, if a union leader sympathetic to the ‘platform’ 
were saddled with an ‘extreme’ mandate, resolutions could be chosen that gave him 
greater discretion in interpreting the mandate. Minkin observes that ‘the result of the 
voting in the hall could virtually be decided in the compositing meeting’ (1980: 142).
While resolutions submitted by voting bodies faced an uncertain passage, the 
NEC’s proposals stood a much greater chance of adoption. Unlike conference 
delegates, the NEC could put its own resolutions to the conference and in contrast to 
the clumsy composites on the agenda, the NEC could devise concise resolutions, 
which were not subject to compositing. These could be tailored to be sure of winning 
majority support at the conference, i.e. they could be precisely worded (or 
alternatively, shrouded in the necessary degree of ambiguity) so as to fall within the 
shaded winset in Figure 5.1. This is what Minkin (1980: 46-7, 53; see also 142-3) 
calls ‘the “anticipated reactions” effect’ whereby the NEC would take soundings 
from the major unions, often via the union members of the NEC itself, to assess the 
sort of policies for which it could secure support at the conference. This being so, we 
might expect defeats for NEC resolutions to be infrequent because defeat could ensue 
only if the NEC miscalculated the balance of forces at the conference or was careless 
in drafting its statements. Despite the administrative advantages enjoyed by the NEC, 
the conference possesses veto power -  a power undiminished by its infrequent use.
Clearly, the best situation for the NEC is when its own factional composition 
is similar to that of the conference. In the 1950s, both the NEC and the conference 
had rightwing majorities so the NEC could be certain of receiving backing for its 
initiatives. The process would not have been one-way: informal soundings would 
have been taken from the major union leaders beforehand in order to agree on a
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policy position within the mutual conference-NEC status quo winset. The NEC would 
initiate policies and work out the details. It could be reasonably confident that it 
would not be upstaged and that the conference would be willing to act as a rubber- 
stamping body. This is the situation that McKenzie portrays in British Political 
Parties (1964). A similar relationship held in the late-1970s except that both the NEC 
and the conference had leftwing majorities, with the NEC making the running for 
leftwing policies, such as unilateralism. The problem for the left in 1980 was that it 
did not have the support of the PLP so the result was an internal civil war. I discuss 
the relationship of the PLP to the extraparliamentary party later. The NEC left could 
also be thwarted by the CAC, which, for example frustrated attempts to pass 
mandatory reselection in 1977 by offering the conference a vote on only an extreme 
composite, which was predictably remitted (see Shaw, 1988: 196-7).
The ‘Two-thirds Majority’ Rule
The assumption of the discussion so far has been that decisions required a 
simple majority to be passed at the conference. For the most part, this is indeed the 
case yet Labour’s constitution appears to contradict it. Clause V.l states that ‘[n]o 
proposal shall be included in the party programme unless it has been adopted by the 
Party Conference by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes recorded on a 
card vote’ (emphasis added). Clause V.l also states that the conference decides ‘what 
specific proposals of legislative, financial or administrative reform shall be included 
in the party programme’. I f  the term ‘party programme’ were interpreted to mean the 
party’s raft of policies, then it would appear that the ‘two-thirds majority’ rule is an 
integral feature of the decision-making process. However, the term ‘party 
programme’ has always been rather vague and aside from those passages of Clause 
V.l already cited, no further definition was provided in the constitution.4 The 
constitution does not say whether all resolutions attaining a super-majority are 
included in the party programme or only some, and if the latter, it does not say who 
decides. The party programme is not synonymous with the election manifesto 
because Clause V.2 states that the latter is drawn from the party programme. 
Passages referring to constitutional amendments (Clause XVI) fail to specify whether 
a simple or super majority is required, though leadership elections require a simple 
majority. As with the ‘uncodified’ British constitution, the Labour Party’s
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constitution relies heavily on unwritten conventions, and simple majorities is one of 
them (another is block voting, mentioned nowhere in the constitution).
The ‘two-thirds majority’ rule appears hugely significant yet it has assumed 
secondary importance. In theory, the rule should facilitate intraparty consensus or 
provide the PLP and the NEC with an excuse to disregard hostile conference 
resolutions that secured slim majorities. Moreover, given that union block votes were 
historically normally in support of the platform, this hurdle would not necessarily 
prove insurmountable for the leadership. It would be more of an obstacle to the left, 
which for the first half of Labour’s history was a weak force. However, when 
political forces in the party became more balanced from the late-1950s onwards, the 
significance of the ‘two-thirds majority’ rule could change so that, paradoxically, it 
might reduce the costs of intraparty conflict and make on-going disputes more 
frequent. If the PLP, NEC and conference delegates were worried about the impact on 
the party’s image of disagreements over policy, they might search for compromises. 
However, one effect of requiring a two-thirds majority is that it may postpone full- 
blooded conflict since actors know anything less than a super-majority is ineffective. 
It would then be easier for the PLP and the NEC to ignore hostile votes without a 
super-majority and the conference delegates, anticipating this may be less fearful of 
inflicting defeats. They might consider that any rows resulting from qualified defeats 
would be muted because the mles would effectively give the platform the right to 
ignore them. If this happened, low-level conflict and defeats for the platform could 
become common.5 However, it would not do the leadership’s public image much 
good if it were seen to be frequently defeated. Thus, party leaders have not always 
sought to use the ‘two-thirds majority’ rule to extricate themselves from defeats. 
After the most famous conference defeat suffered by a Labour leader -  the 1960 vote 
on unilateralism, which did not secure two-thirds majority backing -  Gaitskell did 
not brush off the defeat by referring to the two-thirds majority rule but instead 
challenged the authority of the conference (Minkin, 1980: 280).
5.3 PARTY POLICY AND THE PLP
The relationship between the conference and the PLP was raised in Chapter 4, 
where it was shown that despite Labour’s constitution situating sovereignty in the
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conference, there are no direct means with which the latter can impose its demands 
on a reluctant PLP. This chimes with the McKenzie thesis of PLP domination though 
it was pointed out that union acquiescence to the PLP leadership was not always as 
forthcoming as McKenzie believed, as became evident in the 1970s. The PLP was 
not completely free of the extraparliamentary party but neither was the conference 
fully sovereign. The ties that ultimately bind politicians to activists and unions are 
the resources that the latter supply, and which they can withdraw if the politicians do 
not honour their promises. In fact, the system of conference policymaking is best 
seen as a public forum in which the politicians and union leaders formalised deals 
over policy, endowing them with legitimacy in the light of a positive vote. This 
worked well when the politicians and union leaders shared broadly similar 
preferences, as in the 1950s, but the problems arose when there was a disjuncture in 
their preferences, as in the 1970s. Although there are no iron laws about what 
happens in such situations, we can discern some tendencies. The main components of 
this outline include preferences, costs and access to resources, and these form the 
basis of any exchange model. If the preferences of the conference and the PLP are 
similar, no problem arises. However, when they differ, e.g. when the conference is 
leftwing while the PLP is rightwing, the PLP can choose to ignore adverse votes at 
the conference but in doing so faces certain costs. Party leaders know that shirking 
on promises can cause damaging intraparty strife. Thus, one of the greatest sources 
of power of the extraparliamentary party’s is its ability to impose voice costs on the 
PLP. Sometimes, the PLP may not be concerned about internal strife (e.g. Harold 
Wilson’s governments) and will tolerate these costs. The closer the preferences of the 
PLP and the conference, the lower the costs are of obeying the conference. The PLP 
can try to fix votes with the union leaders so that both sides save face. Block voting 
enabled the PLP and union leaders to bargain with each other directly and thus 
facilitated attempts to determine outcomes in advance.
Resources are also a cmcial aspect of this bargaining game. It is often noted 
that the PLP in government has more autonomy from the extraparliamentary party 
than when it is in opposition (e.g. Brand, 1989; Kavanagh, 1985). The reason is that 
as a government, the PLP has the resources of the state at its disposal, with the civil 
service to implement government policies. When the PLP is in government it is less 
dependent on access to Labour’s own internal policymaking resources. I f  it disagrees
126
with conference decisions, it can simply implement its own policies, and if the latter 
are successful, it can claim the credit. By contrast, in opposition the PLP does depend 
on access to Labour’s own policymaking resources. Therefore, we should expect the 
cost to the PLP of ignoring the conference to be much lower when it is in government 
than in opposition, ceteris paribus. In opposition if it ignores the conference, it may 
lose control of policymaking committees on the NEC (pre-1990s). Brazenly ignoring 
the conference would also stoke internal conflict and perhaps undermine the position 
of the leader. This does not mean it is impossible for the PLP in opposition to reject 
conference decisions, as GaitskelTs rejection of the vote on unilateralism in 1960 
demonstrated, but it is costly (see Minkin, 1980: 288; Epstein, 1962: 180; see also 
Hindell and Williams, 1962). In general, policy bargains in opposition are likely to 
be more favourable to the conference otherwise the PLP may have to accept defeat.
The relations between the conference and the PLP depend on the interaction 
of these resource constraints with preferences. Assuming that the PLP is centre-right 
(i.e. close to the median voter), it is easier to bargain with the conference when the 
latter is similarly centre-right. This also makes it easier for the conference to accept a 
Labour government’s policies; alternatively, it is easier for a Labour opposition to 
strike an acceptable deal (‘fixing’ the vote) with the dominant coalition at the 
conference. Problems arise when the conference is leftwing because its preferences 
will be a considerable distance from those of the median voter. When the PLP is in 
opposition, ignoring or disowning decisions could carry very high costs in terms of 
party disunity. It may have to accept centre-left compromises but given that the 
unions will generally not want to encumber the party with unpopular policies, these 
compromises may be close to the minimally competitive level in the electoral arena.
However, the situation is different when it is a Labour government that faces 
a leftwing conference. A government that bowed to a leftwing conference would 
receive a lot of adverse comment from the press and the opposition, as well as from 
its own MPs. The charge against the government would be that it is weak, which 
would incur further electoral costs, perhaps greater than the costs arising from the 
disunity that would ensue from an outright rejection of the conference’s decision. 
Hence, a Labour government is likely to ignore a leftwing conference if the latter 
rejects the PLP’s overtures to agree on a moderate compromise. In fact, this could 
become the norm because the incentives for the conference (and hence, for the
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unions) to compromise would be reduced. Once the party is in government, the 
unions want it to ‘deliver’ and might try to push it to a more radical position. The 
unions would reason that the potential electoral costs of such a policy position could 
be reduced if the government undertook a preference-shaping strategy. If the 
government fails to do this, the outcome may be open conflict because the party’s 
institutions would no longer be adequate for achieving an agreement. The 
government has less incentive to compromise because it is less dependent on the 
party’s resources. We generally find that the arena of bargaining shifts from 
intraparty bodies in opposition to national institutions, such as tripartite bodies, in 
government. These factors indicate why relations between party leaders and unions 
are most strained under Labour governments.
This illustrates a neat paradox about relations between the parliamentary and 
extraparliamentary parties. When Labour is in opposition, the PLP is more closely 
controlled by the conference but the latter is constrained from imposing policies that 
are too extreme lest it scupper’s the party’s election hopes. When Labour forms a 
government, the unions and the conference want the PLP to use the opportunity to 
implement their favoured policies but the PLP is more independent. If it disputes the 
feasibility of conference policies, it can ignore them. The McKenzie thesis is correct 
for Labour governments and has often appeared correct for Labour in opposition. 
However, the latter appearance of independence stems from the constraining chain 
(on the unions) of electoral viability. Table 5.1 summarises these conjunctures.
Table 5.1 PLP-Conference Conjunctures
Rightwing Conference
SVMM
Leftwing Conference
PLP fixes votes ( i f  moderate) or 
ignores them ( if  extreme)
PLP ignores leftwing votes 
(disunity costs < electoral costs)
PLP fixes or accepts votes PLP fixes or accepts votes 
(very high disunity costs)
Naturally, this taxonomy is highly schematic. Numerous other factors enter 
into the bargaining game, including the proximity of an election (the closer it is, the 
greater the autonomy of the PLP leadership) and the length of time spent in
,P in G overnm ent
PLP in Opposition
_________________
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opposition. The longer the party is out of government, the hungrier it becomes for 
office and the greater the freedom of the PLP leaders, something that helps explain 
the dominance of Kinnock and Blair (see Koelble, 1996). The most notable example 
of this was the unions’ gradual acceptance during the 1980s that a future Labour 
government would not repeal the Conservatives’ trade union legislation, because the 
latter was popular with voters. A complete model would also need to incorporate the 
NEC and the CAC.
Instances aplenty can be quoted for each of these four conjunctures. Labour 
governments have tried to fix votes if the circumstances were favourable (mainly 
when the conference was rightwing) and ignored them when the conference was 
leftwing. Blair worked hard to achieve a face-saving fix on university tuition fees in 
1997. The government had previously announced the policy and it is inconceivable 
that a conference defeat would have seen it scrapped.6 The government felt it would 
benefit from the intraparty legitimacy of an affirmative conference vote and the 
avoidance of internal disunity. When Harold Wilson’s governments faced wish-lists 
or critical resolutions from leftwing conferences in the 1960s and 1970s, they 
ignored them. In these circumstances, the conference was doing little more than 
demonstrating its own impotence.
It was a different matter whenever Labour was in opposition. When the 
conference was rightwing, the PLP had little to fear because it could fix votes with 
union leaders. This happened most blatantly during the 1950s when a triumvirate of 
rightwing unions (the miners, general workers, and transport workers) coalesced to 
deliver the results Gaitskell wanted. McKenzie (1964) described these unions as a 
‘Praetorian Guard’: at twelve annual conferences, between 1948 and 1959, ‘the 
platform’ suffered only one defeat (Minkin, 1992: 311). The problem for the PLP 
came when it was in opposition and faced a leftwing conference, as it did for much 
of the 1980s. Its disinclination towards leftwing policies means that it is likely to risk 
more defeats but will usually end up having to accept them. Thus, in 1980 Labour 
adopted a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament and committed itself to withdraw 
Britain from the EEC. Both policies went into Labour’s election manifesto of 1983 
and both were deeply resented by most Labour MPs. However, the most important 
voice -  that of the leader, Michael Foot -  was in favour of both policies. It is 
doubtful whether either policy would have remained in such a strong form had the
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leader been a rightwinger, such as Callaghan or Healey. The leader after 1983, Neil 
Kinnock, began as a unilateralist but claims that by 1985 he wanted to change the 
policy because it was a vote loser (Kinnock, 1994: 547). However, he had to wait till 
1989 before he could secure a change, too late to prevent Labour suffering an 
electoral drubbing in 1987, a campaign in which defence policy figured prominently 
(see Heffeman and Marqusee, 1992: 233-60; Hughes and Wintour, 1990: 104-27). 
Nevertheless, compromise is still possible, particularly during the run-up to a general 
election. For example, as opposition leader, Wilson faced demands to pledge a 
Labour government to nationalise the top 25 companies but he avoided making such 
a pledge in the 1974 manifesto while accepting a significant role for public 
ownership (Jones, 1996: 92-3; Wickham-Jones, 1996: 126-9).
If information about preferences and resources is complete, we should not 
expect to see many defeats for the PLP at the conference because in opposition the 
PLP knows it has less bargaining power and must make concessions whereas in 
government the unions know the PLP has greater bargaining power so they might 
compromise more to retain a semblance of unity. In which case, why do we ever see 
defeats for the PLP if everything can be fixed in advance? The Labour government in 
the 1970s was repeatedly defeated but just ignored the votes. Between 1983 and 
1990, Neil Kinnock suffered 49 defeats at the conference and suffered jibes about 
union ‘barons’ running the party (Minkin, 1992: 311-313). The explanation is that 
actors inflict (conference) or risk (PLP) defeats in order to signal publicly that they 
wish to move to a new policy position. This incurs costs because the party is publicly 
divided but these can be tolerated for a while if there is a sufficiently high chance of 
securing a policy change in the medium term. Thus, Kinnock endured narrow defeats 
over the sequestration of the NUM’s funds in 1985 and over unilateralism in 1988 
because he was letting the public know that on these important issues, he wished to 
shift the party. He did not try to change defence policy in 1987 because he knew he 
would be heavily defeated. The unions were prepared to defeat Labour governments 
in the 1960s and 1970s because they perceived those governments to be enacting 
policies hostile to union interests. In such circumstances, the policy-seeking unions 
have few incentives to restrain their displeasure because their entire reason for 
funding the party is to obtain favourable policies when it gets into government. 
Defeats for the government at the annual conference become an expression of union
130
anger at government policy. However, this simply demonstrated the impotence of the 
conference. Various attempts were made to overcome the inadequacies in Labour’s 
existing organisational structure. One was the formation of the TUC -  Labour Party 
liaison committee in 1972, which sought to coordinate policy between the 
government and the unions though it was unable top prevent the strife of the 1970s. 
A more dramatic attempt to shore up the extraparliamentary party came during 1979- 
81 when the left introduced mandatory reselection of MPs and the electoral college. 
The intention was to pressurise the PLP into accepting conference resolutions. 
However, as the remainder of this chapter shows, the PLP gained even more latitude 
over policy in the 1980s owing to organisational reforms and greater autonomy 
afforded by Labour’s dire electoral standing.
5.4 THE PLP AND POLICYMAKING AFTER 1983
The autonomy of the PLP enabled party leaders to evade direct control by 
activists and unions. However, its disadvantage was that party leaders could do little 
to stop the conference and the NEC sniping from the sidelines when Labour was in 
government and controlling valuable decision-making bodies when in opposition. 
Leftwing control of the conference and the NEC posed considerable problems for the 
rightwing PLP during the Callaghan and Foot years. The institutional and factional 
separation of the NEC and the PLP created a weak centre in the Labour Party 
(Kitschelt, 1994: 251). The PLP has always been at its strongest when (shadow) 
ministers sat on the NEC and dominated its policy initiatives. With the CLPs still 
electing leftwing MPs to the NEC in the early 1980s, there was little prospect of a 
quick return to rightwing domination of the executive so the new leader in 1983, 
Kinnock immediately wound up the NEC’s subcommittees and established a set of 
joint policy committees (JPCs) consisting of NEC and shadow cabinet members. 
(Figure 5.2 depicts Labour’s overall policymaking structure in the mid-1980s.) This 
did not put the shadow cabinet under the control of the extraparliamentary party 
because the new JPCs were never formalised in Labour’s constitution -  attempting 
this would have been difficult, with likely resistance from leftists suspicious of the 
new structure. The establishment of these JPCs was a step towards strengthening the 
hold of party leaders over policymaking by increasing their initiating power.
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Figure 5.2 Labour Party Policymaking Structure (mid-1980s)
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An important aspect of Labour’s policymaking structure after 1983 was the 
shadow cabinet’s big increase in resources compared to previous spells in opposition. 
The NEC was constitutionally in charge of Labour’s research department, which 
possessed administrative and research facilities essential to policymakers. However, 
Labour was now, for the first time, eligible for ‘Short money’, an annual grant paid 
by the state to opposition parliamentary parties amounting to £440,000 in 1983 (see 
Chapter 8).7 This meant that ‘there were now, for the first time in Party history, 
resources for a sizeable alternative policy advisory staff available to the PLP 
leadership’ (Minkin, 1992: 400). Kinnock was able to fund an extensive office 
consisting of advisors and strategists, who, for example, plotted a new ‘moderate’ 
economic policy and who were answerable solely to the leader.8 In addition to 
significant increases in secretarial and research allowances to MPs during the 1980s, 
the PLP had more resources beyond the control of the extraparliamentary party, 
strengthening its independence.
This trend towards greater PLP autonomy was evident during the major 
policy review of 1987-9 after Labour’s third consecutive election defeat. The 
abandonment of leftwing policies, such as unilateralism and the party’s earlier 
withdrawal of its opposition to Conservative trade union legislation showed that the 
unions realised new policies were required if Labour were to win. But the process of 
the policy review was itself noteworthy for the extent to which the PLP leadership 
had almost completely taken over policymaking. Already in the first four years of 
Kinnock’s leadership, the unions had taken a less visible and non-interventionist role 
in policymaking though informal links between PLP and union leaders increased 
significantly.9 Rather than the PLP setting policy in line with union preferences, the 
unions themselves smoothed the way for the PLP to seek vote-winning policies. For 
the unions, as Minkin writes, ‘all eggs were now in the basket of a future Labour 
Government’ to deliver them from mass unemployment and Conservative policies:
Publicly, the TUC would do nothing to embarrass the Parliamentary 
leadership or to imply its subordination in any way. Privately, the 
TUC would be as helpful as possible in assisting Kinnock to 
achieve a viable political programme. The unstated quid pro quo 
was an understanding that the future Labour Government would do 
its best for organised labour, for working people and for the
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priority social causes of the Party and the unions (Minkin, 1992:
408-9).
The PLP’s autonomy derived from the unions’ desperation for a Labour government. 
Since the unions were widely seen an electoral liability, they stayed out of sight, with 
the PLP taking the initiative. It is worth examining the policy review process to 
observe these trends.
Policymaking and the Policy Review
The commencement of the policy review coincided with the formation of a 
new set of policymaking institutions. This was partly explained by the inadequacy of 
Labour’s existing institutions but it also marked a new stage in the centralisation of 
power. At this point, the unions were very much part of the new system but as the 
review proceeded, the shadow cabinet played the major role though generally with 
the consent of union leaders. The PLP leadership has historically been less 
autonomous of the extraparliamentary party whenever Labour was in opposition but 
that started to change during the late-1980s. Defending the McKenzie thesis, Brand 
(1989: 115) suggests the distinction between Labour in opposition and in government 
is less important if the PLP obeys the conference in opposition but then goes back on 
agreements when it moves into government. However, if the conference encumbers 
the PLP with vote-losing policies in opposition, it might not get the chance to shift 
policy because it could find itself permanently out of office. This was Labour’s 
predicament in the 1980s and it was the realisation that policies -  and by implication, 
institutions -  do matter in opposition that led Kinnock to seek organisational reform.
The policy review continued the recent practice of integrating the NEC and 
the shadow cabinet in policymaking. With soft left MPs from the NEC prominent, 
MPs dominated the seven new policy review groups (PRGs). Each PRG consisted of 
about nine members drawn mainly from the NEC and the shadow cabinet, as well as 
union leaders. The PRGs were charged with looking at ways to update party policy. 
In only two PRGs were MPs in a minority and trade unionists in a majority, one of 
which, the People at Work group dealt with issues in which the unions had a direct 
interest. The inclusion of union leaders was the first time they had been assigned a 
direct role in Labour policymaking (union leaders have never been permitted to sit on
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the NEC). The CLPs were excluded from direct representation on the PRGs though 
MPs from the NEC’s constituency section were present. The PRGs were thus 
dominated by the party and union hierarchies (Taylor, 1997: 47-9). Moreover, they 
supplanted the NEC’s Home Policy and International Committees (Minkin, 1992: 
466). Indeed, the NEC saw its policymaking role contract as the shadow cabinet 
assumed a greater presence. Even on the issue of the election manifesto, Kinnock 
ensured that his own allies wrote the document, which was then rubberstamped by 
the NEC and the shadow cabinet (Heffeman and Marqusee, 1992: 81).
This is not the place to analyse the transformation that Labour’s policy 
programme underwent during the policy review (see Shaw, 1994: 81-107; Wickham- 
Jones, 1995a). The important point here is that party leaders saw the review as a 
chance to abandon unpopular policies in the wake of Labour’s 1987 election defeat 
and adopt policies that were electorally competitive. That is not to say they achieved 
everything they wanted because they faced resistance on some issues. However, on 
most important economic issues, a broad coalition agreed on the need for change, 
and on issues such as keeping the Conservatives’ trade union legislation, the unions 
were sympathetic to the party’s needs. The PRGs were expected to take account of 
public opinion when framing policies, supplied with information from the SCA and 
they were also free to establish working parties and co-opt specialists (Shaw, 1989: 
10, 5). On occasions, aides from the leader’s office were on hand to steer the groups 
in the desired direction, though in only one case (the People At Work group) was 
intervention necessary (Hughes and Wintour, 1990: 143-52). On the whole, there 
was a consensus on the PRGs as to the sort of policies required (Taylor, 1997: 57).
An important feature of the policy review, at least initially, was the launch of 
the ‘Labour Listens’ project, an external consultation exercise. Public meetings were 
organised at which Labour MPs listened to the views of members of the public and 
targeted social groups (Shaw, 1989: 13). The aim was to show that Labour was 
listening to the voters and then channel information gathered into the policy review. 
However, the exercise was a disappointment, attracting cranks to the meetings and 
not producing much material for the review (Hughes and Wintour, 1990: 100).
A significant feature of the policy review was the greatly contracted role of 
the conference. The PRGs’ final reports were presented to the conference in 1989 as 
fait accomplis, which could be accepted or rejected but not amended. In practice, the
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conference had little alternative but to accept the reports: as Taylor (1997: 62) 
observes, ‘ [wjholesale rejection would have left two years of Party strategy in ruins, 
Party policy in tatters, and the Party itself deeply divided and needing to pick up the 
pieces with a possible General Election looming in 1991.’ The unions still dominated 
the conference and would not vote against reports agreed by the major unions leaders 
on the PRGs. Electoral considerations meant they were largely content to allow the 
PLP to establish the parameters of party policy:
The political project of securing a Labour Government had in the 
past evoked solidaristic inhibitions about pushing trade union 
claims, but the constraints on trade union behaviour were now 
greater than at any time since the Party’s foundations as all 
attention was focused on electoral victory (Minkin, 1992: 479).
5.5 TRADE UNIONS AND THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN THE 1990s
Some of Labour’s most symbolic reforms in this period concerned the trade 
unions’ role at the party conference. Although there were some voices in the late- 
1980s in favour of reform (including that of the GMB’s leader, John Edmonds at the 
1989 conference), nothing happened until after Labour’s election defeat of 1992. The 
modernisers’ call for reform of the party-union link gathered momentum as they 
claimed the link contributed to voters’ distrust of Labour, and the feeling that it was a 
Trojan horse for the unions (Gould, 1999; Rentoul, 1995: 308-49). Even traditionalist 
figures realised some changes were needed. The remit of the NEC’s new union links 
review group (dominated by traditionalists) included looking at ways of changing the 
share of votes and the use of block voting at the party conference. Unlike other 
reforms (see Chapter 7), there was broad support for reform of the conference.
The main problem with the conference was that it vividly illustrated the 
unions’ predominance in the party. The problem worsened over the years due to the 
increasing concentration of votes in a few large unions -  by 1990, the four biggest 
unions collectively controlled over half the conference votes. A number of solutions 
were available, some far-reaching and some largely cosmetic. Lewis Minkin (1992: 
366-8), who later became a member of the NEC’s union links review group, listed 
nine broad categories of ‘solutions’.
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1. Recomposition: Allowing more bodies to vote at the conference, including 
regional bodies and the PLP. This would dilute the power of the nationally 
affiliated unions.
2. Equalisation: This could involve either one vote per organisation (undermining 
the power of the unions and giving power to the CLPs) or ODOV (in the sense 
discussed in Chapter 4), which would significantly increase the number of 
delegates at the conference.
3. Synchronisation: A requirement of concurrent majorities among unions and 
CLPs but could create gridlock if the political balance among unions and CLPs 
differed.
4. Consolidation: CLPs would hold a prior conference and adopt a common line, so 
that at the party conference there would be a sizeable CLP block vote. However, 
throughout the 1980s, the combined voting power of the CLPs was half that of 
the TGWU alone.
5. Redistribution: This subsumes a number of proposals. It could involve limiting 
block votes to 100,000, reducing the number of votes unions receive per 
thousand levypayers, or giving CLPs votes commensurate with their affiliated 
rather than individual local memberships. An alternative, which was eventually 
adopted, was to give the CLPs a set percentage of the total votes, creating an 
electoral college at the conference (see below).
6. Actualisation: Unions’ votes would include only those levypayers who are also 
individual party members, but it would push out the vast majority of levypayers.
7. Localisation: Replacing national with local affiliation (like Scandinavian labour 
parties), but it would exclude many levypayers affiliated nationally.
8. Democratisation: This refers to democratisation within the unions, with the 
retention of block votes and overall union preponderance at the party conference. 
It would involve greater participation and democracy inside unions.
9. Individualisation: The abolition of union affiliation and the creation of an 
individual membership party, like the German SPD. It was mooted by some 
modernisers in the 1990s, though it might require state funding for parties.
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Some of these proposals would involve little change while others would involve an 
upheaval. Given the balance of forces in the party under John Smith’s leadership, 
there was little chance of massive change but there was a realisation that the status 
quo was not an option. The focus centred on proposals to redistribute votes. The 
1990 conference agreed to reduce the affiliated organisations’ share o f conference 
votes from about 90 percent to 70 percent, with the CLPs controlling 30 percent (the 
change took effect in 1993). The review group observed that the new distribution of 
votes ‘reflects the relative financial contributions of the trade unions and maintains 
the stability of Conference’ (cited in Alderman and Carter, 1994: 329). This was a 
further illustration of the entwining of votes and finance (see Chapter 4) but it also 
obliquely referred to the potentially destabilising effect of giving too many votes to 
the CLPs, especially if they were to come under leftwing control.
The modernisers, however, were not satisfied. They wanted parity between 
the CLPs and affiliated organisations but the NEC recommended that such a move be 
contingent upon a rise in individual membership to 300,000, which it saw as possible 
if a scheme such as ‘levy-plus’ (see Chapter 7) were to be adopted. As well as 
ensuring that the CLPs shouldered a heavier financial burden, it was also hoped that a 
rise in membership would involve an influx of ‘moderate’ members to outweigh the 
influence of the hard left. This was necessary because CLP delegates would have 
greater voting power so the unions would find it harder to play their traditionally 
protective role of the PLP leadership. In 1996, parity was achieved, with the CLPs 
and the affiliated organisations each controlling 50 percent of the votes. Since the 
affiliated organisations included the small socialist societies, this meant that the 
unions actually controlled marginally fewer than 50 percent of the votes. The policy 
forum was also operating (see below) so the CLPs’ greater voting power at the party 
conference arrived at the point when that body was increasingly sidelined.
The ‘Abolition’ of the Block Vote
In an apparently major change to Labour’s structure, the review group 
recommended, and the 1993 conference agreed that unions no longer cast their votes 
as single blocks but should instead divide their votes among their individual 
delegates, with a maximum of one delegate per 5,000 levypayers. This is not exactly
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the same kind of ‘one delegate, one vote’ (ODOV) discussed in Chapter 4. In that 
hypothetical example, all delegates wielded votes of equal weight but in the Labour 
Party after 1993, there was a subtle difference. Unions would possess their entire 
block of votes, which would be divided equally among however many delegates they 
brought to the conference. Thus, a union with a million affiliated levypayers would 
be entitled to a maximum of two hundred delegates but if it brought 40 delegates, 
each would have 25,000 votes. Given this, and given that not all unions have the 
same number of levypayers, some conference delegates would possess a higher block 
of votes than others, so it would be misleading to describe this as ‘one delegate, one 
vote’: a more accurate description would be ‘one delegate, one mini block vote’ -  
with the size of these mini-blocks varying among delegates from different unions.
Nevertheless, any system of ODOV would reduce individual unions’ ‘effective 
votes’, i.e. the net votes of a union’s delegates. I suggested earlier that this could 
significantly dilute the voices of unions qua organisations and weaken the link 
between financial donations and voting power, possibly leaving the party vulnerable 
to financial free-riding by the unions. Given the greatly reduced authority and 
importance of the party conference, this might be expected to be less of a threat 
nowadays. Yet there remained concerns within the unions about the impact of ODOV 
and the PLP leaders understood them. In his speech to the 1993 conference, John 
Smith emphasised that unions would be free to continue mandating their delegates 
(Labour Party, 1994: 132). Individual delegates would still be regarded primarily as 
delegates of an organisation, even though each would be individually responsible for 
casting a proportion of that organisation’s votes. They would not be seen as 
representatives of strands of opinion within individual unions, still less as free 
agents. Indeed, the party’s then General Secretary, Larry Whitty, assured the NEC 
that the change was ‘largely presentational’, designed to avoid television pictures of 
union leaders casting enormous block votes. He added that ‘we will then say we 
don’t have the block vote’ (Rentoul, 1995: 323). The very fact of mandating assumes 
that organisational interests are above individual delegates’ preferences. We have 
seen that mandates entail measurement costs, particularly in the case of composites, 
though delegation meetings could be used to iron out such problems. Indeed, since 
the change came into effect in 1994, that is precisely the pattern we have seen, with 
unions continuing to cast their votes to all intents and purposes as single blocks. This
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illustrates the continued ‘efficiency’ of block voting, and not only for the unions. A 
noteworthy feature of conferences since Blair became leader is that ‘the platform’ 
has continued to lobby union leaders for support in vital votes, knowing that 
individual union delegates are unlikely to break ranks from any agreed position.
Indeed, this illustrates a feature of conferences of old that the present party 
leadership has sought to resurrect: the managerial role of the block vote. Even with 
an influx of new ‘moderate’ individual members, CLP delegates have not always 
been pliable. Even with 50 percent of the conference votes, the unions remain 
extremely important (their dominance of the electoral college was built on only 40 
percent of the votes). Three large unions -  the TGWU, the GMB and Unison -  now 
control 60 percent of all the unions’ votes (30 percent of the total votes) so if their 
support can be guaranteed, victory, while not certain, becomes much more probable. 
It is their votes that party leaders invariably try to win first because if  they do success 
is likely. The major conference votes of the present government have been preceded 
by intensive negotiations between ministers and leaders of the big three unions. This 
way, the government was able to avoid defeat over university tuition fees (1997), the 
post office’s monopoly on letters and the privatisation of air traffic control (1999).
However, as the 1970s demonstrated, when Labour is in government the 
managerial effectiveness of the block vote can diminish if the unions are 
antagonised. Thus far, Blair’s government has enjoyed a relatively quiet relationship 
with the unions but there have been setbacks. Most notably, the government was 
defeated at the 2000 conference on a contemporary issue motion (a composite of 
union resolutions) on whether pensions should be index-linked to wages rather than 
prices. The government thought not and its case for targeting pensions increases on 
the poorest pensioners rather than across-the-board increases for rich and poor 
pensioners alike found support among CLP delegates, who voted by 63.74 percent to 
36.26 percent in favour of the government. However, despite intensive negotiations 
between unions and ministers keen to avoid a defeat, the unions voted against the 
government by 84.17 percent to 15.83 percent, ensuring that the conference as a 
whole defeated the government by 60.21 percent to 39.79 percent. The government 
vowed to ignore the defeat and press on with its plans, drawing comfort from the fact 
that CLP delegates had backed its line and questioning the legitimacy of a defeat by 
union barons. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown exclaimed, ‘I’m not
140
going to give in to the proposals that came from the union leaders today... It is for 
the country to judge, it is not for a few composite motions to decide the policy of this 
government and this country. It is for the whole community, and I ’m listening to the 
whole community’ (White, 2000). Reminiscent of Harold Wilson’s declaration that 
‘the government must govern’, Brown represents the ‘maximalist’ parliamentary 
position, that the government should be more concerned with how policies play with 
the voters. It has been a commonly held belief among Labour MPs over the years -  
and it is one that has been at the root of much intraparty discord.
5.6 POLICYMAKING IN THE 1990s: THE NATIONAL POLICY FORUM
From the earliest days of his leadership, Kinnock wanted to reform Labour’s 
policymaking structures. He wanted the party to speak with a single voice and to this 
end, the JPCs and then PRGs were attempts to synchronise the shadow cabinet and 
the NEC. However, he believed the format of the party conference, with its set-piece 
debates and public displays of discord damaged Labour. From 1986, the conference 
underwent an image makeover, adopting a more professional and corporate look. 
Conference debates were subject to greater platform management and shadow 
cabinet ministers acquired a prominent role. However, the potential remained for 
embarrassing showdowns, which would be a problem if Labour were to win office. 
Few images are more redolent of the traumas of the Callaghan government than that 
of the Chancellor, Denis Healey, being given five minutes at the 1976 conference to 
defend the government’s economic policy amid a crescendo of jeers from delegates.
To avoid recurrences of such incidents, thought was given to overhauling 
party policymaking on a permanent and constitutional basis. The PLP leadership 
faced a dilemma in regard to the reform of policymaking. It wanted to modernise the 
policymaking process because it was unwieldy, inefficient and block votes brought 
Labour into disrepute. One way of establishing greater control would be to integrate 
the PLP into the extraparliamentary party’s policymaking structures in the 
expectation that it would play the leading role in policy development. This had 
already begun with the establishment of the JPCs and the PRGs, both of which 
institutionalised NEC-shadow cabinet cooperation. There was some talk about 
establishing an electoral college at the conference similar to that for leadership
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elections, with the PLP having a 30 percent stake, a proposal mooted by the NEC 
(Labour Party, 1990: 8). In theory, the conference made policy while the PLP worked 
within parliamentary and electoral constraints to implement it. In reality, the 
conference-PLP relationship was never as simple as this and the PLP had always been 
closely involved in policy development -  the new proposals would formalise that. 
Yet the integration of the PLP would also ensure, as Minkin (1992: 377) remarks, 
that ‘the stakes of Party democracy would be raised considerably’ and this prompted 
hesitation. There would be no new institutional constraints on the PLP because there 
would still be no direct enforcement mechanisms through which the conference 
could punish a shirking PLP. Instead, it would be an issue of the legitimacy of the 
conference. Perhaps for this reason, the proposals for integrating the PLP into the 
conference never got off the ground. Instead, the decision was taken to marginalise 
the conference by creating a new body, in which the PLP and the (shadow) cabinet 
were not merely represented but played a leading role.
The NEC presented a statement to the 1990 party conference proposing to 
establish a national policy forum (NPF) to work alongside the existing institutions 
(Labour Party, 1990). The ostensible aim of this new body was to improve the 
efficiency of the policymaking process. The statement pointed out the many 
weaknesses of the existing system of conference policymaking. Most resolutions 
submitted to the conference were not debated, most resolutions that were debated 
were clumsy, often contradictory composites that made mandates difficult to follow, 
most delegates did not participate in debates, etc. To ensure greater participation and 
properly researched and discussed policies, the proposed NPF, consisting of delegates 
elected by all components of the party, would develop policies on a two-year rolling 
basis. Once agreed, these policies would then pass to the party conference, which 
would be required to back them before they officially became party policy.
The NPF was eventually set up in 1993 and met on eight occasions up to 1997 
but its formal status was unclear and its impact limited (Seyd, 1999: 390). Labour’s 
return to power in 1997 signalled a new emphasis on the NPF, as Blair demanded his 
government should not experience the same conflicts with the extraparliamentary 
party as previous administrations. A consultation exercise ended with the NEC 
presenting its proposals to the 1997 conference, which were duly passed (Labour 
Party, 1997). In its constitutionally enshrined guise, the NPF has now been in
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operation for five years so some impressions can be sketched. The remainder of this 
section looks at the NPF’s composition, and its consequences for policymaking.
Table 5.2 National Policy Forum Membership
Section Number of Representatives Method of Election
Constituency Labour Parties ^  5 ordinary and 1 youth for each o f 9 regions
Regional groups o f CLP 
delegates at party conference
Regional Labour Parties 18 2 for each o f 9 regions Regional conference or policy forum
Trade Unions 30 Agreed formula
Socialist Societies
3 Socialist societies
9 2 Co-operative party
4 Black socialists ’ 
society conference
Socialist societies’ delegates 
at party conference 
Co-operative party NEC 
Black socialists’ society
Elected Labour Representatives
9 PLP
6 European PLP 
- . 4 Local Govt Assoc. 
1 COSLA 
4 Assoc. Labour 
Councillors
MPs
MEPs
Labour group on LGA 
Labour group on COSLA 
ALC members
Government 8
National Executive Committee 32 Ex officio
Total 175
Source: Labour Party (1997: 12).
The NPF consists of 175 delegates representing all sections of the party, 
including the government and the PLP (Table 5.2). It meets twice a year to develop a 
two-year rolling policy programme from which the election manifesto is drawn. The 
first year sees consultation inside and outside the party while the second year sees the 
writing of draft proposals before the final documents are sent to the party conference. 
Minority reports can also be submitted if enough NPF delegates back them.
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Figure 5.3 NPF and the Two-year Rolling Policymaking Structure 
(Based on Webb, 2000: 204, Fig. 7.1)
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The NPF is the apex of a multi-level policymaking structure (Figure 5.3). 
Acting as a steering group for the forum is a joint policy committee (JPC), which is 
charged with ‘strategic oversight of policy development in the party and the rolling 
programme’, shaping the agenda for the whole policy process. The JPC is chaired by 
the Prime Minister and consists of equal numbers of government ministers and non­
government members of the NEC (Labour Party, 1997: 8). It is, as Webb (2000: 204) 
suggests, ‘[t]he main institutional vehicle for the leadership in the policy-making 
process’. Each body in the new structure receives policy documents from the JPC and 
after making its own modifications, sends them back to the JPC. At each stage, the 
JPC can add its own comments and proposals, underpinned by the resources and 
information available to the PLP frontbench. Through these policy-shaping powers, 
the PLP leadership retains a firm grip on the entire policymaking process.
The detailed work on policy formulation is carried out by eight policy 
commissions, each consisting of nine members (three each from the government, the 
NEC and the NPF). These policy commissions have usurped the policymaking power 
of the NEC, which is now restricted to managerial functions. During the first year of 
the policy cycle, the policy commissions consult within the party with CLPs, unions, 
etc., often through local all-member policy forums. They also consult external 
organisations, such as businesses and interest groups. Having done this, the 
commissions then present reports to the NPF and the JPC (which is free to add its 
own proposals), before being submitted to the NEC and the party conference for 
discussion at the end of year one. In the second year, each policy commission reflects 
on the conference discussion and presents a draft policy document to the NPF. Once 
agreed, it is circulated throughout the party enabling branches, CLPs and affiliated 
organisations to consider it and submit proposed amendments, before it returns to the 
policy commission for final drafting. The reports then go back to the NPF and the 
JPC before returning to the party conference. If a sizeable minority of NPF delegates 
(at least 35 out of 175) want to submit a minority report as well, they can do so 
(Labour Party, 1997: 14-15). As part of the changes, the constitutionally enshrined 
‘party programme’, which hitherto had an ambiguous status, was now officially 
defined as ‘the rolling programme presented to the party conference by the National 
Policy Forum, as approved by the party conference’ (Labour Party, 1997: rules 
change appendix, Clause V .l).10
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Although the sovereignty of the party conference is ultimately reaffirmed, in 
reality the new structure significantly curtails the policymaking role o f conference 
delegates and represents a further centralisation of power. The change was justified 
by the efficiency improvements it would herald, and there is certainly something to 
be said for this. The old system concentrated policymaking power in the NEC, with 
the conference often being little more than an occasion for set-piece debates even 
though most of the votes had already been decided in advance. The new system is 
more structured and ensures a greater integration of the parliamentary and extra- 
parliamentary parties. This was long a demand of the left (as evident in the 
constitutional reforms of 1979-81) though it wanted to put the PLP under the control 
of the extraparliamentary party -  the current reforms achieve the opposite. This 
reminds us that institutions have distributive consequences and Labour’s new 
policymaking structure is no different since it has increased the mobilisation costs of 
government critics by assigning a leading role to ministers and filtering out dissent. 
Moreover, proposals will be less vulnerable to leftwing shifts among the unions 
because the latter have only 30 delegates on the 175 member NPF though they retain 
half of the conference votes. It is worth looking in more detail at the system.11
A significant feature of the old system was the conference’s function as a 
forum for intraparty ‘voice’. We saw that in some circumstances, the ‘platform’ 
would compromise on issues in order to avoid incurring high voice costs at the 
conference. Furthermore, set-piece debates every year afforded delegates the chance 
to discuss party policy, once again presenting the ‘platform’ with the likelihood of 
voice costs. By contrast, NPF meetings take place in private, away from the glare of 
the television cameras and newspaper reporters. The are no set-piece debates that can 
be replayed on television to the leadership’s embarrassment. Instead discussion takes 
place without the risk of voice costs damaging the party’s opinion poll rating. This 
leaves the party conference, where NPF reports must be ratified but conference 
delegates are greatly constrained in the subjects they can discuss. Policy areas under 
consideration by any of the policy commissions can no longer be debated at the 
conference and resolutions on such subjects submitted by CLPs and affiliates are 
forwarded by the CAC to the relevant policy commission.
Much of the conference agenda is predetermined, with debates scheduled for 
policy forum reports and drafts. However, resolutions can be submitted ‘on a topic
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not substantially addressed in the ongoing policy work of the NPF...’ (Labour Party, 
1997: 16). The CAC judges whether resolutions submitted fall outside these areas and 
those that do may qualify as a ‘contemporary issue motion’ (CIMs). Those that 
qualify go through to a ballot of conference delegates to decide which five 
resolutions shall be added to the agenda. Thus, the chances of a resolution being 
debated are fairly small unless it is on a burning issue. Even then, there is no 
guarantee it will navigate past the CAC because as Shaw observes, ‘[t]he ambiguity 
of the phrase “substantially addressed” affords the CAC considerable discretion to 
weed out “awkward” resolutions.’ He gives the example of the 30 resolutions hostile 
to the government’s contentious policy of privatising air traffic control, which were 
disallowed by the CAC at the 1999 conference much to the government’s relief. Of 
the CIMs that were debated, two were the result of deals between unions and the 
government and the other three were on uncontentious issues (Shaw, 2000b: 16-17).
The actual making of policy at the NPF has been characterised by government 
dominance. NPF delegates divide up into separate workshops to discuss policies but a 
facilitator (usually a senior party official) guides the discussion and takes notes of the 
proceedings. The facilitator has some discretion to interpret the direction and content 
of the discussion and produces a summary report, which forms the basis of the policy 
statement (Seyd, 1999: 394). Furthermore, Seyd has observed:
[I]n the preliminary discussions of policy documents at the national 
policy forum, the imbalance of power between the well-resourced 
ministerial team and the others is very apparent. Initial drafts, in 
which the parameters of policies are being determined, are coming 
from ministers (Seyd, 1999: 393-4).
Given the increases in ‘Short money’ and the consequent range of independent 
research resources it enables, the advantages mentioned by Seyd are likely to remain 
when Labour is in opposition. Constituency delegates to the NPF are unlikely to 
overcome such high information costs, though unions may be in a better position to 
do so. Accordingly, thus far, ‘the reports which emerged were primarily 
extrapolations of existing Government policy’ (Shaw, 2000b: 13).
The process does make provision for amendments to be made at the NPF to 
reports but there is little scope for genuine change. Amendments must be supported
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by at least eight delegates in order to be tabled; they must reflect a ‘significant 
strand’ of party opinion or points raised during the consultation; delegates proposing 
‘non-endorsed amendments’ are encouraged to meet ministers to reformulate the 
amendments; amendments can be ruled out if they are deemed to be more 
appropriately discussed in the context of a different report from that being 
considered; and they can be mled out if they are inconsistent with the government’s 
present or future legislation (Shaw, 2000b: 13).
NPF delegates who do not support given reports may issue minority reports, 
which also go to the party conference for discussion. Before they can do this, they 
must gather the support of a quarter of NPF delegates or 35 members (whichever is 
the greater) plus the backing of at least three of the seven constituencies represented 
on the NPF (see Table 5.2). Shaw observes that at a meeting of the forum held prior 
to the 1999 annual conference, barely half the forum members attended, and no 
minority was able to win over 35 of the 90 members present (Shaw, 2000b: 12-13). 
This rule poses a significant mobilisation barrier for minority factions though it could 
be overcome if the factional balance within the party changed in response to 
disillusionment with the Labour government. Moreover, the Partnership in Power 
document, which set out the format of the new system, appeared to indicate that 
conference delegates would be able to vote on separate aspects of policies:
In the past, policy statements have been presented to Conference on 
an-all-or-nothing basis. Under the rolling programme Conference 
would for the first time be able to have separate votes on key 
sections and proposals in the policy statement. The final statement 
as agreed by Conference would then become part of the party’s 
rolling policy programme (Labour Party, 1997: 15).
However, at the 1999 annual conference the CAC interpreted this as meaning that the 
conference could refer back individual reports, not sections within them because, it 
argued, the term, ‘final statement’ referred to the entire policy programme of the NPF 
(Shaw, 2000b: 17). The effect of this ruling is to give the conference veto power over 
whole reports but not over elements within reports. This significantly dilutes its pre­
emptive ability to shape the content of the reports. Thus, consider Figure 5.4:
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Figure 5.4 Preference Alignment between the Party Conference and the NPF
•  Ni
•  C SQA
In this policy space, SQA represents the status quo ante while points C and Ni 
are the bliss points of the dominant coalitions at the conference and the NPF 
respectively.12 The shaded area enclosed in the intersection of the two indifference 
curves contains the set of policies that are preferred by the conference and the NPF to 
SQA. The NPF can formulate a policy report that is closer to its own bliss point than 
is SQA but it cannot choose its bliss point because the conference prefers SQA to Ni 
and so would be prepared to refer back the entire report. Instead, the NPF chooses a 
position within the winset of SQA, for example point N2 . The NPF prefers N2 to SQA 
while the conference only marginally prefers it but will nevertheless vote for it rather 
than refer back the entire report. The conference cannot cherry-pick the best parts of 
the report and refer back or amend those parts it dislikes. If it possessed such a line- 
by-line veto, incremental amendments would continue until the content of the 
original report had unravelled, leaving an amended report at point C. The NPF would 
short-circuit this process of unravelling and present a report at point C from the start.
However, the outcome could be different if a faction at the NPF were able to 
mobilise sufficient support to present a minority report to the conference. This is 
difficult but not impossible. Given that half of the delegates at the party conference 
are now sent by CLPs, it might be expected to be easier nowadays for the conference 
to shift to the left. Thus, if there were propitious circumstances for a growth in 
support and recruits for the activist left, such as disillusionment with a Labour 
government, the mobilisation costs for the left at both the NPF and the conference 
could be lowered. A majority at the NPF would not be needed. Instead, if the left
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could mobilise 25 percent or 35 delegates at the NPF (whichever is the greater), it 
could secure a victory for a minority report. This could become more likely if the 
union members of the NPF mobilised against ministers. Shaw (2000b: 19) suggests 
that union members have already been acting as a caucus on the forum and have 
managed to win some concessions from the government. Consider Figure 5.5, which 
illustrates the problems a minority report can cause for the leadership:
Figure 5.5 NPF Minority Reports and the Party Conference
,N«« \  •  Ni
C •
Figure 5.5 is identical to Figure 5.4 except that it includes the bliss point of a ‘sizable 
minority’ in the NPF (point M), defined as a minority that is sufficiently big to issue a 
minority report. In this example, M is fairly close to C, so much so that virtually any 
point that it prefers to SQA is also preferred by the conference (the light and dark 
shaded regions). This is not so for the dominant coalition on the NPF, which shares 
with the minority only a few points preferred to SQA (the small dark shaded region 
only). Thus, the minority could even choose its own bliss point and see this defeat 
the majority NPF report at the conference. If this situation arose, we should expect to 
see negotiations between the dominant coalition at the NPF and the minority to 
secure agreement on a single report. However, if the minority is not satisfied with 
what is being offered, it can settle for a minority report and go for a conference 
victory. It would still, of course, be possible for a Labour government to ignore the 
policies demanded by the conference, as it has done in the past, because the 
conference and the NPF still do not have the ability to enforce their decisions against 
ministers. Yet this would return the party to the sort of confrontational situation the
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new policymaking structure was designed to avoid. This is one reason why reform of 
policymaking in the Labour Party has probably not finished yet. The sanctity of 
conference sovereignty and the possibility of voting on different proposals were 
issues that arose in the consultation process before the present reforms were 
implemented. The strength of feeling ensured that these concessions were granted 
but the new system leaves the party conference with little real work to do. In the 
future, if a situation similar to that depicted in Figure 5.5 were likely to develop, 
party leaders might try to raise the threshold for issuing minority reports or dilute the 
conference’s powers further, perhaps even seeking to abolish it as a decision-making 
body altogether, preserving it solely as a televised political rally.
As things stand, the limited veto power of the conference is one of the few 
mechanisms by which activists can hold the NPF and policy commissions to account. 
The multi-sectional membership and limited electorate of the NPF ensure that forum 
members have considerable discretion. Although the CLP section is the largest on the 
forum, its electorate consists only of conference delegates divided into regional 
groups. This is a small electorate and one whose personnel change from year to year, 
making mandating and accountability difficult to ensure (Seyd, 1999: 394; Shaw, 
2000b: 14). The other sections of the forum are also largely free of institutional 
checks. The major mechanism of control is the ex ante process of screening, i.e. 
choosing candidates whose preferences are believed to be known and desirable to the 
electors. It is possible that changes could come about in future years, e.g. OMOV to 
elect the CLP section. However, the weak lines of accountability from the NPF are 
not unique in the Labour Party. The same has often been true of both the conference 
and the NEC (Kavanagh, 1982).
The intention behind the new system was to make policymaking more 
efficient yet it is hard to escape the conclusion that a major aim of the exercise was to 
reduce voice costs for party leaders. Rows at the party conference made Labour look 
divided while providing the left with a televised platform from which to denounce 
the PLP. It also gave credence to the view that block vote-wielding unions were 
running the party. Both images were electorally damaging. By contrast, the 
conference is now stage-managed and its agenda is largely pre-determined, with less 
time available for set-piece debates. Policymaking has shifted to the NPF, the JPC
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and the policy commissions, whose proceedings are not televised and of little interest 
to outsiders. Consequently, voice costs have fallen considerably.
A common complaint against the new system is that it has centralised power, 
and that this was the underlying motive for reform. To some extent, this is beside the 
point because the new system, like the old, does not give the extraparliamentary 
party the means to enforce its decisions on the PLP. It is true that Labour ministers 
compromised with the unions on some issues at the 1999 conference in order to 
avoid defeat but the compromises were about avoiding the ‘embarrassment factor’ of 
a conference reverse, which would have been newsworthy as Blair’s first defeat at 
the conference as leader. If defeats became more regular, the government would 
probably ignore them in the manner of the Wilson governments.
Membership Referendums
The ideal of Labour’s modernisers was an OMOV-based party in which 
individual members were valued above union affiliates. However, while OMOV 
ballots are useful for electing candidates or leaders, their utility in policymaking is 
less evident. Policymaking involves discussion and negotiation, which is why it is 
usually decided in committees and voted upon at conferences. In the mid-1990s, 
however, Labour did engage in two experiments in membership referendums. In 
1995, Blair ordered a consultation exercise into reforming Clause IV of Labour’s 
constitution, its commitment to public ownership. Blair had hinted at his desire to 
reform Clause IV in his first leader’s speech at the 1994 conference but it became 
clear that there was considerable activist and union opposition to the move. A survey 
of CLPs found that 59 of 61 wanted to keep the old Clause IV, though these were the 
preferences of the activist-led GCs (Rentoul, 1995: 418). To bypass these activists, 
all individual members were sent a copy of the proposed new Clause IV and asked, 
‘Do you agree that this statement should be adopted in the Party rules as Labour’s 
new aims and values?’, with a simple yes/no choice. The members overwhelmingly 
supported the change (over 80 percent, though less than a third participated) and this 
was intended to pressurise delegates at the special conference of 1995 called to vote 
on Clause IV reform. Despite the unions controlling 70 percent of the votes, the 
conference adopted the new Clause IV by 65.23 percent to 34.77 percent (it gained a
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90-10 percent majority in the CLP section and 55-45 percent support in the union 
section) (Seyd, 1999: 389-90; Taylor, 1997: 179-85; Harmer, 1999: 27).
A second membership ballot was held in 1996 to gain grassroots support for 
Labour’s draft election manifesto. Members were sent a document setting out six 
fairly uncontentious and vague policy proposals, which were offered on a take-it-or- 
leave-it basis with no alternatives available and no amendments permitted. Members 
were asked to respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the statement: ‘I support Labour’s manifesto, 
New Labour new life for Britain’. Nearly 95 percent of members (on a 61 percent 
turnout) voted to accept the draft (Seyd, 1999: 390,402, n.6).
No further all-member ballots have thus far been held, though Labour’s 
constitution was amended in 1995 to make provision for them (Clause Vfflj). 
However, only the NEC can decide the issues on which to call ballots as well as the 
question wording. Party members have no rights to call referendums. Thus, the 
situation is similar to that depicted in Figure 5.1 except that instead of the conference 
wielding veto power, it is now the members. The important point here, as there, is the 
NEC’s agenda-control powers, which ensures it can choose a point guaranteed to 
secure backing (especially when the questions are vague). Providing that the NEC has 
not miscalculated the distribution of members’ preferences, membership ballots 
should prove unthreatening to party leaders; indeed, by generating a wider base of 
legitimacy for decisions, they can facilitate oligarchal control. However, they are 
costly to organise and do not involve much membership participation aside from 
casting a ballot. They are unlikely to become a regular feature of Labour’s 
policymaking structure and it is difficult to disagree with Seyd’s (1999: 399) 
assessment that the manifesto ballot was mainly a public relations exercise.
5.7 CONCLUSION
The main focus of reform of the policymaking structure has been on shifting 
power away from the old conference-based system of delegate democracy and NEC 
subcommittees towards structures in which the (shadow) cabinet plays the major role 
(especially the JPC). Under both Kinnock and Blair, policy reviews and the structures 
that came with them were used to ensure that policy was increasingly made by the 
leadership rather than the members (Smith, 2000: 152). The progressive diminution
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of the role of the party conference has greatly reduced the significance of union 
block votes, while the proceedings are now largely a set-piece occasion for speeches 
by ministers rather than ordinary delegates. Intraparty bargaining over policy now 
occurs in the NPF, though the most important strategic decisions are taken by the 
cabinet-dominated JPC. This integration of the PLP into policymaking is a principal 
change in this area since 1983 and has facilitated considerable centralisation, rather 
than PLP accountability to members. The same is true of the membership ballot on 
the draft 1997 election manifesto. An interesting aspect of this exercise was that it 
appeared to elevate referendums above the party conference, if not de jure then 
certainly de facto .13 The votes of hundreds of thousands of party members exude 
greater legitimacy than block votes and to that extent the referendum was another 
signal to the public (while Labour was in opposition) that it had changed.
However, as with other centralising measures, the risk remains that ordinary 
members will feel marginalised in the policymaking process and inclined to exit. 
This applies as much to the unions as to individuals. Although the unions have used 
the NPF to extract some concessions from the government, their overall lack of 
influence in the party and the dearth of policies delivered has led to an increasing 
number of union voices floating the idea of disaffiliation. The big test of Labour’s 
institutions over the next decade will be whether they provide members (individual 
and corporate) the opportunity to achieve their policy goals. If they do not, we are 
likely to see either continued exit (including union affiliates) or a new movement to 
decentralise power similar to that of the early 1980s, though that was achieved only 
after the fall of a Labour government. I address these issues in the final chapter.
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6 The Selection of Parliamentary 
Candidates
6.1 INTRODUCTION
A major way of institutionalising exchange between politicians and activists 
is through the allocation of rights to activists over parliamentary candidate selection. 
If activists can select candidates, they may be able to exert some control over 
politicians. Candidate selection is often a site of internal party struggle as politicians 
attempt to increase their autonomy from activists while the latter seek to reduce it. 
This has been true of Labour since the mid-1970s and was the initial motive for 
reform of the procedures in the 1980s. Voting rights were devolved downwards from 
activists to ordinary members while central veto powers were strengthened. Later, 
the changes evoked opposition from unions as Labour’s leaders sought to use reform 
of selection procedures to facilitate a ‘de-emphasis of the classe gardee\ as 
Kirchheimer put it (1966: 190), i.e. an erosion and eventual abolition of the unions’ 
voting rights in order to combat Labour’s image as a party of sectional interests.
This chapter is set out as follows. Section 6.2 describes Labour’s local 
organisational structure, since it is the CLPs that choose parliamentary candidates. 
Section 6.3 sets out the main stages of the selection process and 6.4 looks at the 
battle to reform the voting system. I examine the old activist-controlled system and 
the mechanics of the new OMOV system. Section 6.5 describes other changes to the 
selection procedures, such as nomination and shortlisting, while 6.6 considers the 
issue of union sponsorship and its eventual scrapping. In section 6 .7 ,1 conclude that 
like other changes during this period, those affecting candidate selection had the dual 
effects of diluting Labour’s federal structure and centralising power, despite the 
formal enfranchisement of individual members.
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6.2 LOCAL PARTY ORGANISATION
Each MP in the UK represents a geographical constituency and corresponding 
to each is a CLP. The CLPs institutionalise politician-activist exchange at the local 
level in the Labour Party, offering rank-and-file members, inter alia, the right to 
choose their own parliamentary candidates. However, the members face a number of 
problems, which must be overcome if the politician is to be adequately controlled or 
influenced.1 Information is required to monitor the MP’s performance so that 
reneging on promises can be detected. This demands more information than is 
available in the mass media so alternative sources must be found and the MP must be 
made to report back. If the MP is found lacking in some respect (in the members’ 
eyes), an alternative candidate will be required. Members need information about 
possible replacements, including information about their preferences and reputation.
CLPs have resources to assist members in these tasks but using them requires 
members to act collectively. Thus, information may be made available to committees 
and through the latter to other members, while the committees can take decisions on 
how to obtain and disseminate information. But committees need members, and in 
parties the members are not financially compensated. Normally, the problems in 
filling committees are easily overcome, as activists are interested in participating in 
them. Once formed, committees provide means of aggregating members’ preferences 
and are sites of factional conflict. They can behave as collective actors. In this 
section, I sketch the outlines of Labour’s local organisation as it existed in 1983.
CLPs are hybrid organisations combining features of the branch structure 
typical of mass parties and affiliated membership characteristic of indirect parties. 
They were formed in 1918 as Labour’s leaders realised they needed local structures 
to campaign during elections. Until then this function had been performed by local 
unions so the move to a network of CLPs enabled for the first time direct 
membership of the party. Since 1989, individuals have been able to join nationally 
after the party HQ introduced a computerised national membership list. The affiliated 
membership has always dwarfed the direct membership -  even when the latter was at 
its peak in the early 1950s, there were six times as many affiliated members. They 
were needed because campaigning techniques remained labour-intensive but Labour 
never relied on them to the same extent as other social democratic parties because the 
unions furnished the party with most of its finance and much of its personnel.
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Figure 6.1 Constituency Labour Party Structure
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Table 6.1 Powers and Responsibilities o f  General Committees (pre-1989)
• Select the CLP’s parliamentary candidate, including deselection o f existing MP if desired
• Decide which candidate to support in leadership and deputy leadership elections. Elect a delegate
to attend the meeting o f the electoral college and mandate her to vote for given candidate(s)
• Submit a resolution to the annual Labour Party conference
• Elect a delegate to attend the party conference and mandate her to vote for/against given policies
• Decide which candidates to support in the CLP section in NEC elections and mandate the CLP’s
annual conference delegate to vote for them
• Elect and hold accountable CLP officers (including the chairperson, secretary and treasurer)
• Hear monthly reports from the MP (if Labour)
• Hear monthly reports from the leader o f the local council (if  Labour)
• Receive national party documents including consultation documents
• Receive and debate correspondence from external organisations
Source: Richards (2000: 35). See this source for GC powers after 1997.
Each CLP consists of a number of ward branches and is run by a General 
Committee (GC), consisting of about 100 people, from which is drawn an Executive 
Committee (Figure 6.1). The branches within the CLP can send delegates to the GC, 
as can local affiliated unions and socialist societies. The GC and the executive 
coordinated local campaigns and decided upon a delegate to send to Labour’s annual 
conference, but the most important of a GC’s functions (until 1989) was to select the 
CLP’s parliamentary candidate (see Table 6.1). In a selection contest, GC delegates
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would vote in a secret ballot to determine the candidate. Local branches and unions 
could nominate candidates, union nominees being particularly attractive because the 
sponsoring union would provide election funds. Sitting MPs could be deselected if 
the local party so wished but this was a fraught process. After 1979, all MPs faced 
mandatory reselection contests between elections.
The GCs are essentially local oligarchies, consisting of committed activists. 
They stand above the mass of ordinary members, who play little role other than 
paying their annual subscriptions. The inactive members are atomised whereas the 
activists are in regular contact at branch or GC meetings, during election campaigns, 
etc. They enjoy social payoffs from their membership, e.g. friendship, mixing with 
like-minded people, etc. GCs provide them with an institutional shell that helps them 
to act collectively, though factional divisions exist.
Trade union branches that fall within the geographical reach of a given CLP 
may affiliate to it. As at the national level, they affiliate for a stated number of levy- 
paying union members, paying a sum of money to the party for each affiliated levy- 
payer. In return, they may send delegates to that local party’s GC. Their allocation of 
delegates depends on their affiliation level, being allowed one delegate for 1-100 
affiliated union members, two delegates for 101-200 members, three delegates for 
201-300 members, etc.2 A union branch could sometimes send delegates to the GC of 
more than one CLP. In industrial areas, GCs could be dominated by scores of union 
delegates representing a variety of unions.3 CLPs in mining areas were heavily 
dominated by delegates from the NUM. Generalist unions such as the TGWU and the 
GMB could send delegates to GCs in constituencies all over the country.
If a single union dominated a CLP or formed a large minority, it could often 
ensure the selection of one of its own officials as the parliamentary candidate. This 
was an important aspect of the party-union link. Securing union candidates as MPs 
can be more useful for the unions than the uncertain process of trying to get Labour 
governments to implement conference votes. This was the basis for the prevalent 
belief that regional union bosses were able to secure parliamentary seats for union 
candidates by packing selection meetings with delegates instructed how to vote. In 
theory, delegates benefited from the old informal rule of ‘no mandating’ in candidate 
selection contests; moreover, the vote was conducted by secret ballot. However, the 
low rate of activism in union affairs, let alone party affairs, by ordinary levypayers
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ensured regional organisers wielded considerable influence in these matters, securing 
places for their allies on GCs who functioned to all intents and purposes as a block 
vote. McSmith (1996: 46) claims, ‘[t]his practice was so common that it was barely 
remarked upon...’ (see also Ranney, 1965: 175; Rush, 1969: 159). That being so, it 
is not difficult to see why union leaders would later oppose OMOV.
6.3 POLITICAL EXCHANGE AND CANDIDATE SELECTION
Having set out some features of Labour’s local structure we can now examine 
the nature of exchange between members and politicians. Purposive incentives 
constitute a principal motivation for activists to become involved in political activity. 
A major way in which they could express their ideological preferences was through 
the selection of their CLP’s parliamentary candidate. They would not have a free rein 
over this because they would need to be mindful of the electoral balance within their 
constituencies as well as that in the country at large. Thus, MPs in marginal seats 
might be expected on average to be more centrist than those in safe seats because the 
main parties are closer in terms of electoral support (though there are normally many 
exceptions to this ‘rule’). A leftwing candidate in a marginal seat might not attract 
the support of the crucial swing voters. Local parties must take account of such 
factors because they prefer winning seats to losing them (Tsebelis, 1990). Activists, 
like unions, are constrained policy-seekers.
However, most parliamentary seats are safe so the incumbent party could win 
them with almost any candidate.4 Thus, CLPs can choose candidates that represent 
their views, even if they are leftwing. In general elections, the media spotlight is 
unlikely to be shone on individual candidates because national issues predominate. In 
by-elections, which can become nationalised in their importance, there may be 
intense media interest in candidates. This was why Labour set up an NEC by-election 
panel in 1989 (see below). But general elections offered leftwing candidates the 
chance to slip through the net. If this happened on a concerted scale, it could tip the 
political balance within the PLP and lead to changes in policy.
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Figure 6.2 Candidate Selection Screens
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The selection of candidates is a multi-stage process in which a series of filters 
produces candidates who enjoy the support of CLPs and the NEC. Figure 6.2 depicts 
the process as a series of six screens (the first five being intraparty filters, the sixth 
consisting of selected candidates fighting elections) that prospective parliamentary 
candidates (PPCs) must negotiate, with each successive stage reducing the number of 
applicants. Different groups may control different stages and reform of candidate 
selection may involve procedural changes to any of the five internal screens. The 
first screen is a rule establishing eligibility to be a candidate. In the Labour Party the 
basic requirement is that PPCs must have been party members for at least two years -  
a fairly easy obstacle to surmount. Some parties have more exacting requirements, 
while in others the hurdles are lower: in some states in the USA, every voter can 
stand as a party candidate (see Rahat and Hazan, 2001: 300-1). Aspiring PPCs could 
either apply directly in writing to CLP secretaries or wait to be approached by a 
nominating body within the CLP -  any ward party or affiliated body (trade union, 
socialist society, women’s section or Cooperative Party), with each branch permitted 
to nominate one candidate. Direct applicants would have their details circulated to
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the branches. Until 1993, most applicants were streamed into different lists, which 
were sent on request by the NEC to CLPs.5 These included nominees the unions were 
willing to sponsor (list A), those nominated by CLPs (list B), and names submitted by 
the Cooperative Party (list C). From 1988, a list W of women nominees was also 
available. Names that did not appear on a list could also be nominated.
List A candidates enjoyed a distinct advantage because they brought with 
them union money. Unions could contribute up to 80 percent of a sponsored 
candidate’s election expenses and up to £750 a year to the CLP (Norris and 
Lovenduski, 1995: 57). I look in more detail at union sponsorship in section 6.6. List 
B candidates had no such attraction for CLPs, consisting of candidates of varying 
quality who brought no promises of financial or personnel assistance to CLPs. 
Moreover, there was little preliminary screening for list B candidates so virtually any 
eligible party member could join the list, and a candidate’s inclusion on list B was no 
guarantee of NEC endorsement. In short, list B was a catch-all list of individuals 
hoping to secure an offer. Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 57) report that while about 
180 individuals appeared on list A, about 650 were on list B. List C, of candidates 
sponsored by the Cooperative Party, contained the names of about 100 party 
members and inclusion on it required the negotiation of Cooperative Party screening 
procedures. List W contained all women candidates who appeared on lists A, B and 
C and involved no further screening mechanisms (save the fact that they had to be 
women!). The list of eligible candidates was thus very large though the vast majority 
of actual applicants were on a list.
The next stage in the process is nomination. The actors in control of this 
second screen are the members of local branches. Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 62) 
estimate that each CLP contains on average about twenty-three nominating bodies 
(with an average 13 union branches and seven party ward branches), each of which 
could nominate one candidate. Attendance at branch meetings could vary immensely, 
ranging from less than a dozen up to fifty (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995: 63). 
Branches typically interview applicants seeking their nomination and here 
ideological and policy preference filters normally come into play, though not all 
nominees are interviewed, particularly if they are well-known by the local elite. 
Cultivating local links could build up a large number of nominations for a candidate 
and improve her chances of progressing through later stages. This may be important
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in winnable seats, where the supply of applicants may be high. Local councillors and 
union officials (in CLPs with a big union presence) are often advantaged here. In 
unwinnable seats, where there are few applicants, the nomination process may be 
straightforward -  with only a handful of applicants, they may all make the shortlist.
After nomination, the CLP’s Executive Committee (EC) would draw up a 
shortlist (since 1993, the GC has compiled the shortlist). Shortlists would need to 
include at least four or five candidates (where there was no incumbent Labour MP) 
but could include more. If there were many nominees, a series of ballots would 
determine who appeared on the shortlist though the choice of the EC (later, GC) was 
constrained. In reselection contests the sitting MP must be included on the shortlist. 
Occasionally, shortlists of one emerged, particularly where the MP was established. 
From 1987, at least one woman had to appear on the shortlist unless no women were 
nominated. Any candidate receiving a quarter of all nominations (including one from 
a ward branch) had to be included on the shortlist. Before this rule was introduced it 
sometimes arose that a candidate could win half of all nominations but not make it 
onto the shortlist due to internal rivalries. Candidates with heavy union backing 
could qualify for the shortlist automatically only if they received support from at 
least one ward branch, otherwise they too had to await the decision of the shortlisting 
meeting. After the EC’s decision, the GC could vote to approve or amend the shortlist 
but in 1993 the balloting procedure for drawing up shortlists was thrown open to the 
entire GC, improving openness. Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 63-4) conclude:
[S]ince there is no requirement for interviews, no set application 
form, and no written report from branch interviews, the process of 
evaluating nominees is not standardised. It seems likely that unless 
contestants are already known to the executive, have union 
sponsorship, or fall into one of the above categories [i.e. those 
contestants shortlisted by right], they stand little chance.
CLP activists thus had considerable opportunities to filter out candidates. However, a 
trend before the 1997 and 2001 general elections was the retirement of some MPs in 
safe seats on the eve of the campaign. In these cases, the NEC was often able to 
impose a shortlist, usually with the purpose of including certain favoured candidates, 
though there was no guarantee that these favourites would win the OMOV ballot.
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The fourth stage of the process -  selection -  has been the focus of the most 
contested reforms since 1983. Before 1989, GCs chose candidates in secret ballots. 
After that, various schemes involving OMOV were used, including local electoral 
colleges until 1992, a provision for levypaying trade unionists from 1992-3 and 
finally straight OMOV from 1993 onwards. I discuss the selection screen shortly. The 
final stage in the process is a central party screen whereby all selected candidates 
required endorsement by the NEC. Often, this was automatic though the NEC has 
sometimes stepped in, e.g. when it refused to endorse Liz Davies in Leeds North East 
(see below). The numerous changes to the selection procedure are discussed in 
sections 6.4-5. The most important reforms relate to the fourth screen, selection, and 
are the subject of the next section.
6.4 SELECTION IN THE LABOUR PARTY
The fourth stage of the selection process involves voting on the shortlisted 
candidates and has been the target of the most contested reforms in the Labour Party. 
The debate concerned the identity of the selectorate choosing the final candidate, 
with a long leadership attempt to wrest control of selection from the GCs and permit 
all individual members a right to vote in OMOV ballots. I turn to that shortly. Before 
that, it is useful to have a simple model of the selection process in the pre-OMOV era. 
Tsebelis (1990) has modelled the re/deselection process for sitting Labour MPs as 
part of an attempt to explain why CLPs chose electorally unpopular candidates in the 
1970s (I do not consider that issue here). He presents re/deselection as a game 
between a sitting MP and a leftwing GC, with the NEC possessing veto power. 
Although this model ignores seats where there is no Labour MP, it arguably looks at 
the most important selection scenario because deselection of incumbent MPs was the 
initial spur for moves towards OMOV. This game is depicted in Figure 6.3.6
In this game, the MP chooses to be moderate (rightwing in Labour Party 
terms) or radical (leftwing) and the GC then decides whether to reselect or deselect 
her. The NEC can affirm or veto the GC’s decision. Tsebelis claims the use of the 
NEC veto depends on the executive’s political composition: if it is leftwing, it will 
not veto the deselection of rightwing MPs but if it is rightwing it will. Similarly, the 
GC, which Tsebelis assumes is always leftwing (I return to this assumption shortly),
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will not deselect rightwing MPs if it knows the NEC will use its veto. For the most 
part, according to Tsebelis, GCs deselect MPs only if the NEC is also leftwing.7 GCs 
choose leftwing candidates mainly in safe Labour or safe Conservative seats because 
the choice of candidate is unlikely to affect the result but in marginal seats they 
prefer moderate winners to extreme losers (Tsebelis, 1990: 131-2).
Figure 6.3 Model o f Reselection/Deselection ofMP
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This is a pared-down account of the selection process but its interest lies in 
the strategic relationship it posits between MPs, GCs and the NEC. Its focus on 
ideology leaves out other considerations that affect GCs’ decisions during reselection 
contests, such as the overall performance of the MP (e.g. in fulfilling his constituency 
duties). Nevertheless, I retain this focus on ideology because: (a) it sits well with my 
assumptions about intraparty exchange; and (b) the major purpose behind mandatory 
reselection and OMOV was ideological (the first to make it easier for leftwing
Q
activists to control the PLP, the second to make it harder). As an approximation of 
the reselection process this model is quite useful. It might be objected that 
empirically it is suspect because few MPs were deselected and even fewer decisions 
were vetoed by the NEC. Mandatory reselection resulted in the deselection of only 
eight MPs before the 1983 general election though several more might have gone had 
they not defected to the SDP (Seyd, 1987: 129-31). However, it is likely that an even 
greater but unquantifiable number toed the line with their GCs for fear of being
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deselected -  a power need not be exercised to be effective (Tsebelis, 1990: 150; 
Williams, 1983: 45).9 The early-mid 1980s was a time when many Labour MPs took 
seriously the possibility of deselection (McSmith, 1996: 38-9). The existence of the 
rules permitting deselection is sufficient to justify depicting the GC-MP relationship 
as a strategic one.
However, a couple of points are in order. First, Tsebelis understates the 
autonomy GCs enjoyed relative to the NEC. He believes the NEC could veto any 
deselection and reject GCs’ preferred candidates if the latter were politically 
unacceptable. This is indeed the case when a candidate is chosen for a vacant seat, a 
recent example being the NEC’s refusal to endorse the leftist Liz Davies in Leeds NE 
in 1995. But insofar as the deselection of sitting MPs is concerned, the adoption of 
the so-called ‘Mikardo doctrine’ first as NEC policy from 1974 and then as an 
official rule in 1978 narrowed the grounds on which the NEC could intervene (Shaw, 
1988: 185-94). This rule gave deselected MPs ‘the right to appeal to the National 
Executive Committee on the grounds, and only on the grounds, that the procedure 
laid down in these rules and the general provision of the constitution and rules have 
not been carried out’ (Labour Party, 1978: Clause XEV.7c. Emphasis added). This 
appears to rule out intervention on political grounds and thus enhanced the power of 
GCs. Deselected MPs could no longer rely on the NEC to save them unless they 
demonstrated procedural irregularities.
However, the NEC can decide how seriously it takes claims o f procedural 
errors. According to McCormick (1980: 385), such errors are bound to occur 
frequently in voluntary organisations such as parties, where those taking decisions 
are not paid professionals with a great understanding of legal and constitutional 
issues. McCormick suggests that if a determined NEC wanted to save an MP from 
deselection, ‘there is never any difficulty in finding an irregularity should one be 
required’. This appeared to be the lesson of the Frank Field affair. Field was an MP 
who found himself deselected by his Birkenhead CLP in favour of a leftist in 1989. 
After his deselection, Field sent a dossier of allegations to the NEC, most centring on 
Militant infiltration of his constituency as well as irregularities in affiliated unions 
concerning voter eligibility. The NEC launched an inquiry into the regional Wirral 
Labour Party but despite finding no evidence of irregularities it ordered a re-run 
ballot because it accepted that six members of Birkenhead CLP were Militant
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supporters (they were subsequently expelled). Field narrowly won the re-run ballot in 
1991. Counter-allegations of irregularities were made by Field’s main opponent but 
the NEC dismissed them (Heffeman and Marqusee, 1992: 271-7). Despite the 
adoption of the Mikardo doctrine, there remained scope for the centre to impose its 
will. Nevertheless, this rule does impose constraints and opportunity costs on the 
NEC because the search for irregularities entails establishing investigative 
committees. A political veto would circumvent such problems.
A second point about Tsebelis’s model is that he understates the effect of 
mandatory reselection on the selection process, yet this rule was vitally important.
[Mandatory reselection] makes the reselection of the MP the rule 
rather than the exception, as it had been before. Before, the GMC 
[i.e. the GC] had to mobilize against its MP; now the MP requires 
the support of the GMC. Before, the GMC needed to provide the 
NEC with reasons for not readopting its MP. No such reasons are 
required now. Therefore, this formula dramatically reduces the 
costs of rejecting the MP (Tsebelis, 1990: 149).
However, according to Tsebelis, this simply modified the reselection game in the 
middle of the process and did not alter the NEC veto, so the major factor is the 
political composition of the NEC (Tsebelis 1990: 151). Yet not only does this ignore 
the impact of the ‘Mikardo doctrine’, it also fails to consider the totality of NEC-GC 
conflicts. Even if the NEC were inclined to intervene and look for procedural 
irregularities, it would face serious problems if many, perhaps dozens of cases 
emerged simultaneously. The NEC would be overwhelmed by the task and face high 
opportunity costs in focusing on selection disputes. Mandatory reselection vastly 
increased the likelihood of numerous GCs simultaneously attempting to deselect their 
MPs. Only if we bear these points in mind, can Tsebelis’s model provide a useful 
schematic approximation of the re/deselection process before OMOV.
How serious, then, was the threat posed by leftwing GCs to centrist MPs? For 
much of Labour’s history, relations between GCs and MPs were fairly sedate, 
shrouded in an air of deference. Until the 1960s, most Labour activists were working 
class and moderate, posing little threat to MPs (Tanner, 2000). Furthermore, GCs 
were often dominated by union delegates instructed how to vote, despite the rule of 
‘no mandating’. Most GCs were concerned to leave the MP to Westminster business
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while they engaged in local affairs. However, this relationship changed in the 1970s 
as a new generation of leftwing activists joined the party. Labour’s individual 
membership had been falling steadily since the war as party membership generally 
held fewer social attractions for individuals, but the party haemorrhaged older, 
working class members in the 1970s in the wake of the unpopular policies of Labour 
governments. Membership decline left many CLPs as little more than organisational 
shells ripe for take-over by newcomers. At the same time, a generation of young, 
university-educated activists radicalised by the 1960s and largely working in a public 
sector wracked by industrial militancy increasingly saw the Labour Party as a means 
to further their ideological goals (Seyd, 1987: 44-7; Koelble, 1991). These members 
were less respectful of older Labour traditions, such as deference to MPs, and they 
were now assuming greater importance and weight within CLPs.
Labour’s federal structure enabled this new left to assume local power. 
Within a given CLP, each ward branch was entitled to a minimum of three GC 
delegates, possibly more depending on membership levels. This could easily mean a 
number of wards with low memberships could outvote on the GC wards that 
collectively had higher individual memberships because what mattered was numbers 
of delegates, not individual members (see McSmith, 1996: 42-3 for an illustrative 
example in Liverpool Knowsley North in the 1980s). Given Labour’s state of 
organisational decay at the time, only a small number of leftists would be required to 
capture wards, and after that CLPs. Consequently, many areas became prone to 
‘entryism’ -  organised groups of the far left, such as the Militant Tendency, 
infiltrating ward branches and CLPs and capturing them (Seyd, 1987: 50-4). This was 
achieved most clearly in Liverpool, where Militant controlled the local council and a 
number of CLPs. One way of taking over CLPs, particularly in university towns, was 
by mobilising the ‘bed-sit left’, in which small numbers of young people sharing a 
handful of addresses in a constituency, would join the local Labour Party and take 
over ward branches, from where they could elect GC delegates. Once a local party 
was captured, the ‘bed-sit left’ could move on to the next constituency.
From the mid-1980s, entryist groups came under fierce attack by Neil 
Kinnock, with a spate of investigations and expulsions (including two MPs, Dave 
Nellist and Terry Fields). However, many leftwing activists remained members of 
the party and continued to dominate its local structures. A comprehensive study of
167
Labour members published in 1992 (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992) confirmed a 
correlation between ideology and activism (Table 6.2). Lending support to May’s 
law, the survey found the hard left over-represented among very active party 
members and under-represented among inactive members.10 Since the GCs include 
many activists, we can conclude that the left was well-represented on the GCs.
Table 6.2 Ideology and Activism in the Labour Party (percentages)
Inactive Occasionallyactive active J J
All members 14 29 34 24
Intraparty L-R scale
Hard left (17) 10 24 34 32
Soft left (41) 10 29 35 27
Centre (20) 15 32 32 21
Soft right (13) 14 33 35 18
Hard right (9) 29 27 28 16
Source: Seyd and Whiteley (1992: 101).
Although the new left’s star waned in the 1980s, one of its legacies was the 
new rule on the mandatory reselection. If the activists were largely leftwing, then 
centrist MPs were vulnerable to deselection. Given the shift to the left on the NEC, 
deselected MPs could not hold out much hope for saviour. After Labour’s general 
election defeat of 1983, Kinnock was besieged by anxious MPs voicing a fear 
widespread in the PLP that mandatory reselection would lead to a cull of ‘moderate’ 
MPs (McSmith, 1996: 38-9). Many MPs wanted mandatory reselection abolished but 
given the continued strength of the left this was never feasible. Seeking to reverse 
mandatory reselection would have gone against the grain of this increased role for 
the CLPs and reignited the civil war in the party that Kinnock’s accession to the 
leadership was supposed to have ended. Besides, the absence of mandatory 
reselection contests would not in itself end the possibility of deselection, as the 
experience of the 1970s showed. Strengthening the NEC’s veto power was not, at this 
point, a viable option either, though it would become so in the following years. In the 
aftermath of a grassroots insurgency, a brazen act of centralisation would have been 
divisive. On the other hand, doing nothing was not feasible either, given the 
enormous unease in the PLP.
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This narrowed Kinnock’s range of options. However, there was an 
alternative, which had been advocated by David Owen before he left the Labour 
Party in 1981. This was to undermine the leftwing cliques on the GCs by opening up 
selection meetings to all party members in the form of OMOV. The assumption was 
that the inactive members comprised a large majority of the membership and were 
overwhelmingly moderate in their opinions. (Table 6.2 provides some evidence for 
this view.) OMOV went with the grain of increased powers for the CLPs though it 
would involve the creation of a unitary structure and the dismantling of the federal 
structure that had provided such favourable opportunities for the left. This was how a 
decade-long assault on Labour’s federal structure began. At this stage, it was not 
seen by its proponents as the precursor to an attack on the party-union link but 
instead a necessary measure to redistribute power away from left-dominated party 
organs in order to help improve Labour’s electoral performance. However, 
opposition was already forming and it is to the battle for OMOV that I now turn.
The Road to OMOV
At the 1984 party conference, Kinnock and his allies advanced a resolution 
calling for the introduction of OMOV for candidate selection on a voluntary basis in 
CLPs where there was a sitting Labour MP. This was designed to allay the fears of 
the soft left that he wished to attack the activists, though some felt OMOV would 
inevitably have to be used in any deselection otherwise the media would pillory the 
party (McSmith, 1996: 45). The resolution was narrowly defeated by the block votes 
of the CLPs and leftwing unions, with 3,041,000 votes in favour and 3,992,000 
against (Labour Party, 1985: 66; see also Minkin, 1992: 273, n.30). Rightwing 
unions supported OMOV because they saw it as a check on the CLP left. Apart from 
the lack of consultation by the leadership and the potential divisiveness of the issue 
just three years after the constitutional crisis, there were three major criticisms. First, 
it would drastically downgrade the GCs, which were the only bodies that could 
systematically monitor MPs. Following from this, the use of postal ballots would 
dilute participatory democracy and allow the media to function as an intermediary 
between ‘ordinary’ members and the leadership (Labour Party, 1985: 59-63). Finally, 
OMOV would weaken the party-union link. However, since most rightwing unions 
were also committed to the link yet voted for OMOV, this argument loses some force.
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The three-year rule on constitutional amendments prohibited a return to the 
issue at the party conference until 1987. By then, hostility had risen, as union leaders 
became aware of its potential consequences for their own local power (see Labour 
Party, 1988: 16-23). A straight vote on OMOV would have been defeated so Kinnock 
offered a compromise. A local electoral college was proposed, giving locally 
affiliated unions a maximum of 40 percent of the votes in selection contests, with the 
remaining votes going to individual members, who would vote on the basis of one 
member, one vote. The unions accepted this compromise and the system was used 
for selections before the 1992 general election. The system removed selection from 
GCs, though the number of union delegates on GCs remained important. The 
proportion of a local electoral college taken by the unions was determined by the 
proportion of delegates they controlled on relevant GC. Where this latter figure was 
greater than 40 percent, the unions’ votes were re-weighted so that they took a 
maximum of 40 percent of the college. Affiliated organisations claimed the full 40 
percent allocation in half of reselections and two-thirds of open contests in Labour- 
held seats (Lovenduski and Norris, 1991: 198-9). The remainder of the college (a 
minimum of 60 percent) was allocated to individual members attending the selection 
meeting and any postal voters, irrespective of turnout. Affiliates voted on postal 
ballots and were free to choose whether or not they held membership ballots.
One of the problems that emerged was that candidates could win majorities in 
the OMOV ballots but not gain sufficient union votes and thereby lose. This occurred 
in at least five contests, three of which the NEC ordered to be re-run. Alternatively, 
candidates could be successfully chosen despite failing to win majority support 
among individual members -  again, this occurred at least five times (McSmith, 1996: 
47-8). Either of these outcomes raises questions about the legitimacy of the adopted 
candidate. It also illustrated that, as in the electoral college for leadership contests, 
the unions’ 40 percent allocation in no way placed them in a subordinate position. If 
the votes were cast as a block, a small proportion of individual members’ votes could 
be enough to determine the contest; as one selector, cited by Lovenduski and Norris 
(1994: 205), exclaimed, ‘think of what can be done with a 40 per cent shareholding!’.
The legitimacy of outcomes was even more questionable when there were 
allegations of irregularities. OMOV was strictly applied to individual party members 
but not to the unions where decision-making procedures were non-uniform and did
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not guarantee involvement by the mass of levypayers (Minkin, 1992: 247; Alderman 
and Carter, 1994: 325). On the contrary, in centralised unions such as the GMB and 
the EETPU, voting rights shifted from branch delegates to central or regional union 
officials (Shaw, 1994: 235, n.14), with unions’ branch vote allocations effectively 
wielded as block votes. The system was susceptible to manipulation, with allegations 
that some candidates paid union membership fees for people who would then be 
made GC delegates, boosting the strength of some unions in local electoral colleges. 
Similar allegations were made of some GMB and EETPU branches in Birmingham 
(see McSmith, 1996: 218-22; Heffeman and Marqusee, 1992: 153-5). The unwieldy 
nature of the system and its susceptibility to fraud led to its abandonment in 1990.
That same year a pure OMOV system was proposed but again, a compromise 
had to be sought. CLPs could choose to use straight OMOV or allow the participation 
of levypayers, whose individual votes would be worth only one-third of those of full 
party members. It was another short-lived compromise that pleased no one though it 
spelt the end for delegatory union influence in selection and marked a dilution of 
federalism. However, only the most active union members would likely use this 
opportunity so the possibility of organised cliques influencing contests remained.
After the election defeat of 1992, Smith became leader and established a 
review group to assess the party-union link (see Chapter 7). Its interim report listed 
five different options for candidate selection (Labour Party, 1993a) but Smith’s 
preference was for pure OMOV. At the 1993 party conference, Smith put his 
reputation on the line and asked the conference to support a move to a full OMOV 
system. Amid much acrimony, delegates voted by 47.5 percent to 44.4 percent to 
adopt the new system. As a consolation, union levypayers would be allowed to join 
the party at a reduced rate, under a new scheme called ‘levy-plus’ (see Alderman and 
Carter, 1994; Rentoul, 1995: 308-49; Labour Party, 1994). However, the unions were 
deprived of collective input in selection contests.
Why did the unions fight so hard to retain their influence in candidate 
selection? Quite simply, they were motivated by ‘a fear that what was being 
proposed might be the thin end of the wedge of separation’ which in turn 
‘strengthened opposition in some major unions to the breaking of the federal 
arrangements’ (Minkin, 1992: 381). Many in the unions felt that the introduction of 
OMOV would erode this grassroots link. I described earlier how the horizontal
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relations between activists through branches and the GC enabled them to become a 
collective actor. This is also true of the union delegates on the GC, who would 
discuss with other union officials their candidate preferences, etc., so that the unions 
had a definite input into the proceedings of the GC. Allowing levypayers to 
participate was the extension of OM O V to the unions and would have drastically 
altered the unions’ role because levypayers would face similar coordination problems 
to those of party members. In the event, the system was never implemented since 
pure O M O V  was introduced in 1 9 9 3 . Therefore, whilst the unions can still send 
delegates to the GC, the latter has had its powers emasculated. One caveat is that 
union influence may not have completely ended, even under O M O V . It has been 
suggested unions can swing the result of selection meetings if they turn enough 
levypayers into full party members. In CLPs with low memberships, the seat could 
allegedly be ‘bought’ by a union for as little as £1,000 (Alderman and Carter, 1 9 9 4 :  
3 3 3 ) .  O M O V  started out as a straightforward redistributive measure designed to 
undermine the activist left but it ended up being the dividing issue in a new cleavage 
between modernisers and traditionalists. I have more to say about this in Chapter 7. 
In the remainder of section 6 .4 ,  I focus mainly on the allegation that O M O V  has 
provided cover for a considerable centralisation of power.
Characteristics of OMOV
Labour’s shift to OMOV conforms with a trend that is increasingly prevalent 
in contemporary parties, whereby voting rights in candidate selection have been 
extended from a core of activists and party functionaries to inactive and moderate 
members.11 Although this trend is not universal (Pennings and Hazan, 2001: 268-9), 
it is characteristic of a growing number of parties, particularly those that have 
experienced electoral decline (Bille, 2001: 363-80). Explanations for this trend focus 
on changes in the nature of party competition and the shift towards ‘cartel party’ 
structures. According to Katz (2001: 282-90), selection procedures reflect the 
relationship between the ‘party on the ground’ and the ‘party in public office’. In the 
era of the mass parties, the party on the ground took primacy over the party in office 
as the emphasis was on mobilising the social group the party represented, which 
necessitated selective incentives for activism -  hence, mass parties allowed activists 
to choose candidates. By contrast, catch-all and cartel parties view activists and the
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party on the ground as a convenient support system for office-seeking politicians in 
an era of class dealignment and capital-intensive communications technologies. 
Giving activists control over selection could result in extreme candidates. It thus 
became imperative to loosen activist control but disenfranchising activists would go 
against the grain of ‘democratisation’ and could lead to membership exit. Instead, 
politicians can ‘decapitate’ the party on the ground covertly, by letting all members 
participate in postal ballots, so they remain disorganised and pliable (Katz, 2001: 
290). At the same time, politicians retain the right to limit members’ choices through 
ex ante and ex post powers.
This focus on the electoral imperative for organisational change chimes with 
the present thesis. The initial purpose of OMOV was to undermine the left. Only GC 
delegates had been allowed to vote in selection contests, ensuring the left remained 
an important influence in the CLPs. But this system meant those ordinary party 
members who did not attend meetings had no say over the PPC. Table 6.2 showed 
that the least active members are more likely to be politically ‘moderate’. If these 
members were to be enfranchised, there should be less pressure on centre-right MPs. 
Figure 6.4 depicts the ideological difference between the median GC delegate and the 
median CLP member, and their distances from the median voter. The top panel 
illustrates the aggregate distribution of all voters’ preferences, with MV being the 
median voter. The lower two panels depict the preferences of Labour activists and all 
members. Point A marks the median activist (meaning the median GC delegate) and 
point B is the median member in general. I assume the Conservatives capture all 
votes to the right of MV. Ordinary members are more ‘moderate’ than the leftwing 
activists but not even the median member is very close to MV because all members 
and activists are recruited from one side of MV. This must be so otherwise it would 
not be rational for them to join the party (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985: 41-2). 
Table 6.2 confirms that the median Labour member is ‘soft left’. Seyd and Whiteley 
(1992: 211-18) also show that Labour members are generally to the left of Labour 
voters on most issues but note that this is a different argument from that illustrated in 
Figure 6.4. The comparison between the policy preferences of a party’s activists or 
members and its median partisan supporter usually underpins empirical tests of 
May’s law but what really matters for a party in a two-party system is the 
comparison of activists’ preferences with those of the median voter overall.
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Figure 6.4 Distribution o f Preferences o f Voters, and Labour Members and Activists
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One possible conclusion is that a move to OMOV should increase the number 
of soft left MPs and reduce the number of hard left PPCs. This was the initial theory 
underlying OMOV and no doubt explains why it was mooted by Labour rightwingers 
before they left to form the SDP. Unlike mandatory reselection, OMOV would create a 
new, more moderate class of voting principals in the CLPs. Yet even moderate 
Labour members are more leftwing than the voters so there were limits to how much 
actual ideological dilution OMOV could cause. However, its effects were greater than 
that because it also impacted on the mobilisation costs of the left. There are 
important qualitative differences between activists and passive members. Activists 
tend to know one another because they are in regular contact whereas ordinary 
members, who never or only rarely attend meetings, know few people in the CLP. 
Whereas activists can organise collective action, inactive members are atomised. 
Participating in an OMOV ballot, particularly a postal one, is qualitatively different 
from engaging in delegatory decision-making. Delegates can bargain with each other 
and do deals, as well as coordinate tactics. They can use the resources of the GC to
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monitor the performance of their MP in the House of Commons, and this may affect 
the MP’s behaviour. Through the GC they enjoy low communication costs with the 
MP and can easily impress their views on her. They can raise issues o f importance 
with the MP, who can them raise them publicly, whether they are constituency issues, 
union matters, or whatever. They can also make threats to the MP if they so wish, 
holding out the possibility of deselection if they are unhappy with her performance.
Although these transaction costs are not low, they are higher under OMOV 
because passive members do not benefit from the power of collectivity. To see why, 
it is instructive to consider Hirschman’s (1986) distinction between horizontal and 
vertical ‘voice’. Horizontal voice consists of ‘the utterance and exchange of opinion, 
concern, and criticism among citizens’ and is normally low-cost since everyday 
grumbling is not subject to the free-rider problem. By contrast, vertical voice is an 
‘actual communication, complaint, petition, or protest addressed to the authorities by 
a citizen or, more frequently, an organization representing a group of citizens’. 
Importantly, ‘[hjorizontal voice is a necessary precondition for the mobilization of 
vertical voice’ (Hirschman, 1986: 82). This is particularly so when vertical voice is 
high-cost and requires the overcoming of a collective action problem. The contrast 
between vertical and horizontal voice is particularly relevant when comparing OMOV 
with the old GC system of candidate selection. One of the characteristics of an 
atomised membership is that voice takes longer to make itself heard in the party and 
may not even be heard at all. Voice generally begins horizontally, as members 
grumble among themselves about this policy or that decision, and once it attains a 
critical mass or is detected by an interested politician, it can ascend vertically up 
through the party. However, in an atomised membership, horizontal voice has few 
roots because members are almost never in contact. Ipso facto , vertical voice is less 
likely as opposition is dispersed and the position of the politicians becomes much 
safer vis-a-vis the members. This explains the phenomenon of party democratisation 
going hand-in-glove with a growing centralisation of power (e.g. Mair, 1997: 149- 
50; Webb, 1994: 120; Shaw, 2000b). This effect of OMOV on politicians’ autonomy 
has been greater than the impact of enfranchising ‘moderate’ members.
Following from this, a host of other problems emerge. Communication costs 
are higher as ordinary members find it difficult to gain access to the MP. Monitoring 
costs are higher because members obtain information about the MP from the media.
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Even the local media are unlikely to provide sufficient information for monitoring 
purposes. Carrying out a deselection threat is likely to be problematical because it 
will involve mobilising ordinary members against the MP, but if these members are 
centre-left, they may be suspicious of initiatives that come from hard left activists.
Candidate selections undertaken by OMOV ballots involve a special selection 
meeting, which selectors must attend. Postal ballots can sometimes be arranged if 
members are unable to attend the meeting. But even at such meetings, members are 
largely unable to bargain with each other or coordinate their actions. Although they 
can vote, they are simply giving their preferences on candidates they may know little 
about. Access to information is constrained since they are not party functionaries and 
are hardly ever in contact with those that are. They depend for their information on 
party literature sent to their homes by the local or national party, or, most often, on 
reports in the media. The latter usually concerns national party issues and deals with 
well-known national personalities so there is little chance that members can use it to 
monitor their MPs. When ordinary members are asked to vote for candidates in NEC 
elections or other elections, their information consists of the brief self-descriptions of 
the candidates sent with ballot papers. In short, compared to activists, ordinary 
members face higher coordination and information costs. MPs would seem to face 
fewer constraints under OMOV than they did under the old system of GC control.
Some observers of the Labour Party regard OMOV as almost purely about 
centralisation (Shaw, 2000b). Yet there must be more to it than that -  as evidenced 
by the fact that the left has enjoyed some success in the CLP section of NEC elections 
in recent years. For the centralising party leader the problem with giving party 
members votes is that they may take their voting rights seriously and choose 
candidates not favoured by the centre. Enfranchising inactive members may have 
different consequences from allowing local elites to take decisions. Think back to the 
pre-OMOV candidate selection game, where disgruntled activists seeking to deselect 
MPs had to weigh up the risk of facing sanctions (perhaps on spurious procedural 
grounds), which might include expulsions and the annulment of the contest. Given 
that the selectors would be GC delegates in close communication with each other, 
they would be easy to identify by an NEC ‘hit squad’. It may thus be rational for the 
NEC to develop a reputation for toughness, as Kinnock’s NEC did in the 1980s, in 
order to signal to local elites that sanctions await deselectors.
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Under OMOV things are different. While inactive members face informational 
and coordination problems, giving them voting rights eases some mobilisation 
problems by providing them with the means to hold politicians to account without 
the need for low-level horizontal voice. If there is more than one name on the ballot, 
the result is uncertain. Passive members are unlikely to be dissuaded from 
deselecting an MP out of fear of an NEC ‘hit squad’ descending on the area because 
they are either unaware of the NEC’s powers or feel they have little to fear. NEC 
signalling games are less likely to be effective when the voters are inactive members.
Mandatory reselection is crucial. Selection contests involving members who 
are unafraid or unaware of NEC intervention might lead to numerous deselections. 
Thus, it is little surprise that OMOV was accompanied by a tightening of other 
selection screens. Mandatory reselection was effectively abandoned when the 1990 
party conference decided to introduce a ‘trigger mechanism’ into the procedure so 
that reselection contests should take place only if a prior ballot of CLP members 
desired it (Gamer and Kelly, 1998: 131). This trigger favoured incumbents by 
increasing the mobilisation costs of those wishing to deselect MPs. Section 6.5 
examines some of the other changes made to the rules on nomination, shortlisting 
and endorsement, most of which served to protect MPs from party members.
6.5 OTHER CHANGES TO CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCEDURES 
Eligibility and Application
The debate in the Labour Party concerning the first screen, eligibility and 
application, has focussed on candidate lists and mles on union sponsorship (section 
6.6). The separate lists A, B, C and W were abolished in 1993 and combined into a 
single list of approved candidates, now known as the ‘National Parliamentary Panel’ 
(NPP). As a concession to the unions, it was agreed that where a union had a suitably 
rigorous selection procedure for its own list of approved (previously sponsored) 
candidates, they would be included on the approved list. Initially, CLPs were free to 
choose candidates not on the approved list (similar to the approved list ‘B’ of 
candidates used by the NEC in the early 1960s -  see Shaw, 1988: 96-100) but now 
they are obliged to choose from it. All candidates for the NPP must attend training 
and assessment weekends and submit standardised CVs, as well as undergo an
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interview. It gives the centre a chance to screen out poor quality and politically 
extreme candidates. A party official quoted by Criddle (2002: 186) admitted that the 
purpose of the NPP was ‘to remove the need for the NEC to refuse endorsement’, as 
in the case of Liz Davies. The existence of a veto power so early in the selection 
process ensures the centre has little to fear from OMOV and saves it from needing to 
exercise its veto later in the glare of publicity. The adoption of proportional electoral 
systems for European elections and elections to the new devolved parliaments and 
assemblies in the UK has necessitated party lists of candidates. The identity of 
candidates and their list placings were decided by centrally appointed nominees 
(party members chose, via OMOV ballots, candidates standing in the single member 
constituencies in elections fought under the additional member system in Scotland, 
Wales and London -  see Shaw, 2001a; Webb, 2000: 208, 215-6, notes 7 and 8).
Shortlisting
Rules on shortlisting were never detailed but a number of changes were 
introduced. First, the right to draw up shortlists was delegated down from ECs to 
GCs, opening up the process to a wider selectorate. Furthermore, a minimum of four 
candidates must be on shortlists in seats where there is no Labour MP (or where an 
incumbent Labour MP is standing down). Also included on shortlists by right are 
candidates with 25 percent of all nominations (including at least one ward branch) or 
50 percent of nominations from affiliated bodies. There had been cases of heavily 
nominated candidates being excluded from shortlists and union candidates with only 
one nomination being included (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995: 63). Once again, this 
reduced the opportunities for small cliques to push or veto particular candidates.
Regulations were also introduced to safeguard incumbent MPs. All sitting 
MPs who wish to continue are included on shortlists by right. From 1993 a sitting MP 
who received two-thirds of all nominations was deemed automatically reselected 
without the need for balloting. This significantly reduced the costs to the MP of 
remaining as MP and was a considerable shift away from mandatory reselection. In 
1999, the life of the incumbent was made easier still when the proportion of 
nominations required for automatic reselection was reduced to 50 percent, with the 
system now called ‘affirmative nomination’ (Criddle, 2002: 187). Securing one-half
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of nominations requires broad support in the CLP but the very existence of the 
mechanism may enable the MP’s allies to pressurise nominating bodies to offer their 
support, whereas in its absence there would be no compelling need to do so. This is 
more likely to work now that relations between MPs and CLPs are more sedate than 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and the NEC would be likely to look into any attempts at 
deselection. Affirmative nomination may serve as a means by which the NEC signals 
to activists that anything other than automatic reselection will invite NEC scrutiny of 
the CLP. Even if the MP fails to secure half of all nominations, the CLP can vote for 
automatic reselection anyway through an OMOV ballot, providing the MP received at 
least one nomination, which only the most incompetent or despised MP could ever 
fail to achieve. The mobilisation costs of the MP’s opponents are increased since not 
only must they fight to win a deselection vote, they must fight to hold a ballot at all. 
Criddle (2002: 187) observes: [t]hose MPs whose tenure was now in doubt were now 
a handful and were the targets not of CLP activists but of the party leadership 
equipped with Whips’ Office reports on the Member’s record’.
One other issue concerning shortlisting needs mentioning. One of the most 
important debates to take place on candidate selection in the Labour Party in the 
1990s concerned the representation of women. Although important, this issue is 
largely peripheral to the present discussion of the power of ordinary members vis-a- 
vis the leadership so I shall mention it only briefly.12 Pressure had been mounting 
throughout the 1980s for a greater representation of women at all levels of the party, 
particularly in the number of women MPs, which stood at just 37 in 1992. The 
leadership was won round to the idea of having all-women shortlists for some CLPs 
as a way of increasing representation and the party conference passed this measure in 
1993. It stipulated that half of all inherited seats (safe Labour seats where the sitting 
MP retired) and half of all Labour’s targeted Tory marginals should have a woman 
candidate in the following general election. To achieve this many CLPs would have 
all-women shortlists so that they could choose from a number of women candidates. 
It was hoped this would raise the number of women Labour MPs. From its inception 
the policy was controversial and aroused resentment in CLPs. Two defeated male 
candidates successfully appealed to an industrial tribunal that the policy contravened 
sex discrimination laws. However, by then many candidates had already been chosen 
from all-women shortlists and the policy was largely responsible for the record
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intake of 102 women Labour MPs in 1997. The policy was then abandoned but in its 
2001 election manifesto, Labour promised legislation to permit all-women shortlists.
NEC Endorsement and Intervention
The NEC is a major player in the selection process and under Kinnock and 
Blair it has both increased its powers and adopted an interventionist stance. We saw 
this in the case of Frank Field where a re-run ballot was ordered. The most important 
recent demonstration of NEC intervention was the decision to veto the selection of 
Liz Davies, a leftwing London councillor. What made this unusual was that she was 
not fighting a by-election but was chosen as the Labour PPC for Leeds NE in the 
1997 general election. The charge against Davies was that she had been a member of 
Trotskyite organisations and had failed to tell the CLP about committal proceedings 
she had faced for refusing to pay the poll tax. In fact, she did inform the local party 
of her refusal to pay and she did not go to jail. Moreover, there was no evidence that 
she belonged to any prescribed organisations. Nevertheless, the NEC barred her from 
standing as a candidate and the 1995 party conference reaffirmed this decision, with 
Clare Short telling delegates, ‘On the basis of her views and record, it is impossible 
for the NEC to endorse Liz Davies’ (The Times, 4 October 1995). An interventionist 
NEC was the corollary of OMOV, because OMOV ballots can increase uncertainty in 
selection contests. When, as in this case, party members made the ‘wrong’ choice, 
the NEC could step in and order a new ballot without Davies’ participation. The 
leadership fought hard to exclude leftwingers because it was concerned with being 
held to ransom by the left if Labour were to win a narrow parliamentary majority.
These powers had long been available to the NEC if it were sufficiently 
strong-willed to use them (which it not always was). However, the period also saw 
the adoption of new powers, the most important being the formation of a special NEC 
by-election panel, which short-circuited the selection procedure. By-elections can 
become national events because they provide litmus tests for the state of the parties. 
A few months before the 1987 general election, there was a by-election in the safe 
Labour seat of Greenwich. The CLP selected as its candidate, Deirdre Wood, a 
leftwing official for the Inner London Education Authority. The campaign was 
dominated by tabloid smears on Wood, dovetailing with hysteria about the ‘loony
180
left’ that allegedly controlled the London Labour Party. Relentless media interest in 
Wood’s private life eventually took its toll and the SDP won the seat, leaving 
Labour’s general election preparations in turmoil (McSmith, 1996: 56-60; Heffeman 
and Marqusee, 1992: 72-4). A year later, Labour faced a by-election in another safe 
seat, Glasgow Govan. The local party chose as its candidate Bob Gillespie, a 
leftwing union official. The SNP, which was challenging Labour, was conducting a 
campaign of non-payment of the poll tax. Labour also opposed the tax but its official 
policy was against an illegal non-payment campaign. However, Gillespie indicated 
some sympathy with the campaign, creating tension within the Scottish Labour Party. 
More bizarrely, the media portrayed Gillespie as unstatesmanlike because he had 
tattoos. Labour subsequently lost the by-election (McSmith, 1996: 60-2).
The disastrous consequences of choosing unsuitable candidates for by- 
elections prompted Kinnock to institute a central by-election panel, run by the NEC, 
which would interview candidates and, if need be, impose them on CLPs. This new 
mechanism would be used a number of times in the following years but the most 
famous case was the first to arise after the rule was approved. Vauxhall CLP chose a 
black activist, Martha Osamor to fight the by-election in Labour-held Vauxhall in 
1989. The NEC objected and drew up a short-list of five, from which the only black 
candidate later withdrew. It was put to the CLP, which rejected it and demanded the 
right to choose a black candidate. The by-election panel refused and imposed a white 
candidate who subsequently won the seat (see Heffeman and Marqusee, 1992: 265- 
70). Central control over by-elections has since become the norm.
NEC intervention can sometimes rebound on the party with unfortunate 
consequences. Shortly after the 1997 general election, the Conservative MP for 
Uxbridge died prompting a by-election in a constituency where Labour had come 
within 724 votes of winning the seat. The CLP wanted to choose as their by-election 
candidate the same candidate who came so close to winning three months earlier, a 
centre-left local councillor. But the by-elections panel decided he was not up to the 
task of contesting a by-election and chose a barrister with no local links. Labour lost 
by 3,766 votes, causing consternation among activists who blamed the national 
leadership for the loss of the seat (The Guardian, 2 August 1999).
Another practice that occurred, particularly before the 1997 and 2001 general 
elections, was for some MPs to announce their intention not to stand at the ensuing
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election. This left their CLPs with no time to organise shortlists so the NEC was able 
to impose its own shortlists. This occurred in seven constituencies in 1997, fuelling 
suspicion that the exercise was a ruse to avoid unacceptable candidates being chosen 
and to parachute in Blair loyalists (Seyd, 1998: 68). Included among them was Alan 
Howarth, the former Conservative minister who joined Labour as late as 1995 and 
for whom the leadership was desperate to find a seat in time for the 1997 general 
election. He eventually secured a safe Labour seat in South Wales (The Guardian, 17 
March 1997). Even more controversial was the case of Shaun Woodward, a former 
Conservative propagandist who defected to Labour in 1999 and became Labour MP 
for the safe seat of St Helens South in 2001 after the NEC imposed on the CLP a 
shortlist that excluded strong local candidates (Criddle, 2002: 191-2).
6.6 TRADE UNION SPONSORSHIP OF PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES
There is a final area of reform that must be examined in Labour’s selection 
procedures -  the sponsorship of candidates. Along with nomination rights, and the 
right to send delegates to GCs, sponsorship was one of three major powers enjoyed 
by unions at the local level. With these powers, unions could influence all screens in 
the selection process. Sponsorship has long been a contentious issue because, as in 
other areas of the party-union link, it appeared to involve the exchange of money for 
influence. Sponsorship has normally involved unions agreeing to pay most of the 
election expenses of given candidates and their CLPs. It has also often involved an 
annual grant paid to sponsored candidates if they became MPs. The practice of 
unions sponsoring parliamentary candidates is as old as the Labour Party -  indeed, 
older because unions sponsored ‘Lib-Lab’ candidates in the nineteenth century and 
was an essential part of securing parliamentary representation for labour. However, 
questions have long been raised about it because to unsympathetic eyes it appeared 
that unions were ‘buying seats’. Sponsorship was bound to come under the scrutiny 
of modernisers in the 1990s.
It is useful to view sponsorship in the broader context of union involvement 
in the selection process. Figure 6.5 shows a simplified selection process in which 
four shortlisted nominees (A, B, C and D) go before the GC but only D enjoys 
sponsorship (rival unions generally did not put up rival sponsored candidates in the
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same constituency). The unions also take up their places on the GC as explained 
earlier. The GC then decides which nominee to adopt (pre-1989).
Figure 6.5 Union Involvement in Candidate Selection
Shortlisted nominees
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There are various criteria by which to assess sponsorship. First, it may be a 
means for unions to shoehorn their own pre-screened candidates into parliament. 
Second, it might be an incentive for CLPs to support union-backed candidates. These 
are ex ante mechanisms of ‘control’ but a third possible use is on-going: as a means 
of influencing the behaviour of MPs, with the sanction of withdrawal of sponsorship 
awaiting MPs who do not do as the unions wish. Let us assess these claims in turn.
Reflecting Labour’s federal structure, individual unions were free to devise 
their own procedures for deciding which candidates to sponsor. These procedures 
could often be rigorous: the TGWU used regional and national interviews while the 
AEU undertook a week-long process of testing the written and verbal skills of 
applicants, their knowledge of party policy, public speaking ability, etc. Other unions 
might sponsor high-profile candidates, some of whom may become MPs before they 
secured sponsorship (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995: 57). In general, unions wanted 
candidates who would stand up for the union’s interests from the backbenches in 
parliament or frontbenchers to whom access might be useful. Screening was a means 
by which unions could look for those candidates most likely to be sympathetic to 
union interests once in parliament. For this reason, union officials with many years of 
experience in their organisations were often sponsored and became MPs. The
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preponderance of union placemen has been a feature of the PLP from Labour’s 
earliest days. Screening, however, was not a guarantee of reliability (see below).
The second ex ante means of influencing the composition of the PLP through 
sponsorship was the incentive it offered to cash-strapped CLPs to adopt union 
nominees. CLPs knew that choosing a union-sponsored candidate would make them 
eligible for financial assistance from the nominee’s union, which by the early 1990s 
included a one-off grant of £2,000-£3,000 to cover election expenses and an annual 
grant of about £750 (Gamer and Kelly, 1993: 165; Norris and Lovendsuki, 1995: 
57). Such financial help has long been attractive: Ranney (1965: 223) suggested that 
in the 1930s, ‘contests for adoptions increasingly resembled auctions in which CLPs 
bid for the support of wealthy trade unions’. This resulted in the Hastings agreement 
of 1933, whereby unions could contribute no more than 80 percent of a candidate’s 
election expenses, after fears that some unions were ‘buying seats’. With this ceiling, 
CLPs also need to raise funds for the candidate (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995: 66). 
Sponsorship brought non-financial benefits to a CLP, including the use of a union’s 
local organisation and personnel. As Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 57), suggest, all 
this could ‘tip the balance towards a sponsored candidate for a local party’.
A survey carried out by Denver (1985) found most GC delegates denied they 
would prefer a sponsored over a non-sponsored candidate solely on the basis of being 
sponsored. However, this does not prove that sponsored candidates enjoyed no 
advantage: most delegates in Denver’s survey believed they did. Minkin (1992: 245), 
while noting the difficulties facing unions in securing positions for their candidates, 
acknowledged: ‘[tjhere is no doubt that a prospective candidate who is known to 
carry sponsorship is carrying an asset into a selection conference’. Even if only a 
proportion of ward branch delegates were swayed by sponsorship (perhaps those who 
sat on the EC and thereby had a greater insight into the CLP’s finances), this would 
often be sufficient if, as was often the case, union delegates on the GC voted en bloc 
to support the sponsored candidate.
If the offer of sponsorship was an effective means of persuading CLPs to 
adopt union candidates, and the unions’ screening mechanisms were thorough, in 
theory this should result in a sizeable body of the PLP being ‘dependable’ on the 
protection of union interests. However, MPs may change their minds once they are 
elected or voice policy preferences they had hitherto hidden. Might it nevertheless be
184
possible for unions to exercise control by threatening to withdraw sponsorship if the
MP shirks? This argument was often made by Labour’s opponents and is the third -
1 ^and most controversial -  claim made for sponsorship. In addition to grants paid to 
CLPs, sponsorship normally involved contributions to the election expenses of MPs 
as well as an annual allowance. In Labour’s early days, this was essential because 
MPs were not paid by the state until 1911, after which the practice of sponsorship 
continued because MPs salaries were fairly low -  in the 1920s, the miners’ union 
paid its MPs £300 a year on top of a parliamentary salary of £400. Even until 1964, 
the GMWU paid its sponsored MPs £250, on top of their parliamentary salaries of 
£1,250. It would have been possible to make a plausible case that MPs would have an 
incentive to maintain the backing of their sponsoring unions.
In the 1970s and 1980s, allowances to MPs were phased out or frozen at low 
levels in response to worries about the perception of MPs being financially supported 
by unions at a time when questions were being raised about union power in the 
country generally. By 1986 the GMWU paid £300, when an MP’s salary was £17,702 
together with various allowances of £12,000. Since the 1980s, sponsorship has 
involved fairly trivial sums compared to money paid to MPs by corporations. To 
portray sponsored MPs as ‘kept men’ is therefore somewhat exaggerated.
There would be little incentive for unions to sponsor candidates unless they 
expected to receive something in return but this was generally understood to be an 
effort on the part of the sponsored MP to raise issues of importance to the union in 
parliament. Most of these issues would relate to trade and industrial matters. For 
example, if the union were involved in a strike, it might expect the MP to make a 
speech in the House or lobby for legislation. Perhaps the most successful recent 
example of sponsored MPs working together and with Conservative dissidents, was 
in their defeat of the Thatcher government’s Shops Bill and its provision for Sunday 
trading in 1986 (Minkin, 1992: 257). However, the effectiveness of sponsorship as a 
means of control was severely blunted, not only by the fact that it involved small 
sums of money, but also by a ruling of the Parliamentary Privileges Committee in the 
1940s. While recognising the legitimacy of sponsorship, the committee prohibited 
unions and other outside bodies from using it ‘as an instrument by which it controls 
or seeks to control the conduct of a Member or to punish him for what he has done as 
a Member’ (cited in Minkin, 1992: 260). Unions retained the right to withdraw
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sponsorship if they no longer thought it in their interests to continue with it but they 
had to be very careful about blatant attempts to influence MPs.14
However, there have been a number of instances when union leaders have 
publicly overstepped the mark in appearing to issue instructions to MPs as to their 
conduct in the House (private transgressions cannot usually be discovered). In 1975, 
the leader of the NUR, Sid Weighed told a public rally that NUR-sponsored MPs 
would be instructed to vote against a contested aspect of the Labour government’s 
railways policy. However, the press published details of the speech and Weighed 
made a full apology before it was raised in Parliament (Minkin, 1992: 262). Tensions 
arose in the 1970s and 1980s between union leaderships and sponsored MPs in those 
unions that acquired new leftwing leaders while the sponsored MPs had been selected 
under the former rightwing regimes. This was evident in the NUM, whose leadership 
shifted significantly to the left. In 1975, five MPs sponsored by the Yorkshire Area 
NUM defied that body’s policy by supporting British entry into the EEC. The 
Yorkshire Area NUM passed a resolution condemning their behaviour and which 
suggested that sponsored MPs must follow ‘guidelines’ on how to vote on issues 
affecting union interests. The resolution concluded: ‘... the Yorkshire Area will no 
longer tolerate a situation where a Miners’ MP accepts the ‘Privilege’ of sponsorship 
and then demands the ‘Luxury’ of independence from Union policy’ (cited in 
Minkin, 1992: 276, n.87). A Labour MP lodged a complaint with Parliament’s 
Privileges Committee, which duly found the resolution ‘constituted a serious 
contempt, which represented a continuing threat to Members’ freedom o f speech and 
action and which could not be allowed to remain in existence’. Already, the NUM’s 
national officials were rowing back and in the end no MPs lost sponsorship (Minkin, 
1992: 265-6). However, two rightwing NUM MPs did lose their sponsorship after the 
miners’ strike of 1984-5, though they were also deselected, presumably because they 
did not offer sufficient support during the strike. Generally, Minkin (1992: 266) 
acknowledges that this pattern of ‘assertiveness, warnings and retreats was not 
without its general impact on MPs’, as many sponsored MPs opted for a quiet life by 
voting in line with union policy on important trade and industrial issues.
It is thus difficult to quantify the impact sponsorship had on MPs’ behaviour. 
Unions undoubtedly saw it as advantageous to have MPs who (it was hoped) would 
be prepared to stand up for union interests. This focus on sponsorship as a means of
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parliamentary representation was evident in the high numbers of sponsored PPCs 
who became MPs. Indeed, all the way through the selection process, union-sponsored 
candidates were traditionally advantaged compared to unsponsored candidates (see 
Figure 6.6 for a schematic illustration). Figures 6.7-9 show that while only about a 
quarter of PPCs were sponsored by unions at any given election, the proportion of 
sponsored Labour MPs was normally over a third, and since 1979 it was over a half. 
Unions concentrated sponsorship in safe Labour seats, where the chance of winning 
was very high. The proportion of union-sponsored candidates who successfully 
entered parliament as MPs never fell below 70 percent in the post war period and was 
usually above 80 percent whereas a much lower proportion of those with just CLP 
backing entered parliament (below 20 percent in the 1980s -  see Figure 6.9).
Figure 6.6 Candidate Selection Screens and Party Lists
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Figure 6.7 Sponsorship o f Labour Prospective Parliamentary Candidates, 1945-92
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Figure 6.8 Sponsorship o f Labour MPs, 1945-92
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Sources for Figures 6.7 and 6.8: Craig (1989: 91-2 Tables 7.03 and 7.04) for 1945-87. Norris and 
Lovenduski (1995: 57, 59) for 1992.
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Figure 6.9 Sponsored MPs as a Proportion o f Sponsored Candidates
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The proportion of sponsored MPs rose considerably in the 1980s, which is 
paradoxical given that Labour’s policies were shifting away from those preferred by 
the unions. In fact, therein lies the explanation. The rise of corporatism in the post­
war era called into question the utility of sponsorship since unions no longer needed 
to rely on it for access to MPs. However, corporatist arrangements were abandoned 
by the Thatcher government and union leaders no longer had access to government. 
This led many unions to ‘rediscover’ the benefits of having sponsored MPs to call 
upon for assistance (Minkin, 1992: 256-7). Some individual unions forged stronger 
links with their sponsored MPs. Minkin (1992: 254) notes that the NUR was 
assiduous in this respect, creating a union post of Political Liaison Officer, whose job 
was to transmit information between the union and its sponsored MPs and play a 
coordinating role. Some of the other big unions followed suit, creating political 
officers and building up their raft of sponsored MPs, though the NUM group waned 
as the mining industry (and its union) declined (Table 6.3). These individual groups 
of sponsored MPs became more important than the old Trade Union Group, the 
aggregate of all sponsored MPs, which had been important in defeating the Labour 
government’s trade union legislation in 1969 but which had since gone into decline.
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Table 6.3 Labour MPs Sponsored by Individual Unions, 1945-92
Union 1945 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 1 
Feb Oct
1987 1992
AEU 4 8 8 6 8 19 17 16 17 16 21 17 12 13
APEX - 1 1 1 1 3 4 3 6 6 6 5 3 -
ASTMS - - - - - 1 2 3 9 12 10 8 10 13
EETPU - 1 1 1 - 1 1 3 3 3 3 4 3 3
GMB 10 6 6 4 4 9 10 12 13 13 14 11 11 17
NUM 34 37 36 34 31 29 26 20 18 18 16 14 13 14
NUPE - - 1 1 2 1 2 5 6 6 6 7 4 12
NUR 12 10 9 8 5 6 7 5 6 6 12 10 8 12
TGWU 17 16 14 14 14 21 27 19 23 22 22 25 33 38
TSSA 9 7 7 5 5 7 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 2
USD AW 8 8 9 9 9 10 10 9 6 5 5 2 8 3
Others 23 16 15 11 14 13 19 13 17 17 14 10 23 16
Tradeunion 
sponsored 120 111 108 95 93 120 132 112 127 129 132 115 U
J o 143
Co-op
sponsored 23 O
O :' 
' 16 18 16 20 18 17 16 16 17 8 10 14
sponsored 250 186 171 164 149 177 213 158 158 172 120 86 139 114
Total
MPs
393 315 295 277 258 317 363 287 301 319 269 209 229 271
Source: Butler and Butler (2000: 162). Note that o f some o f  the unions modified their names during 
the period 1945-92 while others have done so since then (especially after mergers).
Sponsorship offered advantages to unions in terms of access to MPs and 
perhaps in terms of influencing MPs’ behaviour. It was also advantageous for 
candidates to enter selection contests carrying offers of sponsorship. However, the 
rules on sponsorship came under scrutiny in the 1990s as modernisers sought reform 
of the party-union link. Even if sponsorship was a limited means of union influence, 
what mattered was public perception. Anything that appeared to involve unions 
buying influence could give Labour a bad press. In 1995 the direct sponsorship of 
MPs ended though under new ‘constituency plan agreements’, unions could continue 
making payments to CLPs. Many agreements were concentrated in key marginal 
seats that Labour won in 1997 in order to build up its organisational strength 
(Criddle, 1997: 206). The Neill Committee’s report on party funding found that CLPs 
received on average £2,016 in the form of union donations in 1997, a general 
election year. The previous year saw CLPs receive an average union donation of 
£446 and in most non-election years the figure was barely £200 (Neill, 1998: 40).
The breaking of the link between union funds and individual candidates was a 
further weakening of the party-union link, if mainly symbolic. On the other hand,
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despite the abandonment of direct sponsorship, unions continue to work to secure 
nominations for their preferred candidates on the NPP. Before the 2001 general 
election the major unions secretly agreed to avoid destructive competition by putting 
up just one union-backed candidate in winnable vacant seats. This would not ensure 
union candidates were selected but such favoured candidates would benefit from 
union help in securing nominations, making constituency contacts, covering 
expenses, etc. and they would have access to union staff and other resources (Shaw, 
2001a: 47; see also Criddle, 2002: 192). The unions can still rely on general support 
from many Labour MPs in the battle to protect their own interests, as is currently 
evident with the widespread sympathy among Labour backbenchers for union 
opposition to government plans for private-sector involvement in the public services.
6.7 CONCLUSION
The Labour leadership’s decade-long battle to reform selection procedures 
illustrated the two organisational goals of the period under review. OMOV was 
initially envisaged as a distributional reform that would undermine the activist left in 
the CLPs and smooth strained relations with MPs that had developed in the 1970s. It 
is true that deselections occur less frequently than they did in the early-1980s though 
it is difficult to say how much of this is due to OMOV, how much is due to fear of 
NEC intervention, and how much is due to genuine contentment with MPs’ 
performances. However, OMOV has not banished selection difficulties per se because 
there has been a number of acrimonious incidents in OMOV ballots as we saw earlier. 
Rules have been bent and allegations made of vote fixing. Moreover, the left has on 
occasion succeeded under OMOV. Many ballots involve low turnouts of party 
members, giving the committed activists a proportionately greater say though not 
nearly as much as under the old system of GC control. It is because OMOV has not 
proved a panacea for the ‘modernisers’ that central control had to be maintained. The 
NEC under Kinnock and Blair often intervened in OMOV ballots if they produced the 
‘wrong’ results. Recent reforms have continued this centralising impulse with the 
compilation of the NPP. Selection procedures help determine the composition of the 
PLP so a centralising leadership will inevitably continue to exert control. Central 
control is nowadays so strong that the greatest threat to the security of MPs’ tenure is 
not plotting activists but the party leadership itself. As central control has extended to
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the PLP, rebellious backbench MPs must beware of falling foul of the whips lest the 
NEC pressurises CLPs to deselect them (see Bale, 2000).
As the 1980s wore on, it became apparent party modernisers were pursuing a 
second goal through OMOV -  the weakening of the federal links with the unions and 
the imposition of a unitary membership structure. It was this aim and its symbolic 
importance that created much consternation among the unions. Many feared OMOV 
was the thin end of a wedge leading to eventual separation, that it was an attempt 
fundamentally to alter the entire basis of political exchange in the Labour Party. 
Although some commentators denied that the change to the selection procedures 
really meant anything substantive in terms of loss of union power (e.g. Lovenduski 
and Norris, 1994), it surely is the case that unions cannot stitch-up local selections to 
the extent they once could in unionised areas. Nomination rights remain as do seats 
on the GCs but voting rights have gone and historically it has been the ability to cast 
concentrated blocks of votes that has underpinned the unions’ domination of 
Labour’s extraparliamentary organs. OMOV has ended that. Local trade unionists can 
still participate in selection ballots but only in their capacity as individual party 
members. It is possible that crude attempts could be made to buy up hundreds of 
membership places but this would prompt an NEC enquiry.
Participatory rights in candidate selection are a selective incentive for party 
members (Scarrow et al., 2000: 134; Pennings and Hazan, 2001: 268). In common 
with other parties, Labour expanded participation rights while strengthening the 
powers of the centre. This has undermined the sovereignty of members and raises the 
question of whether selection institutions are still efficient in the sense o f providing 
members with incentives to remain in the party. If institutions do not provide control 
and fail even to enable adequate internal ‘voice’, then the outcome may be 
membership exit. I take up this issue in Chapter 9.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6: CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCEDURES
Before 1989 1989-92 1992-3 From
Eligibility & (I) CLP initiates selection process. 
Application Timeuble agreed »ith NEC Party 
membership and GC delegations 
‘frozen’ to prevent ‘packing’
1 (2) EITHER:
|  (a) CLPs seek applicants from national 
lists held by party HQ:
List A: union-sponsored candidates
List B: CLP recommended candidates
List C: Co-operative Party recommended
1 (b) CLPs wait for individuals to apply to 
the CLP secretary about the vacancy 
(individuals need not be on any of the
As before 1989, except that national lists 
now include:
List W: approved women candidates 
(consisting of all the women candidates on 
lists A, B and C)
As 1989-92 • As 1989-92 except that Lists A, B, C 
and W merged into one NEC- 
approved list (National Parliamentary 
Panel)
• Direct union sponsorship of MPs and 
candidates ended
Nomination • Party ward branches and local
affiliated organisations (incl. branches 
of unions, socialist societies, Co-op 
Party, women’s section and Young 
Socialists) each entitled to nominate 
one candidate
• In reselection contests, the sitting 
Labour MP is eligible for nomination
As before 1989 As before 1989 As before 1989
Shortlisting (1) The CLP’s E xecutive C om m ittee
draws up a shortlist of candidates, 
which must include the sitting MP in 
reselection contests
I (2) The shortlist is presented to the full 
G eneral C om m ittee (G C ) for 
confirmation
As before 1989, except:
• Shortlists must include at least five 
names (incl. sitting MP where 
relevant) or all nominees if fewer than 
five
• Shortlists must include at least one 
woman
As 1989-92, except that some CLPs were 
presented with all-w om en shortlists
(1) G eneral C om m ittee (not Executive 
Committee) draws up shortlist
(2) Shortlists must include:
• at least four names if no Labour MP
• sitting MP where relevant
• anyone with 25 percent of all
(3) The shortlist must be ratified by the 
NEC
•  Nominees with at least 25 percent of 
nominations (incl. at least one ward 
branch) must be on shortlist
nominations (incl. at least one ward 
branch)
• anyone with 50 percent of 
nominations from affiliated 
organisations
• equal numbers of men and women (all 
nominating bodies must nominate a 
man and a woman); all-women 
shortlists abandoned in 1996
(3) If sitting MP receives one-half o f all 
nom inations (reduced from two-thirds 
in 1999), s/he is deemed 
autom atically reselected.
.
• If sitting MP receives at least one 
nomination, CLP can vote for 
automatic reselection if desired
Selection
' : ■ :
: ■ -
• :
■
. .
Secret ballot of all GC members, using the 
Alternative Vote method
Local electoral college selects candidate.
College consists of:
•  Individual m em bers, who comprise 
at least 60 percent of college. They 
vote in one m em ber -  one vote ballot 
at selection meeting (postal votes 
available on approval by GC)
•  A ffiliated organisations, comprising 
m axim um  o f  40 percent of college. 
M em bership ballots optional. Votes 
cast by postal ballots before selection 
meeting.
•  One m em ber -  one vote ballot of
individual members.
•  Ballot of individual members to 
decide whether to allow local union 
levypayers to participate. If 
affirmative, levypayers’ votes worth 
one-third of those of individual 
members
Where MP has not been automatically 
reselected (see above), and in open 
contests, a one m em ber -  one vote ballot 
takes place at a selection meeting (postal 
ballots available if approved by GC)
Endorsement NEC must endorse or reject chosen 
candidate (rejection rare)
As before 1989 As before 1989 As before 1989
Sources: Gamer and Kelly (1993: 166-7, Table 7.1; 1998: 130, Box 6.1); Lovenduski and Norris (1991); Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 53-76); Criddle (2002: 186-7).
7 Electing the Leader: The Electoral 
College
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The post of leader is the most important position in a party. The leader fronts 
the party and is its public face to the voters. Party leaders play a key role in intraparty 
decision-making and possess powers of patronage. They normally face a trade-off 
between the demands of voters and intraparty actors. In the Labour Party the leader 
has intraparty powers of patronage over (shadow) cabinet portfolios, an ex officio 
seat on the NEC, and enormous power over policy when Labour is in government. 
The British system of government confers great power on the Prime Minister, while 
extraparliamentary actors have no direct influence. This has often resulted in Labour 
prime ministers presiding over policies opposed by party members. After the actions 
of the Wilson and Callaghan governments of 1974-79, the emerging Bennite left 
sought a series of internal party reforms designed to constrain the PLP. One of these 
reforms concerned the method of electing the party leader. The left wanted to make 
the leader accountable to activists but it also wanted a method that would maximise 
the chances of securing the position for its own favoured candidate.
In this chapter I examine this new method, the electoral college, and its 
reform. Section 7.2 constructs a general principal-agent model of leader-follower 
relations. Section 7.3 turns to Labour and looks at the electoral college as it existed 
until 1993, dominated by union block votes. Section 7.4 examines the reformed 
college, based on OMOV and union levypayer involvement, while 7.5 assesses its 
limitations as a means of controlling party leaders. Section 7.6 concludes that the 
college has entrenched the party leader and its reform has curtailed the power of 
union leaders. An appendix looks at recent changes to the structure of the NEC.
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7.2 RATIONAL CHOICE AND PARTY LEADERSHIP
Most parties have formal institutional means by which to select leaders, such 
as ballots of MPs, membership votes and electoral colleges. In each case, the identity 
of the selectorate may differ but whichever system is deployed, those intraparty 
actors entitled to participate generally choose leaders they believe will benefit them, 
whether that means improving the party’s election prospects and/or adopting a given 
policy platform. In this sense, the relationship between a leader and his selectorate is 
an example of a principal-agent relationship.1 Principals are actors who wish to 
achieve some goal and recruit agents to help them, the agent receiving compensatory 
benefits for his efforts. Principals may face problems monitoring agents to make sure 
they do what they have been contracted to do. In politics, groups of principals often 
recruit an agent to be their leader though problems of shirking may arise. Political 
leaders require certain qualities, as Shepsle and Bonchek (1997: 383) describe:
Leaders are specific sorts of agents. They are relied upon by 
followers to coordinate their activities, to provide rewards and 
punishments for group objectives, to secure allies and defeat 
opponents, and generally to ‘grease the skids’ for the things 
followers want. Leaders are normally chosen for the specialized 
skills they possess -  to reason, persuade, bully, inspire, rally, 
intimidate, mediate, and so on.
Leaders help followers overcome their collective action problem by monitoring 
principals, enforcing decisions, offering selective incentives and punishing free­
riders (see Cox and McCubbins, 1993). The attributes of leaders listed above are 
essential but they can become the means by which leaders dominate principals. 
Political actors face at least four problems when recruiting a leader (Laver, 1997: 72- 
80). (1) How is the mandate awarded (and who awards it)? (2) Can limits be placed 
on the ‘coercive power’ ceded to the politician, i.e. what sanctions does the politician 
have at his disposal and can his use of them be controlled? (3) Does the politician 
have incentives to renege on deals made with intraparty principals? (4) What 
mechanisms exist to evict a politician who outstays his welcome? All of these 
problems touch on issues of power and accountability. The problem facing principals 
is how to ensure they recruit a good quality politician who will not renege on his
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promises. The problem facing the politician is how to win an election while trying to 
keep the intraparty principals happy -  or how to escape their control.
In a two-party system, leaders must have some autonomy if  they are to win 
elections for their parties. If MPs have monopoly voting rights in choosing their 
leader this may often be less of a problem than when activists possess such voting 
rights. It was shown in Chapter 3 that the concept of constrained policy-seeking 
activists, who face a trade-off between recruiting a politician to espouse their policy 
preferences and recruiting one that will win them an election (which may require 
different policies), opens up a space of discretion, which the politician can exploit. 
The narrower the preference-gap between the median principal and the median voter, 
the less severe will be the trade-off facing the principals. If there is a sizable gap, the 
principals must decide how much discretion to allow the agent (though they will 
realise the agent will try to extend the field of discretion). Even if principals possess 
means of ex post control over agents, they may not wish to use them if  doing so is 
likely to damage the party’s electoral chances. However, there are limits to this 
discretion and principals want to keep the leader as close to their own preferences as 
possible while maintaining the party’s electoral viability. The worry for principals is 
that ceding power to office-seeking politicians involves the risk of politicians straying 
too far from principals’ preferences. Principals want to contain the extent of agency 
loss so they will need to have monitoring and eviction mechanisms available.
There are two general ways in which leaders can be controlled. The first is 
through the use of formal mechanisms that constrain their power, be they ex ante, ex 
post, or on-going. There are four major types of mechanisms for reducing agency 
loss: (1) contract design, by which the terms of the agent’s remit are established; (2) 
screening, i.e. ex ante mechanisms to filter out unsuitable candidates; (3) monitoring, 
whereby agents’ activities are formally observed by committees of principals, with 
procedures for reporting back, etc.; (4) institutional checks, such as committee veto 
powers (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Strom, 1993: 318-9). Ideally, such controls 
bind the leader to the dominant coalition of principals while also allowing him the 
necessary freedom to carry out his responsibilities, though in practice, it may be 
difficult to achieve this balance. Screening mechanisms have assumed an important 
part in the debate about leadership selection because they offer ways of predicting 
what a leader will be like. However, principals have limited information about
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politicians, not least because the latter have incentives to hide some information. The 
role of reputation is important in these situations because it is a resource for 
politicians, who consequently will invest in building a reputation, e.g. for being 
tough, etc. Reputation depends on past actions and can take a long time to acquire, 
yet it can be lost with one rash act, so it is a constraint on politicians’ actions since 
they may be unwilling to do things that damage their reputations (Calvert, 1987).
The second major means of controlling leaders is to expose them to 
competition from rivals. Rival politicians may find it in their interests to shoulder the 
costs of monitoring the performance of the incumbent. If  they can publicise under­
performance by the incumbent, they may be in a position to exploit disaffection by 
principals. Competition among politicians stems from one of two sources. First, a 
politician may challenge an incumbent while claiming that she can provide the same 
policies more effectively, e.g. by enjoying greater personal popularity among the 
voters. Second, the incumbent may be challenged by a politician offering different 
policies. Competition among politicians often reflects differences among subgroups 
of principals. Given the inevitability of intraparty preference heterogeneity, there will 
be conflict over which politician principals wish to be their leader. If one faction can 
coerce or dominate the others, it can recruit a politician to supply its own preferred 
policies regardless of what the other factions want. Other factions can try to persuade 
rival politicians to challenge the incumbent though such collective action is difficult 
if the various dominated factions are ideologically disparate (Laver, 1997: 73).
The subject of leadership autonomy and accountability is a huge one and in this 
chapter, I confine myself to the question of how leadership election procedures help 
affect leaders’ autonomy. The main points of reference are how different procedures 
affect who can vote for leaders and how dissatisfied principals can eject leaders. The 
following two sections look alternately at Labour’s old and reformed electoral college.
7.3 LABOUR’S ELECTORAL COLLEGE, 1981-93
Until 1981 the Labour Party chose its leaders through a ballot of sitting 
Labour MPs, not surprisingly because in the ‘Westminster model’ of government, 
parties are dominated by their parliamentary wings. Unlike other European socialist 
parties but like other British parties, Labour did not have separate parliamentary and
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organisational leaders (on the continent, the latter is often the more powerful -  see 
Strom, 1993; De Winter, 1993). Nevertheless, there was some ambiguity because 
until 1978 Labour’s parliamentary leader was the de facto but not the de jure  leader 
of the entire party (Punnett, 1993: 258-9). This was changed as part of the reform of 
the party’s selection mechanism.
The main argument in favour of the old system was that MPs were more 
likely than ordinary party members to possess information about the preferences and 
character of candidates. For this reason, Roy (now Lord) Hattersley has described the 
PLP as ‘the electorate most competent to choose’ the leader (cited in Stark, 1996: 
138; my italics). The ex ante possession of such information is a resource of 
principals and, initially at least, a constraint on prospective agents. As we move 
down through the party’s organisational structure, we would expect the information 
to which principals have access to be less complete. Party activists have much less 
first-hand information about candidates than MPs do because they have little contact 
with the candidates. Inactive members have less information still. Ordinary voters 
have the least information of all the groups of principals, being dependent mainly on 
television. In the Labour Party, union leaders possess good knowledge o f candidates, 
as good as that of many MPs, and in many cases, better. As we move down through 
the unions’ organisational levels, this information is less readily available.
However, private information about candidates is but one among many 
criteria for a selection mechanism. Moreover, even on this count, the ex ante 
information available to MPs is far from complete. Stark (1996: 139) argues that MPs 
‘are not better choosers’ than party members, pointing to the wide gap between ex 
ante perceptions and outcomes with regard to the election of Edward Heath and 
Margaret Thatcher in the Conservative Party. Each was elected in a ballot of 
Conservative MPs yet in both cases, the electors did not foresee their arrogance. The 
real justification for this particular selection method is political: letting MPs pick the 
leaders usually ensures a ‘moderate’ candidate is chosen. Such candidates are likely to 
maximise the party’s electoral chances. However, parties have horizontal divisions, 
between different classes of principals, and as we saw in Chapter 3, there is a tendency 
for middle-level activists to be more radical than MPs.
Leftwing activist anger erupted in the Labour Party after the demise of the 
Callaghan government in 1979, when many felt that the government had reneged on its
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radical promises. I do not wish to discuss the ensuing events in detail since this has 
already been done elsewhere (see Kogan and Kogan, 1982; Seyd, 1987; Koelble, 1991). 
Essentially, the activists, through the agency of the Campaign for Labour Party 
Democracy (CLPD), devised a set of rule changes to make it easier for them to control 
MPs in the fixture. One such change was to deny MPs the sole right to elect the leader, 
and instead allow all sections of the party to have some influence. Thus, as Michael 
Meacher told the Labour Party conference in 1979:
... [T]he Leader of the Party is accountable, not just to the 
Parliamentary Party, but to the movement as a whole and he should, 
therefore, be elected by those to whom he is more broadly 
accountable (Labour Party, 1980: 256).
‘Accountability’ here refers to the ability of activists to hold the leader to his promises 
and remove him if he shirks. By changing the leader’s intraparty constituency (the 
‘how’ and ‘who’ of electing him), the activists would alter his incentives for reneging 
on policy deals and could replace him if need be. The answer was to form an electoral 
college and spread responsibility for choosing the leader between the three pillars of the 
party: MPs, CLPs and unions. A combination of leftwing planning, luck and farce at the 
special Wembley conference of 1981, which debated the structure of the college, 
ensured that the unions secured a 40 percent share2 while the PLP and CLPs each took 
30 percent (see Appendix 1 to Chapter 7). This institution reflected the new balance of 
forces in the party as the left coalition sought a means of controlling the leader and 
securing the top position for its own candidate, Tony Benn.
The electoral college contains three or four types of screen, depending on 
whether Labour is in government or opposition (Figure 7.1). The first screen is an 
eligibility requirement, and as before 1981, only MPs can become leader. This is a 
matter of practicality in the Westminster system of government. It continues to hold 
in the electoral college to this day and I will say no more about it. The second screen 
concerns nomination and here any MP, CLP or affiliate can nominate a candidate. 
Often, individuals and affiliates add their names to lists of nominators to show their 
commitment (Punnett, 1992: 107) though it may also reflect a desire by career- 
minded MPs to join the bandwagon of the frontrunner. An important aspect of this 
screen in 1981 was that each nominee needed to receive a minimum level of support
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of 5 percent of the PLP (increased to 20 percent in 1988). A third screen that would 
operate only when Labour is in government would be the necessity to receive two- 
thirds majority backing at the party conference for the principle of a contest. This 
would require the votes of the big unions, which would be difficult to envisage in 
anything but extreme circumstances and would provide a sturdy shelter for a Labour 
Prime Minister. This screen has never been tested but it would enable the unions to 
halt a challenge to a Labour Prime Minister. The final screen would be the selection 
ballot at the electoral college, which is the focus of analysis below.
Figure 7.1 Leadership Election Screens
Selection
Approval 
(Govt only)
Nomination
Eligibility
A couple of further points about the electoral college are in order. First, it was 
envisaged that formal leadership contests would be held annually, though this would 
naturally require a challenger to put himself forward. The Bennite left wanted this 
provision because annual contests would lower the costs of challenging the 
incumbent and thus make it easier to control his actions (Kogan and Kogan, 1982: 
96). If contests had not been made annual events, it would be more difficult for 
dissidents to challenge the incumbent because contests would be the exception rather 
than the norm, so pressure would be applied to prevent a contest. However, as we 
shall see, this became true despite the provision for annual contests. Another key 
feature of leadership election rules is whether candidates are obliged to join ballots from
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the beginning of a contest or are allowed to join in later ballots. The latter rule was a 
feature of Conservative leadership elections before 1998 and contributed to the ease 
with which Conservative MPs could eject unpopular leaders. Challenging an incumbent 
is risky and may deter many challengers, particularly if they already hold senior 
positions. However, if challengers are allowed to join in later ballots, incumbents could 
face ‘stalking horse’ candidates in early ballots and if they suffer irreparable damage, 
stronger contenders can step in. The new rules in the Conservative Party require 
challengers to be in from the start, which may deter some stronger rivals and thereby 
increase the security of tenure of the incumbent (Conservative Party, 1998). This was 
the rule in the Labour Party until 1980 when it restricted votes in leadership contests to 
MPs and it continued to be the case with the adoption of the electoral college. It 
represented another hurdle to would-be challengers.
MPs and the Electoral College
From a position of determining the leader of the party, the PLP saw its influence 
reduced to a 30 percent share of the electoral college. As if that were not bad enough, 
MPs would now have their votes publicly declared, a change from the secret ballot of 
the old system. Critics alleged this would effectively enable the CLPs to determine 60 
percent of the electoral college votes because in addition to their own 30 percent share, 
they would also be able to compel MPs, under threat of deselection, to follow their 
preferences (Williams, 1983: 45). However, by this argument, an electoral college 
would not have been needed at all since the left in the CLPs should simply have 
maintained the old system of PLP selection of leaders but in an open rather than a secret 
ballot. As it is, in the first outing of the electoral college in 1981, 47 percent of MPs cast 
their votes for a candidate different from that favoured by their own CLPs (Seyd, 1987: 
130-1). Even so, it was a dramatic change and effectively robbed the PLP of holding its 
own leader to account. Although the PLP has historically been loyal to its leaders, the 
latter would have to retain the confidence and trust of MPs otherwise there was always 
the possibility of being challenged (as Gaitskell was in 1960) and overthrown. Such a 
mechanism would allow the prompt replacement of unpopular leaders, a feature absent 
from the electoral college (see below). The PLP would, however, continue to wield 
some veto power by retaining some control over the nomination process for leadership 
contests, with each nominee requiring the support of at least five-percent of the PLP.
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This was a low hurdle to surmount and suited the left in 1981 when its strength was 
weakest within the PLP, though Benn secured the support of one-third of Labour MPs 
when he challenged Healey for the deputy leadership that same year.
The left declined in the 1980s but in 1988, Benn challenged Kinnock for the 
leadership. It was evident that Kinnock would win easily but he deemed such 
challenges damaging so, with the backing of the NEC and the party conference Kinnock 
introduced a rule change, which raised the nominations benchmark to 20 percent of the 
PLP for each challenger. This reduced the maximum number of candidates to five in 
theory, but four, or even three in practice, and it presented problems in 1992 when 
Bryan Gould, the sole challenger to John Smith for the leadership, struggled to secure 
enough nominations (Alderman and Carter, 1993: 55-6). In 1993, the threshold was 
reduced to 12.5 percent for contests arising from the death or resignation of an 
incumbent due to concern that 20 percent might stop any contest at all.
The ‘20-percent rule’ strengthened the PLP in selection contests by increasing 
its veto power over whether contests should take place in the first place as well as which 
types of candidates would be likely to secure nomination. Yet this increased power for 
the PLP was negative, better enabling it to prevent contests but not enabling it to control 
and dispense with unpopular leaders because contests would still be conducted through 
the electoral college. But to the extent that preventing a contest was all Kinnock wanted 
after the 1988 challenge, the rule served its purpose. Reforming the nomination screen 
was much easier for Kinnock and his allies than reforming the selection screen, since 
increasing the PLP’s share of the electoral college would have entailed decreasing the 
share of one or both of the other sections. Such a move would have evoked considerable 
opposition and may also have worried union leaders at a time when they were anxious 
about their position in the party. By focusing on nomination procedures, Kinnock was 
able to carry the unions with him in re-establishing a large measure of PLP control 
while maintaining the unions’ pre-eminent overall position in the college.
Giving MPs only a 30 percent say in choosing their leader was a big step away 
from the conventions of a party competing within the Westminster model (see Punnett, 
1992). Extending the franchise beyond the PLP would result in a more ‘presidential’ 
style of leadership contest. This becomes apparent when we look at the two other 
sections of the electoral college: the trade unions, and before them, the CLPs.
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CLPs and the Electoral College
The CLPs became as important as the PLP in the electoral college when they too 
were given 30 percent of the votes, considerably greater than their voting strength at the 
party conference. However, the existing decision-making structure within the CLPs 
remained whereby the decision on which candidate to support would be taken by the 
GCs. As shown in Chapter 6, the GCs are cliques of the most active members of the 
party. Moreover, the CLPs would cast their votes as undivided blocks so that minority 
opinion within each CLP, no matter how sizable, would not be expressed in the final 
vote. This suited the left because it was disproportionately represented on the GCs.
Since GCs took the decisions, leadership candidates could profitably embark on 
rounds of meetings and rallies of the party faithful in order to procure votes. Tony Benn 
performed a punishing round of such meetings in his bid for the deputy leadership in 
1981, and it paid off for him as he secured the support of four out of five CLPs in the 
second ballot. His rightwing opponent, Denis Healey, was much less active in this way, 
reflecting the reality that his support within the CLPs was limited. However, it was 
believed that if the CLPs were to conduct membership ballots, the hard left might be 
undermined as more ‘moderate’ members were enfranchised. In 1983, a minority of 
CLPs conducted some form of membership ballot and 90 percent of these backed the 
rightwing candidate in the deputy leadership race, Roy Hattersley. Of the CLPs that did 
not conduct any ballot, two-thirds voted for the leftwing candidate, Michael Meacher. 
Similarly, in 1988, 337 CLPs (60 percent of the total) conducted branch or postal ballots 
of their members and only a quarter supported Benn in the leadership contest, though 
overall, only one in five CLPs supported Benn. But 23 CLPs that had nominated Benn 
subsequently voted for Kinnock after their consultation ballots (Drucker, 1984; Punnett, 
1990: 187-8). A mle change obliged CLPs to hold OMOV ballots in subsequent contests, 
the first of which occurred in 1992. However, in the leadership and deputy leadership 
contests of that year, the votes in the electoral college continued to be cast on a winner- 
takes-all (unit vote) basis, as each CLP held an OMOV ballot, with the candidate topping 
the poll taking the entire college vote of that given CLP. In 1993, block votes were 
abolished and all individuals’ votes were aggregated for a grand CLP section total. 
Minority support for a candidate within a given CLP was now accredited to that 
candidate, breaching the federal principle.
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Trade Unions and the Electoral College
The most controversial feature of the electoral college was the part played in 
it by the unions. Although they did not dominate it to the extent that they dominated 
the party conference (40 percent of the votes compared to 90 percent), their role in 
the college was more crucial. Policies at the conference may or may not be adopted 
by a Labour government, but having a say in who should lead the party could mean 
helping to pick the Prime Minister. Significantly, the block vote magnified the power 
of the big unions in the college beyond a simple calculation of relative shares of the 
votes. Although they could not arithmetically determine the winning candidate, they 
could substantially decide the trajectory of the contest. This owed not just to their 
share of the total vote but to the concentration of votes, in the form of block votes.3
The big unions dominated the union section of the electoral college and had a 
substantial say in any contest. In 1981 the big four unions (the TGWU, the AUEW, 
the GMWU and NUPE) controlled half of the votes in the union section, and 20 
percent of the entire college. The TGWU alone wielded 8 percent of the college votes 
(as it did again in 1988 and 1992). By 1988 the big five unions controlled over 60 
percent of the union section -  a quarter of the college. We can see how significant 
these shares were by comparing them to the votes of MPs and CLPs. In 1981 there 
were about 250 Labour MPs (after the initial waves of SDP defections) and in 1983 
there were 209, which meant each MP controlled about 0.1 percent of the entire 
college. In 1981 the TGWU’s block vote was equivalent to that of 67 MPs while the 
big four unions controlled votes equivalent in size to two-thirds of the PLP -  167 
MPs. In 1988 the big four unions’ votes were equivalent to those of 190 MPs. 
Similarly, assuming there were about 600 CLPs, the TGWU was equivalent to about 
160 CLPs in 1981 and about 200 in 1988. The big four unions were equivalent to 400 
CLPs in 1981 and 500 in 1988. Considering the time and resources needed to 
campaign for the votes of such large numbers of MPs and CLPs, we can see how 
important the big unions were with their huge concentrations of votes.
If a candidate could get an early commitment of support from a couple of big 
unions, he could quickly find himself virtually home and dry. The successful 
construction of coalitions could be greatly assisted by an early build-up of support as 
this could provide a campaign with valuable momentum. A bandwagon could be set 
in motion and it could quickly become unstoppable. In their discussion of the
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formation of political coalitions, Lax and Sebenius (1991) argue that ‘strategic 
sequencing’ is an important tactic commonly used to construct and cement alliances. 
This involves approaching potential allies in a certain order so that gaining one 
party’s support makes it easier to win the support of another party later on. As they 
put it, ‘the prior commitments of other parties may be used as resources in obtaining 
the acquiescence of other subsequent parties.’ (1991: 180. Emphasis in original). In 
the electoral college, if a candidate could secure early backing from some big unions, 
he could increase the credibility of his campaign and thereby encourage other parties 
to support him. The huge block votes wielded by the unions could firmly establish a 
candidate as a frontrunner. Since the unions were unique in their high concentration 
of college votes, they were in a better position to be able to provide candidates with 
an early boost. This increased the bargaining power of the leaders of the big unions 
and led to frequent claims that they were ‘kingmakers’.
It may be objected that the decision was not up to union leaders but was made 
after internal consultation. It is true that the discretion claimed by union leaders did 
not stretch to taking unilateral decisions on important issues such as leadership 
elections. Nevertheless, union leaders did have significant influence in the early 
stages of a contest because they retained nominating rights. Sometimes this could be 
almost as good as voting for the candidate. The importance of nomination was that, 
unlike the casting of votes, it could be done very early on in the campaign, 
contributing to -  or even setting in motion -  the bandwagon effect described above. 
For example, Kinnock’s leadership quest in 1983 was settled long before the casting 
of votes in the electoral college. Shortly after Labour’s crushing election defeat in 
June 1983, it was announced that Michael Foot would stand down as leader. Clive 
Jenkins, the leader of ASTMS, immediately nominated Kinnock as his successor. The 
UCW quickly followed suit and Moss Evans, leader of the TGWU, was also pushing 
Kinnock. Rival candidates such as Peter Shore complained of a ‘stitch-up’ by union 
barons (see Heffeman and Marqusee, 1992: 36). Some commentators questioned 
whether the actions of these union leaders were overly significant (see Minkin, 1992: 
344) but there seems little doubt they were instrumental in giving Kinnock a head 
start.4 These leaders, in collusion with their ECs, acted quickly to promote their 
favoured candidate. Though no votes had yet been cast, nominating Kinnock, while 
not committing their electoral college delegations, did make it harder for the latter to
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vote another way. In any case, by the time the conference arrived, the bandwagon 
had been of such force that no one was in any doubt about the result. One 
consequence was that many MPs voted for Kinnock in the open ballot of the PLP 
section because they knew he was home and dry, and did not want to damage their 
chances of patronage (Stark, 1996: 140).
The unions did the same thing in another leadership contest after another 
election defeat, this time in 1992. John Edmonds of the GMB made a baronial 
intervention in the leadership contest two days after the party’s defeat at the polls. 
His forthright backing for John Smith attracted resentment within the PLP but the 
Smith bandwagon very quickly became as unstoppable as Kinnock’s nine years 
earlier. Smith romped home in the leadership contest, taking 90.9 percent of the 
college votes. His margin of victory over the vanquished Bryan Gould (who took just 
9.1 percent) was greatly exaggerated by the system of block voting.5
The contests of 1983 and 1992 were the only ‘open’ contests arising from 
vacancies (as opposed to challenges to an incumbent) under the old electoral college. 
Contests that followed a resignation freed the unions from the need to show loyalty 
to the incumbent allowing them instead to push their own candidates. It is clear that 
this happened on a concerted scale in both 1983 and 1992 insofar as the leadership 
elections were concerned. It also occurred in the deputy leadership election in 1983 
when the unions heavily pushed Hattersley as part of the ‘dream ticket’. It happened 
again in the deputy leadership election of 1992 with Margaret Beckett though to a 
lesser degree: allegations of a ‘stitch-up’ with Smith’s election made everyone wary 
of pushing another ‘dream ticket’. Informally, though, the Smith camp was receptive 
to the idea of Beckett as deputy (Alderman and Carter, 1993: 54; McSmith, 1993: 
213). Union support also influenced the behaviour of candidates in leadership 
elections. In 1983 three of the four candidates for the leadership (Hattersley, Heffer 
and Shore) urged the unions to consult their members before casting their block 
votes. The fourth candidate, Kinnock, was silent (McSmith, 1996: 30). Similarly, the 
party-union link was itself one of the major campaign issues in 1992. Gould was the 
most vocal candidate in support of reform, while Smith and Beckett were much more 
cautious (Alderman and Carter, 1993: 58). However, none of this prevented Kinnock 
or Smith changing their minds once they had won.
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Coalition-Building in the Unions
Given the need to win over entire unions to secure their block votes, how did 
candidates respond? Canvassing within the unions took two forms. The most obvious 
way was to seek the backing of the union leader. The second consisted of canvassing 
support among union personnel below the position of leader: members of the EC, 
regional organisers, delegates at the union’s conference, etc. These two strategies 
were not mutually exclusive -  a candidate could build up support from the lower 
levels of the union gradually moving up to the leader himself. Two trends established 
themselves during the use of the electoral college. First, union leaders, including 
those on the left, tended to support incumbents and express hostility towards the hard 
left. Indeed, there was generally a consensus stretching from the leaders of the 
leftwing unions to the centre-right leaders. Secondly, ballots of union members 
always provided succour for ‘moderates’. The first tendency echoes our assumptions 
that union leaders have an interest in Labour’s electoral fortunes. The second 
tendency implies curvilinear disparity within the unions. Certainly, rightwing 
candidates relied on the dual strategy of gaining the backing of union leaders and 
calling for consultation ballots. Healey (1981) and Hattersley (1983) both employed 
this strategy (see Minkin, 1992: 337, 345). By contrast, Benn’s leftwing campaign in 
1981 relied on cultivating links with intermediate-level union officials.
The situation was more problematical for candidates lacking the support of 
union leaders. This did not preclude them capturing block votes but it made it more 
difficult. A major consequence of block voting was the high mobilisation costs it 
imposed on minority factions in the unions and at the party conference. Candidates 
lacking the patronage of the union leader would have to seek out intermediate level 
supporters in the union. To do this in one union was difficult; to do it in many unions 
was a monumental task. It required a well-run organisation to mobilise support 
against the union leaders. The only occasion on which this happened systematically 
was during the first ever election conducted under the electoral college rules.
Benn announced his intention to challenge Healey for the deputy leadership 
in April 1981, as the left was gaining strength and the right was on the defensive over 
the record of the previous Labour government. Nevertheless, virtually the entire 
Labour establishment was against Benn. Those opposing his bid included the leader 
Michael Foot, all of Benn’s shadow cabinet colleagues, most of the PLP, and most of
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the leaders of the major unions, right and left, including Evans (TGWU), Jenkins 
(ASTMS) and Bill Keys (SOGAT). Moreover, the media were uniformly hostile to 
Benn throughout the six months of the campaign and opinion polls showed large 
majorities of both ordinary voters and union members preferring Healey to Benn.
Benn targeted middle-level union officials by utilising the Rank and File 
Mobilising Committee (RFMC), an umbrella organisation for existing leftwing 
groups, which had been formed in May 1980 to fight for the left’s constitutional 
reforms. RFMC activists attempted to outflank union leaders by seeking out allies in 
unions’ ECs, conferences and delegations. By exploiting links that the CLPD and 
others had already established with union officials, RFMC activists were able to 
reduce their mobilisation costs. Utilising these activists also eased information costs 
since they could take Benn’s message into the unions for him, distributing leaflets 
and other propaganda, as well as reporting back on internal developments. In short, 
‘[t]he Benn campaign became a campaign for trade union politicisation’ (Kogan and 
Kogan, 1982: 119), and it injected uncertainty into the casting of the block votes. 
This was carried out on a concerted scale across a range of unions though only in 
ASTMS did delegates ignore their leadership’s wishes and support Benn.
Given the unpropitious circumstances, it is not surprising Benn lost though 
only by a tiny margin, collecting 49.574 percent of the college votes to Healey’s 
50.426 (Table 7.1). Nevertheless, Benn’s defeat at a time when the left was at its 
zenith, and despite great tactical ingenuity, illustrated the difficulty of mobilising 
block votes against Labour’s elite. Ultimately the costs of mobilisation were too 
great -  largely because too many separate unions had to be won. The Bennites’ 
strength was as a pan-organisational faction, but block voting requires concentrated 
strength within unions as well as across them. The aggregate percentages of the 
deputy leadership ballot conceal the politics of mobilisation within the unions. The 
concentration of voting power in a few big unions meant that it needed only a 
handful of delegates to change their minds in order to put a completely different 
complexion on the result. Had the TGWU voted for Healey, he would have won by a 
margin of 17 percent rather than 0.8 percent. Equally, had NUPE voted the 
preferences of its leftwing EC rather than holding a membership ballot (which went 
to Healey), Benn would have won by 7 percent. Block voting introduces an element 
of arbitrariness, which explains why candidates focused on winning union votes.
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Table 7.1 Contests under the Electoral College
PLP (30%) CLPs (30%) Union;s (40%) Total
1981 (Deputy leader)
First Ballot
Healey* 51.0 17.7 61.7 45.5
Benn 21.2 78.3 16.0 36.6
Silkin 26.5 3.7 22.3 18.0
Second ballot
Healey* 65.8 18.9 62.5 50.4
Benn 34.2 81.1 37.5 49.6
1983 (Leader)
Kinnock 49.2 91.5 72.6 71.3
Hattersley 26.1 1.9 27.2 19.3
Heffer 14.3 6.6 0.1 6.3
Shore 10.3 0.0 0.1 3.1
1983 (Deputy leader)
Hattersley 55.7 51.0 88.1 67.3
Meacher 29.3 47.8 11.8 27.9
Davies 10.9 0.8 0.0 3.5
Dunwoody 4.0 0.3 0.1 1.3
1988 (Leader) 
Kinnock*
Benn
1988 (Deputy leader) 
Hattersley*
Prescott
Heffer
83.0 81.2 97.4 88.6
17.0 18.8 2.6 11.4
58.0 60.3 78.3 66.8
24.0 26.0 21.8 23.7
18.0 13.7 0.3 9.5
77.2 97.7 96.3 90.9
22.8 2.3 3.7 9.1
1992 (Leader)
Smith
Gould
1992 (Deputy leader)
Beckett
Prescott
Gould
42.9
31.4
25.7
63.5
23.7
12.9
63.5
29.1
7.5
57.3
28.1
14.6
1994* (Leader)
CLPs (1/3) Unions (1/3)
Blair 60.5 58.2 52.3 57.0
Prescott 19.6 24.4 28.4 24.1
Beckett 19.9 17.4 19.3 18.9
1994a (Deputy Leader)
Prescott 53.7 59.4 56.6 56.5
Beckett 46.3 40.6 43.4 43.5
All figures in table a percentage o f votes in each section of the electoral college. Sources: Gamer and 
Kelly (1998: 142, 144); Punnett (1990: 187); Labour Party (1982, 1984, 1989, 1992b).
* denotes incumbent
a: union section - votes cast by levypayers; block vote abolished in CLP section; PLP section also 
includes MEPs. The 1994 leadership election saw votes cast by 329 MPs/MEPs, 172,356 individual party 
members and 779,426 levypayers.
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One factor complicating the search for support within the unions was that no 
uniform procedures existed by which unions would decide how to cast their votes, 
reflecting the federal principle that affiliates enjoy autonomy in such matters. Some 
unions left the decision to their ECs, consisting of top union officials. Others allowed 
their conferences to decide, the latter being dominated by officials and activists. 
Finally, some unions conducted various forms of membership ballots, including 
postal and branch ballots. Sometimes, the electoral college delegates decided among 
themselves who to vote for. The choice of procedure could be important, particularly 
if curvilinear disparity existed within unions. Most union leaders tend to be centre- 
left but individual union members can span the political spectrum. In the first general 
election of 1974, only 55 percent of trade unionists voted for Labour, falling to 51 
percent in 1979 and 39 percent in 1983, after which it rose again (Taylor, 1987: 246). 
Between a quarter and a third of union members support the Conservatives. Union 
activists are more likely to be leftwing though perhaps not as much as Labour Party 
activists since their primary concerns are industrial rather than party political.
Given these differences, we should expect large-scale balloting of union 
members to produce favourable results for ‘moderates’ because more o f the ordinary 
(centrist) trade unionists will participate. Similarly we might expect the left to do 
better when union conferences take the decision since decision-making power lies 
with the activists. As for the ECs, once again, we should expect a tendency towards 
‘moderation’ but the left may sometimes benefit. The experience of the 1981 deputy 
leadership election confirmed many of these hypotheses, as do the contests of other 
years. In 1981 most unions allowed either their ECs or their conferences to make the 
decision, covering both leftwing and rightwing unions. Meanwhile, a number of 
unions held ballots, including NUPE, the NUM and COHSE. Most ballots were held in 
branches but turnout rates were low, reflecting low participation rates in union 
branch meetings: in COHSE, only 1.7 percent of the union’s members participated 
(Minkin, 1992: 339). With the exception of the NUM, every local ballot produced a 
majority for Healey. This was even true of NUPE, whose leaders and conference 
supported Benn. This explains Healey’s ‘two-level strategy’, as Minkin describes it: 
‘a much heavier emphasis on ad hoc personal contacts with union leaders and a 
systematic campaign to call for ballots of the membership’ (Minkin, 1992: 337).
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Controversy surrounded the decision-making processes of the TGWU. The 
union leadership was hostile to Benn but the left was confident that the TGWU’s 
biennial conference would back him. Agenda-manipulation by the leadership ensured 
that the biennial delegates were precluded from supporting Benn. Instead, a 
consultation exercise was undertaken in the union’s regional administrative units. 
The result was inconclusive though Healey won in a greater number o f regions. The 
results were not, in any case, binding on the EC, and it recommended a vote for 
Benn. In the end, the electoral college delegates supported a compromise candidate, 
John Silken,6 in the first ballot, and switched to Benn in the second. The press 
subsequently heaped opprobrium on the TGWU, deriding its procedures.
In later contests there was a shift towards balloting, though other methods 
survived (see Minkin, 1992: 344-357; Punnett, 1990: 185-6; Alderman and Carter, 
1993: 61-2). In the more clear-cut contests some unions questioned the point of 
spending scarce resources on expensive membership ballots. Such ballots were to 
become obligatory with the shift to ‘one levypayer -  one vote’ in the union section of 
the college after 1993. These ballots differed from the earlier ones in that block votes 
had been abolished so that individuals, rather than organisations, cast the votes. 
Before 1993, balloting favoured the ‘moderates’ even more because no matter how 
close the results of a ballot, the winner-takes-all rule remained in force. Moreover, 
turnout rates had no effect on the size of the block votes. Whether 80 percent or 20 
percent of levypayers participated in the ballots, the size of a union’s block vote 
remained the same. The introduction of compulsory ballots under OMOV would 
change this, as I show in the next section.
7.4 THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AFTER 1993 
The Union Links Review Group
Virtually the entire PLP leadership wanted to reform the college after the 
election defeat of 1992 because it was seen as unacceptably dominated by the unions. 
There was anger at the way union leaders had been perceived to ‘bounce’ the party 
into accepting Smith in 1992, not least because many modernisers believed that the 
party-union link contributed to voters’ lack of trust in Labour (Gould, 1999). Thus, 
as with other organisational reforms of the period, this one was motivated by
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electoral factors (Webb, 1995: 7), and while everyone accepted the need for change, 
the debate concerned its extent. Labour’s dominant coalition had historically been 
between the PLP and union leaders. In 1992-3, the leaders of the major unions 
accepted the need to reduce their share of the electoral college but were looking for 
an equal tripartite college in which the PLP, CLPs and unions each controlled one- 
third of the votes. They wanted a consolidating institution, in which the old dominant 
coalition was preserved and strengthened (despite the reduction in the unions’ voting 
power) as a more acceptable and legitimate college was established. By contrast, 
modernisers wanted a ‘new deal’ institution from which the unions were removed 
entirely. This would be achieved by an alliance of MPs and party members, the two 
groups that would benefit from the reform. An alternative option was to give all the 
votes to the individual members but this was never likely to get through the union- 
dominated party conference. This was a big obstacle for modernisers and meant 
compromise was inevitable though they hoped the unions might flinch from 
defeating Smith, whose preferences on this were closer to the modernisers’.
The battle began in earnest with the establishment in 1992 of the union links 
review group. This had started off as a sub-committee of the NEC set up by Kinnock 
in the final weeks of his leadership to examine the electoral college, candidate 
selection, and the union block vote at the party conference. Kinnock expected it to 
abolish union representation in the first two institutions but his authority was waning 
and the review group was dominated by traditionalists, including representatives of 
the four biggest unions. Most of the debate concerned OMOV in candidate selection, 
with leadership elections a long way behind in importance. In its published interim 
report submitted for consideration by CLPs and unions in March 1993, the review 
group did not recommend specific reforms but instead listed a number of options. 
These included a reweighted electoral college in which CLP, MPs and unions each 
controlled one-third of the votes (with block voting and compulsory balloting), an 
electoral college of party members and MPs each having 50 percent of the votes and 
various alternatives on candidate selection (Labour Party, 1993a: 13-15).
The debate over the electoral college became entwined with the debate over 
OMOV in candidate selection. Smith struggled to persuade the unions to accept OMOV 
so he sought a trade-off between the reform of candidate selection and leadership 
contests. On the latter, Smith’s preference, shared by the modernisers, was for an end
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to union participation and a new college in which the PLP (and EPLP) and individual 
party members would each take 50 percent of the votes. The unions opposed this so 
Smith offered them a continued role in the electoral college in return for OMOV in 
candidate selection. However, in the new college, the unions’ vote share would be 
reduced to one-third and block voting would be abolished, replaced by one levypayer 
-  one vote (OLOV). This represented a defederalisation of the union section and broke 
the power of union leaders though this was not recognised by modernisers or 
traditionalists. Each side saw only the fact that union involvement was maintained, 
which is why traditionalists accepted the reform while modernisers such as Blair and 
Brown were aghast (Rentoul, 1995: 328-9; Gould, 1999: 189-91). Traditionalists still 
opposed OMOV but thanks to the compromise Smith persuaded the review group to 
recommend straight OMOV in its final report, which also advocated changes to unit 
voting at the party conference (Labour Party, 1993b).
Figure 7.2 Institutional Preferences: Traditionalists and Modernisers (1993)
Unitary
Federal
 ►
UnitaryFederal
Candidate Selection
Figure 7.2 offers a schematic depiction of the trade-off over the electoral 
college and candidate selection. Between OMOV and the two-section electoral college 
on the one hand and the status quo on the other stood numerous possible compromise 
solutions, ranging from more federal (‘indirect’) to more unitary (‘direct’). The 
modernisers wanted unitarism in both spheres while the traditionalists preferred only 
a slight dilution of the federal structure. SQ denotes the status quo ante 1993 while T
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and M are the bliss points of the traditionalists and modernisers (including Smith) 
respectively. The circle indicates all points that offer the traditionalist majority the 
same payoff that accrues from SQ. Ideally, many would have liked to remain at SQ 
but realised this would be costly to the party, in terms of voter distrust and a 
continuation of the damaging conflict with the modernisers. They preferred a move 
to T, which would retain union influence while showing the public that Labour was 
changing. So, given the traditionalist majority on the review group and at the party 
conference, why did they not get their preferred outcome?
It appears that Smith played a key role here. He was not a member of the 
review group but turned up unannounced at its final meeting, which was to agree its 
recommendations. The union representatives were divided over what compromise 
they wanted and tried to adjourn the meeting but Smith insisted they continue. A 
compromise was informally agreed but since the union representatives had been 
mandated to support other proposals, no vote was taken. Instead, a one-page 
document set out the bare bones of the deal, including the new electoral college and 
OMOV in candidate selection with levy-plus, indicated by point X above. Smith 
immediately informed a waiting television crew that consensus had been achieved 
(Rentoul, 1995: 330-1). They were not what Smith or the modernisers wanted (point 
M) but they were the most that could be pushed through the NEC (which 
subsequently passed them by 20 votes to 7).
That still left the party conference, which had a traditionalist majority. Even 
if the status quo ante was completely discredited and change were necessary, why 
were the traditionalists unable to secure an outcome closer to T? The answer lies in 
the NEC’s agenda-setting powers. We have seen that the NEC enjoys procedural 
advantages in policymaking at the conference but on constitutional amendments it 
possesses a further power. In 1968, a rule was introduced requiring all rule 
amendments submitted by delegates to be automatically remitted to the NEC, which 
would report back at the following year’s conference and offer its recommendations 
before allowing a debate. The ‘1968 rule’ was adopted so that the NEC could 
examine the impact and compatibility of proposed rule changes with existing rules -  
a sensible provision, perhaps, though one that gives NEC constitutional initiatives 
(exempt from the rule) a head start on amendments from ‘the floor’.
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In 1993, the NEC could put the proposals of the review group to the 
conference free of competition from alternative rule amendments, enabling it to
• j
determine the agenda. This prevented the traditionalist majority at the conference 
putting forward its own proposals leaving it with a choice between the status quo and 
the NEC’s proposals. Once again, we can see that the NEC’s agenda-setting powers 
were more crucial than the conference’s veto powers (and to the extent that there 
may have been different majorities for different proposals, the NEC’s powers are also 
a means of breaking vote cycles). Ultimately, the amendment on the electoral college 
was passed easily but that on OMOV in candidate selection was extremely close and 
was secured only after last-minute arm-twisting of the MSF union, which was 
persuaded to abstain in the vote (Rentoul, 1995: 337-9).8
The Mechanics of OLOV
The reaction to this compromise is somewhat surprising. Modernisers were 
unhappy with the retention of union influence, Brown opposing it vehemently and 
Blair regarding it as a ‘disaster’. Union leaders seemed happy enough despite the fact 
that individual levypayers would now cast the votes. Neither side recognised it for 
the dramatic change it was. Inter alia, this implies a critique of some existing rational 
choice work on institutions. Alt and Shepsle (1990: 2) state that a key feature of the 
rational choice approach is ‘the recognition that those responsible for changing an 
institution can anticipate any effect of an institutional change’ (see also Shepsle and 
Weingast, 1995; Krehbiel, 1991). However, just as individuals are institutionally and 
informationally constrained in the pursuit of their policy preferences, so they are 
constrained in the pursuit of their preferred institutions. The existing structure of 
institutions puts obstacles in the way of changing those institutions, which an 
enacting coalition must overcome. Similarly, we must recall that individuals, while 
rational, are only boundedly so. Particularly when contemplating institutional 
variations without many (or any) precedents, actors may not be able to foresee all the 
consequences of changing those institutions. We can agree with Alt and Shepsle that 
‘those seeking to change an institution have some result in mind when they try to do 
so’ (1990: 2) but that is not the same as saying those results will necessarily transpire 
from the change. As to why actors would risk a change if they cannot foresee all the 
consequences of doing so, it may be that the status quo ante is so unappealing that
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they are willing to take a risk. Perhaps more often -  and this would appear to be the 
case with the reform of Labour’s electoral college -  they believe they can predict the 
consequences of change but hindsight shows they miscalculated.
The 1993 reform of the electoral college altered the role of the unions and 
dramatically reduced the role of union leaders and intermediate level officials. Union 
influence would henceforth be administered through the agency of individuals and 
would be mediated by turnout rates. Under the block voting system, if a union had
500.000 levypayers registered, it would cast 500,000 votes in the union section, 
regardless of how many actually participated in consultation procedures or ballots. 
Under the new system, by contrast, if only 5,000 levypayers cast their ballots, then 
only 5,000 would be counted in the sectional vote. Furthermore, votes would be 
aggregated for each candidate: if, out of these 5,000 votes cast by a union’s 
members, 3,000 were for candidate A and 2,000 were for candidate B, then the two 
candidates would receive precisely these amounts. Under the block voting system, 
candidate B would have a minority of the votes so she would get no votes at all from 
that union, whereas candidate A would take the entire block of votes -  in this case,
500.000 because turnout rates were irrelevant.
Table 7.2 Individual Unions’ Influence under OLOV
TURNO
IDEOLOGICAL
CONFORMITY Low impact Very low impact
High impact Medium-low impact
Low turnout rates under OLOV would be less important if all unions had the 
same turnout rate. But if a large and a small union saw the same absolute number of 
levypayers participating, then, ceteris paribus, the smaller union is having a 
disproportionately greater say in the leadership election. However, other things may 
not always be equal. Since each candidate’s votes are aggregated, a union qua 
organisation may not have any net influence at all, i.e. if its members divide evenly
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between the candidates. This was not fully appreciated during the negotiations and 
distinguishes this format from the review group’s interim suggestion o f compulsory 
balloting but a retention of block votes. Table 7.2 shows how much impact a given 
union qua organisation can have in a contest with varying member turnout rates and 
ideological uniformity in the members’ views. A given union will maximise its 
relative impact on the result of the election by maximising the proportion of its 
levypayers voting, though this impact will be greater if the members are 
predominantly uniform in their preferences. However, a union leader may not strive 
to achieve a high turnout in such a situation if he believes his members’ preferences 
contradict his own. He and his EC may decide to print their recommendation on the 
ballot papers -  a ploy that is permitted under the rules and which was utilised by six 
unions, including the TGWU and the RMT, in the 1994 contests, the first to be held 
under the new OLOV mle. Since voting figures are produced for each individual 
union, many union leaders feared their authority would be undermined by making a 
recommendation that went unheeded by the levypayers. It appears these 
recommendations may have had a marginal impact (Alderman and Carter, 1995: 
449-50) though it is clear that the unions qua organisations play a greatly diminished 
role under OLOV. The union leaders are largely deprived o f their old ‘kingmaking’ 
role since it is no longer in their power to promise hundreds of thousands of block 
votes to a given candidate. Their enrolment in a candidate’s coalition of supporters is 
thus less requisite. Bandwagons of support are less likely to be set in motion by 
union leaders. This involved a transformation in principal-agent relations and in the 
nature of political bargaining as Punnett (1990: 190) observes:
The granting of support in return for policy concessions is central 
to the decision-making process, whether in government, union 
affairs or intra-party politics. This bargaining process, however 
requires a system of representative democracy in which union and 
constituency leaders are able to make agreements on behalf of their 
members. Postal ballots would strip MPs, union leaders and 
constituency activists of this bargaining role.
Political exchange between candidates and hundreds of thousands of individual party 
and union members is qualitatively different from that with union leaders and 
delegates. If a candidate wants to know the views of a union leader, she need only
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ask him. Candidates can also, without much difficulty, discover their depth of 
support among union EC members and conference delegations. Once a candidate has 
this information about principals’ preferences, she can tailor her promises towards 
winning the block votes. The task of discovering the preferences of party members 
and union levypayers is trickier, and thus costlier in terms of time and resources. 
Candidates cannot feasibly bargain directly with party and union members; instead, 
they will need to find out what the members’ preferences are, which will require 
expensive polling. McSmith (1996: 339) observes that ‘[t]he new electoral system ... 
allowed Blair to arrive without making bargains or being beholden to sectional 
interests inside the party.’ This is a major consequence of OLOV.
Moreover, since leadership elections are conducted by postal ballot, union 
members need not attend branch meetings or be active in union affairs in order to be 
able to vote. This implies that the sort of active campaigning undertaken by Benn in 
1981 will be less evidently useful in procuring votes under OLOV. Organisations like 
the RFMC were more effective when the voters were sitting together in conference 
halls rather than sitting alone in the privacy of their own homes. A geographically 
dispersed, atomised electorate necessitates a media-centred campaign, in which 
imagery and presentation supplant direct bargaining. The collective action problem 
now consists of persuading levypayers to fill in their ballot papers. Many levypayers 
have a low propensity to politically activity. Given the ‘contracting out’ system, 
some union members may not even realise they pay the political levy at all. We 
would expect the rate of participation among non-active levypayers to be lower than 
that of non-active party members. The latter at least have demonstrated their 
commitment to the party by joining it and paying membership fees. The 1994 
contests elicited a turnout rate of just 19.5 percent in the union section (779,426 
votes), a figure comparable to turnout levels in internal union elections. By contrast 
the turnout rate in the CLP section (conducted under an OMOV ballot) was 69.1 
percent (Alderman and Carter, 1995: 449).
Earlier, I argued there is a relationship of curvilinear disparity within the unions, 
with leaders and passive levypayers politically more ‘moderate’ than activists. Thus, in 
1994, Margaret Beckett believed a low turnout in the union section would ensure the 
over-representation of leftwing activists. When it became clear that she was trailing 
behind John Prescott, she shifted to the left in order to win these votes, though
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ultimately it was to no avail (Alderman and Carter, 1995: 448). But a high turnout in 
this section should, in theory, benefit the ‘moderates’. A major reason why the 
Labour right supported membership ballots was that they believed the inactive 
members of the party and the unions tend to be less radical than the activists. Given 
the sort of problems that Labour governments have often experienced with the unions, 
the electoral college as originally designed could have presented an unpopular Labour 
government with serious difficulties. The unions’ internal ‘consultations’ would involve 
union officials and activists -  the people who might have the greatest hostility towards a 
Labour government that was embroiled in disputes with unions. In these circumstances, 
the left might gain more support as it did in the 1981 deputy leadership election, which 
took place just two years after the fall of the Labour government, and in which one of 
the candidates was the minister responsible for that government’s economic policies.
However, it is precisely in such situations that OLOV might be expected to 
neuter the threat of the left. Even if the unions were at loggerheads with a Labour 
government, May’s law should still apply. There might be some shift to the left given 
such large-scale mobilisation of workers, but the evidence from the 1974-79 
government suggests that most workers saw the disputes in narrowly sectional terms, 
justifying their own strike action but hostile to that of other groups of workers. This 
is more likely to be true of generally non-active trade unionists than it would be of 
activists; yet it is the former group that OLOV enfranchises. A leadership election in 
such circumstances could find ordinary levypayers resisting the siren call of the left 
and staying with the ‘moderates’. The blaze of publicity given to a contest to choose 
a Prime Minister would likely induce a higher turnout rate, which would probably 
benefit the ‘moderates’.
In the CLP section, OMOV ballots were used in 1994 but minority support within 
each CLP was now credited to a candidate, with her support being aggregated over all 
CLPs and thus abandoning the federal principle. The attraction of OMOV ballots for the 
modernisers is that they enfranchise moderate and inactive members outside the closed 
ranks of the GCs. These members gain most of their political information from the 
media, particularly television, so the latter becomes a more important instrument in 
leadership contests. The personal images of the candidates also assumes greater 
importance as the inactive members are likely to be interested in attributes other than 
just policy positions, particularly if each candidate is saying a similar thing. In fact, the
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contests of 1994 were rather bland because none of the candidates wanted to attack his 
or her opponents for fear of damaging the party as a whole.9
The need to win the votes of individual party members and levypayers meant 
inevitably that the media would play an important role in the contests. The media 
could not cast any votes but their control and transmission of information could 
influence the votes of others. As Alderman and Carter (1995: 452) observe:
In 1994 the media took the place filled by the union barons in 1992 
in immediately identifying a frontrunner [viz. Blair]. The support 
this generated for Blair and media judgments as to the popular 
appeal (and telegenic attributes) of various potential candidates 
appear to have influenced the withdrawal of Robin Cook and 
Gordon Brown.
It is unlikely that the media could play this role unless MPs themselves were closely 
involved in briefings and hints. The politicians interact with the media, as shown by 
the important role played by spin doctors. The 1994 contests took place in special 
circumstances following the death of John Smith. A moratorium was called on 
campaigning for a month to allow the party to mourn the former leader but this 
simply created a vacuum, which was quickly filled by media speculation. There is 
little doubt that allies of the potential candidates, particularly Blair, were 
coordinating this behind the scenes. Peter Mandelson allegedly worked clandestinely 
to promote Blair among journalists and denigrate the chances of Brown.10 Ideally, 
the best way to start a bandwagon is to enlist the support of a large group of MPs, 
including as many (shadow) ministers as possible. (This would be essential because 
the 12.5 percent nominations barrier would have to be negotiated.) The media would 
play a more important role than when only MPs chose the leader because they would 
transmit information to party members and levypayers (Stark, 1996). It would not be 
enough simply to do deals with MPs though the latter would be important. In a 
reversal of the old college, the vote of one MP would now be worth 800 party 
members or several thousand levypayers (Alderman and Carter, 1995: 445). Even so, 
these figures were nothing compared to the old union block votes. In the new 
college, even if a candidate trailed behind another in terms of backing from MPs, she 
could still triumph once the members’ postal ballots had been counted.
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Thus, the reform of the electoral college had two important consequences. 
First, the PLP reassumed primary (but not sole) importance in leadership contests, 
both in its gate-keeping powers over the nominating process and in its ability to 
shape the contest as a whole, a role they inherited from union leaders under the old 
college. Second, the reforms resulted in a major strengthening of Labour’s unitary 
membership structures and a consequent crumbling of federalism. In both the CLP 
and union sections, block votes were abolished and their place taken by individual 
votes. Not only that, OMOV-OLOV also ended organisational autonomy by 
aggregating individual votes in each section. Thus, even union levypayers were now 
integrated into the party on a unitary basis and this helped combat claims about the 
illegitimacy of the party-union link.
7.5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
The avowed aim of the left in arguing for an electoral college in 1980-1 was to 
make the leader of the PLP accountable to the entire party. If ‘accountability’ is 
understood to mean the leader being subject to control from below regarding the 
direction of party policy, then the aim of the reformers has been frustrated. The 1980s 
and 1990s witnessed an unprecedented degree of freedom for Labour leaders over 
policy and internal party affairs. In this section, I examine some aspects of leadership 
accountability and how the electoral college failed to ensure it.
Ex Ante Information and the Electoral College
In theory, the old block voting system should have scored highly on the 
criterion of ex ante information about candidates because the union leaders would 
have been familiar with the candidates they were pushing. With hindsight, we can 
see they misjudged both Kinnock and Smith. If the unions thought these two leaders 
would be their captives, they would have been disappointed at the way both men 
sought to reduce union influence in the party. Campaigns in the electoral college 
provided principals with little insight into candidates’ future performance. Under 
OMOV-OLOV, candidates would not be perfectly informed of principals’ preferences, 
giving them an incentive to shroud their own preferences in ambiguity to avoid 
alienating potential supporters. Moreover, candidates do not want to alienate voters
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by saying anything that can be construed as extreme. In 1994, all three candidates 
running for the leadership issued mini-manifestos but they were light on substance 
and all were released late in the contest (Alderman and Carter, 1995).
Accountability and Monitoring: The Role of Intraparty Competition
One of the most important means of holding politicians to their promises is by 
exposing them to competition from rival politicians. If rivals covet the position held by 
the incumbent, they will have an incentive to monitor him in the hope of finding 
evidence of shirking or incompetence, and thereby oust him. If two rivals in the same 
party fight each other, they must consider not only the private benefits of scoring points 
against one another, but also the collective costs of party disunity. Disunity is a 
collective ‘bad’ for the party but there may be a collective action problem in producing 
the collective good of ‘unity’. If rivals believe they could gain more than they would 
lose from attacking each other, the situation could be a prisoner’s dilemma, in which 
both attack each other and the party appears split -  to the detriment of both rivals. The 
payoffs from mutual defection (party disunity) fall during the run-up to an election but 
can rise after an election, especially after a defeat. The desirability of party unity can 
hamper the efforts of politicians trying to hold the leader to account. This may often 
lead to ‘whispering campaigns’ rather than outright public attacks, though even the 
former can have a debilitating effect on a party and its leader.
The extent to which divisions need to be made public is itself variable and 
can depend on the method of choosing the leader. This helps us isolate one reason for 
the frequent observation that the electoral college has transformed the position of 
Labour leader into a sitting tenancy. When MPs choose the leader, rivals can monitor 
the incumbent’s performance without needing to make frequent use of the media to 
publicise shirking. There may be leaks and briefings but a rival politician need only 
make sure that other MPs are aware of the shirking, reducing the disunity costs of 
disseminating hostile information about the incumbent. By contrast, such costs are 
considerably higher when leaders are elected by the present college. If rival 
politicians want to draw attention to underperformance by the incumbent, they must 
let the mass of party members know, which will unavoidably involve utilising the 
media. If there remains the same desire not to publicise party divisions, competition 
among politicians as a mechanism for preventing shirking is blunted. Moreover, the
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rivals’ reticence in using the media too overtly will make it more difficult for them to 
build a base of support among ordinary members.
Mobilisation Costs
A major reason why tbe electoral college has failed to hold Labour leaders to 
account is that it increased the costs of mobilising against the incumbent, particularly 
after the twenty-percent nomination rule was introduced. When MPs alone chose the 
leader, there was always the option of a quick coup against an incumbent who had 
outstayed his welcome -  an option the Conservatives used to particular effect in 1975 
and 1990. Mrs Thatcher’s parliamentary colleagues deposed her in just three weeks. All 
that was needed was dissent among a sufficiently large group of MPs together with a 
credible candidate willing to stick his neck out. Organising a coup in the block vote 
electoral college would have been difficult. A challenger would need to secure the 
nominations of twenty-percent of the PLP, a considerable hurdle given that about a third 
of MPs were recipients of patronage from the incumbent in the form of front bench 
positions. The number of those hoping for patronage would comprise another 
significant portion of the PLP. A further obstacle was that all potential candidates knew 
they would have to secure the block votes of some of the big unions. The latter would 
have their own reasons for not wanting to destabilise the party, and they would frown 
on leftwing challenges. Hence, even if challengers could secure the backing of some 
MPs, they could not count on the unions. This knowledge would have presented a 
considerable mobilisation problem to those who wanted to depose their leader, since 
they would have to mobilise a fifth of the PLP and obtain information about the 
preferences of the major union leaders.
The electoral college is too clumsy to be of much use in controlling Labour 
leaders. It is costly for politicians to operate it and with the shift to OMOV, only the 
most serious challenges will be contemplated since hundreds of thousands of pounds 
will need to be spent balloting. As more and more unions and CLPs shifted away 
from executive-level decisions to some form of mass balloting, the costs began to 
rise. Indeed, the AEEU chose not to hold a ballot in the 1992 contests because the 
result was already clear and did not justify the expense of a postal ballot. The 
candidates also ran up considerable costs as they produced campaign literature and 
travelled up and down the country for meetings and debates. The total cost of
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balloting conducted in CLPs and unions in 1988 amounted to £500,000, while 
candidates spend, on average, over £10,000 each (Stark, 1996: 122).
This all helps the leader because under systems where only MPs can vote, it is 
possible for a non-serious ‘stalking horse’ candidate to challenge the incumbent in 
the hope of damaging him and opening up the field for a more serious challenger. 
The most famous example of this occurred in 1989 when Sir Anthony Meyer 
challenged Mrs Thatcher for the leadership of the Conservative Party. Meyer knew 
he had no chance of winning but used the campaign to argue that Thatcher was an 
electoral liability. Sixty MPs (out of 374) failed to support the leader. Her defences 
had been breached, and the following year she faced a serious challenger in Michael 
Heseltine. Thatcher failed to win the requisite number of votes to win outright on the 
first ballot and resigned. Given the expense involved in electoral college contests, 
such a step-by-step approach to dislodging the Labour leader is unfeasible.
However, while the electoral college makes challenges costly it does not 
make them impossible. Benn did challenge Healey in 1981 and Prescott challenged 
Hattersley in 1988. Benn’s 1981 challenge in particular showed that ultimately, the 
key factor is not the method of selection, important though it is, but the balance of 
political forces in the party. Benn was able to challenge Healey because the left was 
at its high-water mark in the Labour Party during 1980-1. Indeed, the switch to the 
electoral college encouraged Benn to challenge Healey because it enfranchised those 
sections of the party controlled by the left. In the future, it will be possible for a 
politician to challenge a Labour leader in the OMOV-OLOV electoral college -  but 
only if the leader is performing extremely poorly or the party is ideologically 
polarised. If a sizable section of the PLP deserted their leader, a contest would be 
possible, but given the rules and the expense, it would have to be a serious challenge. 
If it reached that stage, the incumbent might well stand down so that one of his allies 
could fight for his position.
Legitimacy Contra Accountability?
A further factor that helped entrench incumbents after the adoption of the 
college was the winning candidates’ enlarged base of legitimacy. A political actor 
can utilise the legitimacy underpinning her position as a power resource (Harsanyi,
225
1980: 168; Dowding, 1991: 71; 1996: 64). The fact that Labour leaders were, after 
1980, elected by sections representing the entire party, and not just by MPs, gave 
them greater authority (Gamer and Kelly, 1993: 181). The Labour MP, Stan Orme, 
warned Benn not to stand for the deputy leadership in 1981, arguing that a contest 
would ‘elevate the electoral college above the Conference, because if Healey wins he 
will cite the college as proof that he has support’ (Benn, 1994: 120). After Kinnock 
beat Benn in 1988, he claimed the result gave him a mandate to lead the party as he 
chose (Heffeman and Marqusee, 1992: 103). The emphasis has increasingly shifted 
away from accountability to ‘legitimacy’, particularly with the introduction of 
OMOV-OLOV. It is noteworthy that when the Conservative Party switched in 1997 to 
a version of OMOV for electing its leader, William Hague emphasised how this would 
give the leader greater legitimacy. There was no mention of accountability.
However, the three-way division of the college can also create problems of 
legitimacy. Every victorious leadership candidate in the college won at least a 
majority in two sections and a plurality in the third. In the deputy leadership election 
of 1981, however, Healey won majorities in the PLP and union sections but received 
the votes of only a fifth of the CLPs. This called into question his legitimacy among 
ordinary members. Benn narrowly lost that contest, by 0.8 percent but if  four more 
MPs had voted for him he would have won. If that had happened, Benn would have 
become deputy leader despite Healey winning big majorities in two sections (the PLP 
and union sections). It is hard to see how Benn could have claimed legitimacy in 
such circumstances. Therefore, we should be wary of saying that the electoral college 
always bestows legitimacy on the winners.
The Frequency of Contests
The left believed that by making contests annual events, it would be easier to 
keep leaders on their toes and reduce shirking. Yet despite the provision for annual 
contests, challenges to incumbents have been rare. Time and cost were major 
considerations though so was the lack of appetite among MPs and union leaders to 
see constant intraparty turmoil. Without annual contests the electoral college has 
tended to lead to the inauguration of victors with little subsequent accountability to 
the members. Evidence of what can happen with regular contests was provided by 
the deputy leadership contest of 1994 which saw the incumbent, Margaret Beckett,
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decide to run again just two years after being elected. The occasion for this decision 
was the death of Smith. Beckett suggested that a deputy leadership contest should be 
held simultaneously to avoid the expense of a possible challenge to her in the autumn 
should she have decided to stay on as deputy. In addition, she wished to run in the 
leadership contest making it proper for her to resign her old post first. However, the 
gamble did not pay off and Beckett was defeated in both contests. It is difficult to 
compare the figures for 1992 and 1994 owing to the 1993 reforms but even this could 
probably not explain the fact that in both the CLP and union sections, Beckett’s 
support fell by more than twenty percent in 1994 compared to 1992. One possible 
explanation for the haemorrhaging of her support was the ambivalence of her 
backing for Smith over OMOV at the 1993 annual conference. John Prescott made a 
last-minute speech in favour of OMOV and the leadership narrowly won the vote but 
afterwards, modernisers accused Beckett of disloyalty, suggesting she was making a 
play for the support of union leaders in the event of a Smith resignation (Rentoul, 
1995: 341). It is possible that Prescott was being rewarded and Beckett punished for 
the OMOV dispute of 1993. If this were the case, 1994 contests were a way of holding 
Beckett accountable for her actions and rejecting her on that basis. If the college had 
been used more frequently, this sort of occurrence might have happened more often.
7.6 CONCLUSION
The transformation of the electoral college mirrored the other organisational 
changes during the 1980s and 1990s in that the dual aim of the ‘modernisers’ was to 
erode leftwing power in the CLPs and reduce the visibility of the unions. These 
reforms mainly concerned the selection screen but other reforms, such as the 
‘twenty-percent rule’ impacted on the nomination screen. By enfranchising 
individuals rather than organisations, OMOV and OLOV represented a big shift 
towards unitarism in the Labour Party. The reforms were also part of the project to 
produce an organisational structure that would facilitate an office-seeking electoral 
strategy. Writing in the aftermath of Blair’s election as leader in 1994, Alderman and 
Carter (1995: 453) observed: ‘The party now has a system more attuned to producing 
a leader possessing the characteristics required to win over uncommitted voters in a 
general election.’ It did this by undermining the ability of intraparty principals to 
hold the leader to account. As with other reforms, the modernisers eased the
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transaction costs facing the leader in his dealings with voters and imposed them on 
party members in terms of increased mobilisation costs. This is likely to be important 
now that Labour is in office. Labour governments have often felt the strains of 
governing though a Labour Prime Minister has never been challenged for his 
position. The new electoral college makes this even less likely since neither Cabinet 
rivals nor union leaders can be sure that a putsch would be successful.
Contrary to expectations the electoral college contributed to the centralisation 
of power, leaving party leaders largely autonomous of the members from the moment 
the ballots are counted. Thus, as Margaret Beckett once remarked, the electoral college 
‘has had, in a sense, almost the reverse effect of what some of its proponents 
intended’ (cited in Stark, 1996: 66). Unwieldy, time-consuming and expensive 
mechanisms are inadequate in permitting on-going control over leaders. Possibly the 
only occasion during the last twenty years when the electoral college seriously 
constrained a party leader was in 1988 when Kinnock reined in his attempts to 
abandon Labour’s unilateralist defence policy for fear that union votes in that year’s 
deputy leadership contest might be switched from Hattersley to Prescott, an act that 
would have damaged the leader himself. Even then, the constraint was temporary as 
Kinnock changed the policy the following year.
A more important distributive consequence of the OMOV-OLOV reforms has 
been on the types of politicians who may succeed in the college. Benn would have 
had no chance of coming so close to securing the deputy leadership under the system 
of MP selection. Equally, Blair’s victory in 1994 owed a lot to the reform of the 
college the previous year. It is inconceivable that a candidate as rightwing (in Labour 
terms) as Blair could have won majorities in every section of the party at any other 
point in Labour’s history. That he did so in 1994 reflected the desperation at all 
levels for electoral success. Yet even here, we must bear in mind that Blair was not 
elected by, and did not have to win, union block votes. As we have seen, union 
leaders quickly installed frontrunners in the two previous ‘open’ contests in the 
electoral college in 1983 and 1992, and they opted for people they thought they could 
trust on union interests (even though this trust was misplaced in both cases). Had 
they retained their block votes in 1994, it is tempting to speculate they would have 
reverted to type, looking for a labourist candidate they could trust and then building 
up a bandwagon of support behind him/her. On the basis of past records, it is
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questionable whether that frontrunner would have been Blair, given his well-known 
support for OMOV and his pre-emptive move as Shadow Employment spokesman in 
1989 against the retention of the ‘closed shop’. It is possible that more support might 
have been forthcoming for Prescott and Beckett, but if it were felt that a modernising 
voter-friendly candidate were needed who nevertheless retained labourist credentials, 
Gordon Brown might have been the beneficiary. It is possible (though improvable) 
that the shift to OLOV in the union section was responsible for Blair, rather than 
Brown, becoming Labour leader.11 If that is so, the reformed college may have 
played an important role in determining Labour’s trajectory after 1994.
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A ppendix 1 to C hapter 7
Procedures for Challenging a Labour Leader
FF
j In opposition ,Ue^ w,e/, ,
Challenger secures 
backing of 5% of PLP.a
Following 6 months: 
votes of MPs and CLP 
and trade union block 
votes sought.b
Party conference: 
electoral college votes 
collated (30% PLP (open 
ballot); 30% CLPs; 40% 
affiliated organisations) 
and result announced.
Challenger secures 
backing of 5% of PLP.8
Principle of contest 
approved by two-thirds 
majority at the party 
conference.
Following 3 months: 
votes of MPs and CLP 
and trade union block 
votes sought.b
Special party conference: 
electoral college votes 
collated (30% PLP (open 
ballot); 30% CLPs; 40% 
affiliated organisations) 
and result announced.
Challenger secures 
backing of 20% of PLP.c
Following x months: 
votes of MPs/MEPs, 
individual CLP members 
and individual trade 
union members sought.d
Party conference: 
electoral college votes 
collated: (33.3% 
PLP/EPLP (open ballot); 
33.3% individual CLP 
members (national 
aggregate); 33.3% 
individual trade unionists 
(national aggregate). 
Result announced.
Challenger secures 
backing of 20% of PLP.c
Principle of contest 
approved by two-thirds 
majority at the party 
conference.
Following x months: 
votes of MPs/MEPs, 
individual CLP members 
and individual trade 
union members sought.d
Special party conference: 
electoral college votes 
collated: (33.3% 
PLP/EPLP (open ballot); 
33.3% individual CLP 
members (national 
aggregate); 33.3% 
individual trade unionists 
(national aggregate). 
Result announced.
Sources: Gamer and Kelly (1993: 177); Stark (1996: 176-8).
Notes: a: Increased to 20% in 1988.
b: From 1989, CLPs’ block votes had to be preceded by ballots of individual members.
c: 12.5% in the event of a vacancy arising from resignation or death of incumbent.
d: Individual trade unionists must belong to a union affiliated to the Labour Party, indicate on 
their ballot paper their support for Labour and confirm that they do not belong to another 
political party.
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Appendix 2 to Chapter 7
Electing the Extraparliamentary Leadership: The NEC
Internal elections are held for Labour’s ruling body, the NEC, as well as for 
the national constitutional committee (NCC), which is in charge of intraparty 
discipline. The unions’ block votes largely decided the composition of both bodies. 
The NEC has undergone changes in the period under discussion, reflecting both the 
centralisation of power and the shift towards individual members. In this appendix, I 
consider the changes made to the way in which NEC members are elected.
In 1982, Kavanagh (1982: 206) wrote that the ‘present structure of the NEC 
defies any coherent theory of representation’. Its structure was a compromise 
reflecting the different stakeholders in the Labour Party but from its earliest years its 
election was dominated by the unions. Initially, the unions had seven seats to the 
socialist societies’ five (out of a total of 12), rising to 13 out of 23 in 1918 by which 
time the new CLPs took five and the women’s section four. However, the entire NEC 
was now elected by the whole party conference, dominated as it was by the unions 
and it was not until 1937 that the CLPs won the right to choose exclusively their own 
candidates. With a few minor changes, that is how things largely remained until 
1998, by which time the NEC had 29 members, of which twelve were trade unionists 
and seven were elected by the CLPs, but with the unions, via the party conference, 
controlling the election of 18 places (see Table 7.3). However, the unions rarely used 
the NEC for factional purposes, preferring to permit autonomy to the PLP and play a 
largely supportive role, protecting the leadership from the left and intervening only 
when their own interests were at stake, e.g. strikes, but also Gaitskell’s attempt to 
change Clause IV. The variegated manner of its election helped insulate the NEC 
from overt control unless the unions acted jointly.
The CLP section of the NEC was smaller than the union section but its 
members tended to play leading roles on the executive because they were usually
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(though not always) MPs. The PLP was not represented on the NEC at all, reflecting 
its institutional detachment from the extraparliamentary party. Since leftists often 
dominated the CLPs so the MPs elected to the CLP section tended to be from the left 
of the PLP. Thus, the leftist supporters of Anuerin Bevan swept the constituency 
section in the 1950s (while remaining a minority on the NEC as a whole) and what 
would come to be called the Bennite left did the same in the 1970s. Since Labour 
(shadow) cabinets were dominated by the party’s centre-right, it was rare to find 
individuals who sat in the (shadow) cabinet and the NEC, other than the leader and 
deputy leader, with the result that the NEC could often be home to virtually a 
‘shadow’ party leadership. The provision for annual elections was an effective means 
of maintaining accountability among these MPs, as the veteran leftwinger, Ian 
Mikardo discovered in 1978 when his perceived backsliding on promises over 
mandatory reselection was punished with his removal from the NEC (see Panitch and 
Leys, 1997: 144). Interestingly, elections are to become biennial affairs from 2002.
Given that NEC elections offered the left an annual rallying cry and 
demonstration of strength, it is not surprising that they became a focus of the 
reforming ambitions of the modernisers in the 1980s when Kinnock introduced 
OMOV to the CLP section (replacing block voting by CLP delegates to the party 
conference). Since this did not infringe on union prerogatives in any way, no union 
opposition was forthcoming and only the hard left objected. OMOV ballots were made 
compulsory in 1990 and quickly precipitated a clear-out of the left (Shaw, 1994: 118- 
20). The hard left was not as well represented among the passive members as it was 
among GC members. Furthermore, the inactive members were more reliant on the 
mass media for information about the candidates, so shadow cabinet members could 
expect to benefit from their higher media profiles.
However, it would be wrong to conclude that OMOV permanently frustrated 
the Labour left. In 1997, Ken Livingstone defeated Peter Mandelson in what was 
widely seen as a head-to-head battle. Even if they are more moderate than activists, 
most Labour members are soft left, and certainly further to the left than floating 
voters. Moreover, the following year’s elections, the first under new rules prohibiting 
MPs from standing in the CLP section (see below) saw the formation of a leftist slate 
called ‘the grassroots alliance’. A number of members on the slate had some profile 
among Labour members and received considerable exposure in the national media,
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gaining the backing of a Guardian editorial -  a newspaper read by many Labour 
members. The slate won four of six seats available in the CLP section.
Labour’s leaders reformed the NEC in the 1990s to avoid a return to the open 
warfare of the 1970s. A consultation document, Partnership in Power (passed by the 
1997 conference) set out a new relationship between the NEC and the government, a 
partnership in which governing was left to the government. As part of this reform 
process, the composition of the NEC was altered (see Table 7.3) and its role 
redefined as being ‘to provide a strategic direction for the party as a whole and to 
maintain and develop an active party in the country, working in partnership with the 
party’s representatives in Parliament, the European Parliament and local government 
to secure the party’s objectives’ (Labour Party constitution (2000), Clause VIII(3)). 
The NEC’s policymaking powers have been usurped by the NPF, consigning the NEC 
to managerial functions and neutering it as a channel for intraparty ‘voice’.12
Table 7.3 Electing the NEC
Section NEC 1972-97 NEC 1998-
No. Method of Election No. Method of Election
Leader 1 ex officio 1 ex officio
Deputy leader 1 ex officio 1 ex officio
Treasurer 1 party conference ballot 1 party conference ballot
Trade unions 12 ballot o f unions at party conference 12
ballot o f  unions at party 
conference
CLPs 7 GC block voting* 6 OMOV ballot
Socialist societies 1 ballot o f socialist societies at party conference 1
socialist societies at party 
conference
Young Labour 1 1 Young Labour conference
Women 5 party conference ballot —
Government — 3
PLP (incl. EPLP) — 3 PLP/EPLP ballot
EPLP leader — 1 ex officio
Local government — 2 Association o f Labour Councillors
Black socialists ’ society — 1 National Black Socialist Society conference
Tota. 292 32
Source: Labour Party (1997: 9). * Compulsory OMOV ballots in CLP section from 1990.
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Under the new structure, the executive was expanded from 29 to 32 members. 
The union section was frozen at 12 members while the CLP section was reduced to 
six. The women’s section was abolished altogether but in its place was introduced a 
provision setting out minimum quotas for the numbers of women elected to each 
separate section (6 in the union section, three in the CLP section and a minimum of 
12 on the NEC as a whole). MPs would no longer be eligible to stand for election in 
the CLP section, which would be reserved for ordinary activists. Instead, MPs would 
have their own section, which would elect three members, and there would also be 
three places for members of the government. The significance of this reform is that it 
prevents CLPs from voting a slate of high-profile leftwing MPs onto the NEC year 
after year, causing trouble for the leadership (see also Bale, 2000: 284). MPs selected 
from the PLP and government sections would reflect the traditional dominance of the 
centre-right in those bodies. Those members elected on the CLP section might be 
lesser-known figures with few contacts and resources, lacking the confidence to 
tackle the government. In the event, the ‘grassroots alliance’ slate performed well 
and chose figures who, if not well known outside the Labour Party certainly had 
some following inside it. Moreover, the PLP section has chosen the leftwing MP, 
Dennis Skinner to be one of its representatives. Nevertheless, the NEC has lost many 
of its powers and it has not shown much inclination to take on the government.
An interesting feature of the NEC in its present form is the diminished power 
of the unions. Their twelve seats now represent a smaller proportion of the overall 
NEC. Other than their own section, the only other NEC member whose election they 
participate in is the treasurer, the only position that is subjected to a vote of the entire 
party conference. Thus, in the mid-1990s the unions could determine 18 out of the 29 
NEC seats (62 percent) but by 1998 that was down to 13 out of 32 (41 percent). This 
was in keeping with reforms in other areas of the party. Even so, some modernisers 
had set their sights on removing the union section completely but the unions 
successfully fought off such changes (Alderman and Carter, 1994: 332-3). The 
experience of the electoral college is that a 40 percent share of the votes is extremely 
useful and will enable the unions to protect their interests.
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The National Constitutional Committee
The National Constitutional Committee (NCC) was formed after Kinnock’s 
battle with the ultra-left Militant Tendency in the mid-1980s, sitting for the first time in 
February 1987. The need for it arose after a legal ruling that the NEC had violated 
natural justice by acting as prosecutor, judge and jury against party members who were 
accused of belonging to Militant and who thus faced expulsion from the party. The NCC 
was intended to take over the judicial function while the NEC would retain its role as 
‘prosecutor’. Despite its title, however, the NCC did not have control over the 
interpretation of Labour’s constitution, which remained with the NEC. Instead, it would 
play a narrow role in disciplinary matters, though even then this would relate mainly to 
individuals. The NEC retained control over disciplining affiliates and CLPs, which was 
considered essential for the purpose of party management (Shaw, 1988: 281).
There is no need to go into great detail on the NCC’s functions and operation 
(see Shaw, 1988: 280-5) though its control of some sanctioning rights is an important 
intraparty resource. Like the NEC, the NCC was elected by four different sections. It 
would have eleven members, five of whom were chosen by the unions, one by the 
socialist societies, three by the CLPs and two from the women’s section, elected by the 
entire party conference. This gave the unions control over seven of the eleven seats (64 
percent), reflecting their strength at the time on the NEC. Subsequent years saw the 
extension of OMOV in the CLP section for NCC elections.
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8 Organisational Resources 
Supply and Demand
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The basis of the exchange model is that parties demand resources in order to 
campaign for election and that individuals and organisations supply resources in 
return for policy promises and other benefits. This chapter looks at both sides of this 
supply and demand problem. Issues of funding and campaigning are often neglected 
in studies of the distribution of power in parties but they must be considered because 
they impact on exchange relations. This chapter does not offer a comprehensive 
account of Labour’s finances or its campaigning methods. Instead, the aim is to 
provide a brief description of these aspects of the party in order to gain further 
insight into Labour’s structural transformation.
In the first part of this chapter, I examine the supply-side, describing the main 
resources ‘traded’ in the Labour Party. This is a largely empirical endeavour, 
charting changes in the supply of different types of resources. I follow Webb (2000: 
218-51) in distinguishing three main resources: funding, members and staff. These 
are assessed in turn in sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4, and changing trends are identified, 
specifically, a reduced dependence on union resources (section 8.5). In the second 
part of the chapter, I examine Labour’s shift from a labour-intensive campaign 
technology to a capital-intensive one, drawing out the consequences for exchange 
relations. In section 8.6 I provide a theoretical framework for analysing political 
communications, which adds a dynamic element to the exchange model. I then set 
out the history (section 8.7) and techniques (8.8) of Labour’s communications 
revolution. Section 8.9 concludes.
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Part I. Resources
8.2 FUNDING
All main parties need a substantial supply of funds. This financial imperative 
becomes greater over time as the costs of campaigning rises. In the UK there has 
been a significant upward trend in the costs of elections over the last decade.1 This is 
reflected in the growth in the main parties’ expenditure and income (Table 8.1, 
Figures 8.1-2). As Labour’s demand for funds has risen, it has broadened its funding 
base. This section looks at three sources: unions, individuals and the state.
Table 8.1 Labour Party National Head Office Income and Expenditure, 1959-97
Nominal mloney terms 
Expenditure £
,
Real terms ( 
Income £
1997 prices) 
Expenditure £
1959 498,000 
1964 573,000 
1966 725,000 
1970 1,034,000 
1974 1,781,000 
1979 3,113,000 
1983 6,200,000 
1987 9,843,000 
1992 13,200,000 
1997 24,100,000
485.000
583.000
420.000
948.000
1.865.000
3.358.000
6.100.000
11.300.000 
19,000,000
31.500.000
6.225.000 
6,228,510
7.250.000 
8,613,220
10,009,220
8,467,360
11.284.000 
15,256,650
15.048.000
24.100.000
6,062,500
6,337,210
4,200,000
7,896,840
10,481,300
9,133,760
11,102,000
17.515.000
21.660.000 
31,500,000
Change
1959-97 +287% +420%
Figure 8.1 Main Parties ’ Head Office Expenditure 1959-97 (1997prices)
□  Conservatives 
Labour
i  15 --
1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997
General Election Year
237
Figure 8.2 Main Parties ’ Head Office Income 1959-97 (1997prices)
45
□  Conservatives
■  Labour
1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997
General Election Year
Source for Table 8.1 and Figures 8.1-2: Webb (2000: 232-3, Tab. 8.1).
Affiliation Fees and Donations
Most of Labour’s funds have historically come from the trade unions. Union 
money has come mainly in the form of affiliation fees, reflected in block votes, and 
special donations to general election campaigns. Affiliation fees come out of the 
political levy that individual trade unionists pay, though most unions do not hand 
over all of the levy to the Labour Party, keeping some for union campaigns.3 Each 
year, unions pay into Labour’s General Fund a uniform affiliation fee for each 
levypayer they affiliate to the party. In 1980, union affiliation rates stood at 32 pence 
per member per year. By 1987, this figure had risen to £1.45 in 1991 and £2 in 1998. 
Over the same period, the CLPs paid a lot more per member: £5.30 in 1989, 
compared with £1 for unions. This stemmed from a policy of trying to extract more 
money from individuals after 1980 (until then, CLP affiliation rates were the same as 
those for unions) as unions initially resisted big increases in affiliation rates. The 
unions also made additional payments to Labour’s General Election Fund, totalling 
£2,183,000 in 1983 and £3,760,000 in 1987 though Labour is less expansive on the 
details of these donations (Webb, 1992a: 21; see also Webb, 1992c).
The early-mid 1980s saw a marked increase in Labour’s financial and 
organisational dependence on the unions, not surprising given its falling individual
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membership and poor electoral performance. Affiliation fees increased by 80 percent 
in real terms between 1979 and 1987, and while Labour’s affiliated membership fell 
by 11 percent between 1979 and 1988, the actual decline in levypaying members 
(due largely to mass unemployment) within the unions was 29 percent. Thus, the 
unions softened the blow of their own falling memberships by affiliating to the party 
at 105 percent of their actual level (Webb, 1992a: 24). The vigour with which the 
unions mobilised support to retain their political funds in 1985-6 underlined their 
commitment to the financial well-being of the Labour Party. A change in the law 
introduced by the Thatcher government stipulated that union members must vote 
every ten years to decide whether their organisations should have political funds 
(which finance the Labour Party). All the ballots held in the 1985-6 period produced 
comfortable ‘yes’ votes, though this was partly because the unions’ links with 
Labour were downplayed (see Minkin, 1992: 562-82; Taylor, 1987: 205-34; Webb, 
1992a: 24-30). It is noteworthy that these ballots marked the start of an increasing 
emphasis on individual levypaying trade unionists that would produce innovations 
such as the ‘levy-plus’ scheme to recruit union members into the party as individuals, 
as well as the endowment of voting rights in Labour leadership contests. Increased 
levypayer involvement diluted Labour’s federal structure by switching the emphasis 
from corporate bodies to individuals. It also increased the legitimacy of union 
funding (Fisher, 1992: 120), helping to blunt Conservative attacks.
The formation of pan-union organisations such as Trade Unions for a Labour 
Victory (TULV) in 1978 and Trade Unionists for Labour (TUFL) in 1986 confirmed 
the unions’ pre-eminent position in the party. TULV encompassed most of the main 
unions and helped coordinate Labour’s election strategy on the ground by mobilising 
union staff to work for the party and encouraging union members to vote for Labour. 
It provided staff to regional Labour bodies and raised money for the party, for 
example by establishing a levy of 10 pence per affiliated member to contribute 
towards Labour’s election fund in 1983 (Webb, 1992a: 47). TUFL was a similar kind 
of body and was set up after the political fund ballots to try to build on their success. 
TUFL’s main task was to reactivate party-union relations at the grassroots. During the 
1987 general election, it provided union staff, resources and transport to aid Labour 
in targeted constituencies though it made little long-term impact in recruiting union 
members as individual party members (Minkin, 1992: 579).4
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If the 1980s saw the unions increase their financial burden, the 1990s saw the 
reverse. As Labour’s modernisation increased in the early 1990s, the unions 
contributed a declining proportion of its income while individual donors contributed 
more (Table 8.2). The party told the Neill committee’s investigation into party 
funding5 that most of this came from small donations (classified as being less than 
£5,000) though in the period 1992-97, about a third of donations were large (over 
£5,000). The proportion coming from the unions declined from 66% of total net 
income in 1992 to 35% in 1996, to 40% in 1997 (Neill, 1998: 231). The figure for 
1992 was itself a considerable decline on previous years. Minkin reports that the 
unions provided 89% of Labour’s funds in 1978 -  a postwar peak, falling to 73% in 
1987. The unions were also providing up to 95% of Labour’s general election fund in 
the early 1980s (Minkin, 1992: 509, 533).
Table 8.2 Labour Party Annual Income (£ millions)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997* Total
Subscription 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.5 2.1 1.9 11.7f
Affiliation fees 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.4 40.8
Donations 3.5 3.0 3.7 4.2 10.1 14.5 39.0
Commercial 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 2.6
Other 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.8 0.9 6.3
Total 13.2 12.8 13.7 15.1 21.5 24.1 100.4
* Estimate f  Accounting conventions for subscriptions changed between 1992 and 1997.
Source: Neill (1998: 30, Table 3.1)
However, the resources made available to Labour by the unions are more than 
simply financial. Until 1918, Labour’s local campaign network consisted entirely of 
local union branches and they continued to play an important role long after that, 
supplying personnel to the party during election campaigns and permitting the use of 
union buildings and offices. It is difficult to quantify these ‘gifts in kind’, as the Neill 
committee discovered when it questioned union leaders in 1998. Furthermore, 
Labour can also benefit from union campaigns that are formally independent of the 
party. In its submission to the Neill committee, the Conservative Party claimed:
[T]he trade unions contribute substantially more to the [Labour]
Party’s finances than is suggested in the Party’s accounts.
Donations in kind -  in terms of staff, equipment, advertising and
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campaigning -  are worth millions of pounds a year to the Labour 
Party. According to our estimates, in the six months up to 1st May 
1997, the trade unions spent £7.3 million campaigning for Labour 
yet none of this needs to be declared in Labour’s accounts. In 1996, 
trade unions affiliated to Labour spent over £14 million on political 
activities -  £7.7 million was given directly to Labour but more than 
£6 million was spent by the unions themselves (Neill, 1998: 238).
It may be that these estimates are inaccurate and that much of the money 
spent by the unions on political activity would not have been beneficial to Labour. 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Labour benefits to some extent from donations 
in kind and from union political campaigns: in the election year of 1997, UNISON ran 
a public campaign for a national minimum wage, a policy supported by Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats but opposed by the Conservatives. (Though the present 
Labour government is also currently the target of campaigns by unions regarding the 
use of the private sector in the running of public services.) In their evidence to the 
Neill committee, union leaders defended their right to engage in political 
campaigning, including advertising, during election campaigns and insisted that caps 
on party spending should not prevent them from undertaking such campaigning. The 
committee eventually recommended that individual unions be permitted to spend up 
to £1.5 million during general election campaigns.
State funding
There is no generalised state funding of parties’ organisations in the UK -  for 
the most part, parties have relied on individual subscriptions and donations, and 
donations by the factors of production, capital and organised labour. Nevertheless, 
since 1975 there have been limited state funds available for opposition parliamentary 
parties to enable them to engage in research and thus ‘shadow’ the government. This 
‘Short money’ (see Chapter 5, note 6) is calculated on the basis of seats and votes 
won, and initially was capped at an upper limit, though this cap was removed in 
1987. In 1998, the Neill committee recommended raising the value of Short money 
by a factor of 2.7, though by then Labour was in government and no longer eligible 
to receive it. Short money was a valuable source of funds to Labour under Kinnock 
(see Table 8.3). He used it to fund his leader’s office and provide research support
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for frontbenchers. An attempt by the left-dominated NEC in the early 1980s to put 
Short money under NEC control was successfully fought off by the shadow cabinet.
Table 8.3 ‘Short M oney' to the Parliamentary Labour Party, 1980-97
■mrYpar
vention (£) Year
State sub- 
vention (£)
1980 227,500 1989 839,709
1981 290,000 1990 839,709
1982 290,000 1991 839,709
1983 296,497 1992 946,250
1984 317,056 1992-4* 1,577,344
1985 440,355 1994-5 1,331,173
1986 440,355 1995-6 1,408,542
1987 436,669 1996-7 1,446,771
1988* 883,136 1997 (Apr) | 121,959
* Formula changed. From 1993 funding years ran from 1 Apr to 31 Mar (previously, 1 Jan to 31 Dec). 
From 1993, funds were also made available for travel expenses (totalling about £100,000 p.a. for all 
parties). These sums are not included in the above figures.
t  Payment for 01-04-97 to 30-04-97 only. After that date Labour was no longer eligible for Short 
money, having entered government on 01-05-97.
Sources: Webb (1994: 123, Table 5.3); Winetrobe and Clements (1993: 16); Walker (2001: 34). This 
latter source provides the formulae from which the figures for 1995 onwards were calculated by the 
present author.
The notion of state funding of parties has been highlighted by recent 
discussions of ‘cartel’ parties (Katz and Mair, 1995). From the perspective of the 
exchange model of parties, state funding is a crucial development because it involves 
the provision of valuable resources without the requirement for party leaders to 
provide policy concessions or other benefits to the donor. For this reason, state 
funding became an attractive potential long-term goal for some Labour modernisers 
and has again recently been floated by Labour’s General Secretary and some 
ministers in the light of heavy membership loss since 1996 (see below) and 
increasing allegations of ‘sleaze’ regarding the undue influence of wealthy donors 
(Wintour, 2002b). However, the major constraint has been that the public may not 
tolerate it. The UK possesses an entrenched political culture that encourages scrutiny 
of public expenditure and outcries over perceived waste. The public might tolerate 
parties ‘wasting’ their own money on extravagant campaigns but not that of
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taxpayers. Nevertheless, Short money was a useful addition to PLP finances, enabling 
it to begin overhauling Labour’s policies in the 1980s. The recent increases will 
prove useful to the next Labour opposition leader though even this would be nowhere 
near sufficient to reduce Labour’s reliance on individual and organisational donors.
Conclusion
At the start of the 1980s, Labour was a largely trade union-based party, 
financially and organisationally. That has now changed. Webb (2000: 237) states that 
‘[i]n 1983, some 96% of all central party income (including General and General 
Election Funds) could be traced to the unions ..., but within a decade no more than 
two-thirds could and by 1997 the figure stood at just 40% ...’ This conceals a lot of 
other factors, as mentioned above, yet there is little doubt that Labour’s financial 
reliance on the unions has greatly reduced to the extent that rather than being a 
largely union-based party, it is now a party with a significant though minority union 
financial base. Even Labour’s general election fund is no longer reliant on the unions 
to the extent it once was. The Electoral Commission reported that Labour received 
donations for the 2001 general election campaign totalling £6.1 million from three 
wealthy individuals (as well as other large donations from other individuals in 
business and the arts),6 while the unions collectively donated £6 million for the 
campaign. The unions’ contribution was expected to fall to 35 percent of Labour’s 
total election spending -  half the figure for 1992 (Hencke, 2001). Large donations, 
together with more small donations, have provided a sorely needed boost to party 
income. Furthermore, Labour’s status as the governing party makes it attractive to 
corporate donors, who have played an increasing role in offering sponsorship for 
Labour’s annual conference and other events run by the party, all presumably in the 
hope of obtaining access to, and a sympathetic ear from ministers. Although 
ministers are sensitive to charges that wealthy donors and big business can ‘buy’ 
policy outcomes, there would appear to be little incentive for such donations to be 
made unless favourable outcomes were the intention. The head of Formula One, 
Bemie Ecclestone’s £1 million donation to Labour was followed by an exemption for 
Formula One from the ban on tobacco advertising in sport (though the ensuing 
controversy led to the donation being returned). More recently, the steel magnate
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Lakshmi Mittal, a Labour donor, was the beneficiary of prime ministerial lobbying of
n
the Romanian government for British access to the Romanian steel market.
However, union funds are not surplus to requirements. Donations from 
individuals and business donors may dry up as the Labour government loses 
popularity or moves into opposition. The benefit of union funds is that they have 
been reliably secured for a century. The party’s fair-weather friends may desert it 
when the going gets tough but the unions have always been there. A realisation of 
this perhaps quietened demands by modernisers for a party-union divorce, though 
dissatisfaction with government policies has led a number of unions to call into 
question the money they give. Indeed, in July 2001, the GMB decided to cut its 
funding to the Labour Party by £250,000 per year (from £650,000 to £400,000) for 
the coming four years (Maguire, 2001b).
However, the demand for funds may not grow as exponentially as in the past 
given the new legal cap on campaign spending following the recent The Political 
Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. The new legislation prevents the main 
parties from spending more than £20 million on general election campaigns, perhaps 
dampening the growth in demand for finance.8 This has the potential to level the 
playing field between Labour and the Conservatives; it could also reduce the need for 
Labour to rely on unions funds -  providing that alternative supplies are available, 
and we have already indicated that this cannot be relied upon. Nevertheless, these 
changes could significantly impact on Labour.
8.3 MEMBERS AND ACTIVISTS
Individual members are a vital resource to parties, providing money in the 
form of subscription fees and donations9, voluntary labour (in quantities that would 
be prohibitively expensive in labour markets), and links to ordinary voters, to whom 
they can communicate party policy. The members keep local party organisations 
running and provide parties with a pool of potential candidates for elective office 
(see Scarrow, 1996: 40-6). However, like many other parties in both the UK and 
other Western democracies, Labour has experienced membership decline during the 
post-war period. There are a number of reasons for the general decline in party 
membership in Western Europe. Among the most important include a long term
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trend towards partisan dealignment, as the old social class boundaries break down 
and individuals no longer feel bound by a sense of identity to individual parties, 
whether as voters or members.10 Furthermore, with the increasing privatisation of 
people’s leisure activities, individuals no longer need to rely on parties for access to 
cultural resources or social clubs, i.e. there are fewer solidary incentives to join 
parties. These are supply-side reasons for membership decline (Scarrow, 1996; see 
also Webb, 2000: 221-3), which explain decline in terms of the supply of recruits 
drying up. There are also demand-side explanations, in which membership decline is 
interpreted as a reluctance of party leaders to recruit members, e.g. because they are 
too ‘extreme’. Webb (2000: 225-6) observes that this does not tally with the UK’s 
experience, where leaders of all parties have sought to recruit members. However, 
Labour has attempted to reduce its reliance on members in campaigns. A further 
demand-side factor that could be important in the future is the availability of 
comprehensive state subventions to parties, which would ease the need to recruit 
members for financial reasons (unless the level of state funds were linked to party 
membership levels, in which case they could provide an incentive for recruitment).
The general pattern of decline has been particularly evident in the UK and 
especially so in the Labour Party. In Labour’s case, it is important to be clear what 
we mean by ‘party members’. Labour has traditionally counted among its members 
not only those individuals who join CLPs but also the much larger number o f people 
affiliated through unions (and socialist societies). Even when Labour’s individual 
membership was at its peak in the 1950s, its affiliated membership was five times 
greater. The affiliated membership peaked in 1979, after which unemployment 
reduced union membership and thereby Labour’s affiliated membership (Webb, 
1994: 114). Individual membership continued to fall through to the early 1990s 
though the extent to which it had fallen earlier was masked by the requirement until 
1980 that all CLPs affiliate a minimum of 1,000 individual members. When that was 
changed, a truer picture of membership levels emerged (see Table 4.1 in Chapter 4).
Labour’s affiliated membership provided the party with the consoling myth 
of a mass membership, which existed only on paper. (Tom Naim described the 
affiliated members as the ‘dead souls’ of labourism, after Gogol’s novel while 
Gregory Elliott called them phantom industrial armies.) Some union activists have 
worked for the party but these people are also usually individual party members. The
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bulk of the affiliated membership is not active in any way in the Labour Party -  even 
in the leadership election of 1994 when individual levypayers could cast postal votes, 
barely one-fifth did so. Despite this, affiliated members brought the party money and 
largely obviated the need for serious membership drives in the Labour Party. This is 
one reason why little was done to stem membership decline in the 1960s and 1970s, 
leaving many CLPs vulnerable to take-over by the ‘bedsit left’ (see Chapter 6).
However, the picture began to change in the 1980s. As part of the attack on 
the activist left, Kinnock wanted to recruit a mass of moderate members, who would 
impose fewer electoral costs in terms of policy and who could help solve Labour’s 
financial problems. A membership drive was undertaken in 1989 (along with the 
computerisation of membership records and the provision of facilities to join the 
party at the national rather than local level) and reduced fees were introduced for 
members of affiliated unions. Kinnock rashly stated that his aim was to push 
membership to the one million level but despite a brief surge over 300,000 there was 
little real prospect of reaching such an ambitious figure. Given the persistent post­
war tendency in Britain of membership decline, it would have been surprising had 
Labour’s drive resulted in a long-term reversal of an inexorable decline. Moreover, 
the membership drive, although intended to increase numbers, was not meant to 
increase grassroots control of the leadership but reduce the influence of the activists 
and later to dilute Labour’s links with the unions.
After Labour’s defeat in 1992 and the inauguration of the union links review 
group, the new leader, Smith sought to increase the CLPs’ votes at the party 
conference. However, given that union block votes reflected affiliation levels, union 
leaders demanded that before any more increases in the CLPs’ share of votes could 
take place, the CLPs would have to carry a greater financial burden, which implied an 
increase in individual membership. It was agreed the CLPs could take 50 percent of 
the conference votes only when individual membership passed back above 300,000. 
A ‘levy plus’ scheme was also introduced to enable affiliated levypayers to join the 
party for just £3, compared to the normal £15 (Alderman and Carter, 1994).
These schemes had some initial success but they were not responsible for the 
remarkable surge that took place in Labour’s membership level in the mid-1990s. 
From a trough of 266,000 in 1994, membership soared to 405,000 just four years 
later (Figure 8.3). This increase coincided with the first years in charge of Tony
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Blair, a leader with a favourable media image and broad electoral appeal. Intensive 
advertising was carried out in the press and signalled in party political broadcasts, 
with the new leader imploring people to join the party, with considerable success. 
Labour seemed to have bucked the historical trend and presented itself as the fastest 
growing party in Western Europe.
Figure 8.3 Labour Party Individual Membership 1980-2002
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Sources: 1980-99: Tanner et al. (2000: 396-7); 2000-02: Wintour (2002a) -  no figures for 2001
However, this dramatic surge was followed by an equally dramatic slump. By 
2000, membership had fallen back to 311,000 and by January 2002, the party’s 
General Secretary admitted it had fallen to 280,000 -  back at the levels of the 1980s 
-  prompting him to float the idea of state-funding (Wintour, 2002a). There has been 
some debate about whether those exiting are disgruntled activists angry with the 
Blair government or fair-weather supporters who failed to renew their subscriptions 
(probably a combination of both). Unsuccessful spells in government often lead to 
activist exit. When Harold Wilson entered government in 1964 Labour’s individual 
membership stood at 830,000, having risen from 751,000 in 1961 but it had fallen to 
680,000 when he left office in 1970. Labour’s membership also fell somewhat during 
the years of the 1974-79 government, though the tumultuous years of 1980-1 saw a
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bigger slump. A problem with centralising power in a party to such an extent that 
there are few outlets for dissent is that disgruntled members, unable to exercise 
voice, may decide to exit instead. I return to this in Chapter 9.
Other members are probably failing to renew their subscriptions after the 
novelty of a new leader and new government have worn off. The members recruited 
since 1994 are considerably less active than longer standing members (Whiteley and 
Seyd, 1998a: 200-04). A membership recruited mainly for purposive reasons tends to 
have a high turnover rate as issues and personalities lose their salience. Those who 
joined Labour because they liked its leader or wanted to see it replace an unpopular 
Conservative government would have had less reason to stay once Labour was in 
government. Fair-weather supporters are the last to join and the first to leave.
A large and stable individual membership seemed to be a prerequisite for 
turning Labour into a direct membership unitary party. At first, a large membership 
was thought necessary because there had to be a way of providing an alternative 
financial base if the unions were to be edged out. It was eventually realised that 
Labour would not ever likely be in a position where it could depend principally upon 
individual members for finance. Katz and Mair (1995) have suggested that large 
memberships today are valuable to party leaders mainly as a legitimising device, to 
suggest to voters that the party has a large following and that its decisions are 
internally backed by party members in specially arranged plebiscites (a tactic 
employed by Blair -  see Chapter 5). However, are the members still valued as a 
labour resource, as activists who can campaign for the party and mobilise voters? I 
return to this question in the second part of this chapter.
8.4 PARTY STAFF
An important trend over the past two decades has been the professionalisation 
of central party workers (Panebianco, 1988). In the Labour Party, professionalisation 
has characterised its new communications structure (see below). In common with 
other parties (though more dramatically), Labour increased its paid central HQ staff 
while there has been a long term decline in the number of employed local party staff 
(Table 8.4). These figures are in addition to the many individuals who work as 
volunteers for the party HQ during elections.
248
Table 8.4 Party Staffing Levels in the Labour and Conservative Parties, 1964-98
Year Central ^Sub-national ---------c T tr T r i i f b - n l t io n a l
1964 50 
1970 50 
1979 n/a 
1983 n/a 
1987 71 
1993 90 
1998 179
248 97 580 
167 95 431 
128 n/a 350 
104 n/a n/a 
95 100 291 
n/a 148 240 
150 167 221
+258% -40% 472% -62%
Source: Webb (2000: 243, Table 8.2)
Webb (2000) observes an increase in the number of regional officials 
employed by Labour in recent years. He points out that regional staff are employed 
by, and answerable to the party HQ, unlike CLP officials who must answer to GCs 
and party members. This has facilitated central coordination of local campaigning in 
elections, which has been crucial to the success of targeted campaigns in general 
elections. Webb says that in 1998-9, Labour increased its regional payroll staff from 
75 to 142 -  an increase of 90 percent -  and he concludes: ‘central coordination is one 
means by which parties adapt both to technological change and to the loss of staff 
and members at the local level’ (2000: 244).
8.5 CONCLUSION
It is important to know where a party’s resources come from because these 
supply lines affect the nature of internal exchange relations, and with them the shape 
of institutions. This has always been true in the Labour Party: the fact that the unions 
affiliated principally on a national basis was important in directing resources to the 
centre and thus strengthening it (Fisher, 1995: 191). The fact that individual 
members can also now join the party nationally, together with fundraising exercises 
that specifically target them (e.g. mailshots) also increases central control as money 
flows nationally rather than locally (Seyd, 1999: 401-2). More generally, however, 
the new financial relationships emerging in the party will affect institutions because
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the considerable reduction in Labour’s dependence on union money inevitably brings 
into question their institutional prerogatives in the party. Indeed, the relative decline 
in the importance of union donations has trekked the decline in their organisational 
power in the Labour Party. Even the affiliation fees paid by the unions no longer 
possess the significance they once did. Whereas in the past, each affiliation fee 
bought one vote at the party conference, nowadays each affiliation fee buys one vote 
weighted by the unions’ overall share of the conference vote (currently just below 50 
percent). Union affiliation fees are less than those paid by the CLPs but the latter now 
have 50 percent of the conference votes while they do not contribute anything like 50 
percent of party revenue. In a sense, this is a moot point because the power of the 
conference has itself been curtailed but it is reflective of a double trend over the past 
decade: the shift of power away from the unions towards individual members and 
upwards to the party HQ and the PLP leadership.
Resources are deployed most obviously during election campaigns so it is 
here we can gauge the relative importance of different resources. Thus far we have 
looked at the supply of resources to the Labour Party but not at its demand for, and 
its deployment of them. That is the subject of the remainder of this chapter, 
providing a fuller picture of where the party’s organisational development is heading.
Part II. Political Communications
8.6 PARTY RESOURCES AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS
Historically, the benefit to parties of activist labour was that it provided a 
means of political communication between party leaders and voters, as activists 
organised local campaigns, delivered leaflets, and performed other party work for no 
financial reward. Such campaigning was decentralised and labour-intensive in that it 
was usually local rather than national in scope and relied on the exertions of the 
activists. However, relying on activists to undertake political communication is not 
costless because activists require the inducement of social and purposive benefits to 
perform these tasks. Giving them influence over policy and candidates might keep 
them active but it could alienate the voters if unpopular policies are chosen. Thus, 
politician-activist exchange may be a (necessary) cost of politician-voter exchange. 
The problem for politicians is that if too many policy concessions are made to
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activists, voters may be scared away; yet if not enough concessions are made, some 
activists will exit and there may not be enough remaining to run an effective 
campaign. Figure 8.4 illustrates this dilemma for the party leaders.11
Figure 8.4 Trade-off between Activist Retention and Electoral Support
No of Activists 
Retained
A m a x
■m v
MVL*
Policy preferences are plotted along the horizontal axis with the median voter 
position at MV, while the number of activists in the party is plotted along the vertical 
axis. The problem facing party leaders is that unilaterally shifting party policy to the 
office-winning position of MV risks provoking activist exit (and activist voice, 
though for simplicity that cost to the leadership is ignored here). The maximum 
number of activists (AMax) is retained at policy position L* but this is a considerable 
distance from MV and may result in electoral defeat. If policy were set at MV, 
disgruntled activists would exit until only Amv activists were left. Now let us 
assume that if a party is to campaign effectively in order win an election, it requires a 
minimum of AMm activists. In this example, AMV < A Min so the party will fail to 
mobilise sufficient support despite having electorally optimal policies. One way out 
of this dilemma is for parties to ‘becloud their policies in a fog of ambiguity’ 
(Downs, 1957: 136), making vague promises to convince voters they are moderate 
while holding out the hope of radical measures for activists. This strategy will 
generally work best when the distance between L* and MV is fairly small, but the 
greater the gulf between activists’ and voters’ preferences, the harder it is to bridge 
the gap through ambiguity, and the possibility of a credibility gap emerges.
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There is evidence that Labour Party activists in the 1970s and 1980s 
conformed to a radical outlook. In their survey of Labour Party members in the early 
1990s, Seyd and Whiteley (1992: 59-68) found two-thirds of Labour’s members 
joined the party for purposive benefits (see Table 3.1). Furthermore, we have also 
seen that the ideological distribution of the membership is skewed to the left (Table 
6 .2), with the hard left being more active than any other ideological grouping in the 
party. However, office-seeking politicians need to capture the median voter, 
suggesting activists could impose considerable constraints on party leaders. In fact, 
party members in this survey also indicated a willingness to grant autonomy to the 
party leadership, as we saw earlier. However, particularly during the mid-1980s it is 
arguable that the extent of this willingness would have been less than it was in 1990 
when the survey was undertaken. Moreover, even then the hard left activists were 
much less likely to support autonomy for the leadership.
However, politician-activist exchange is not static. An important step that 
rational politicians can take is to change the technology of political communications 
so as to minimise activist-induced costs (e.g. the imposition of ‘extreme* policies) 
while maintaining an effective level of campaigning. If politicians can develop 
communication techniques that are less dependent on activist labour, the bargaining 
power of the activists may decline and this affects the intraparty distribution of 
power. Capital-intensive communication generally involves centralised campaigns 
conducted through the electronic mass media, including broadcasts and political 
advertising, and increasingly it involves IT. Television broadcasts by politicians can 
reach millions of voters on a more regular basis more efficiently than an army of 
activists. The party may still require some activists but perhaps not to the extent that 
damaging policy trade-offs need to be made, depending on how great the reliance is 
on media campaigning. In principle, various combinations of capital (media) and 
labour (activists) can be forged to give different levels of communication 
technologies. Figure 8.5 depicts four different technologies employed at the optimal 
policy position of MV. Technologies Ai and A2 are fairly labour-intensive but with its 
policy at MV, the party would not be able to retain sufficient activists to do the work 
of mobilising voters. By contrast, technology A3 needs fewer activists and could just 
about withstand activist exit to capture the median voter. Technology A4 is capital- 
intensive and could be used to communicate to enough voters to win at MV. Indeed,
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with this technology, the party would have a ‘surplus’ of activists in the sense of 
more activists than the minimum level it requires to be both electorally competitive 
(policy at MV) and electorally efficient (i.e. having the ability to inform and mobilise 
those voters who prefer it to the other party). Other things being equal, parties may 
prefer the most capital-intensive technology to avoid policy dilution.
Figure 8.5 Communication Technologies
No o f
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However, other things are not always equal. Capital-intensive techniques may 
facilitate office-seeking but they are financially costly. Before they allow their 
activist base to run down, politicians must consider activists’ financial contributions. 
If activists are the major source of party funds, leaders must either continue to offer 
benefits to activists or seek new sources of funding. In fact, the latter is likely to 
happen regardless because capital-intensive communications and media-based 
campaigns push up election costs. Labour’s election expenditure trebled in real terms 
between 1979 and 1997 (Table 8.1), reflecting greater reliance on advertising and the 
services of pollsters and focus group organisers. Parties’ need to raise ever more 
funds can impact on or even transform intraparty exchange relationships. We have 
seen that Labour has undertaken a diversification of funding sources.
The use of sophisticated techniques for gathering information about voters’ 
preferences and relaying information about policies requires a corps of professionals 
rather than amateur volunteers. This vision of parties less reliant on bureaucrats and 
activists, and more dependent on specialists has been forcefully argued by
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Panebianco (1988), who claims we are witnessing the rise of ‘electoral-professional’ 
parties. These professionals are responsible for specialised tasks rather than 
administrative or overtly political tasks. Such parties require spin doctors, press 
officers, pollsters, media consultants, advertising agents, marketing experts, 
designers, image consultants, and a host of other specialists. Many of these areas of 
expertise involve presentation and the control of information about the party. This 
too is a feature of the new Labour Party.
The simple model sketched above illustrates the attractions to politicians of 
developing capital-intensive and professionally-run communications. The potential 
pitfall is that the financial costs are high. Nevertheless, on becoming Labour leader, 
Kinnock quickly identified party communications as an area in desperate need of 
reform. He was lucky in that Labour’s shambolic election campaign of 1983 created 
a consensus on the need for fundamental reform in this area. The remainder of this 
chapter offers a brief overview of the transformation. The intention is not to provide 
an exhaustive analysis of modem communications techniques but to assess the extent 
to which Labour’s new campaigning methods have eased its dependence on activists.
8.7 LABOUR’S POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION
In the mid-1990s, Labour gained a reputation -  often self-promoted -  of 
being the most fearsome election-fighting machine in Western Europe. The party’s 
Millbank HQ was and still is -  a byword for political machinations and ruthless 
efficiency. It was not always thus. Labour’s landslide defeat in 1983 followed what 
was widely recognised as ‘one of the worst led, most unprofessional campaigns of 
[the party’s] history’ (Hewitt and Mandelson, 1989: 49; see also Butler and 
Kavanagh, 1985). Its spokesmen made too many mistakes, there was a lack of 
coordination and the party leader, Michael Foot was more at home making stirring 
speeches to rallies of the party faithful than he was communicating via television to 
the watching voters. The entire communications edifice needed reforming.
The weakest aspect of Labour’s campaign was its use of the media. This was 
recognised by the new leader Kinnock, who appreciated the growing importance of 
the media in modem election campaigning. Kinnock wanted a structure that utilised 
the services of communications professionals, and emphasised marketing and
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advertising. A capital-intensive communications system and a professionalisation of 
personnel, who now possessed technical skills, would also mean less dependence on 
activists and thus fewer policy concessions to them. There was certainly a wide 
receptivity to an overhaul of Labour’s communications in the light of the 1983 
defeat. The existing communications structure was ramshackle, with responsibility 
for campaigns and communications divided between different departments and 
committees. Lines of control and authority were unclear and there was a lack of 
cooperation and coordination between the head office at Walworth Road, the NEC 
and the shadow cabinet (Shaw, 1994: 55). Kinnock’s response was to establish a 
campaign strategy committee (CSC) in October 1983, consisting of NEC and shadow 
cabinet members, PLP representatives and leaders of the major unions (in their 
capacity as representatives of TULV). It was charged with overseeing all campaigns- 
related activities, including party political broadcasts and polling. It was formally 
answerable to the NEC but took all the important campaign decisions and generally 
allowed Kinnock to by-pass the NEC (with its strong leftwing representation) on 
campaign matters (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988: 50). The CSC’s formation was an 
early expression of Kinnock’s desire to accord a higher priority to communications 
and ensure it came under central (but not NEC) control.
A CSC subcommittee proposed a reorganisation of the party’s HQ, which saw 
a myriad of departments reformed into three directorates: policy, organisation, and 
campaigns and communications. The latter (CCD) took control of all campaigns and 
communications matters, and would, as Shaw (1994: 56) put it, ‘operate as a 
clearing-house for all contacts between the Party and the media’. Peter Mandelson, a 
television producer at London Weekend Television, was appointed the first director 
of the CCD in October 1985. One of Mandelson’s first acts was to commission an 
advertising executive, Philip Gould, to prepare an audit on the state of Labour’s 
communications. The report, presented to the NEC in December 1985, argued for ‘a 
shift in campaigning emphasis from “grassroots”/opinion forming to influencing 
electoral opinion through the mass media’ (cited in Gould, 1999: 56). This dovetailed 
with the desire of many in the PLP to reduce the power of activists. Gould considered 
hiring the advertising agency, BMP, to work for Labour but there was resistance on 
BMP’s board to being associated with Labour. Therefore, Gould suggested the 
establishment of a shadow communications agency (SCA), which would tap the
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professional and technical expertise of Labour supporters in marketing, the media 
and advertising, who were willing to volunteer their services to the party. The SCA 
was structured round BMP personnel, particularly the latter’s managing director, 
Chris Powell, and was, to all intents and purposes, a front organisation for BMP 
(Gould, 1999: 315). Only Gould and his business partner, Deborah Mattinson, would 
be paid for their services. Gould later estimated that two hundred people, including
19writers, broadcasters, art directors, and other professionals, worked for the party 
free of charge during the 1987 election campaign, saving it £500,000 (Webb, 1992b: 
270). The SCA would also conduct quantitative and qualitative research, though 
Labour continued to employ the paid services of the pollsters, MORI. Despite its 
voluntary and revolving membership, the SCA proved a permanent fixture in 
Labour’s new communications network. Officially, it had a purely advisory role and 
was answerable to the NEC but in practice its research and ideas had important policy 
implications and it answered to Mandelson. At the time, the NEC had a strong 
leftwing contingent, which was hostile to the methods of modem communications so 
the SCA had to give little away (Gould, 1999: 48).
Between annual conferences, the NEC is the authority to which all extra- 
parliamentary bodies are accountable but this was only formally true of the new 
communications bodies. Communicators require considerable autonomy in order to 
be effective; their functions are not conducive to anything but the most general forms 
of NEC control, particularly with the shift to 24-hour news and the ‘permanent 
campaign’ (see Kavanagh, 1995: 108). This explains why Labour’s communications 
came to be dominated by a few trusted lieutenants loyal to the leader, most notably 
Peter Mandelson (and later, Alastair Campbell). Kinnock could not oversee 
everything so he built up a sizable13 staff in his own leader’s office, including media 
advisors, political fixers and policy specialists, who could liase with the CCD and the 
SCA. The leader’s office was a considerable weapon in the leader’s armoury and is 
not subject to any constitutional controls in the Labour Party. Successive Labour 
leaders have used officials in their office to help develop policy and strategy, as well 
as gathering information and disseminating the leader’s opinions and wishes.
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8.8 THE NEW COMMUNICATIONS: TECHNIQUES AND MODUS 
OPERANDI
From 1985, Labour’s communications underwent a revolution. Constituency 
campaigning was downgraded in importance. Party campaigns were largely divorced 
from campaigns run by unions, such as mass demonstrations against the 
Conservative government. In 1981, with strong backing from the leftwing NEC, the 
TUC had organised a ‘People’s March for Jobs’ to pressurise the government on 
rising unemployment. Kinnock, however, wanted to move Labour away from such 
methods, and after the defeat of the miners’ strike in 1985, extraparliamentary 
campaigns were dead in the water, as far as the party was concerned. From now on, 
media campaigns assumed new significance. It would be wrong to say media 
campaigns were hitherto unimportant because ever since the 1950s, the major parties 
have recognised the importance of television. What was new was the extent to which 
media campaigning displaced other methods and the degree to which it became 
entangled with policymaking and power relations within parties. In this section, I 
describe some of the techniques used by Labour’s political communicators since 
1983, assessing their implications for the party’s organisation and power structure.
Some of the changes were purely presentational though they were intended to 
project a professional image of the party. These included image consultants, who 
advised MPs on their appearance. The party acquired a corporate image with the 
adoption of the red rose as its symbol in 1986, replacing the red flag. Bowls of red 
roses adorned party conferences and the rose symbol was printed on party stationery. 
Art designers improved the backdrop at the conference, while party documents 
became glossier and professional looking. These changes did not affect the 
functioning of the party though the left was suspicious of this new ‘glitznost’ and 
complained style was being elevated above substance. However, many new 
techniques had implications for power relations, including advertising, the rise of 
spin doctors, and the compilation of quantitative and qualitative research.
Political Advertising
Labour’s use of political advertising in the press and on posters in the 1980s 
was nothing new either to British politics or to Labour itself. Labour had
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concentrated on posters, particularly during elections, and this was coordinated from 
the centre (it formed a press and publicity department in 1917). In the 1950s, 
television ownership spread and Labour ran its first television-based election 
campaign in 1959 using innovative election broadcasts, though there was unease 
among politicians about the emphasis on presentation (Wring, 1996: 112-4). The left 
in particular developed a long-standing hostility to glitzy communications (McNair, 
1999: 115-7). It was not until 1964 that both main parties relied significantly on 
advertising professionals and by the late-1970s, the Conservatives were setting the 
pace with their hiring of the Saatchis’ agency. In the 1979 election, Labour relied on 
volunteers instead of employing an agency though they were beset by coordination 
problems. Labour first hired an agency in 1983, though the venture was not 
successful, largely because Labour’s policies were unpopular but also because the 
agency was not integrated into the decision-making structure as politicians retained a 
tight rein. From 1986, Labour relied on the SCA to produce its advertisements but in 
1997 it hired the BMP agency (the SCA was dismantled in 1992).
Advertising is not always decisive enough to alter election results but it is 
useful in helping to set the agenda (Gould, 1999: 314). Unlike in the USA, parties in 
Britain are not allowed to buy advertising time on television, being restricted instead 
to the specific form of the party political broadcast (PPB) and the party election 
broadcast (PEB). These are one-off broadcasts, usually lasting about five minutes 
nowadays (though they were considerably longer in the past). Sometimes they can 
have dramatic effects, as did certain Labour broadcasts in 1987 and 1992. These are 
no substitute for televised advertisements, which are shorter and can be played over 
and over again for greater impact. British parties use poster and press advertisements, 
though the latter are declining in importance. Posters require more than just a 
propaganda message if they are to succeed. Research must be conducted on what sort 
of words, images and even colours affect the viewer. The use of specialist designers 
and marketing experts is a necessity.
Spin Doctors
The rise of spin doctors is one of the most noted features of ‘new’ Labour. 
Spin doctors are commonly regarded as media advisors acting on behalf of certain
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politicians but their remit is much more political than this. They are ‘courtiers who 
serve leaders rather than the party’ (Heffeman and Stanyer, 1997: 177). McSmith 
(1996: 250) provides a useful thumbnail description of what they do:
Spin doctors are a product of the age of instant communication, 
operating in the tiny space between when a political event takes 
place and when it is first reported to the wide public. It is now an 
axiom of political journalism that the public must be given more 
than the bald facts. Every event must be placed in a context. It must 
be a victory for someone in the public eye, or a setback for 
someone else. If it is an internal development within a political 
party, it must either be good news or bad news for the party leader.
Spin doctors try to be the first to put their interpretation, or ‘spin’ 
on events, preferably by having a quiet word with correspondents 
on the spot, before they have even reported back to their 
newsdesks.
A good example of this was the interpretation offered by Labour spin doctors of 
Blair’s first conference speech as leader, in 1994. Blair implored delegates to ‘say 
what we mean and mean what we say’ and offered to produce an ‘up-to-date 
statement of the objects and objectives of our party’. After the speech, spin doctors 
briefed journalists that the leader’s words were code for an attack on Clause IV, the 
party’s almost sacred constitutional commitment to public ownership. This was a big 
enough gamble by Blair because it risked re-opening internal divisions in the party 
but he dared not ‘say what he meant’ because the reaction from delegates would have 
been uncertain. The spin doctors enabled the leader to drop his bombshell while 
enjoying a good reception for his set-piece speech (see Jones, 1995: 163-6; McSmith, 
1996: 340-1; Rentoul, 1995: 416-7).
It has been a persistent claim (usually by those on the receiving end) that spin 
doctors are often used in intraparty battles, not only against factions but also 
individual (shadow) cabinet members. The acrimonious pre-contest to succeed Smith 
as leader in 1994 is only the most famous occasion, when Mandelson, Labour’s most 
famous spin doctor, was accused of working to promote the candidacy of Blair and to 
denigrate the chances of Gordon Brown. The episode left a bitter aftertaste and was 
one of the tensions underlying the internecine warfare between Blairites and 
‘Brownites’ that would explode in December 1998 resulting in the resignation from
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the government of Mandelson (who by now was Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry), and Geoffrey Robinson, a friend of both Brown and Mandelson, as well as 
Brown’s spin doctor, Charlie Whelan (Jones, 1995: 150-8; McSmith, 1996: 276-82; 
Rentoul, 1995: 353-80; Routledge, 1998: 189-210).
Spin doctors are important political operators and their close links with 
journalists are the source of their power. The manipulation of news content is a skill 
that requires an eye for what journalists look for when they write their stories and 
knowledge of decision-making structures inside media companies so that pressure 
can be applied at the right level. It requires a cool head to deal with crises and the 
necessary temperament in turn to bully and flatter journalists. Good spin doctors are 
a valuable asset for politicians. However, it is a mistake to view them as ‘running’ 
parties because they remain dependent on the politicians they serve. They possess no 
constitutional position in parties and instead rise and fall with their political sponsors, 
unless they move on to serve new masters. For example, despite being elected an MP 
in 1992, Mandelson’s career stagnated after Kinnock resigned and Smith became 
leader, because Smith distrusted spin doctors and the SCA (Gould, 1999: 161-82). 
Mandelson returned to the fray with the accession of Blair to the leadership.
Quantitative Polling and Qualitative Research
The importance that parties attach to polling is not surprising because polls 
provide information about voters’ preferences. Labour’s commitment to polling has 
varied over the years. The period of leftwing ascendancy during the 1970s and early 
1980s saw less importance placed on polling. This was part of a general leftwing 
suspicion of polling methods, the belief being that Labour should shape public 
opinion rather than just accommodate it. Throughout the 1983 election campaign, 
Michael Foot persistently brushed aside Labour’s poor showing in the polls, 
convinced that the party would do much better come polling day. Moreover, polling 
often provided unwelcome evidence of how unpopular many leftwing policies were. 
Despite Foot’s confidence, Labour went down to a heavy defeat and one 
consequence was that Kinnock assigned greater importance to polling in the 1980s 
along with a new significance to qualitative research. For most of the 1980s Labour
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relied on MORI for its private polling though the extent to which the pollsters were 
integrated into Labour’s communications structure varied.
Pollsters do not have as much influence within British parties as they do in 
America: as Kavanagh (1995: 144) glibly puts it, ‘Pollsters in Britain are not 
campaign consultants; they are on tap, not on top.’ Nevertheless, the findings they 
present are important. Private polls contain information for parties that helps 
influence important decisions, including timing an election, defining a party’s image, 
testing old and new policies, tracking voters’ preferences, targeting voters and 
ultimately, changing the party (Kavanagh, 1995: 135-9). Poll results can affect the 
conduct of election campaigns, influencing, for example, Kinnock’s late interest in 
proportional representation in the 1992 general election. Polling data was also 
important in persuading many activists and unions to back Kinnock’s repositioning 
of Labour during the policy review of 1987-9. The control of information is a power 
resource within parties. It is easier for leaders to persuade activists to abandon 
cherished policies if they can present convincing evidence that those policies are 
electorally damaging. However, crucially importance is the question of who 
dominates decision-making over polling. In the Labour Party, it was traditionally the 
NEC that allocated funds and commissioned polls. If the leader and his allies did not 
control the NEC, they could find themselves in trouble: in 1978, the leftwing NEC 
denied Prime Minister Callaghan funds for polling (Kavanagh, 1995: 134), perhaps 
worried it would reveal the left’s unpopularity. Kinnock wrested control of polling 
from the NEC and assigned it to communications professionals. In 1992, the SCA was 
responsible for polling, commissioning NOP, which answered to the SCA.
However, the increased used of polling also presents problems for party 
leaders since those who live by polls may also die by them. Kavanagh notes that not 
only parties but leaders too are continually polled and bad polls can undermine a 
leader’s authority. The low personal rating of Mrs Thatcher and the Conservative 
Party’s depressed support were key factors in her ejection from office by her own 
MPs in 1990. Kinnock’s persistently low personal ratings undermined his efforts to 
make Labour electable (Kavanagh, 1995: 123-4). On the other hand, personal 
popularity among voters was a key reason for Blair’s accession to the Labour 
leadership in 1994. The present government spends considerable public money on 
polling so as to keep its policies in tune with public opinion.
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Polling is increasingly important for modem party campaigning, but the 
biggest change to take place in Labour’s communications since 1983 was the rise of 
qualitative research, in particular, ‘focus groups’. The gum of focus groups, Philip 
Gould, was a key strategy adviser to Labour during this period and he used them 
extensively to gauge the attitudes of floating voters. Focus groups consist of eight 
people talking in a room about issues of interest to the convenor. Most of Gould’s 
focus groups consisted of swing voters who had supported the Conservatives but 
who might switch to Labour. People are able to talk at length and their underlying 
feelings can be ascertained. ‘In a [focus] group it is possible to test out the strength 
and depth of feeling around an issue, which can be more difficult, although not 
impossible, in a conventional poll’ (Gould, 1999: 328; cf. Worcester, 1998: 56-7). 
Focus group findings first systematically informed Labour’s general election 
campaign in 1987 (Gould et al., 1989: 72-3; Gould, 1999: 74), and by 1997 Gould 
organised focus groups six nights a week for the whole campaign, interpreting the 
data and writing reports for Blair. It is clear from his account that these data affected 
campaign decisions and how much emphasis was placed on issues.
Even more than conventional polling, the interpretation of data from focus 
groups is very subjective so it follows that whoever has the task of organising and 
interpreting it controls an important power resource (Shaw, 1994: 148). In 1992, it 
was top SCA officials (Gould and Patricia Hewitt -  both Kinnock allies) that 
performed this task, and in 1997, Gould played an even greater role in that his own 
company had been specifically hired by Labour to conduct and interpret focus 
groups. Just how important a power resource this is can be seen by considering two 
contrasting responses to adverse data coming out of focus groups.
In the aftermath of the 1992 general election, Gould conducted a number of 
focus groups to ascertain the reasons for Labour’s defeat. He argued that voters did 
not fully trust Labour and that they were still worried about the possibility of trade 
union tyranny under a Labour government. He claimed that floating voters revealed 
in these groups lurking fears about the party, that it had not changed sufficiently: 
‘The polling was clear: Labour lost because it was still the party of the winter of 
discontent; union influence; strikes and inflation; disarmament; Benn and Scargill’ 
(Gould, 1999: 158). This appeared to fly in the face of conventional polling results, 
which suggested Labour lost for other reasons, such as tax, with the unions low down
262
the list. Clare Short (1992: 14) asserted: ‘There is no serious political commentator 
who believes that Labour’s link with the trade unions explains our appalling electoral 
performance’. However, Gould insisted the existence of the link contributed towards 
voters’ general unease about Labour and what was lacking was the elusive quality of 
‘trust’. (Union influence imposed commitment costs on political exchange between 
Labour and the voters.) It was difficult for Gould’s opponents to challenge his 
findings because they did not have access to them, seeing only his own 
interpretations (Webb, 1995: 7-10). Such is the nature of qualitative research though 
Gould might claim subsequent events proved him right. Indeed, his findings provided 
much of the basis for Blair’s assault on ‘old’ Labour when he became leader and the 
justification for modernising reforms such as the revision of Clause IV.
Yet the power of advisors such as Gould is dependent on their political 
masters in the same way that spin doctors cannot survive unless journalists believe 
they are talking for their bosses. Kinnock’s period as leader was dogged by 
persistently low personal poll ratings and within the media and the party, it was 
widely suspected that had Labour replaced him with John Smith, the party might 
have won, or at least, not lost, the 1992 general election. Kinnock’s main problem 
was that he was widely perceived to have changed his mind on every substantive 
issue and could not therefore be trusted to keep his election promises. This came 
through clearly in quantitative polling and Gould encountered it regularly in his 
focus groups. Gould seemed to accept Kinnock was an electoral liability and one of 
his colleagues sent him a memo in March 1991 stating: ‘The worst thing that 
happened to Labour was the ousting of Margaret Thatcher. With Kinnock as the 
candidate, Labour cannot win the next General Election’ (cited in Gould, 1999: 141). 
Yet SCA presentations routinely excluded data on perceptions of Kinnock because it 
was so bad (Hughes and Wintour, 1990: 62). Gould recounts how John Prescott 
questioned the role of the SCA in not revealing all:
His most consistent criticism was: why did you not present polling 
about Neil Kinnock to the Shadow Cabinet? There is still, today, a 
feeling that the SCA and I [Gould], in particular, represented the 
leader rather than the party; that by withholding information in 
some way we interrupted the democratic process. If they had had 
the full information, they could have acted against him (Gould,
1999: 144).
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Gould admitted he ‘put loyalty to Neil first’ but suggested that Kinnock already 
knew the public did not warm to him and so ‘[t]here was no need for me to tell him’ 
(Gould, 1999: 144). Yet quantitative and qualitative confirmation of this would 
surely have put enormous pressure on Kinnock. It is not fanciful to suggest that some 
members of the shadow cabinet would have concluded Labour could not win with 
Kinnock as leader. Moreover, the man widely tipped to take-over in the event of a 
leadership contest, John Smith, was much more sceptical of the usefulness of the 
methods employed by the SCA. Indeed, when Smith finally became leader in 1992, 
the SCA was disbanded and Gould, Mandelson et al. found themselves out in the cold 
(though they subsequently came back with Blair’s accession to the leadership). It 
would be highly speculative to suggest that Gould did not reveal the data about 
Kinnock because he knew the latter’s resignation would leave Gould himself out of a 
job. Nevertheless, it does highlight the degree of mutual interdependence between 
advisers and their sponsoring politicians. Spin doctors, campaign advisors and other 
professionals without a constitutionally prescribed position in the party rely on their 
access to the leader for their own power, and once their patron has gone, they may 
find themselves surplus to needs. However, while they are in situ, they exercise 
considerable influence and to the extent that they operate on behalf of their political 
masters at the top of the party, the inescapable conclusion is that the rise of spin 
doctors and campaign professionals is indicative of the increasing centralisation of 
power in parties in general. The rise of the SCA (and Kinnock’s ultimate control over 
it) was another dimension of Labour’s centralisation.
Communication Technology and General Election Campaigns
The revolution in Labour’s communications was reflected in the election 
campaigns it conducted after 1983. The intention here is not to recount those 
campaigns in full but to highlight certain features that illustrate the transformation of 
the party’s electioneering.14
Labour’s campaign of 1987 marked its coming of age as an exponent of 
modem electioneering. Although Labour suffered another defeat, it was widely 
acknowledged to have run the most competent and professional campaign of the
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main parties. It was meticulously planned in advance, with a theme for each of the 28 
days of the campaign, to be carried to the voters by press conferences, visits, PEBs 
and photo-opportunities (Hewitt and Mandelson, 1989: 52). Advertising was tied in 
with press conferences and speeches, and the campaign was informed not only by 
MORI’s quantitative work but also by data from focus groups (Gould et al., 1989: 72- 
3; Gould, 1999: 74). The campaign was geared towards television, which required a 
centralised command structure and partly explained Labour’s decision to focus on 
the perceived strengths of Kinnock. The epitome of this near presidential campaign 
was the PEB on Kinnock, a personal profile of the leader, which became the first PEB 
to be repeated. Produced by the film director, Hugh Hudson, the PEB presented a 
more human image of the leader and produced a surge in his approval ratings, though 
it failed to transform the party’s fortunes (Rosenbaum, 1997: 71-2).
Constituency activists continued to be needed but it was clear they were in 
the process of being progressively supplanted. Shaw (1994: 67) writes:
With the arrival of Mandelson and the [SCA], the role of the 
constituency machinery was heavily down-graded in favour of the 
mass media, especially television, and maximum favourable TV 
coverage became the end to which much of Labour’s campaigning 
was geared.
Nevertheless, rather than being abandoned completely, the CLPs were 
integrated into the new centralised structure. Labour HQ utilised British Telecom’s 
‘Telecom Gold’ system to send information quickly to candidates and thereby was 
able to coordinate a national campaign on the voters’ doorsteps (Swaddle, 1989: 34). 
Together, these techniques helped Labour run its most professional campaign ever, 
though there were murmurs from internal opponents that substance was sacrificed to 
style. This became a major issue in 1992, when there were persistent complaints after 
Labour’s eventual defeat that the ‘admen’ had taken over from the politicians and 
sacrificed substance for glitz. The so-called ‘War of Jennifer’s Ear’ -  an emotive 
Labour PEB on health that badly backfired -  called into question the role of the SCA 
and the wisdom of handing over communications to non-political professionals.
Nevertheless, Blair’s period as leader saw a further professionalisation of 
campaigning, influenced by techniques developed by the American Democrats in
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Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign in 1992. Many of these techniques addressed 
problems and opportunities arising from increasingly media-centred elections. The 
most obvious difference with the past was the trend towards the ‘permanent 
campaign’. Although campaigning before the official election campaign gets under 
way is nothing new, Labour took a quantitative and qualitative step forward after 
1994 (Kavanagh, 1997: 540). The idea is that elections are not won or lost in the four 
weeks of the official campaign but over the months and years prior to the election. 
With the contemporary omnipresence and diversity of the electronic media, it is 
possible for parties to spend considerable time between elections campaigning for the 
next election, especially if they are in opposition and unencumbered with the burden 
of governing. The development of satellite and digital television, 24-hour news, and 
the internet,15 has accelerated the news cycle and made it imperative that parties be 
able to respond quickly to attacks from opponents and adapt to (and try to set) the 
news agenda (Norris, 1998: 126; Gould, 1999: 295). This increases the importance of 
spin doctors because it is essential to have experts who understand decision-making 
structures within the electronic news media and who can attempt to manipulate news 
for their party’s advantage. It also led to innovations such as Labour’s Rapid 
Rebuttal Unit, an idea borrowed from Clinton’s Democrats, which was used to offer 
detailed responses to Conservative attacks within the same ‘news cycle’ and 
neutralise anti-Labour stories. This relied on ‘Excalibur, a computerised database of 
facts, figures and research, providing further evidence of the shift towards capital- 
intensive technologies (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 59). This was coordinated by a 
core of planners and advisors from a new media centre at Millbank Tower. Labour’s 
‘inner core elite’ (Heffeman and Stanyer, 1997) of leader, spin doctors, strategists, 
pollsters and advisors, formed a ‘war room’ at Millbank, from where, with the help 
of 200 staffers, they coordinated the national campaign, maintaining contact with 
candidates and campaigners on the ground by telephone, fax, email and pager 
(Gould, 1999: 298-309; Norris, 1998: 126-7).
Labour also undertook intensive polling and qualitative research during these 
years. Polling was conducted by NOP, which regularly surveyed throughout the 
parliament and twice-weekly during the election campaign. The results were reported 
to Gould, whose agency was hired by Labour to undertake qualitative research. This 
consisted of focus groups of floating voters; Gould met about 70 such groups during
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the official campaign of 1997, having conducted 300 in the pre-election months 
(Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 129-30; Gould, 1999: passim). Gould used quantitative 
polling evidence to test themes in the focus groups. It is clear from his book that 
great store was put on the output of these focus groups, with Gould writing nightly 
memos during the campaign to Blair. In total, Labour spent £500,000 on NOP 
surveys from 1993, and £180,000 on focus groups conducted by Philip Gould 
Associates (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 242).
The 1997 election campaign also saw a return to constituency campaigning, 
though in a more centrally controlled form. There were two key differences with the 
past, one strategic and one technological, though the latter underlay the former. 
Strategically, Labour adopted an aggressive system of targeting, not only of key seats 
but also of key voters. Millbank officials drew up a list of 90 key marginal seats and 
they became the focus of campaigning from late 1995. Activists then undertook 
‘voter identification’ by telephone in the 18 months before the election, ascertaining 
voters’ party identity, current party preference and other pertinent information. The 
data was used to identify voters by category, e.g. ‘reliable Labour’, ‘weak Labour’, 
‘switchers’, ‘first time voters’, etc. The aim was to contact 80 percent of voters 
within these constituencies and use the information to target direct mail to voters 
depending on the category into which they fell. Although the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats also targeted seats and voters, the process was carried furthest by 
Labour (Denver, Hands and Henig, 1998: 176-80).
This new focus on the constituencies depended on technological advances. 
Cheaper telephone calls enabled telephone canvassing to begin supplanting doorstep 
canvassing, and some of this was conducted outside the constituencies, often from 
Millbank. A survey found that of Labour’s target seats in 1997, 80 percent did a 
‘substantial’ amount of telephone canvassing (36 percent in non-target seats), 88 
percent had telephone canvassing from outside the constituency (4 percent for non­
targets), and 79 percent sent a ‘substantial’ amount of targeted mail (39 percent for 
non-targets) (Denver, Hands and Henig, 1998: 183, Table 4). Email also became 
important, enabling instant communication between Millbank and candidates and the 
transmission from the centre of party literature (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 211-3). 
The biggest impact was made by the increased use of IT. Not only could PCs be used 
for printing address labels; they were essential for the targeting strategy, as they
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could sort information quickly. PCs were common in 1992 but became near 
ubiquitous in 1997 and Labour concentrated them in its target seats (Tables 8.5-6), in 
contrast to the Conservatives, who concentrated them in seats they were defending.
Table 8.5 Use o f Computers by Constituency (percent)
Very safe Comfortable Marginal Possible Hopeless All
Labour
1992 73 73 97 97 67 77
1997 82 89 99 100 88 90
Conserv­ 1992 87 90 93 71 45 79
ative 1997 99 100 97 82 61 88
Table 8.6 Mean Number o f Computers used, by Constituency
Very safe Comfortable Marginal Possible Hopeless All
Labour
1992 1.5 1.8 4.2 3.5 1.4 2.3
1997 1.9 3.7 4.8 4.5 2.6 3.2
Conserv­ 1992 1.4 1.4 1.5 0.9 0.5 1.2
ative 1997 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.0 0.9 1.6
Table 8.7 Mean Number o f Campaign Workers by Constituency (per day)
Very safe Comfortable Marginal Possible Hopeless All
Labour
1992 43 70 78 77 30 50
1997 55 72 76 73 39 56
Conserv­ 1992 134 113 78 30 15 91
ative 1997 99 77 62 21 13 58
Source: Denver and Hands (1998: 82-3, 79, Tables 7.7, 7.8 and 7.4).
There is a clear shift to capital-intensive technologies in the constituencies, 
yet telephones need people to dial them and PCs require operators. In short, there is 
still a need for local activists though these more efficient technologies require fewer 
workers to operate them. In their survey of local campaigning in the 1997 election, 
Denver and Hands found Labour had an average of 56 campaign workers within each 
constituency per day though there was some concentration in marginal seats (see 
Table 8.7). This would mean Labour had 35,000 campaign workers nationally per 
day, representing less than 10 percent of its total membership though there was 
probably some turnover of workers throughout the weeks. It has long been estimated 
that Labour’s activists comprise no more than a sixth of its membership, though 
Denver and Hands estimate an average of 127 volunteers per constituency worked on
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polling day -  about one in five, and Whiteley and Seyd (1998a: 195-6) claim a 
quarter of members helped out on polling day. The latter also claim only 9 percent of 
members worked in a constituency other than their own during the campaign. This 
queries claims made for targeted campaigning though they suggest it explains why 
targeting did not produce greater swings to Labour, answering those who claim 
targeting had no effect (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 312).
It would seem parties still require activists to run constituency campaigns, 
man the telephones and operate the PCs. However, that once again raises the problem 
of incentives for activists to participate. Since 1983, decision-making power has been 
centralised to such an extent that the influence of activists has been greatly curtailed. 
Institutions that centralise power too much may alienate activists, encouraging them 
to reduce their activism and eventually leading to membership decline. This was 
precisely the charge levelled at Labour’s leaders in the 1990s. Moreover, Seyd and 
Whiteley have provided evidence that activists were indeed reducing the amount of 
work they carried out for the party. The authors asked party members in the early 
1990s how active they were compared with five years earlier: less than 20 percent 
said they were more active while 42 percent said they were less active (Seyd and 
Whiteley, 1992: 227; see also Whiteley and Seyd, 1998b). They also found that 
many ex-members blamed their decision to exit on Labour’s ‘shift to the right’ 
though the latter was also a symptom of their own declining power. By 1997, Labour 
had been out of office for 18 years and there was desperation at all levels of the party 
for an election victory. This may have encouraged many activists to swallow their 
disagreements with the leadership and continue campaigning. However, it remains to 
be seen whether they will be equally anxious now that Labour is in government. In 
particular, if Labour adopts policies that anger its activists causing a decline in 
political activity at the local level, its strategy of targeting individual constituencies 
may be hit.16 One factor that (temporarily) softened the consequences of this was the 
large increase in party membership in the first five years of Blair’s leadership. 
However, Whiteley and Seyd (1998a: 200-204) have demonstrated that these new 
members are qualitatively different from the existing ones, being significantly less 
active. This suggests that the long-term fate of the party is to become increasingly 
‘de-energised’ at the grassroots level. This could be compounded if union officials, 
who traditionally offer local support during election campaigns (Minkin, 1986, 1989;
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Webb, 1992b) reduce their efforts in response to government policies. Labour may 
suffer in the future if it does not replenish its stock of volunteers, though the age of 
media campaigning ensures it will never be as beholden to activists as it once was.
8.9 CONCLUSION
In terms of resources, Labour’s communications are now much more capital- 
intensive than they were in 1983. Labour is not unique in this respect -  indeed, it 
used many techniques devised by the American Democrats. However, party leaders 
adopted these out of a conscious desire to improve the party’s electoral performance. 
One element of this is a desire to use those techniques that can most effectively relay 
the party’s message to the voters. However, another element is that capital-intensive 
techniques reduce the leadership’s dependence on policy-seeking activists. This latter 
aspect should not be under-estimated, though Labour’s new constituency-based 
campaigning requires a core of activists. Electoral professionals recruited by the 
party do not impose policy ‘costs’ on party leaders; on the contrary, to the extent that 
their own prospects are bound up with those of the politicians they serve, electoral 
professionals assist in office-seeking. Policy costs imposed by the unions have 
diminished in line with the unions’ standing in the party. However, relying on 
wealthy donors may involve policy concessions in particular areas and these may 
come back to haunt parties if the public perceive that governmental favours have 
been purchased, the Ecclestone saga being the most obvious example.
The greater reliance on electronic media-based communications, the growing 
importance of polling and focus groups, and the employment of specialists is 
reflected in the spiralling cost of electioneering. This means fundraising will not go 
away as a problem. In Labour’s case, it has meant the modernisers’ early calls to end 
the party-union link have died down as they realise such a project would, in the 
absence of alternative stable funding arrangements, leave the party in a precarious 
financial position. Corporate funders cannot be relied upon when Labour goes into 
opposition and problems confront any attempt to introduce state-funding. However, 
the trend has been towards a reduced union presence in Labour’s organisation that 
has shadowed the financial change. In the final chapter, I examine the constraints on 
outright divorce and assess the extent to which Labour really has changed.
270
9 Conclusion: 
Labour’s Transformation
9.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 1, I asked how and why a trade union-funded party would 
transform its power structure to the extent that the paymasters’ own interests were 
harmed. The answer offered was that even unions cannot ignore the electoral 
imperatives facing the party and so, grudgingly they permitted some reforms, the 
cumulative effect of which transformed Labour. The unions were moderately 
conservative, providing a brake on the speed and extent of reform -  more would have 
changed faster had it not been for their opposition -  but they realised all-out 
opposition to every reform would have greatly harmed the party. Modernising 
politicians provided the initiative while the unions scrutinised, criticised, opposed but 
eventually acquiesced in many reforms. In this final chapter, I overview the 
conclusions of the foregoing analysis. Section 9.2 gauges the extent of the reforms as 
a whole, identifying two principal stages and assessing the propositions of party 
change generated in Chapter 3. Section 9.3 looks at what the changes mean for 
Labour today, in particular the incentives for members -  individual and corporate -  
to remain in the party. Sections 9.4-5 look in turn at objections to the model 
developed here and some of its principal strengths, as well as the main contributions 
of the present study. Finally, section 9.6 concludes.
9.2 EXPLAINING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE IN THE LABOUR PARTY
The purpose in developing the exchange model was to understand parties’ 
internal dynamics and the forces that promote change. In Chapter 3 ,1 provided eight 
propositions on party change, three of which are relevant to Labour since 1983:
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C .l Electoral failure creates pressure for organisational change that promotes 
policy flexibility and/or makes vote-gathering less costly.
C.2 Redistributive change instigated from above’ by party leaders is usually 
intended to increase their autonomy from party members.
C.7 Institutional change can be introduced if  voters are repelled by a party’s 
existing institutional structure.
C.2 captures Labour’s successive waves of centralisation while C.7 covers 
the loosening of the party-union link. Meanwhile, C .l provides the ultimate motive 
for both types of change: the desire of Labour’s leaders -  and eventually its members 
-  to have a party capable of winning elections. I argued that while unions, in their 
capacity as interest groups, may be policy-seekers, when they organisationally and 
financially dominate a major party in a two-party system, electoral considerations are 
fundamental. No policies can be implemented in opposition so doctrinal purity is an 
irrational posture to strike. Imperfect information in the political arena means the 
party might be able appease some union demands but the unions’ pure policy 
preferences are ultimately more likely to constrain than determine party policy.
Vote-seeking party leaders measure their success in terms of electoral 
performance. When performance is poor, change that increases the autonomy of 
party leaders becomes more likely. That was the lesson of Labour’s years in 
opposition, with each successive election defeat adding new impetus to the process 
of centralisation. Normative critiques of electoralism rebuke leaders who sacrifice 
ideology on the altar of electoral expediency. This is a charge often made by leftists 
within the Labour Party, though Marxisant critics say it illustrates the incompatibility 
of socialism and electoralism (Miliband, 1972; Panitch and Leys, 1997; Coates and 
Panitch, 2001). However, my position is that accusing politicians of electoralism is 
like condemning firms for maximising profits. In each case, it is the behaviour we 
anticipate from rational actors. Getting into government requires electoral success, 
which requires offering an attractive package of policies and gaining voters’ trust.
Everyone in the Labour Party wants to win elections; they sometimes differ 
over how to achieve that end. It is those that value office-seeking above all else who 
gain the upper hand inside a party the longer it is in opposition. An unsuccessful
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party is like a plummeting hot-air balloon: if initial attempts to regain height are 
unsuccessful, items must be thrown overboard until the fall is halted and height 
regained. The longer a party is out of office, more policies must be changed and 
often a prerequisite for this is organisational change that undermines those groups 
that cling to the old policies. The personalities associated with those policies may 
also have to go, which is why Foot resigned as Labour leader in 1983 and his 
successor, Kinnock resigned in 1992, both doing so after election defeats.
To say electoral considerations weighed heavily in the minds of party 
reformers is fairly uncontentious but reveals little about the kinds of change that 
occurred. However, C.2 and C.7 reveal that in Labour’s case, centralisation and 
legitimisation were the substance of party change. Although Labour’s organisational 
transformation was not a smooth process following an original blueprint for reform, 
nevertheless two broad stages can be identified:1 the attack on the left in the 1980s, 
resulting in centralisation, and the dilution of the party-union link in the 1990s as 
successive leaders sought to legitimise the party’s structure (combined with more 
centralisation). Each has consequences for the nature of exchange relations.
Figure 9.1 Simple Membership Structure o f the Labour Party
Leader
Party leaders
PLP NEC
CLP activists Trade unions
Party members
Inactive
members
Inactive
levypayers
Figure 9.1 provides a simple illustration of the Labour Party’s structure. Party 
leaders sit on the NEC and/or are in the PLP, while party members are individuals 
(CLPs) or corporate (unions). In 1983, the main linkages were between the NEC and
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the intermediate-level bodies, such as GCs (home to the activists) and nationally 
affiliated unions. There were no links between the NEC and low level party members, 
such as inactive CLP members and union levypayers, with whom any contact came 
from intermediate-level bodies. Links between the NEC and PLP were fairly weak 
and not institutionalised. However, CLP activists, via GC selection meetings, could 
influence the composition of the PLP. Labour’s structure was thus hybrid at the 
membership level and pluralistic at the leadership level.
The reforms weakening the hard left were straightforwardly redistributive. 
These included the early moves towards OMOV in candidate selection, NEC and 
leadership elections, together with the creation of the by-elections panel. In each 
case, the aim of the proponents of change (the party leadership) was to reduce the 
power of CLP activists by centralising power up to the NEC or decentralising it down 
to individual members. In Figure 9.1, this would be represented by the erosion of 
links between party leaders and intermediate level bodies controlled by the activists, 
and the creation of links between leaders and low-level inactive members. OMOV was 
partly about changing the way in which members’ preferences were aggregated 
giving more power to (it was envisaged) ‘moderate’ members. Yet the success of 
Ken Livingstone in the 1997 NEC elections, and the failure to use OMOV in the 
selection of Labour leaders in the devolved assemblies in the face of certain defeat 
for leadership loyalists illustrates that the median Labour Party member (as opposed 
to activist) is a creature of the centre-left. This is where the second, and arguably 
more important aspect of OMOV kicks in. Most Labour members are politically 
inactive. They may vote for centre-leftists if given the chance but in between 
membership ballots they are hard to mobilise. Where GCs were once power bases for 
the activist left, enabling radicals to meet and plot, atomised members rarely if ever 
meet face to face. Their aggregated ballots occasionally frustrate the leadership but 
they mostly remain impotent. They are not a powerful bank of organised opposition 
to party leaders. Thus, the overall effect of OMOV was to increase the discretionary 
power of the politicians -  not surprising given that it was initiated ‘from above’.
By the late-1980s the left was a spent force and Labour’s leaders enjoyed 
considerable policy flexibility, abandoning unilateralism in 1989 and, with union 
approval, accepting Mrs Thatcher’s trade union legislation. Yet Labour’s electoral 
performance barely improved, culminating in the catastrophic defeat of 1992. Policy
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changes were not enough because Labour’s problems ran much deeper: the crucial 
swing voters did not trust it. Moderate policies were worthless if too many people 
suspected that moderation in opposition would be abandoned in government. Distrust 
of Labour was fed by a number of factors, all played up in the media, including the 
‘winter of discontent’, the traumas of the year-long miners’ strike, growing concern 
about the ‘loony left’, and a perception that Kinnock had changed his mind on most 
important issues in British politics. The replacement of Kinnock might have 
eradicated one source of public mistrust though it is unlikely to have significantly 
altered Labour’s standing in the 1980s. Some successful attempts were made to 
counter the ‘loony left’ image, notably the attack on Militant in 1985-6 though 
problems later emerged during the Greenwich by-election. That left the trade union 
‘problem’, exposed at every party conference with regular denunciations of the block 
vote by Labour’s opponents. The persistence of union power, represented by the 
block vote, meant that more than policies had to change. In order to restore Labour’s 
credibility among voters, the party had to reform its own organisation, freeing it from 
perceived illegitimate control by sectional interests.
Thus, the second stage of reform pursued by Labour’s leaders was the 
reduction in the power and visibility of the unions in Labour’s decision-making 
structures. The unions’ perceived domination of Labour’s organisation together with 
memories of the ‘winter of discontent’ combined to create a commitment problem for 
Labour leaders vis-a-vis voters. The identification of this generic form of party 
change represents an important contribution of the present study. Party structures are 
rarely thought to be an important factor in determining a party’s level of support. 
However, institutions and preferences are the joint determinants of party policy. 
Voters can observe a party’s institutions and the stated preferences of powerful 
intraparty actors, and compare the preferences of the latter to official party policy. If 
there is a discrepancy they may estimate that control of the institutions by a certain 
group may lead in the post-election period to a revising of party policy. Anticipating 
such policy change, voters will discount the likelihood of a party’s stated policies 
being pursued in government. The institutions thus burden the politicians with a 
credibility problem. This was particularly problematical for Labour since its 
institutions were dominated by trade unions, which are organised interest groups in 
their own right and whose interests may appear threatened by ‘moderate’ policies,
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especially when ‘moderation’ was defined by a status quo in which unions had been 
popularly stripped of many of their old powers. The message hammered home by the 
Conservatives and their press allies was that Labour could not be trusted to keep its 
promises because union paymasters would look for a return on their investments and 
would return Britain to the strikes, disruption and high tax rates of the 1970s. Labour 
leaders felt that only organisational reform would show that the unions were not in 
control of the party. The party-union link had not always been a liability. Labour 
entered the election campaign of February 1974 arguing that its institutional links 
with the unions would uniquely allow it to end the industrial disputes that bedevilled 
the 1970-4 Conservative government. Labour won the election but the ‘winter of 
discontent’ in 1978-9 exploded the myth that Labour politicians could control the 
unions -  indeed, the conclusion widely drawn was that the unions were in control. 
The next two decades saw repeated attempts by Labour leaders to overcome the 
resulting commitment and legitimacy problems.
Nevertheless, there remained important constraints on the modernisers. 
Labour’s continued dependence on union funds ruled out the prospect of an 
immediate divorce between party and unions. Loosening rather breaking the link was 
the order of the day, as modernisers pursued the dual strategy of trying to legitimise 
the link by defederalising it while at the same time keeping union leaders out of 
public sight during elections. Yet even here the modernisers did not get it all their 
own way because the attempt to build an internally legitimated party inevitably 
entailed distributive consequences. In the electoral college, there were two forms of 
distributive change: the reduction of the unions’ share of the college from 40 percent 
to 33.3 percent, and the enfranchisement of individual party members and levypayers 
(OMOV-OLOV). Different methods of preference aggregation can have different 
distributive consequences. OMOV redistributed power downwards, away from the 
hard left activists and middle-ranking union delegates who gave Benn such solid 
support in 1981, to moderate inactive members and levypayers, considerably 
defederalising the party’s structure in the process (consult Figure 9.1). However, by 
far the greater impact of the enfranchisement of levypayers lay in the greater 
legitimacy it bestowed on elected party leaders. Machinating union barons were 
shorn of their ‘kingmaking’ role and instead almost a million party members, 
levypayers, MPs and MEPs cast ballots in the 1994 leadership contest. The new
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procedures helped dispel fears that a future Labour Prime Minister would be 
beholden to union barons. Nevertheless, the modernisers’ preferred option of an 
electoral college without any union involvement was rejected.
The interaction of redistributive and legitimacy considerations also 
characterised the reform of candidate selection. When Kinnock first sought OMOV in 
1984, many saw it as a means of undermining hard left CLP activists. It was only 
narrowly defeated at the party conference, suggesting that the rightwing unions did 
not view it as an assault on the party-union link. In the years that followed, this 
perception changed and there was a much greater feeling among unions that OMOV 
was the thin end of a wedge designed to lever them out of the party. It is perhaps 
ironic that the hardest battle for organisational reform that Labour’s leaders fought in 
this period was not over the electoral college or the block vote at the party 
conference, the two areas where the party’s procedures were highly visible and 
which brought it into disrepute, but over candidate selection. Although Labour 
activists had been involved in highly publicised deselection attempts in the 1970s, 
the issue was less visible than block votes wielded at the national level. OMOV 
assumed huge symbolic importance for the party leadership too. The veiy notion of 
‘one member -  one vote’ evokes democratic values and popular legitimacy, which 
were watchwords of the party leadership as it sought to throw off the image of a 
union-dominated party. Indeed, it is remarkable how television news reporters 
seemed to confuse the battle for OMOV with the battle against the block vote. This 
simply emphasised that OMOV was about establishing an internally legitimised party 
structure and regaining voters’ trust.
This was also seen, though to a lesser extent, in the reforms to Labour’s 
internal policymaking process. The problem here had been the unions’ dominance of 
the party conference through their block votes. Given the reduced authority of the 
conference, most of the changes were geared towards improving its public image. 
Modernisers were wary of increasing its legitimacy per se because that might imply 
that it did indeed have authority over party policy. From 1986 the conference 
underwent an image overhaul and became a set-piece occasion for shadow 
ministerial speeches directed at the watching television audience. The aim was to use 
the conference for the party’s electoral benefit and avoid the sort of arguments that 
regularly occurred during the early-1980s. These changes were supplemented with
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others, such as the reweighting of conference votes and the formal abolition of unit 
voting, which had distributional consequences but which were also largely about 
managing public perceptions. However, the major change in the realm of 
policymaking was the establishment of the NPF, which siphoned off many of the 
powers of the conference and allowed ministers to dominate intraparty policymaking 
away from the gaze of television cameras. Policy documents could then be presented 
to the conference on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Although the Blair government had a 
few run-ins with the conference over contentious policies, these were nothing 
compared to the sort of rows that engulfed Labour in the 1970s. Leadership control 
was increased with the establishment of the joint policy committee and the reform of 
the NEC. The occasional use of membership referendums also bypassed activists and 
unions while the PLP leadership controlled the agenda. The result is a considerable 
centralisation of power.
The twin aims of centralisation and internal legitimation on the basis of 
OMOV characterised all of the major organisational reforms Labour undertook after 
1983. In each case, the motive was electoral: the desire to make the party outwardly 
more attractive and internally more pliable so as to develop the sort o f policies it 
needed to win elections and, importantly, to convince voters that after an election 
victory its moderate policies would not be at risk from leftwing activists and union 
barons. On the basis of the 1997 general election, it would appear voters were 
sufficiently convinced Labour was no longer under the union yoke. The effect of 
having a new leader was probably significant, especially as it became clear from 
1994 that Blair wanted to offer the unions ‘fairness, not favours’ (Blair, 1996: 136; 
see also Mandelson and Liddle, 1996). The battle over Clause IV in the face of union 
opposition was symbolic in this respect, signalling to voters that Labour was 
consigning old shibboleths and the privileging of sectional interests to history (see 
Jones, 1996,2000; Smith 2000; Kenny and Smith, 1997).
The transformation of the unions’ position has important consequences for 
the pattern of future intraparty conflicts. Historically, Labour’s dominant coalition 
has consisted of PLP and union elites but that is likely to be less so now. For 
example, Blair sought an alliance with party members over the reform of Clause IV. 
This does not mean Blair has always been able to rely on the members (many 
continue to support the left in NEC elections) and he has even had to rely on the
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unions to clinch victories at the party conference. However, the striking thing about a 
PLP-individual membership coalition is that it will inevitably be dominated by the 
PLP. The old coalition of PLP and union leaders entailed two sets of elites who could 
negotiate with each other and co-manage internal party affairs. By contrast, the 
individual members have no separate elites who can bargain with the PLP on their 
behalf. Unlike social democratic parties in Europe, Labour does not have separate 
parliamentary and organisational leaders, though between 1994 and 1997 the deputy 
leader, John Prescott, appeared to play a role somewhat akin to an organisational 
‘leader’. Similarly, in the 1970s the left saw the NEC as a means of representing the 
preferences of the wider party but now it is a greatly emasculated body. The result is 
a party in which individual members are invited to renew their annual subscriptions, 
receive occasional party literature, are permitted to vote in postal ballots and attend 
occasional local policy forums but where the key decisions are taken at the centre. 
Members have been enfranchised but they are largely powerless.
The Limits of Exogenous Shocks on Party Change
There is little doubt that Labour’s poor electoral performance created the 
conditions for organisational change. Furthermore, it was inevitable that the unions, 
as the party’s major stakeholders, would sanction some changes if they were deemed 
a sine qua non of improved electoral performance. However, this is not to suggest 
that organisational change was an automatic adaptation to ‘environmental’ pressures. 
If all party actors had reacted reflexively to electoral defeat then Labour’s 1983 
defeat would have been the catalyst for a dramatic transformation. Instead, the 
unions chose a leader from the centre-left of the party, whom they thought -  wrongly 
in the event -  would defend their interests. Even more obviously, Kinnock’s reform 
agenda was constantly resisted to the extent that OMOV, his overriding reform aim, 
was not achieved during his nine-year period as leader despite strenuous efforts. 
Between the election defeats of 1983 and 1987, very few organisational changes 
were secured, while leftwing policies remained. The 1987 defeat did spur a major 
policy review but again, progress on organisational change was slow. Even after the 
historic fourth defeat of 1992, there were powerful voices resistant to change, as 
shown by the willingness of the big unions to try to defeat Smith over OMOV -  it is 
important to recall how narrow Smith’s victory was, as well as the fact that he had
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made it a confidence vote in his leadership. Arguably, it was not until the 1994 
election of Blair, possibly the most rightwing leader in Labour’s history, that the 
majority of party members and union leaders agreed that far-reaching changes were 
required, and even then, powerful forces tried to stop the re-writing of Clause IV. 
Thus, the environmental (electoral) imperative did finally assert itself among a 
majority of party members but not before four election defeats. The existence of an 
environmental imperative may suggest the need for change but it still requires a 
coalition of reformers (enthusiastic or otherwise) to push through the changes. 
Organisational changes to produce an efficient electoral machine cannot be ‘read-off 
from election defeats because institutional changes have distributive consequences, 
which may prompt potential losers to resist change. Thus, the unions and leftwing 
activists resisted change in the Labour Party because their own powers were 
threatened. This can prolong the period that actors are willing to spend resisting 
change. Rather than the emergence of an ideal-typical organisation perfectly suited to 
its electoral environment and mapped out in advance, what we saw was a series of 
shifts, sometimes halting, sometimes dramatic, often convoluted and stamped with 
compromise. The battle for organisational reform in the Labour Party was nested in 
the broader context of electoral competition but its rhythm reflected power struggles.
As if to underline the dangers of talking too glibly about party structures 
ideally suited to their environments, the problem facing Labour today is that while its 
organisational structure enables an office-seeking electoral strategy, power has been 
centralised to such an extent that channels for intraparty voice have disappeared and 
disgruntled members -  including unions -  may desert the party. This could seriously 
damage its campaigning ability as it loses funds and activists. As long as parties 
require activists to campaign for them, there will always likely be disputes about the 
intraparty distribution of power, even if such disputes lay dormant for stretches of 
time. It is therefore difficult to talk about ‘equilibrium institutions’ with regard to 
parties being suited to their electoral environments because institutions must also be 
internally ‘efficient’, i.e. provide members with incentives to remain in their parties. 
A centralised party suited to producing policies preferred by the median voter might 
not be so attractive to party members. If members decide to exit in large numbers, the 
party may not be in a position to get its vote out. I return to this in section 9.3.
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Other Dimensions of Change in the Labour Party
We have seen that propositions C .l, C.2 and C.7 form the crux of the 
explanation offered for Labour’s transformation. Three other propositions of change 
have a role in the explanatory narrative of Labour’s transformation:
C.5 Institutional change can he introduced to increase the supply o f  resources to 
the party.
C.6 Institutional change can be introduced to facilitate new communication 
technologies.
C.8 Leadership change can be a spur fo r party change.
An example of C.5 would be the idea that OMOV was partly introduced as a selective 
incentive to encourage individuals to join/remain in the party (Scarrow et al., 2000). 
More obviously, subscription discounts were devised to recruit levypayers into CLPs, 
though the scheme met with limited success and it is questionable how many people 
joined Labour to participate in internal ballots. C.6 was confirmed by the new 
communications structure that was largely autonomous of the NEC and which 
entailed centralisation. Moreover, the greater reliance on capital-intensive 
communications reduced Labour’s reliance on activists and permitted a downgrading 
of the CLP machinery, particularly activist structures such as the GCs. Finally, C.8 
was confirmed by the way in which Kinnock, Smith and Blair each sought to 
crystallise a given balance of forces on coming to power. Especially interesting was 
the transition from Smith to Blair in 1994. Labour had not suffered any electoral 
reverses during Smith’s brief tenure -  indeed, it was riding high in the polls. 
However, a sense of urgency and the availability of new leadership selection 
structures saw the victory of Blair and an abrupt change of direction and tempo. Blair 
led an intraparty coalition of forces different from that represented by Smith and 
ensured he was not beholden to union leaders.
These then were the main explanations of Labour’s transformation. Of less 
significance for the period under review were propositions C.3 and C.4:
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C.3 Redistributive change instigated 'from below’ by party members is usually
intended to reduce politicians’ opportunities to shirk by shrinking their 
autonomy from members.
C.4 A perceived government ‘betrayal’ o f  party members, followed by electoral
defeat, increases the likelihood o f attempts from below ’ to introduce ‘new 
deal’ institutions and/or reduce leadership autonomy.
Evidence was provided for these propositions during the period 1979-83. After 
Labour’s defeat in 1979, it was convulsed by a civil war that resulted in the left 
winning support for reforms that restricted the autonomy of MPs and party leaders. 
Despite some important supporters in the PLP and on the NEC, this coalition for 
change came largely ‘from below’, consisting of the CLPD (and other leftist groups), 
CLP delegates at the party conference, and leftists in middle-ranking positions in the 
party and the unions. Many unions supported these reforms because they believed the 
Labour government shirked on its obligations under the initial terms o f the ‘social 
contract’. In the light of such ‘betrayals’, the left is able to prosper by gaining wider 
sympathy for a reduction in leadership autonomy: unions and activists remain policy- 
seekers, and if the government ignores their preferences, electoral success is less 
meaningful. However, these reforms failed to improve Labour’s performance and the 
defeat of 1983 paved the way for a reassertion of leadership control.
All eight propositions on party change are relevant to the Labour Party since 
1979. The most useful models are those capable of explaining change, not least 
because they can explain a broader range of facts. The model presented earlier 
explained change in the Labour Party and could be extended to other parties.
9.3 THE NEW LABOUR PARTY
Unitarism and Labour’s Catch-all Structure
We are now in a position to assess the structure of exchange relationships in 
the Labour Party post-1997. The fundamental shifts have been, at the membership 
level, from a largely union-based party to an increasingly direct party, and vertically, 
with a centralisation of power. The reforms up till 1992 were predominantly but not
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wholly about centralisation while the reforms after 1992 were about moving away 
from the federal structure, together with further centralisation. These shifts are 
illustrated in Figure 9.2. The shaded strip on the left shows the normal historical 
range of Labour’s organisational structure, firmly federal but varying in the degree of 
centralisation, with the latter being greatest when Labour was in government. In the 
bottom left of the diagram is Duverger’s ideal-typical indirect mass party, which 
Labour often approximated. In the bottom right is the ideal-typical direct mass party, 
with both ideal-types characterised by bottom-up control. The shaded area at the top 
is the range of Kirchheimer’s catch-all party, a leadership-dominated party structure 
more likely to be based on individual membership and unlikely to have strong links 
with a classe gardee (e.g. trade unions) though some linkage may remain for a while.
Figure 9.2 Labour’s Two Phases o f Modernisation
Centre
Kirchheimer’s 
catch-all partyLP 1997
LP 1992LP (‘noi 
history)
Indirect (federal) ^ Direct (unitary)
LP 1981
Duverger’s indirect 
mass party
Duverger’s direct 
mass party
Members
Horizontal plane: Direct (unitary) versus indirect (federal) membership structure 
Vertical plane: Distribution o f power between centre and party members 
LP = UK Labour Party
It is the latter model Labour increasingly resembles though it arrived there by 
a circuitous route. The reforms of 1979-81 increased the degree of federalisation 
through the establishment of the block vote-based electoral college but also devolved 
power downwards away from MPs to party activists and trade unionists. During the 
Kinnock years, there were numerous moves to centralise power yet by 1992, Labour 
was still a mainly federal party2 -  hence, the efforts Kinnock had to make to manage
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the party, particularly the NEC (see Kinnock, 1994). However, under Smith’s 
leadership OMOV was finally achieved and block voting was ended in the electoral 
college. These reforms represented a big shift towards unitarism, reinforced by the 
later use of membership ballots. Further centralisation meant that by 1997 Labour 
resembled a catch-all party, emphasised by its increasing tendency to seek donations 
from wealthy individuals and non-union interest groups. (See Appendix 1 for a 
summary of Labour’s main shifts from federalism to unitarism.)
The principle of OMOV altered the very nature of the Labour Party. Since 
1918, Labour has had a hybrid organisational structure, and this remains true today. 
However, whereas it was for long a mainly federal party with some unitary features, 
in the 1990s the federal features were eroded (though not abolished) and the unitary 
features were extended. Labour is a hybrid of direct and indirect features, with the 
balance tipping decisively in favour of the former. Yet it is not simply becoming a 
conventional mass party with an old-fashioned branch structure. When Duverger 
contrasted the mass party with the cadre party, he claimed the main differences were 
structure and function, not size. The mass socialist parties were designed to recruit 
and mobilise members, and educate the working class. Financially, the party’s 
organisation and campaigns would be financed by its members, rather than wealthy 
donors. In the contemporary Labour Party electoral strategy is ‘catch-all’ rather than 
class-based and it does not seek to educate politically members or voters. Local 
branches persist but they do not mobilise local members. Many branch meetings 
attract fewer than a dozen members, with councillors and local notables dominating 
proceedings (the same is often true of local all-member policy forums).
The basis of exchange relations has been transformed as capital-intensive 
campaigning obviates the need for a mass active membership. Local activists are still 
required but there is no pressing need to undertake mass recruitment. Local parties 
are not essential for recruiting and organising new members because people can now 
join the party at the national level. For many, this may be the limit of their contact 
with the party. Financially, there was never any realistic possibility of Labour’s 
membership drives of the 1980s and 1990s creating an individual membership base 
sufficient to supplant the unions as the party’s principal source of funds. Labour is 
becoming more dependent on corporate donations and wealthy individuals (though 
union funds are still essential) but the party does not expect its members to solve its
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funding problems, particularly if in return they demand real influence in decision­
making. Far from becoming a classic mass party, Labour retains members for 
reasons of legitimacy, decoration, a bit of finance, and some free labour, but with the 
latter two functions mainly being bonuses. In their taxonomy of party organisations, 
Katz and Mair (1995: 18) argue that in catch-all parties, ‘members are organized 
cheerleaders’ for the leadership. In cartel parties, the emphasis is on ‘members as 
individuals rather than as an organized body’ and members are valued mainly for 
contributing to the party’s ‘legitimizing myth’. This captures the reality of Labour’s 
members today, the best illustrations being the 1996 membership referendum on the 
draft election manifesto and the 1995 abolition of Clause IV.
Nevertheless, whether for reasons of legitimacy or the perceived necessity to 
retain even a diminished stock of activists on the ground, the problem of membership 
recruitment and retention is one that has been taken seriously in the Labour Party. 
Membership drives had some temporary success but attention after 1997 shifted to 
the structures and functions of CLPs. There has been some appreciation that endless 
centralisation has progressively diluted institutional incentives for participation and 
academic observers have argued that the party’s grassroots have become ‘de­
energised’. Some modernisers have suggested a restructuring of CLPs to turn them 
into strong campaigning forces, thereby encouraging people into the party and giving 
it a local presence, which might improve Labour’s electoral performance. In a recent 
Fabian Society pamphlet, Paul Richards (2000) recommended Labour become what 
he called a ‘communitarian party’.3 Richards’ pamphlet provides a trenchant critique 
of CLPs, describing how they are characterised by endless meetings that deal with 
correspondence, minutes, treasurer’s reports, etc., that are of interest solely to 
committed activists but which are extremely off-putting for most members. Richards 
argues for the abolition of GCs, the wider use of local policy forums and the 
formation of local ‘task forces’ to organise members into local campaigns (pp 34-6). 
In place of the traditional party structure, Richards advocates a communitarian 
structure, named after the strand of social thought developed by writers such as 
Amiati Etzioni, in which the emphasis is on collective action by local communities. 
Richards claims, ‘[t]he incentive for new members to join, and for existing members 
to become more active, would be huge if they could see a real benefit ensue from the 
energy they personally expended’ (p.28), and he gives a number of examples of such
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community action, including setting up local creches, removing graffiti and rubbish 
from housing estates, etc. Richards notes that Labour used to provide many services 
and social functions in the 1920s and 1930s, such as cycling clubs. His proposals are 
presented as a way of re-integrating Labour into local communities. The publication 
of this pamphlet was heralded in the national press as a signal to party activists that 
things would soon change. Sure enough, Labour sent out a consultation document, 
21st Century Party (Labour Party, 1999) in 1999/2000 and local policy forums were 
organised to discuss the options for change.
There are a number of problems with this set of proposals. The old mass 
parties were able to provide successful social and cultural functions to party 
members and the wider community because they were filling a gap in service 
provision. Before the war, public services were less extensive than they are now. 
Furthermore, the provision of leisure services depended much more on local groups 
and clubs. Nowadays, people can obtain leisure in many other ways that do not 
depend on joining clubs (e.g. television, computer games, clubbing, etc.). The pursuit 
of leisure is an increasingly privatised affair and individuals lead more atomised lives 
than in the past. Furthermore, when they do want to become involved in campaigns, 
there exists a whole host of single issue groups that they can join or support.
This does seem to constrain the space available for the kind of communitarian 
party Richards envisages. Importantly, he fails to provide any account of how the 
local collective action problem will be solved by a party that spends much of its time 
performing local chores. There appears to be a significant mismatch of incentives in 
the communitarian party. For example, there is surely a very low limit to the amount 
of time that politically motivated activists will be willing to spend on removing 
graffiti from the walls of council estates. I have argued that activists are motivated by 
a combination of strong purposive incentives buttressed by social incentives and 
institutionalised rights in the local decision-making process. Thus, although the 
abolition of GCs can be justified on the grounds that they are largely redundant and 
enshrine a two-tier membership structure (Richards, 2000: 34-5), they are also the 
focal point for the party’s activist core. Without them activists may become more 
atomised, which would erode social incentives for activism (e.g. monitoring by one’s 
peers) and perhaps speed up activist exit. The fact that largely inactive members do 
not participate in them may be beside the point if one accepts that political activists
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face different incentives than inactive members or individuals contemplating joining 
the party. While new or inactive members are often mainly motivated by purposive 
incentives, social incentives are a fundamental component of activist participation, in 
terms of the enjoyment of participation, commitment to the group and social 
sanctions against shirkers. If the GCs were abolished, there would need to be an 
alternative institutional structure in which social incentives could be embedded 
otherwise the activists might simply shirk and drift away.
Activists also require a role in decision-making as the price for the time they 
devote to party work. Labour is heading in the opposite direction, with power 
centralised. Whiteley and Seyd (2001) claim an attraction of a campaign-oriented 
communitarian party to party leaders is its amenability to leadership control and its 
removal from the policymaking process:
Opposition and dissent require organisation and if the grassroots 
organisation is transitory and linked only to campaigns, it would 
lack the continuity and institutional memory required to challenge 
the status quo. From a party manager’s point of view the ideal party 
would consist of a sales force who are willing to go out and 
promote policies which have been decided elsewhere, while at the 
same time supporting the party with generous donations of money 
(Whiteley and Seyd, 2001).
The problem with this is that it is like expecting employees to work hard while 
foregoing their wages. It is unlikely to provide a stable equilibrium but will instead 
prompt activist voice or exit. Whiteley and Seyd say that most members oppose a 
campaign-oriented model of party organisation in which leaders make decisions over 
policy and conclude: ‘Members join the party and are active in part because they 
want to change policies and have influence over the future development of the 
Labour government. Take away that motivation and party activity will decline and 
members leave.’ No amount of institutional alchemy is likely to persuade members 
to devote time to activism if their views are going to be ignored.
Even the recruitment of inactive members will become increasingly difficult. 
Blair’s ascendancy to the leadership prompted an influx of new members attracted by 
the new image projected by Blair. However, membership has since fallen back, 
which is the usual pattern when Labour is in government. Membership retention is
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also problematic in the case of members that join for purposive incentives: once the 
salience of the issue that prompted them to join has died down or if  they have come 
to the conclusion that it is difficult to exert influence in the party, exit becomes 
likely. The increasing reliance of all major West European parties on purposive 
incentives for membership recruitment, and the relatively weak staying power of 
such incentives mean that Labour’s problem is not unique.
It would appear that Labour’s long-term future as a purely direct membership 
party is problematical, particularly if decision-making remains centralised. It would 
also appear incapable of providing Labour with a solid financial base. However, 
none of this is to suggest that Labour necessarily faces huge problems in the future 
because unlike the mass party structure of old, the catch-all structure relies on media- 
based campaigns so a degree of activist exit may not harm the party’s campaigning 
abilities to any fatal extent. Activists are still required to operate computers and 
telephones and Labour’s general election strategy of targeting marginal seats requires 
activist input. Thus, activists cannot simply be abolished but there is no doubt that 
Labour, like many other parties, will continue to explore new campaign techniques 
that revolve around the electronic media and, increasingly, the internet.
Labour and the Unions: Prospects for the Future
When the key Labour moderniser, Philip Gould called his recent book on the 
party, The Unfinished Revolution (1999), the implication was that the modernisers 
saw the reformed party of 1997 as merely another stage in its transition rather than its 
end point. Gould hinted that the party-union link should be further reformed or even 
ended yet it seems clear that there are important obstacles in the way of a divorce 
initiated by the party.4 Most obviously, Labour would struggle without union funds 
unless comprehensive state funding of parties is introduced -  and that still looks 
some way off. Some modernisers have even tried to make a virtue of necessity, with 
Blair defending the link at the 1999 TUC. One of the old uses of the link, which was 
also its most neuralgic point, was the habitual request by party leaders to union 
leaders for wage restraint. Labour’s adoption of neo-liberal economics and the 
unions’ acceptance of the end of the old tripartite structures has removed this source 
of tension and to that extent made the party-union link less objectionable to
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modernisers,5 though recent union opposition to public sector reforms and an 
upsurge in strikes could rekindle their objections. Moreover, the government’s 
economic competence has shown it need not be regarded as untrustworthy simply by 
dint of the party-union link. Provided there is no return to industrial unrest, the 
unions need not present Labour with a credibility deficit. Finally, Blair has 
rediscovered one of the benefits of the link for party leaders, viz. its use as a means 
of party management (Ludlam, 2001b). Unions at the NPF have proved particularly 
helpful to the leadership, frustrating attempts to mobilise support for leftwing 
policies. The unions also used their block votes to help Millbank shoehorn favoured 
candidates into position to run for the London mayoralty and the leadership of the 
Labour group in the National Assembly of Wales. These baronial favours ultimately 
backfired though not before we observed the strange spectacle of ‘new’ Labour 
ministers and party officials justifying union block voting in internal elections.6
As predicted by the exchange model, the financial aspects of the relationship 
are the major constraint on the party abandoning the unions. However, the exchange 
approach also directs our attention to what the unions are getting from the party. This 
had been raised in 1992, when even moderate union figures such as Tom Sawyer 
rallied under the banner of ‘no say, no pay’ in response to the iniquity of being asked 
to continue funding the party while having less power. A decade later, the unions are 
unlikely to win back their former institutional prerogatives in Labour’s organisation 
so one may ask what incentive they have to remain in the party. Some in the unions 
have started to ask themselves this, most notably Ken Cameron, general secretary of 
the fire brigades’ union in 1999. It is not surprising that such sentiments should arise 
after Labour had been elected because the point of funding the party is for it to win 
office and implement favourable policies. Yet while conflicting preferences arose 
under previous Labour governments, they did not lead to murmurs about a party- 
union divorce. What is different now?
There are many differences. The position of the unions in the economy has 
changed dramatically since Labour was last in office, with deindustrialisation, an end 
to corporatist structures and a considerable reduction in union membership.7 This has 
reduced the unions’ political and economic status and raises questions about the 
extent to which a modem party can allow itself to be dominated by ‘old’ industrial 
interests. The unions’ constitutional position in the party is also much weaker so
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there appears less hope of recapturing it. Party institutions do not offer the promise of 
great influence over policy. Yet what are the alternatives to the party-union link? 
Some unions have started allocating money from their political funds to campaigns 
outside of the Labour Party -  or even against it in the case of recent opposition to 
proposed private sector involvement in public services. As yet, the unions have not 
seriously considered diverting funds to other parties. It must be recalled that many 
unions belonging to the TUC are not affiliated to the Labour Party so arms-length 
relations with the government and other forms of campaigning are facts of life.
Labour’s reform of the UK constitution since 1997 has dispersed state power 
and created sites other than Westminster where unions can seek to influence policy 
(Ludlam, 2001b). However, many unions have opposed changes such as executive 
mayors and proportional representation out of concern for their prerogatives. The 
AEEU leader, Sir Ken Jackson connected the attack on the party-union link with the 
battle for electoral reform in UK parliamentary elections. One of the most consistent 
claims of opponents of proportional representation (even the mild proposals of the 
Jenkins commission) is that it empowers small parties and leads to coalition 
governments, the latter being deemed ‘weak’ and ‘unstable’. This is not the place to 
assess these arguments (see Farrell, 2001) but what is interesting is that unions’ 
political and policy objectives are assumed to be best achievable through the existing 
‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system (FPTP). This system best enables two-party 
systems and single party majority governments (Duverger, 1964: 217; Riker, 1982). 
Presumably, such governments are deemed best able to implement their policy 
promises while participants in multiparty coalition governments are compelled to 
bargain away some of their promises in coalition negotiations. By contrast, under 
FPTP policy negotiations take place within parties before elections (Mair, 1994: 152). 
Again, this is a (contentious) gloss but the point is that many union leaders believe a 
majority Labour government offers more for them than multiparty coalitions.8
This is perhaps a clue as to why the unions remain in the Labour Party. 
Labour remains significantly dependent on the unions and now that the crucial 
electoral breakthrough of 1997 has been banked and a second-term achieved in 2001, 
union leaders hope their influence will grow now they are no longer deemed an 
electoral albatross. The unions can mobilise MPs and party members to oppose 
undesirable policies and use party institutions to restrain party leaders. Ministers may
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be willing to offer concessions to the unions for fear of evoking opposition like that 
encountered in 1978-9. One reason why Labour was punished so severely by the 
voters after the ‘winter of discontent’ was that it was seen as culpable due to its 
institutional links with the unions. A party-union divorce might reduce this feeling of 
culpability in any future disputes because a besieged Labour government could 
credibly claim that unions were completely separate entities and it might be less 
restrained in its moves against them. However, I have suggested that a divorce 
instigated by the party is not presently likely in which case party leaders have 
incentives not to antagonise the unions too deeply because the fate o f the Labour 
government -  and the next Labour opposition -  could be closely linked with the 
climate of industrial relations. To the extent that union leaders have made these 
calculations, they may be inclined to believe they are better off in the Labour Party -  
particularly one that is not reliant on coalition partners.
However, this is not the whole story. The unions have secured some policy 
gains under the Blair government (Ludlam, 2001b; cf. Dorey, 1999) as well as 
considerable access to ministers (always an important aspect of the party-union link 
-  Fisher, 1995: 190) but they do not possess the strength they enjoyed in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and are unlikely to recoup it. Indeed, many in the unions have accepted 
the shift from voluntarism and industrial conflict towards a rights-based workplace 
culture (Ludlam, 2000: 235). Besides, the re-election of the Blair government in 
2001 came on the back of popular dismay at the state of public services and the 
government will be judged at the next election on its progress in improving service 
delivery. For this reason, the government sees public sector reform and greater use of 
the private sector as essential to its aims, even if it entails antagonising public sector 
unions. The government may be anxious to avoid a 1970s-style showdown but its 
continuation in office may depend on taking on vested interests in the health, 
education and public transport sectors. The government’s plans have already evoked 
an angry response from the unions and looked set to dominate the conference season 
in 2001 before the terrorist attacks of 11 September in the USA transformed the 
political agenda. More unions are questioning what they get in return for their 
affiliation fees and in June 2001 the GMB announced it was reducing its affiliation 
level to the Labour Party, amounting to an annual funding cut of £250,000. In 
Chapter 4 I argued unions would be reluctant to reduce their affiliation levels for
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purely factional reasons but the present dispute is not factional -  it impinges on all 
public sector unions. It represents a dispute between the PLP elite and the party’s 
members (corporate and individual) and marks a worsening of the terms of political 
trade within the party for the unions. Labour’s internal institutions do not appear to 
offer many opportunities to make a real impact on government policy. For example, 
the head of the Fabian Society recently complained of the new policymaking 
structure centred round the NPF: ‘It sounds sensible. But it is now almost universally 
regarded by the membership as a sham, hijacked by the party HQ at Millbank. 
Agendas are set, papers drafted and minutes written by party staff; and real 
arguments about the direction of policy are snuffed out. And then the entire process 
is ignored anyway’ (Jacobs, 2001). This last remark was a reference to the 
government’s plans for public services, a major change of policy and opposed by 
most of the party and the unions but never discussed at a policy forum.
For these reasons, talk of a party-union divorce is nowadays more likely to 
come from union officials than government ministers. They may have secured some 
concessions from the Blair government but as one union-friendly journalist has 
observed, the non-affiliated Royal College of Nursing and British Medical 
Association have more influence over health policy than affiliated UNISON or the 
MSF (Maguire, 2001a). The affiliated unions still believe there may be advantages in 
their party membership but the longer they feel their voices are ignored, the louder 
the calls for disengagement with the party will become. The government’s problem is 
that its policy programme may necessitate trampling on union prerogatives: steering 
a course between electoral pressures and the need for union money will not be easy 
and could impose the greatest strain on the party-union link in Labour’s history. 
There is a real possibility that some -  or all -  unions could depart the party during 
the next decade if they feel they are getting a raw deal; or if  the government loses 
power during that period, there could be another backlash against the ‘shirking’ PLP 
leadership. A ‘third way’ might be a looser relationship, perhaps marked by the 
abolition of national affiliation and an end to the unions’ existing constitutional 
rights in the party. Alongside this would inevitably be a reduction in union resources 
supplied to the party so any such settlement will require real movement on the 
difficult issue of party financing and state funding.
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9.4 OBJECTIONS TO THE MODEL
In the final two parts of this thesis, I turn to the broader question of the 
usefulness of the models deployed earlier. The exchange approach can in principle be 
extended to any party (though modifications would be required before applying it to 
parties in multiparty systems). In section 9.5 I pinpoint some of the contributions 
made to the exchange approach in this thesis as well as advances in the analysis of 
the Labour Party. Before that, it is necessary to look at some likely objections to the 
rational choice approach to the Labour Party. Many of these objections revolve 
around the general issues of leader-follower relations, and office-seeking versus 
policy-seeking. In this section, I examine the claims of those who advocate a 
‘sociological’ approach to the study of the Labour Party. I argue that this approach, 
while not without some merits, is often too vague and unable to explain change, 
while the exchange approach fares much better.
A standard criticism of rational choice analyses of organisations is that it is 
too simplistic to see individuals as the embodiment of homo economicus. Such critics 
believe that viewing individuals as utility-maximisers pursuing their self-interest 
makes for narrow and unsatisfactory explanations; that the ‘economic approach’ to 
human behaviour leaves out too many important aspects of individuals and groups, 
and a more ‘sociological’ approach is required. Many opponents of rational choice 
assume that rational choice theorists deny the importance of social norms, values and 
culture. In fact, there have been a number of rational choice analyses of these 
phenomena. Kreps (1990b) offers an account of corporate culture (in principle, 
generalisable to non-corporate settings) in which conventions and organisational 
reputations provide imperfectly informed actors with focal points (Schelling, 1960) 
on which to coordinate their actions. Even somewhat anachronistic cultural practices 
may represent actions that were once rational but perhaps are no longer so. 
Binmore’s (1998) game theoretic account of the social contract views norms of 
fairness as equilibria of repeated games. Finally, Chong (2000) combines 
individuals’ material incentives with their social and moral dispositions (seen as 
psychological and social investments acquired over time within communities and 
groups) to produce a broader based rational choice model of value formation and 
value change.9 Chong shows that introducing incentives into the discussion of norms 
and values gives the rational choice approach an advantage over sociological and
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psychological theories in explaining how and why such deeply rooted phenomena 
can often change. The difficulty of explaining change within a purely norms-based 
framework is evident in the literature on the Labour Party. This ‘sociological’ 
approach is closely identified with the work of Minkin, who has recently been 
championed by Shaw (2001b) for demonstrating that ‘homo sociologicus ... has 
much more to offer than homo economicus’ in the study of the Labour Party. 
Minkin’s mode of analysis of party-union relations is so widely accepted by 
academic specialists on Labour that it is worth further examination.
Minkin adduces what he calls five ‘rules’, which regulate the relationship 
between Labour and the unions. These ‘rules’ are freedom, democracy, unity, 
solidarity and priority (Minkin, 1992: 26-48). Minkin holds that these ‘rules’ explain 
the mutual restraint that has traditionally governed relations between the two wings 
of the labour movement. Freedom referred to the mutual autonomy of the party and 
the unions and implied that the party should not interfere in industrial matters while 
the unions should not use party sanctions to force the politicians to adopt their 
preferences. Democracy referred to a respect for majority decision-making and was 
reflected in the almost dewy-eyed respect for the party conference.10 Unity referred 
to the desirability of consensus, essential in collective action and embodied in the 
steadfast support offered by union representatives on the NEC to the PLP leadership. 
Solidarity, a fundamental value of the union movement, involved the party backing 
unions in industrial disputes and the unions lining up alongside party leaders to 
provide internal stability by neutralising threats from the left. Finally, priority 
involved union leaders making a case to the politicians for those interests of greatest 
concern to them but ceding autonomy to the party on other matters.
Minkin’s choice of the term ‘rules’ is unfortunate since this term is usually 
reserved by political scientists for formal institutional mles rather than the informal 
understandings Minkin has in mind (he usually puts the word inside inverted 
commas). Shaw (2001b) describes Minkin’s ‘rules’ as social norms but this is not 
entirely satisfactory either. Social norms tend to be much more prescriptive, ranging 
from simple ones like ‘Do X’, to more complex ones like ‘If others do Y, then do X’ 
and even ‘Do X if it would be good if everyone did X’ (Elster, 1989b: 98). Now, in 
some specific instances Minkin’s ‘rules’ do translate into norms, such as that against 
unions mandating their delegates at parliamentary candidate selection meetings
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(which he derives from the ‘rule’ of ‘democracy’). More generally, however, these 
‘rules’ are better seen as values, a more generic term (Minkin himself sometimes 
describes them as such). Thus, Minkin’s argument is that a set of pervading values 
has guided the unions and the PLP in their dealings with each other. Moreover, these 
values manifested themselves in Labour’s institutional structure and have been the 
major source of stability in the party over the course of its history.
Now there are some obvious problems with this kind of analysis. The main 
problem concerns establishing causality between values on the one hand and 
institutions, stability etc. on the other. Even if one accepts that certain values exist, 
there is the possibility that the values that supposedly explain ‘restraint’ between 
Labour and the unions were themselves a product of the need for restraint 
historically, i.e. the relationship of causality is reversed. For example, Minkin 
describes a norm (falling under the generic ‘value’ of ‘democracy’), that the unions 
did not explicitly link the provision of money with the selection of certain 
parliamentary candidates by CLPs or the adoption of given policies by the party 
conference. This norm crystallised after the 1933 ‘Hastings agreement’ reformed 
sponsorship rules. However, in the realm of candidate selection, it was often ‘more 
symbolic than effective as an attempt to make finance less important’ (Minkin, 1992: 
33) because selectors knew which candidates carried the promise of sponsorship and 
what sort of help would be forthcoming. As Minkin observes, the unions have often 
felt uneasy about being seen as the party’s paymasters because it looks bad to 
ordinary voters. Yet there, perhaps is the real explanation. If unions make financial 
threats, it can harm Labour’s electoral prospects if voters see the party as a Trojan 
horse for union interests. Furthermore, I showed in Chapter 4 that linking finance to 
policy outcomes at the party conference could destabilise the party by creating free­
riding among unions. More generally, the restraint between the politicians and the 
unions is often in their interests. These norms and values may have emerged in 
response to this reality, as in the case of finance, and thus represent an equilibrium.
The norm against mentioning finance in selection meetings was explicitly 
discussed in the party and even found its way into the NEC’s Memorandum on the 
Selection of Candidates though it was never formalised in the party’s rules. 
However, many of Minkin’s norms were never or rarely explicitly stated. For 
example, he observes that the unions have always refrained from unilaterally altering
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Labour’s constitution, and generally intervened only when requested to do so by the 
party leadership (Minkin, 1992: 38-9). He concludes that this must be an intraparty 
norm. The problem with this is that since the norm in question was not explicitly 
stated, it has to be inferred from actual behaviour. However, once a norm is inferred 
solely from behaviour it cannot logically be used to explain that behaviour. The 
evidence gathered for the existence of the norm might be merely a description of the 
behaviour the norm is supposed to explain (Barry, 1978: 89-92). The mere existence 
of such an empirical regularity is not by itself sufficient to demonstrate the existence 
of a norm or value. One could think of rational reasons why the unions might adopt 
this position, e.g. an unwillingness to be viewed by voters as ‘bossing’ the party, the 
lack of necessity of changing the constitution given that they already controlled the 
extraparliamentary party, etc. Once again, none of this is to deny norms and values 
exist, only that the business of finding evidence for them is not straightforward.
Even if we accept that a value exists and that the direction of causality runs 
from values to actions to institutions, there remains the problem of establishing the 
weight of their explanatory role. This is no easy task. Is the existence of Minkin’s 
party-union values a necessary condition for restraint between the two bodies, a 
sufficient condition, or a necessary and sufficient condition? Presumably these values 
are not sufficient because there have been occasions when restraint has been absent, 
most notably during the 1970s when Labour governments sought to undermine the 
traditional ‘freedom’ of the unions in the industrial sphere. More recently, some in 
the unions have threatened a reduction in union finance in response to the policies of 
the Blair government. In which case, are Minkin’s values necessary? He argues they 
are, though much of his evidence consists of empirical regularities. It may be that 
they are neither necessary nor sufficient -  the provision of rational accounts of 
institutions and underlying mechanisms would lend support to this view. But even if 
values are necessary, the question remains how necessary? Do they account for most 
of the explanation, some of it, or just a small part? Minkin does not say.
There is one final feature of Minkin’s schema that is analytically and 
explanatorily problematical. If so much of the party-union relationship is structured 
by enduring norms and values, and so little by interests, why do we ever observe 
institutional change? Any account of the Labour Party since 1983 needs to explain 
the causes of change. If it was a ‘rule’ of the party-union relationship that the party
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respected union ‘freedom’ in the realm of collective bargaining, why have Labour 
governments often violated this ‘rule’? (Indeed, how can we tell whether a violated 
‘rule’ is simply violated or no longer operable?) If there is a norm against the unions 
mentioning finance, how do we explain the traditionalists’ rallying-cry of ‘no say, no 
pay’ in 1992, or the GMB’s reduction of its affiliation level in 2001 in anger at 
government policies? Much of the time, Minkin’s response is to deny that the 
violation of a ‘rule’ is as great as believed. For example, his discussion of the left’s 
constitutional reforms of 1979-81 puts the major emphasis on the role o f the leftwing 
NEC and stresses the unease felt among many in the unions. Yet mandatory 
reselection and the electoral college were approved by the union-dominated party 
conference. Both reforms sought to reduce the autonomy of PLP personnel. Rather 
than questioning the extent to which ‘restraint’ had broken down, it is better to ask 
why union restraint weakened at this point. Sometimes, Minkin accepts there were 
violations of the ‘rules’ but his explanations are external to those ‘rules’. Thus, he 
agrees that Kinnock’s acceptance of the Conservative government’s trade union 
legislation, a major incursion into union ‘freedom’, was driven by electoral factors 
(Minkin, 1992: 623-4). This is an unremarkable conclusion but electoral failure is not 
a systematic element of Minkin’s schema in the way it is in the exchange model. 
Minkin’s ‘rules’ guide actors in their responses to change but they do not explain 
why change is initially undertaken. Such explanations must be sought outside his 
‘rules’. The suspicion is that Minkin’s ‘rules’ are often descriptions of regular 
patterns of behaviour, and when the latter change the ‘rules’ appear to be violated.
Shaw (2001b) claims organisational change can be understood within 
Minkin’s schema. He argues that throughout Labour’s history, the ‘rules’ have been
constantly revised as circumstances, pressures, political alignments 
all mutated. Role-playing [between politicians and unions] was not 
a matter of passively following role prescriptions but of constant 
renegotiation and mutual adjustment ... Norms, roles and 
relationships, in short, were constantly being revised as differing 
interests were reconciled, new challenges met, new bargaining 
arrangements evolved and new compromises struck (Shaw, 2001b).
This sounds more like instrumental rationality and the clash of interests. ‘Constant 
renegotiation’ is not something we usually associate with norms and values, and if
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the latter were ‘constantly being revised as differing interests were reconciled’, it 
would seem they are merely descriptive concepts rather than explanatory ones. The 
explanatory work is being done by self-interest and rationality.
It is noteworthy that the same inability to explain change is found in the most 
famous analysis of power in the Labour Party, that of McKenzie (1964). It will be 
recalled that the McKenzie thesis posits a relationship of PLP dominance over the 
extraparliamentary Labour Party owing to the British constitutional convention that 
outside bodies (other than the electorate) cannot impose their will on parliament. 
McKenzie claimed this freed the PLP from control by the party conference but he 
went further and suggested the unions were normally willing to offer their support to 
the PLP. In fact, the 1960s and 1970s illustrated the limits of union acquiescence. 
The major problem with the McKenzie thesis is that it is insufficiently flexible and 
that by positing a single outcome (PLP dominance) it is unable to explain change 
without either downplaying its importance or importing new explanatory factors 
external to the original theory. This is not a problem with the exchange approach, 
which systematically integrates electoral performance into explanations of change.
These are some problematic features with ‘sociological’ approaches to the 
study of the Labour Party. Nevertheless, that there are weaknesses in alternative 
approaches does not by itself demonstrate the superiority of the rational choice 
approach. That has to be demonstrated on its own merits, and while the whole of this 
thesis is offered as evidence for the utility of the approach, a few points ought to be 
said about one of the most persistent criticisms of exchange models. This is what 
Bale (1999: 6) has recently dismissed as its ‘impoverished view of leaders as office- 
seekers and followers as human resources’. This distinction provided the principal 
driving force for the models presented earlier, directing our attention to the dual 
exchange in which politicians engage: internally with party members and externally 
with the electorate. The approach allowed us to separate two distinct categories of 
change: the centralisation of power as party leaders marginalised the activists; and, 
the shift from a form of internal exchange based on PLP-union relations to one in 
which the unions were marginalised and individual members enfranchised. Despite 
these analytical gains, some observers might question the distinction between the 
office-seeking PLP and policy-seeking unions. The description of the PLP leadership 
as office-seekers would probably arouse less controversy nowadays, as even Minkin
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might concede. I shall not discuss this assumption further, having already set out my 
reasons for adopting it. However, critics of rational choice might still dispute the 
assumption that the unions are guided by instrumental rationality in their dealings 
with the Labour Party. This would be the position of those who believe norms and 
values offer the best interpretation of the party-union link.
However, there is a misunderstanding about what rational choice implies in 
regard to the unions. Shaw (2001b) believes that a rational choice analysis must 
necessarily view the unions as power-maximisers who try to ‘maximise their 
interests’ in the party and use their institutional power ‘to pressurise party leaders to 
conform to their preferences’. Against this view, Shaw offers Minkin’s examples of 
the unions refusing to use financial leverage to obtain favourable policies and the 
inhibited behaviour of union representatives on the NEC. Yet this is too simplistic. I 
argued that rational union leaders would cede some autonomy to party leaders and 
refrain from seeking to impose their most preferred policies if the latter entail 
electoral costs. Maximising their influence in the party is not identical to maximising 
the size of their block votes. Threatening financial sanctions might be counter­
productive if it undermines Labour’s capacity to campaign. Union representatives on 
the NEC are indeed ‘restrained’ on issues of little direct interest to them but they 
intervene when those interests are threatened (as Minkin acknowledged).
The rational choice approach is thus capable of explaining ‘restraint’ (as well 
as explaining the limits to it) rather than deriving it from norms and values. 
Moreover, the rational choice approach can account for what Shaw acknowledges to 
be a weakness in Minkin’s account -  the observation that the unions have tended to 
be more restrained in their dealings with the PLP than vice versa. Shaw disputes 
Minkin’s claim (Minkin, 1992: 47, passim) that the politicians are equally bound by 
ties of restraint, a proposition lacking credibility after the recent programme of 
‘modernisation’. Shaw explains this in terms of the old union right and left being 
inculcated in a culture of ‘labourism’ whereas the Blairites are a new middle-class 
right, alien to the culture of ‘labourism’ and its notion of ‘restraint’. However, this 
does not tell us how the Blairite interlopers were able to assume such a dominant 
position in the party in the face of such labourist hegemony and how they were able 
to overthrow the old values. A rational choice account has no such problem in 
explaining this asymmetry in the party-union relationship. Viewing the unions as
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constrained policy-seekers captures the way in which they have definite interests in 
the party but are inhibited from pushing them too hard lest they harm its electoral 
prospects -  which explains not only their ‘restraint’ but also the fact that they have 
tended to play a ‘negative’ role, setting limits to the autonomous politicians rather 
than prescribing policy. For their part, the office-seeking politicians have electoral 
considerations at the top of their agenda but are constrained by the preferences of 
unions and activists. However, if they can extend their autonomy they will do so 
because this facilitates policy flexibility and the pursuit of electoral success. The 
unions often appear restrained because they operate within an organisation where 
votes are the criterion of success. In turn, the politicians are office-seekers 
constrained by intraparty policy-seekers. Where the unions have historically been 
se/^restrained, the politicians have faced institutional and resource constraints. The 
exchange model predicts these constraints are loosened when the party suffers poor 
electoral performance, after which the politicians often gain more autonomy. This 
was precisely the case with the Blairites in the 1990s.
9.5 INTELLECTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS
In this final substantive section of the thesis, I wish to highlight some of the 
contributions made in the course of this work to the study of the Labour Party and to 
the theory of party organisation. I look at each in turn.
Contributions to the Study of Labour Party Institutions
Relatively little has been written on Labour’s organisational reforms (in 
contrast to its policy changes). Interesting papers have appeared on various aspects of 
these reforms but there was hitherto no book-length work specifically devoted to the 
party’s organisational transformation. The present study fills this gap in the Labour 
Party literature. Rational choice theory provided a systematic method of inquiry into 
individual reforms and the programme of reforms as a whole, leading to some non­
trivial intellectual contributions.
First, the block voting system was shown to be rational and efficient. Despite 
its widespread notoriety the block vote had never previously been systematically 
analysed. Most of this thesis has been about party change but the models also
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explained stability and the equilibrium institutions that underlie it. Institutions are 
stable when the dominant coalition has no incentive to change them and actors 
outside the dominant coalition are unable to form a new coalition for change. I 
showed that the block vote represented an equilibrium institution within the Labour 
Party given the organisational domination of the latter by the affiliated unions. I also 
explored the distributive consequences of block voting and showed why it is 
inaccurate to view the unions as ‘power-maximisers’ in the Labour Party. This was 
also related to the distinction between parties and interest groups, and the notion of 
‘constrained’ policy-seeking. The model showed not only why the system survived 
so long -  due to its efficient and distributive qualities -  but also why it eventually 
came under strain, as the PLP-union dominant coalition broke down in the 1970s, and 
the system created a credibility gap between Labour’s promises and voters’ 
anticipations of a Labour government. The exchange model was crucial in explaining 
the block vote. It was the focus on the exchange of resources for influence with 
institutional guarantees that was the basis for understanding the system’s rationality.
Second, rational choice shed light on OMOV, by focusing on the different 
kinds of collective action problems facing activists and non-active members. It has 
been widely remarked that democratisation has been the vehicle for centralisation, 
not just in Labour but in other parties too. I explained this in terms of ‘horizontal’ 
and ‘vertical voice’, whereby the lack of opportunities for horizontal voice between 
atomised individuals prevents individual members from mobilising against party 
leaders (vertical voice). This was rarely a problem for activists bound together in the 
institutional shell of the GC. However, pace those observers who believe OMOV is 
almost purely about centralisation, giving members ballot papers eases their 
mobilisation costs and has resulted in some success for the left in internal ballots. I 
argued that whereas under the old selection system, GCs would be concerned about 
NEC sanctions in the light of deselections, such dissuasive reputational power is less 
effective under OMOV because ordinary members are unlikely to be concerned about 
(or even aware of the possibility of) NEC sanctions against deselectors. This explains 
why OMOV is always accompanied by greater veto powers for the centre and/or pre­
selection rules that short-circuit the entire process, such as ‘affirmative nomination’. 
The latter also puts the focus back on the activists and could serve as a means by
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which the NEC signals to them that anything other than automatic reselection will 
invite central scrutiny of the local party.
Third, contributions were made to the understanding of Labour’s electoral 
college. Curiously, the college has received little attention from academics. Existing 
accounts assess given leadership contests and speculate whether the system benefits 
certain types of candidates. By contrast, I examined it as a means of accountability 
and control over party leaders -  which, we should recall, was the reason it was 
introduced in the first place. This emphasis was a consequence of using a model that 
focused on principal-agent relations between leaders and followers. I showed there 
are considerable obstacles to using it for purposes of control, and that legitimacy is 
now a more important consideration in changing leadership selection mechanisms. I 
also showed why the unions were able to dominate leadership contests despite 
controlling less than 40 percent of the votes. This was due to the concentration of 
voting power embodied in block votes. By abolishing block votes, the reforms of 
1993 strengthened the unitary nature of the party, which had consequences for its 
structure and the distributive qualities of its institutions.
Fourth, insofar as policymaking is concerned, the major debate had centred 
round the McKenzie thesis of PLP domination. This thesis came under attack in the 
1970s but looked more convincing in the 1980s. I argued that the key issue was the 
lack of any enforcement mechanisms between the party conference and the PLP. 
However, I specified the conditions under which the conference might be expected to 
exercise more control, such as during periods of opposition. The fact that this did not 
happen in the 1980s and 1990s reflected the desperation at all levels of the party for 
electoral success. It was shown that the new policymaking structures have led to a 
centralisation of power but by using rational choice methods of analysis of legislative 
institutions (looking at agenda-control, veto powers, etc.), and contrary to the claims 
of internal critics of the system, I showed it is quite possible for organised minorities 
to use the NPF to inflict defeats on party leaders.
Fifth, throughout this thesis, institutions have been understood as structures 
for governing exchange relationships. Sometimes the terms of exchange change and 
this was acknowledged in the discussion. For this reason, attention was devoted to 
shifts in resource supply and demand within the Labour Party and the consequences 
this has for likely (dis)equilibrium institutions. It also entailed an examination of
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Labour’s shift towards capital-intensive communications technologies and the 
remaining incentives for individuals to join the party and participate in its campaigns. 
This adds dynamism to the exchange model and is an important part of the story that 
is often left out of other accounts.
Sixth, reflections were offered on the nature of the Labour Party today. The 
exchange approach directed attention towards this shift from a federal to a unitary 
structure, as exchange relations tilted away from activist and corporate bodies 
towards party members and levypayers. Federalism dispersed powerbases and 
resources in the party but unitarisation has eroded this plurality of resource sites. 
Labour is now a more direct membership party, with the union link increasingly 
expressed in individual rather than corporate relationships. This is often neglected in 
favour of a focus on centralisation. However, the thesis showed that excessive 
central domination of institutions may present problems for recruiting and retaining 
members, who might feel they have few incentives to remain -  hence, Labour may 
have disequilibrium institutions.
Contributions to the Exchange Approach to Party Organisation
An exchange model of party organisation was employed in this work because 
such models potentially offer a way of combining intraparty conflicts, electoral 
shocks and party resources in an explanation of party institutions. However, existing 
work using the ‘exchange approach’ tends to look at these areas in isolation. An 
important aspect of this thesis has been its contribution to the development of the 
exchange approach. My model integrated various aspects of previous contributions, 
including Schlesinger’s (1984) focus on intraparty incentives, Strom’s (1990) 
emphasis on the institutions through which party members control leaders and 
Aldrich’s (1983a, 1983b, 1995) attention to members’ preferences in the context of 
party competition. The present thesis has combined all of these factors and others to 
produce a set of tools for examining parties’ organisational structures. It has also 
gone beyond these accounts in several ways. For example, Ware (1992) criticises 
exchange models for ignoring social incentives but the model developed here regards 
such incentives as crucial for activists. Purposive incentives are collective in nature 
and rational individuals require selective incentives if they are to contribute towards
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a public good. Social incentives provide these private benefits though they are less 
important for inactive members, explaining the higher rate of turnover of the latter. 
Further developments were made in respect to actors’ preferences. Previous 
exchange models have tended to treat members as ‘pure’ policy-seekers (e.g. 
Aldrich, 1983a, 1983b; Robertson, 1976) but I relaxed this assumption so that they 
are now ‘constrained policy-seekers’, with the constraint being that any party must 
win an election before it can implement its policies. This is part o f a broader 
integration of the exchange approach into the Downsian model of party competition, 
whereby intraparty conflicts can inhibit in the short to medium term party 
convergence on the median voter position. Also on actors’ preferences, a 
modification was offered of May’s ‘law of curvilinear disparity’ whereby the low 
organisational level focus turns from the preferences of partisan supporters to those 
of the median voter. This undermines some critics of May’s law.
Advances were also made on exchange accounts of party institutions. Again 
on the issue of members’ preferences, it was argued that preference heterogeneity 
among members is inevitable and that this has consequences for the exchange 
approach. Since only one set of policies can be offered by party leaders to the 
membership as a whole, incentives need to be provided to stop dissatisfied members 
exiting. Institutions provide such incentives by offering ‘losers’ the chance to try 
again to get their policies or candidates adopted. Thus, it is not simply policies that 
politicians offer to their members in exchange for resources but also institutions -  
indeed, for most members, the institutions substitute for policies. This idea has been 
absent from previous exchange models but it provides an explanation for factional 
cleavages inside parties. Following Panebianco (1988), the strength of factions inside 
any given party depends in part on the distribution of decision-making powers 
among party institutions. I also argued that divisions between leaders and followers 
ultimately retain explanatory primacy because factions tend to be unevenly 
distributed among high- and intermediate-level bodies (May’s law).
Institutions were described as efficient responses to the commitment problems 
that plague exchange between leaders and followers, largely following Strom. 
However, linked to the assumption of constrained policy-seeking members, it was 
argued that party leaders require some autonomy from members if they are to square 
the circle of membership preferences and the preferences of the median voter. This
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goes beyond Strom’s account of institutional controls by showing that elite discretion 
inevitably means that commitment problems between leaders and members can be 
reduced by institutions but never completely eradicated. This was the explanation for 
why most institutional change in parties tends to be ‘redistributive’, enhancing or 
reducing leaders’ autonomy from followers. However, as we saw in the case of 
Labour, too much elite autonomy reduces the efficiency of institutions, sometimes to 
the point where members may not have sufficiently strong incentives to continue 
participating, in which case membership voice and exit may follow.
A feature of the model developed here is that it is dynamic, offering 
propositions on when party change becomes more likely -  an advance on previous 
exchange models. These propositions follow from the nature of intraparty political 
exchange. Thus, if activists impose policy constraints on leaders, the latter may have 
incentives to adopt capital-intensive communications. The most important precipitant 
of change is electoral failure. This is not simply an ad hoc form of explanation. 
Intraparty exchange is nested in party-voter exchange and the model developed here 
systematically incorporates inter-party competition into the explanation rather than 
treating it as an ‘external shock’. Intraparty conflict and organisational change have 
consequences for a party’s electoral performance and the latter in turn affects internal 
conflict and the likelihood of change. The systematic integration of party competition 
with party organisation was reflected in the derivation of the very need for party 
organisation and resources from imperfect information in the electoral arena. Again 
this was an advance on previous exchange models.
A further advance was in identifying the importance of party change arising 
from unpopular internal institutions. It was pointed out that this especially pertains to 
‘externally legitimated’ parties such as Labour parties, which institutionalise interest 
group participation. This type of change differs from typical redistributions of power 
within parties because it is directly concerned with electoral factors. This idea has 
been implicit in debates about Labour’s modernisation of its links with the unions but 
to my knowledge has not been explicitly spelt out as a specific type of motivation 
underlying party change.
In summary, the present thesis has extended the exchange approach in a 
number ways. The simple leader-follower dichotomy was developed in such a way as 
to permit leadership autonomy and factional divisions. The importance of electoral
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factors, stressed by Duverger and Epstein, is integral to the model but so are 
intraparty factors, as emphasised by Panebianco. Parties’ need for resources was also 
a fundamental aspect of the model. The tools developed here are applicable to the 
study of any party, though extending them to parties in multiparty systems would 
require a different conception of party competition, which could have consequences 
for intraparty factors. The point, however, is that the tools developed here are not 
restricted to an analysis of the British Labour Party but can in principle be applied to 
other parties. This is perhaps the ultimate strength of the model developed here. 
Exchange relationships are ubiquitous in all parties. Thus, just as organisational 
economists can use their tools of analysis to examine any enterprise, so students of 
political parties can use the exchange approach to analyse any party, or indeed many 
in a comparative analysis.
9.6 CONCLUSION
I indicated at the beginning of this study that rational choice work on the 
theory of party organisation is relatively underdeveloped, notwithstanding useful 
contributions from a number of authors. This thesis has sought to contribute further 
to the rational choice body of work and show how it can shed light on parties. 
However, rather than just some general remarks, the models developed were applied 
systematically to a party that has undergone enormous organisational change over the 
last two decades. It was shown that the rational choice approach can explain 
institutional structure and institutional change in parties, and a number of new 
insights were offered, which sprang directly from the models. Further theoretical 
development and more applications to real life parties can help build up the rational 
choice corpus of work on the subject. When political scientists share a common body 
of analytical possessions, as rational choice theorists do, it is easy to add to it at low 
cost (Barry, 1991: 191). This is not to advocate the colonisation of political science 
by rational choice theory but it does demonstrate that rational choice theorists have 
the advantage of being able to draw on particular concepts in order to apply them to 
new areas and shed light on them. The present thesis has sought to do this, with the 
hope that its own insights can be built upon by others.
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Appendix 1 
From Federalism to Unitarism in the 
Labour Party
x  JYear Event Details Effect on Labour Party
1900 Formation of 
LRC
Largely an extraparliamentary party 
dominated by unions. No individual 
members. Unions and socialist 
societies elect separate sections to 
NEC. Unions finance party out o f  
normal union (industrial) funds 
without members’ permission
Strongly federal party structure 
with completely indirect 
membership structure
1909 Osborne
judgement
A railway worker, W.V. Osborne 
objects to his union’s funds going 
to Labour party. Wins court 
injunction, upheld by House o f  
Lords.
Union funding to Labour virtually 
collapses and the party’s survival is 
at risk
1913 Partial repeal 
o f Osborne 
judgement
Liberal government introduces 
Trade Union Act 1913, allowing 
unions to spend money on political 
activities providing that (a) political 
and industrial funds are kept 
separate, and (b) union members 
have the right to ‘contract out’ o f  
paying political levy
Shift towards a more direct 
relationship between individual 
union members and Labour party -  
principle o f consent means 
levypayers can ‘contract out’ (but 
apathy ensures not many do -  
‘negative’ consent)
1917 NEC reform Entire NEC elected by the annual 
conference (socialist societies 
allowed exclusive right to nominate 
candidates for their section)
Undermined federalism by ending 
exclusive voting rights for affiliated 
bodies to their own NEC sections
1918 Labour’s new 
constitution
Permitted individual membership 
for the first time (via CLPs). NEC 
reform of 1917 upheld
Strong shift towards direct 
membership elements
1927 Introduction 
o f  ‘contracting 
in’
Conservative government 
introduces Trade Union Act 1927 -  
now union levypayers must state 
they wish to pay political levy
Increased direct nature o f party- 
union link (requirement o f  
‘positive’ consent) and decreased 
affiliated membership
1937 NEC reform CLPs permitted exclusive right to 
vote on NEC candidates for the 
CLP section o f the NEC
Increased federal nature o f the party 
and reversed NEC reform o f 1917
1946 Reintroduction 
o f ‘contracting 
out’
Labour government repeals Trade 
Union Act 1927 and reintroduces 
‘contracting out’
Increased indirectness o f party- 
union link and raised affiliated 
membership
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1981 Electoral 
college for 
leadership 
elections
Separate union (40%)and CLP 
(30%) sections (block voting) as 
well as PLP section (30%)
Federalisation of leadership 
elections by giving votes to all 
party stakeholders
1985-
86
Political fund 
ballots
Unions obliged by law (Trade 
Union Act 1984) to ballot all 
members on whether to maintain 
political funds
Strengthened direct link between 
levypayers and party (because 
ballots were won); legitimised 
Labour’s union funding
1987 Reform of
candidate
selection
Introduction of local electoral 
colleges for selecting parliamentary 
candidates: min. 60% share for 
individual members (by OMOV); 
max. 40% share for unions
Considerable strengthening of 
direct nature of individual party 
membership (but not affecting 
continuing indirect nature of party- 
union relationship)
1989 Computerised
national
membership
list
Establishment of computerised 
national membership list enabling 
individuals to join party at the 
national level
Strengthening of unitarism -  centre 
can communicate with individual 
members, including distribution of 
ballot papers
1989-
91
NEC and 
electoral 
college reform
Mandatory OMOV ballots for CLP 
sections in NEC and leadership 
elections; selection o f CLP 
delegates to annual conference by 
OMOV
Strengthening of unitarism and 
reduction in power o f  GCs
1993 Rule changes 
introducing 
OMOV and 
abolishing 
union block 
votes
(a) Union votes removed from 
parliamentary candidate selection 
(pure OMOV). (b) Electoral college 
-  OMOV and OLOV in CLP and 
union sections, (c) Formal abolition 
of block voting at party conference 
and reduction o f unions’ vote share 
to 70% (50% in 1996)
Very strong shift towards direct 
membership structure among both 
individual and affiliated members; 
considerable undermining (though 
not abolition) of federal structure
1995 National
membership
ballots
Provision for membership ballots 
on policies or issues decided by the 
NEC (reform of Clause IV in 1995; 
draft election manifesto in 1996)
Further shift to unitarism but this 
time at the national level. NEC 
control o f agenda-setting implies 
greater central powers
1997 Partnership in 
Power
(a) Reduction o f union power on 
NEC; (b) confirmation of new 
power of NPF (lower union 
membership than party conference)
Reduced power for affiliated 
organisations
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Appendix 2 
UK General Elections, 1900-2001
%
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40%
20%
0%
■ c o n  d u b  Year
□  OTHERS ■LAB
Sources: Butler and Butler (2000: 233-9); Morgan (2001: 11).
Notes:
1918: Figures for Conservatives include ‘Coalition Unionists’. Figures for Liberals include ‘Coalition 
Liberals’.
1922: Figures for Liberals include ‘Coalition Liberals’.
1931: Figures for Liberals include ‘National Liberals’.
1983-2001: Figures under ‘Liberal’ are for SDP/Liberal Alliance (1983-7) and Liberal Democrats 
(1988-2001).
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Notes
1 Introduction
1 On disputes over the selection of candidates for the devolved assemblies and for the European 
parliamentary elections o f 1999, see Bale (2000), Bradbury et al. (2000), Shaw (2001a), Flynn 
(1999).
2 The Rational Choice Approach
1 For discussions of the rational choice approach, see Dowding (1991: 1-29), Dowding and
Hindmoor (1997), Tsebelis (1990: 18-47), Shepsle and Bonchek (1997: 5-35), Elster (1986), 
Monroe (1991), Green and Shapiro (1994), Friedman (1996), Cox (1999) and Opp (1999).
2 For sociological critiques of rational choice see Hindess (1988,1989) and Udehn (1996).
3 Moreover, King et al. (1994: 43) have observed that ‘the difference between the amount of 
complexity in the world and that in the thickest o f descriptions is still vastly larger than the 
difference between the thickest o f descriptions and the most abstract quantitative or formal 
analysis’.
4 The erroneous focus on politicians’ personal policy preferences vitiates Norris’ (1995b) critique 
of the Taw o f curvilinear disparity’, which asserts activists are more extreme than office-seeking 
politicians and ordinary voters (see Ch. 3). Norris collected data on the self-professed personal 
preferences o f MPs, party activists and voters during the 1992 British general election and found
MPs to be as radical as activists. However, subsequent events in the Labour Party proved that
politicians would abandon radicalism in the hunt for votes. The law o f curvilinear disparity relates 
to types (politicians, activists and voters), not tokens.
5 Before 1997 there were no regional assemblies (as there are in federal systems) that opposition 
parties could capture to implement policies and dispense patronage.
6 On the ‘new institutionalism’, see March and Olsen (1984), Moe (1984), Peters (1999) and 
Goodin (1998). For rational choice discussions o f institutions, see Pettit (1998), Shepsle (1979, 
1989,1998) and Dowding (1994).
7 Hay’s list o f the authors who have referred (sometimes en passant) to Downs in this respect, 
includes Blyth (1997), Gavin and Sanders (1997: 127), Heath and Jowell (1994: 199-201), Heath 
and Paulson (1992), Kenny and Smith (1997: 224-5), Sanders (1998: 216-24), and Shaw (1994: 
171-5).
8 The median voter theorem applies only to unidimensional policy space; multidimensional space 
almost never permits such equilibria (McKelvey, 1976).
9 Nowadays, the left-right scale would range from high taxation/government spending (leftwing) to 
low taxation/government spending (rightwing).
10 Strom and Muller (1999: 8-9) use the term ‘vote-seeking’ for two-party systems and reserve the 
term ‘office-seeking’ for multiparty systems, where office-seeking need not involve seeking to 
increase votes.
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11 Among other simplifications of the Downsian model, it assumes a single national constituency 
whereas in the UK there are 659 constituencies, while the existence o f the Liberal Democrats 
complicates the assumption of a two-party system (though this assumption is justifiable when we 
look at seats rather than vote shares). Most important, regarding parties as unified teams assumes 
away internal conflicts (see Ch. 3).
12 Another term of abuse often deployed against vote-seeking parties is ‘electoralism’, though any 
party that commits itself to political change mainly through the parliamentary route engages in 
‘electoralism’ since only by winning votes can parties win power.
13 Dowding and Hindmoor (1997: 453-4) examine preference formation within a ‘battle o f the 
sexes’ game, in which strategic interaction between individuals can encourage them to re-evaluate 
their preference rankings.
14 Like Hay, Heffeman offers a leftwing critique of ‘new’ Labour.
15 My thanks to Keith Dowding for emphasising the importance o f this distinction.
16 Similarly, Heffeman’s account of Dunleavy and Ward’s preference-shaping model claims that it 
‘assumes that voters can be persuaded to alter their electoral preferences’ (2001: 121; emphasis 
added).
3 An Exchange Model of Party Organisation and Party Change
1 For an attempt to link rational choice and sociological approaches see Mule (1997).
2 For critiques o f the cartel thesis, see Koole (1996) and Kitschelt (2000).
3 However, note that only assumptions 1,3 and 4 are required for the MVT to hold.
4 Though it is increasingly being relaxed, e.g. see Berger et al. (2000), Enelow and Hinich (1984: 
115-30), and Hinich and Munger (1997: 117-35).
5 The following discussion o f politician-activist exchange relations relates to a two-party system 
with a unidimensional ideological scale. The conclusions derived apply to systems conforming to 
these restrictions.
6 See Wright (1971), Aldrich (1983a, 1983b, 1995), Robertson (1976).
7 The following paragraphs are a condensation of Schlesinger (1984: 380-9).
8 Parties may employ some professional specialists, such as pollsters, designers, etc. but these are 
limited in number. The ordinary foot soldiers -  the envelope-stuffers and pavement pounders -  
are unpaid volunteers.
9 In the old days of party ‘machines’, politicians could secure services through patronage (and in 
the UK, there are still claims that there are ‘going rates’ for honours). Moreover, despite parties’ 
public goods output, party donors can sometimes secure private goods from politicians, e.g. a 
construction firm being awarded building contracts by a governing party to which it donated 
money. (My thanks to Professor Kenneth Shepsle for making this point and offering this 
particular example.) Nevertheless, for most of their supporters, politicians have limited ability to 
offer patronage or material benefits and must rely on purposive and social incentives.
10 Social and purposive incentives are also important in Aldrich’s model of party activism (1983a, 
1983b), which revolves round a calculus of individual participation for prospective activists.
11 And not simply as a convenient add-on -  in Chapter 9 , 1 argue that a major problem with recent 
suggestions to reform the local structures o f the Labour Party is that they ignore the importance of  
social incentives for activists.
12 In fact, we still might expect ideologically-motivated activists to be fairly radical. Hinich and 
Munger (1996: chs 1 and 4) argue that ideologies tend to be politically non-centrist because they 
often initially arise as justifications of or reactions against the status quo. Centrist ideologies are 
often a mish-mash o f leftwing and rightwing ideas, lacking any great coherence. Ideologies offer 
views o f the world based on principles rather than middle-of-the-road compromises characteristic 
o f centrist politics.
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13 Given the presence o f two or more parties on each side o f the median voter position and the 
absence o f a clear incentive for parties to converge on this position (see Shepsle, 1991; Kitschelt, 
1994: 114-30), there is no systematic tendency for May’s law to operate in multiparty systems.
14 This section follows closely arguments presented in Quinn (2002: 208-12).
15 For an early appraisal o f the relevance of ‘new institutional economics’ to political science, see 
Moe (1984).
16 Forerunners o f the same argument are Coase (1937) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972). On the 
transactions cost approach in politics, see North (1990a, 1990b).
17 For further reflections on factionalism in parties, see Heidar (1984), Hine (1982), Medding 
(1970), Rohrschneider (1994) and Zariski (1960).
18 Laver and Shepsle (1990) make a fairly similar argument for the preference-aggregating nature of 
parties at the elite level.
19 The term ‘evolutionary’ is Panebianco’s though this use of it would probably look unfamiliar to a 
Darwinian. A  better term might be ‘teleological’.
20 Though it is not impossible: the dominant coalition may seize the opportunity to buttress its 
position, perhaps in anticipation of later problems.
21 This was especially true o f Labour’s constitutional revolution o f 1979-81, which came at the 
expense o f lost opportunities to attack a deeply unpopular Conservative government.
22 Here and later in this section, I have provided an example from the British Labour Party to 
illustrate a formal proposition on party change. However, these propositions are not tautologous 
because they have not been derived solely from observation of the Labour Party. They are largely 
derived from the exchange model with the exception o f C.8 (taken from the HJ model) and C.7 
(identified as a rare form o f party change applicable mainly to ‘externally legitimated’ parties). 
Examples from numerous other parties could be offered for propositions C .l-6  and C.8, e.g. see 
Koelble (1987,1996) and Katz and Mair (1994).
23 See note 22 to this chapter (above).
4 Political Exchange in the Labour Party (pre-1990)
1 For accounts of Labour’s formative years, see Lovell (1991), McKibben (1974), Moore (1978),
Tanner (1990), Bealey and Pelling (1958), Miliband (1972), Taylor (2000a) and Chadwick 
(2000).
2 The use o f the political system by organised interests is particularly emphasised in the public 
choice literatures on rent-seeking (Buchanan et al., 1980; Olson, 1982) and regulation (Stigler, 
1971; Peltzman, 1976; Noll, 1989; Posner, 1974).
3 For further details on the election o f the NEC, see Appendix 2 to Chapter 7.
4 Fisher (1992: 116) estimated that about one in seven levypayers contracted out between 1987 and
1989.
5 The Trades Union Act o f 1913 overturned the ‘Osborne judgement’ (see above) and established 
the right o f unions to hold political funds. However, it stipulated that all unions must immediately 
hold one-off ballots o f their members to establish whether the latter wanted their unions to 
possess political funds, and provisions had to be made to entitle members to ‘contract out’ if they
so desired (see Reid, 2000: 226). In 1928, the Conservative government changed the law so that
union members had to ‘contract in’ to pay the political levy otherwise their dues would not be
deducted. Inertia and ignorance now worked to the disadvantage o f the Labour Party, and its 
affiliated membership duly fell. The Attlee government reintroduced ‘contracting out’ in 1946 
and it remains to this day though Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government introduced the
Trades Union Act 1984, which made it mandatory for unions to hold 10-yearly ballots for
members to decide whether their unions should maintain political funds.
6 Affiliation fees went into Labour’s ‘general fund’ but the unions also contributed heavily to its 
separate ‘general election fund’ (see Webb, 1992a: 21-4). Contributions to the latter by individual
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unions normally roughly reflected the pecking order o f affiliation size, with the large unions 
contributing more.
7 Labour’s rules stipulate that a union can send one delegate to the conference for every 5,000 
affiliated levypayers.
8 Another institution, the secret ballot, increases enforcement costs when the organisation’s votes 
are divided among its delegates, irrespective o f mandates. This is because information costs are 
extremely high -  it is very difficult to find out which way individual delegates have voted. If 
delegates had to record their votes to the leader o f the delegation or declare them publicly before 
casting them, these costs would fall.
9 A similar thing happened at the 1993 annual conference when the divided MSF delegation 
narrowly decided to abstain in the crucial vote on OMOV despite being mandated to vote against 
it. I return to this in chapters 6 and 7.
10 The dominance of the large unions has been reduced since 1996 when the CLPs were allocated 
half o f the conference votes.
11 However, as I argue in Chapter 9, unions may have fewer inhibitions in withdrawing funds if  they 
are all being antagonised by the party.
12 For the most part in this thesis, when I refer to ‘the PLP’, I am speaking about the parliamentary 
leadership. This is a useful shorthand though strictly speaking the two are not identical. 
Backbench Labour MPs do not always obey their leaders though the whipping system in the 
House o f  Commons, together with leadership control over patronage (e.g. frontbench 
appointments) normally ensures general backbench compliance with party leaders’ wishes 
(McKenzie, 1964; Heffeman, 2000).
13 See Beer (1982); Brand (1989); Epstein (1962); Gamer and Kelly (1998); Kavanagh (1985,
1998); McKenzie (1964,1982); Miliband (1958); Minkin (1980,1992); and Rose (1956).
14 In his book, McKenzie often appears to suggest that Labour leaders are unable to violate the 
British constitution but in his 1982 article, his argument is normative, suggesting they should not 
violate it. This article appeared in the aftermath o f the left’s reform o f Labour’s constitution.
15 Webb (1992a: 126, Tab. 5.1). Chapter 5 o f this source provides an extensive discussion o f the 
relationship between union membership and Labour’s electoral performance between 1964 and 
1987. See also Taylor (1987).
16 On the link between decentralisation and free collective bargaining, see Crouch (1982) and 
Taylor (1991, 2000b).
17 A further reform, to allow only the NEC to decide the contents o f Labour’s election manifesto, 
was narrowly defeated at the party conference.
18 For this reason, I have not followed the trend to capitalise both words in the term, as in ‘New 
Labour’, not least because it may turn out to be transient and look faddish in later years.
19 The key modernisers at this early stage were Kinnock and his office, joined later by younger MPs 
such as Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.
5 Policymaking
1 An impressive account o f which already exists in Minkin (1980).
2 The CAC previously had recourse to the ‘three-year rule’, allowing it to remove resolutions on 
policies debated within the previous three years’ conferences. After 1979, the rule applied only to 
constitutional amendments.
3 Affiliates can send delegates to the compositing meeting at which their resolutions are being 
discussed by the CAC. They can refuse permission for their resolutions to be composited but this 
reduces the chances of their resolutions being debated at all, leading to remittance to the NEC and 
likely oblivion (Minkin, 1980: 143).
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4 At least not until 1997, when it applied to the rolling programme o f the national policy forum (see 
below).
5 Tsebelis (1990: 180-1) presents similar arguments about special majority rules in consociational 
institutions.
6 Interestingly, the government has since promised a review o f the policy, though mainly in 
response to voter disquiet evident before the 2001 general election.
7 ‘Short money’ was named after Edward Short, the then leader o f the House of Commons who 
introduced the measure in 1975.
8 On the role played by one prominent advisor in the reconstruction o f Labour’s economic policy, 
Henry Neuburger, see Wickham-Jones (2000b).
9 For example, there was a ‘contact group’ between the NEC and the TUC, in which Kinnock built 
support for his policies among the major union leaders.
10 The stipulation that proposals included in the party programme require a two-thirds majority 
remained.
11 The following analysis o f the new policymaking procedures relies considerably on Shaw (2000b) 
and Seyd(1999).
12 For simplicity, the JPC has been ignored in this illustration but its role would involve trying to 
influence the position o f the NPF’s bliss point through its policy-shaping powers in the 
policymaking process.
13 In the same way that national referendums in the UK seem to offer a de facto  breach o f the 
principle o f the sovereignty o f parliament.
6 The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates
1 For simplicity, I henceforth refer to politicians as ‘MPs’, though not all CLPs have a Labour MP.
2 In 1988, a rule change stipulated that union branches were entitled to a maximum of five 
delegates per GC, though only the heavily-concentrated NUM was significantly affected by this 
(Minkin, 1992: 245).
3 However, in a survey o f 202 CLPs carried out in 1986, only 18 reported that union delegates 
comprised a majority on the GC, probably reflecting the deleterious effect o f mass unemployment 
on union membership in the 1980s (Minkin, 1992: 246). Nevertheless, if  union delegates acted as 
a cohesive bloc, they could still wield considerable power on a GC.
4 There are exceptions as the case o f the Conservative MP, Neil Hamilton, demonstrated in 1997.
Hamilton lost the safe Conservative seat o f Tatton after allegations against him o f financial
impropriety.
5 The following discussion o f Labour’s selection process is based on Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 
53-76), whose division o f the process into application, nomination, shortlisting, selection and 
endorsement is used here. See also Janosik (1968: 113-55), Gamer and Kelly (1993: 165-8; 1998: 
130), and Geddes et al. (1991).
6 See Tsebelis (1990: 138). I have modified Tsebelis’s version to take account o f mandatory 
reselection. I have also changed some o f the terminology, e.g. ‘radical’ instead o f ‘extreme’. For 
accounts o f selection pre-OMOV, see Denver (1988), Janosik (1968: 113-55), McKenzie (1964: 
549-58), Ranney (1965) and Rush (1969).
7 Though Tsebelis argues that even if the NEC is rightwing, GCs may sometimes deselect
rightwing MPs in order to send a political message to the NEC that they are unhappy with the
status quo.
8 Another dimension of political exchange, between MPs and trade unions, is examined in section 
6 .6 .
9 Dutiful attention to constituency affairs would also go in MPs’ favour during reselection contests.
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10 The high number of members claiming to be active should be treated with caution since nothing 
like a half o f Labour’s members are so active. Activists probably account for about a sixth o f the 
party’s membership.
11 A special issue of the journal, Party Politics has recently been devoted to the subject of candidate 
selection. See Party Politics 7 (3), 2001. See also Scarrow et al. (2000: 129-53).
12 Issues o f power were not wholly absent as the policy did generate conflict between some CLPs 
and the NEC. On the issue of gender and selection in the Labour Party, see Lovenduski and 
Norris (1991), Norris (1995a), Norris and Lovenduski (1995) and Perrigo (1995).
13 Much o f the information in this and the next paragraph is from Minkin (1992: 242).
14 In February 2002, the RMT union mooted the withdrawal o f sponsorship from the CLPs o f half- 
a-dozen MPs in the light o f their failure (in the eyes of the union) to stand up for the RMT in its 
industrial action. That union had come increasingly under the control o f the left.
7 Electing the Leader: The Electoral College
1 See Kreps (1990a: 577-614) for an introductory discussion of principal-agent relationships.
2 Strictly speaking, it was the affiliated organisations that controlled 40 percent, i.e. unions and 
socialist societies. The unions’ share of the 40 percent was about 39.5 percent.
3 A quantitative study using power indices to measure unions’ power found that each 1,000 votes 
cast by the big unions in the electoral college were worth up to 10 percent more than each 1,000 
votes o f the CLPs (Leech, 1992: 254-7).
4 That much is clear from Clive Jenkins’ own account of proceedings (see Jenkins, 1990: 209-213).
5 In his autobiography, Gould estimated that ‘the true extent of my support in the party was much 
nearer 35 percent or even 40 percent’ (Gould, 1995: 263). A further account o f this election can 
be found in McSmith (1993: 203-215).
6 Silken was a TGWU-sponsored MP whose candidature was pushed heavily by many officials in 
that union.
7 In fact, a TGWU resolution largely reaffirming support for the existing arrangements for 
candidate selection (and thus contradicting OMOV) was also narrowly passed by the conference 
but the vote was academic because NEC rule amendments take precedence over ordinary 
resolutions.
8 Key members o f the MSF delegation were persuaded that the defeat o f OMOV would hinder the 
adoption o f all-women shortlists in parliamentary candidate selection, a cherished union policy 
and included among the rule changes in the NEC’s OMOV resolution.
9 On the other hand, blandness is not a certainty in OMOV campaigns, as the Conservative Party’s 
contest o f 2001 demonstrated. The problem here was that a fierce and tight battle necessarily 
involved public mud-slinging because most ordinary participants in the ballot could be reached 
only over the airwaves.
10 On Mandelson’s role in the contest, see Sopel (1995); McSmith (1996: 276-82); MacIntyre 
(2000: 286-310); and Routledge (1998: 189-210; 1999: 154-60).
11 Though one o f Blair’s biographers argues rather unconvincingly that he could have won even 
under the old block voting system (Rentoul, 1995: 345).
12 Another recent change will see a modification of the NEC’s standing orders to end the tradition o f  
policy motions being tabled at NEC meetings, with all such resolutions in future being 
automatically referred to the relevant policy commission. The change followed leadership 
concern that leftwingers were using NEC meetings as a platform from which to attack 
government policies (Maguire, 2002).
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8 Organisational Resources: Supply and Demand
1 This applies to national election campaigns. There continue to be strict limits on local spending in 
elections, typically ranging from £7,000 to £8,000 per party per constituency in 1997. For 
information on the income and expenditure o f local parties, see Fisher (2000b).
2 For more historical details on party funding in the UK, see Pinto-Duschinsky (1981, 1985, 1989). 
See also Fisher (1995,2000a).
3 For example, Fisher (1992: 122) reports that on average, Labour-affiliated unions gave 64 percent 
o f their political funds to the party (including 45 percent on national affiliation) during 1984-9. 
The public sector union, UNISON currently has two separate political funds: an affiliated fund for 
contributions to Labour and a separate general political fund for its own campaigns. This 
innovation came about as a result of UNISON’s formation in 1992 out o f the merger o f three 
unions, two o f which (NUPE and COHSE) had previously been affiliated to Labour and one 
(NALGO) that had not.
4 For further discussion o f the work of TULV and TUFL, see Minkin (1986; 1992: 485-582) and 
Webb (1992a: 44-53).
5 Report o f  the Committee on Standards in Public Life on the Funding o f  Political Parties in the 
UK (2 vols), Cm 4057 (London: The Stationery Office, 1998).
6 The three individuals were the Labour peer and supermarket magnate, Lord Sainsbury (£2 
million), the publisher, Lord Hamlyn (£2 million) and the philanthropist, Sir Christopher 
Ondaatje (£2.1 million). Webb (2000: 237) claims part of the reason for Labour’s recent success 
in fund-raising lies with its professional approach and its employment o f external specialists on 
fixed-term contracts.
7 The exchange o f political donations for favourable policy outcomes is a staple feature of the 
literatures on rent-seeking and regulation (see note 2 of Chapter 4 for bibliographical details).
8 See Fisher (2001) for the effect o f the new legislation on campaigning in the 2001 general 
election.
9 Fisher (1999) develops a model of political donations by party members in the UK.
10 For an overview of the debate, see Webb (2000:38-83). See also Sarlvik and Crewe (1983), 
Franklin (1985), Heath et al. (1991), Dalton (2000), Dalton et al. (2000). In relation to the Labour 
Party, see Crewe (1982,1991).
11 A similar version o f this illustration is used in Robertson (1976: 33) except that the author plots 
financial contributions rather than number of activists retained along the vertical axis.
12 This included a number of people from the BMP advertising agency (see Hughes and Wintour, 
1990: 55).
13 By 1989, under Kinnock the Leader’s Office had 12 members, compared to five under Foot 
(Minkin, 1992: 417, n. 19). Blair expanded the Leader’s Office to about twenty members.
14 Detailed accounts of British general elections between 1983 and 1997 can be found in Butler and
Kavanagh (1985, 1988, 1992, 1997, 2001); Crewe and Gosschalk (1995); Crewe and Harrop
(1986, 1989); Crewe et al. (1998); Denver et al. (1998); King et al. (1993); and Norris (2001).
15 The internet played more of a role in the 2001 general election (see Coleman, 2001).
16 The consequences of this were brought home to the party during the London mayoral election o f
2000 when much of the London Labour activist base effectively went on strike, refusing to
campaign for Labour’s official candidate, Frank Dobson, against the activists’ favourite (and 
newly independent candidate), Ken Livingstone. Livingstone won the election convincingly while 
Dobson limped in a poor third, behind the Conservative candidate and only narrowly ahead of the 
Liberal Democrat.
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9 Conclusion: The Transformation of the Labour Party
1 For another debate over the stages o f Labour’s reforms see Lent (1997) and Heffeman (1998).
2 An important shift to unitarism in the 1980s was not prompted at all by intraparty reforms: the
trade union political fund ballots involved individual union members affirming their unions’ links 
with the Labour Party, and thereby affirming their own status as affiliated members.
3 For a normative taxonomy o f party types, see Pomper (1992).
4 The debate started in 1992 after Labour’s election defeat. For early contributions, see Tindale and
Walsh (1992), Sawyer (1992), Linton (1992), Manwaring (1992), Crine (1992) and Sassoon 
(1993).
5 For differing perspectives on the extent of Labour’s acceptance o f the neo-liberal economic 
agenda, see Coates (1996, 2001), Coates and Hay (2000), Driver and Martell (1998), Hay (1997,
1999), Hay and Watson (1999), Heffeman (2001), King and Wickham-Jones (1998, 1999), and 
Wickham-Jones (1997,2000a).
6 Among others, Labour’s General Secretary, Margaret McDonagh and the Minister for London, 
Nick Raynsford, both justified the use of a tripartite, block vote-based electoral college for 
selecting Labour’s London mayoral candidate, claiming that the same system had been used to 
elect Tony Blair as party leader. In fact, as we saw in Chapter 7, Blair was not elected by any 
block votes.
7 See Howell (2000) and Famham (1996).
8 There waS more support for PR among trade unionists before 1924 when Labour was a minority 
party but opponents stressed the opportunities to build up support under the existing system in 
areas with concentrated working class support (Chadwick, 2000: 324-5).
9 For earlier discussions o f norms and values as explanations for social action, see Barry (1978), 
Elster (1989a, 1989b).
10 Often manifested in the omission o f the definite article before, and capitalisation o f the word 
‘conference’. Many academic specialists on the Labour Party also follow this practice.
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